COMMITTEE ON THE Wednesday 16 August 2006 Members in attendance for all or part of proceedings: Witness: The Committee met at 10.04 am. (The Chairman (Mr Wells) in the Chair.) The Chairman (Mr Wells): When I was sitting in on Monday’s meeting, I heard the odd sound that indicated that some people had their mobile phones switched on. Everyone must switch off his or her mobile phone. The Editor of Debates has informed us that some of the recording has been lost because of mobile phone interference, so somebody was illicitly listening to something. Therefore, please turn off your mobile telephones. Mr Kennedy: Chairman, have you ever considered that that might be in the public interest? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Something may have been said of such importance that it would be a pity to lose it. Can members indicate whom they are representing today? Mrs Foster: I am here for Lord Morrow; Sammy Wilson will be here in place of Ian Paisley Jnr, and Mr Weir is here for Rev William McCrea. Mr McFarland: Mr Cobain is here for Mr McNarry. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I thought that you said Mr Beggs. Mr Cobain: I wish that Mr Beggs were here. Mr Weir: So do we. [Laughter.] Mr Neeson: I am here for Mr Ford. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex, who is on your team? Mr Attwood: Am I here as myself? I will take your guidance on it, Chair. The Committee Clerk: Mark Durkan, Alasdair McDonnell and Seán Farren are the three nominated SDLP representatives. We shall work it out. Mr G Kelly: I am here for Mr McGuinness, and Fra McCann is here for Conor Murphy. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Will there be a third member from your party? Mr G Kelly: A third member will not be present today. The Chairman (Mr Wells): At least one new member is present this morning, so are there any declarations of interest to be made? Mr Kennedy: I arrived late at the previous meeting, but I said at the time that I was a member of the Northern Ireland Policing Board. That does not appear to be recorded in the draft minutes. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is very important that that be recorded. Mrs Foster: Chairman, must we declare interests at every meeting? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Only if it is a member’s first appearance at a meeting, and he or she is a member of the Policing Board, a district policing partnership (DPP), MI5 or the security forces. Mr Cobain: Do not say that or everyone will put their hand up. Mr G Kelly: Welcome to MI5. Mr Kennedy: You said that you would not say that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): If you are being paid by the intelligence services, you must declare it. Mr Weir: It is purely voluntary work. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Members should have had a chance to look at the draft minutes of 9 August. Are there any amendments or additions? I have noted that Mr Kennedy’s declaration of membership of the Policing Board was not recorded. I take it that the draft minutes are acceptable. Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is our first consensus of the morning. I now move to matters arising. I chaired the meeting at which these matters were raised, and I recall it vividly. Several members requested that research documents be prepared. Mr Alban Maginness asked for a paper on the functions of the Lord Chancellor, particularly his role in the Judicial Appointments Commission. That was an especially difficult task, but it has been done. A paper was also requested on excepted and reserved matters. From memory, I think that Mr Maskey asked for a definition of national security. Those papers arrived this morning. That was quite a tall order, given that this is the holiday period. I am conscious that it may not be reasonable to ask members to discuss those documents now. We have two options: we can adjourn for an hour, and rooms are available to which members can adjourn to examine the papers, or we can defer consideration of the material until next week’s meeting and deal with the other issues that are listed for discussion. Of course, we can also discuss the papers straight away. We are trying to arrange for Minister Maria Eagle, whom I have not yet met, to attend next Wednesday’s meeting. It may dovetail nicely if we discussed those issues during our meeting with her next Wednesday. That is only for information — I am not trying to steer the Committee in any direction. Mr McFarland: The UUP is happy to defer those issues, as we have been awaiting research papers from London, which have not yet arrived. However, if we have those discussions today, that is fine. Mr G Kelly: My inclination is to take the advantage of suspending the Committee for an hour. Mr McFarland is probably right that we will not refer to the detail of those papers. Some of this material is relevant to the discussion paper, which we started to discuss on 9 August. We will probably return to that material at a later date, but the next item on the agenda is the discussion paper. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do other parties have a view on that? Mr Attwood: We could begin discussions on those papers today, but some of the matters may soon become irrelevant. Consequently, I suggest that we suspend for an hour, because the papers will crowd in on the conversation sooner or later during the course of the meeting. Mrs Long: Last week, the Committee adjourned because we recognised that the requested paper would impinge on later discussions. Therefore the Alliance Party has no objection if the Committee wishes to defer detailed discussion on those matters until next week. However, I am concerned about what we could usefully discuss today if those discussions were deferred. Our preference is to suspend for an hour. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is a good point. We could have a general discussion on policing issues, and then we could get discuss the Police Ombudsman and community restorative justice. We could fill today with substantive material, so we will not lose time — it is simply about how we manage that time. Mrs Foster: The DUP is minded to suspend for an hour to read through the papers. We may not go into detail on those today, but we feel that we should read them. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is an either/or option. Gerry Kelly has accepted that the Committee could resume after the hour and still defer the issue. Mr Weir: I appreciate that a great deal of work has gone into the research paper, and it does contain some comparative material. However, I am disappointed that it seems to only include references to the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. We also received a separate list last week. Part of the reason for requesting a compare-and-contrast paper was to consider whether any issues had shifted between 1998 and now. Has there been any change in the devolution of policing and justice powers since 1998? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Tim Moore, Senior Research Officer, prepared the paper, so I will ask him to clarify that. Mr T Moore: In my research paper, appendices 1 and 2 set out schedules 2 and 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which deal with excepted and reserved matters. The appendices detail any changes that have been made to schedules 2 and 3. Having examined those schedules to consider where changes had been made, I would be loath to say that there have been significant or insignificant changes. That is for members to decide. Mr Weir: The DUP is happy to suspend for at least an hour. I doubt whether everyone could absorb all the information in that time, but we are open-minded in that regard. The Chairman (Mr Wells): No one is dying in the ditch on this issue, but it seems that there is consensus to suspend for an hour and let members decide whether that is sufficient time for them to discuss the material this morning. If not, we shall return to it at a later date. Four Committee rooms are available if Committee members, or party members, wish to avail themselves of them. Mr G Kelly: Party rooms can also be used. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is almost 10.15 am now, and we will resume at 11.15 am. Please do not disappear, because we will not resume if one party is missing. Do not take the day off. The Committee was suspended at 10.14 am. On resuming — 11.20 am The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have had an hour to look at the material. I am interested in views on whether we proceed with it or leave it for a week. Mrs Long: The Alliance Party has no strong preference. It might be better to defer in order to allow a more detailed look at the material. However, we are content to deal with the issues today. Some matters could be resolved today, and we could specifically consider more contentious issues in greater detail. There are some issues on which we may find agreement. Others may have strong feelings, but we are flexible. Mr Attwood: Some of today’s agenda items will refer to these papers anyway. Next week, when a Minister comes — I believe that it will not be Maria Eagle — some of the remaining matters from today’s papers could be raised. There is no easy way to handle this, because it all gets joined up, but that might be the most logical way to proceed. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have made initial contact with NIO, and it could be either Mr Goggins or Maria Eagle. It looks likely that one of them will be available. Mr G Kelly: Sinn Féin is happy to go through the set agenda. The papers are very helpful, but there are a lot of them. There are issues concerning the NIO and national security detailed at paragraph 13 of the Clerk’s briefing to the NIO discussion paper that we could go through, but if the Minister is coming it is probably better to deal with everything at once. My only difficulty is that I will not be here for that. Mr McFarland: We are happy enough. Most of the material is non-contentious, and there are issues that clearly need substantial discussion. We keep reminding ourselves that time is not on our side, so we should have whatever discussion we can have today. I presume that we will discuss the matters contained in the Secretary of State’s letter of 9 August. My impression of the general tone of the letter was that, if we wanted the Minister to answer questions of fact, we should provide questions beforehand so that the Minister could answer them. What is it that we do not have here? The Secretary of State is clearly saying that he will not allow a Minister to be cross-questioned on attitudes and views. If we are dealing with questions of fact, what factual questions do we want answered? There is quite an agenda to get through between now and the week after next, and unless we are going to get something dramatic from a Minister, why are inviting one to attend at this stage? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mrs Foster raised that issue after the Secretary of State’s Glenties speech, in which he outlined what the DUP considered to be new material on devolution, policing and justice, and the DUP wanted to question him on that. Mrs Foster: Indeed. Mr McFarland: I understood that we had agreed that that would be left until our last meeting, so that we could pile in all our unanswered questions. There are several substantive issues that we have not gone into, and we may have questions about those. Next week, we may have questions to ask about community restorative justice. I understood that we were to leave questions for the Secretary of State or the Minister until the final meeting. We would do a wrap-up at that meeting when we would know exactly what we wanted them to talk about. Indeed, I share Mrs — Mrs Foster: Arlene. Mr McFarland: Pardon? Mrs Foster: Arlene. Mr McFarland: Mrs Foster. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Your colleague got into trouble for that last week. Mr McFarland: I have the same trouble. Mrs Foster: I am going to wear a name tag. Mr McFarland: I am suddenly reminded of Dermot Nesbitt doing the same thing last week. I hope that I am not in for a similar week of battling. Mr Kennedy: You need to watch yourself; the meeting is being recorded. Mr McFarland: Yes, it is. I understood that we were going to wrap up the meetings with a visit from a Minister. However, next week is quite soon for a ministerial visit. Mrs Foster: Chairman, you are correct. Alex Attwood and I had raised the issue of a visit from the Secretary of State in light of his speech at Glenties. In view of that speech, I find his letter somewhat puzzling. It suggests that he does not know why he was invited to the Committee. Had he read Hansard, he would have known why. I agree with Alan McFarland — there is no point inviting Maria Eagle, Paul Goggins or another Minister to next week’s meeting. If there is any need to speak to a Minister at the end of our deliberations, so be it. The Secretary of State was, however, specifically invited to discuss the comments that he made about the constitutional and practical aspects of policing — as he called them — in his speech at Glenties. His letter now says that he does not want to come here to be “quizzed”. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I believe that he is not coming because he is on holiday. Mrs Foster: It would have been more helpful if he had said that. Mr Weir: Correct me if I am wrong, Mr Chairman, but my understanding is that we did not specify a date for the Secretary of State’s visit; the invitation was open-ended. Can he not, because of his busy schedule, find the time to visit the Committee at any stage before it completes its work? I take it fairly thick that the Secretary of State constantly lectures us about getting things sorted out. There is a degree of urgency to our task, yet when he is asked to give evidence to the Committee, he deigns not to because he might get “quizzed”. That is fundamentally wrong. With regard to your initial question on the research material, although some of it has been useful, I am a little concerned that some of what we were given was not precise enough. However, that may be our fault for not explaining clearly what we wanted. The research paper contains tables, and the appendices reproduce schedules 2 and 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. However, it is noted that schedule 2 of the 1998 Act, as reproduced in the paper, has not been updated to include amendments that result from the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006. It would have been helpful if any changes that that Act had brought about had been included. Perhaps there was none, but I want to be able to see that information. Mr T Moore: The changes are listed in paragraphs 17 and 21 of my research paper. Mr Weir: That is all very well. However, the complication is that we may have too much material. One section contains lists, and paragraphs 17 and 21 cite references. However, the paper does not seem comprehensive. I was specifically trying to establish whether there had been a shift on the reserved, excepted and devolved nature of each of the issues. Those who were involved in the talks will remember that the Ulster Unionist Party, DUP, SDLP positions and so on were clearly laid out in columns on our documentation. I am sure that they found that helpful when we debated matters such as Standing Orders. Ideally, I would have liked to see details on whether each matter was reserved, excepted or devolved in 1921, 1973, 1998 and 2006. That could help to narrow the scope of the discussion. In light of last week’s discussion, more examination is necessary; for example, if a matter was in one category in 1998 and was shifted for some reason in 2006. Frankly, it strikes me as futile to try to bag issues that will never be devolved, have not been devolved since the beginning of the state, and in 1973, 1998 and 2006 were treated consistently as — Mr Cobain: This is not a state. 11.30 am Mr Weir: I do not want to get involved in semantics, so I will change that remark to “since the creation of Northern Ireland”. My point is that it would take an extremely strong argument to convert a matter that had been reserved consistently — one that was reserved in 1998 and remains reserved in 2006 — to a devolved matter. I thought that a historical perspective would help to achieve clarity on that. I know that there are references to the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 in Mr Moore’s paper, but I want to see what the position is — Mr S Wilson: Are we to take it that paragraphs 17 and 21 contain only the changes under the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006? Mr T Moore: I will try to explain appendices 1 and 2, which set out schedules 2 and 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Schedule 2 deals with excepted matters, and schedule 3 with reserved matters. Perhaps the way that it has been presented was not explained properly, but, in schedule 2, appendix 1, anything in square brackets indicates an amendment to the original Northern Ireland Act 1998. All the amendments are listed after the schedules. Mr Weir: Yes, but the point is that at the top of the opening page of appendices 1 and 2, that paper states that: “The schedule provided below is not updated to include amendments resulting from the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006.” Perhaps I misunderstood, but my interpretation was that the square brackets contained changes that happened between 1998 and 2006, but did not include changes made in the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006. Mr T Moore: That is because there is no available version of the revised 1998 Act. As the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006 is so recent, as far as I can find, no amended version of the 1998 Act has been produced. Members will notice that the NIO’s paper has made the amendments and provides updated legislation. Paragraphs 17 and 21 of my paper highlight and detail the two changes to schedule 2 and the three changes to schedule 3 that will occur due to the 2006 Act. Outside of that, appendices 1 and 2 contain the schedules as amended. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Moore will be with us throughout the discussions. It may help to call upon him to clarify any difficulties that arise as we discuss the papers. Mr Attwood: I want to return to the issue of the Minister coming to the Committee next week. Frankly, I have some sympathy with Alan McFarland’s view that if the Minister is coming merely to exchange factual information, it may help a bit, but not as much as members thought. I would much rather the Secretary of State came, because his letter of 9 August 2006 is intellectually and politically dubious. Mrs Foster: Hear hear. Mr Attwood: The point is not that he does not feel that the PFG should be, as he states in his letter: “quizzing ministers on views they may have expressed.” The key line is: “I hope instead that the PFG will focus on issues that the parties agree need to be resolved between themselves in preparation for government.” We know that the policing issue must be resolved, either through the PFG Committee, once devolution is restored, or whenever. Policing issues appear on every agenda, but the Secretary of State will not come here to discuss what he may, or may not, do to resolve the policing and preparation for Government issues between the parties and himself. That is an intellectually and politically dubious approach. Given that we are trying to resolve the policing issue as part of the preparation for Government, the Secretary of State should share what he is doing to resolve that issue with us. The Committee should reply to the Secretary of State and make that point. The Chairman (Mr Wells): As far as short-term availability is concerned, either Paul Goggins or David Hanson could come on Wednesday 23 August 2006. However, if members want to invite the Secretary of State at a later stage, I doubt that that will happen in August. Mr Cobain: I am becoming slightly concerned about where we are going with this. The Committee on the Preparation for Government (PFG) was set up to consider the devolution of policing and justice and to produce a report. That is its role, yet we are wandering all over the place. If the Secretary of State discusses policing and justice with individual parties, there is no way that he will tell the Committee what he is talking about or reveal his relationships with other parties on the matter. Mr Weir: The Committee’s remit is wider than the devolution of policing and justice. That is just one item on the Committee’s agenda, which is why we are looking at, for example, the Police Ombudsman and community restorative justice. The PFG Committee has been tasked with overcoming obstacles to the devolution of policing and justice. Devolution of policing and justice forms a significant part of our deliberations but not the whole. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We need to decide today whether we wish to have a junior Minister in attendance next Wednesday. It would be either Mr Goggins or Mr Hanson, whose responsibilities overlap. If we want the Secretary of State instead, we must alert him that we want him to attend at a future date. Mrs Long: I am fairly indifferent, because it matters very little who attends. We will not obtain any more information, regardless. If we continue to discuss whom we should invite, it may descend into a battle over something that will not really add to our work. Therefore, I am flexible. Alan suggested that we try to complete as much of the work as we can, in order to identify those issues that we want to raise. We should forward those to the Secretary of State and request that if he does not come himself, he sends a Minister in his place. If we simply set ourselves up to do battle with the Secretary of State, because he has refused to attend the Committee — despite it being the preference of most members that he should — I cannot see where that would get us. We could spend the next hour discussing this, and we could be no closer to getting him into the room. Mr McFarland: Why would we have a Minister here next week? What would that add to our deliberations? We have a substantial agenda and lots of paperwork to get through. Questions may be raised that only Ministers can answer, but I recall that, at one of our first meetings, we decided that we would only get the Secretary of State to attend once. Therefore, in the meantime, it would be worthwhile to store up questions and do as much work as possible. After that, we could have a proper, serious discussion on issues about which we need to speak with the Secretary of State. It is right that he, rather than a Minister, should discuss those issues with the Committee. The Secretary of State has gone on and on about this Committee, and, in the end, for him not to appear before the Committee would be slightly strange, given the importance that he has attached to it. Mr S Wilson: My understanding is that we want the Secretary of State to attend because he has declared publicly his parameters for policing. Those parameters will impact on our decisions. It is important, therefore, that he comes along to justify and clarify his position. Last week, and presumably the week before when I was not here, we scoped the issues that we believe need to be addressed. As Alan said, we do not want to discuss any secret talks that he may be having with individual parties, rather his publicly stated position on what he believes parties must do to show acceptance of policing. His position seems at variance with that of many of the parties around this table. We should have a discussion with him. We have scoped certain issues, and the Secretary of State has said publicly that he disagrees with how far some of us believe parties should go on policing. Therefore, he should be here to talk to us about policing. Otherwise, we are wasting our time. If he sets a completely different threshold from that set by the majority of parties, we will not get anywhere. Mrs Foster: The DUP sees no need to invite a junior Minister; it would be a waste of time. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We must get a view on this from the Committee. Clearly, the DUP wants the Secretary of State to attend. Mr McFarland: I propose that we do not invite the junior Minister next week, but that we invite — and, perhaps, expect — the Secretary of State to appear, probably in two or three weeks’ time, when we will have a substantial list of issues to raise with him. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are there any other proposals? Does anyone have problems with that suggestion? Everyone seems happy not to invite the junior Minister next week, but to invite the Secretary of State to attend in a fortnight’s time. Mr McFarland: Perhaps “encourage” him to attend? Mr S Wilson: Or cajole? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is the Committee happy to invite the Secretary of State to attend and to see how he reacts to the invitation? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will now discuss the issues in the papers and research documents. Table 1 in the NIO paper, which deals with reserved matters and their implications, helpfully sets out the relevant provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998; the issues that will, and will not, be devolved; and any outstanding issues. It is a useful basis for discussion, as, last week, there was cloudiness about matters that will, and will not, be devolved, and what matters should be devolved. Alban Maginness raised several important issues. It is unfortunate that he is not present, as his input would have been useful. Is everyone happy to use the NIO paper as a basis for discussion? Mr G Kelly: I have no difficulty with it, as it is a replication of schedule 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The NIO paper presents it in a different format. Mr G Kelly: In some ways, it is a clearer format. The NIO paper does not define national security, which gives it carte blanche on that issue. That makes the Sinn Féin position very difficult as regards input from MI5 and whoever defines national security. It impinges massively on the policing issue. Moreover, no protocols are mentioned in the paper. Sinn Féin wants neither MI5 nor MI6 anywhere in Ireland. The fact that there are no protocols deepens the worry that nationalists have — and, I argue, everyone should have — about MI5 interference. The issue, and the role of MI5, should be depoliticised, not extended. I am happy to go through the list, but I wanted to state Sinn Féin’s approach to it. Mrs Long: Last week, the Alliance Party raised a concern about how differing views on what constitutes a threat to national security can impact on how loyalist and republican paramilitarism are dealt with and any potential inequality. The paragraph in the NIO paper that contains the legal definition of national security states: “actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.” That seems to cover all paramilitary activity, regardless of from which section of the community it comes. That explanation should be further explored, as the Alliance Party would be unhappy if acts of republican terrorism were treated as matters issue of national security and acts of loyalist terrorism were treated simply as criminal offences. That would not be proper and fair. A clear definition of what constitutes a threat to national security might allow a more detailed examination. We wish to reiterate that concern. 11.45 am Mr McFarland: Following Gerry Kelly’s statement, does Sinn Féin accept that, under the Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom until the people of Northern Ireland vote otherwise? If so, the Parliament of the United Kingdom is sovereign and will, therefore, decide — until Northern Ireland is part of the Irish Republic — what constitutes national security. The NIO letter explains that the Security Service Act 1989 defines the protection of national security as: “protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.” It seems fairly clear that that means threats to the state. We know from Sinn Féin’s statement that the Provisional IRA is no longer a threat to the state — it remains for the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) to confirm whether that is the case. We are dealing presumably with a residual grouping of dissident republicans; it does not affect Sinn Féin and the main republican movement since they tell us that they have stopped all that. Does Sinn Féin accept that someone must have responsibility for national security and that every country’s security services run agents in organisations that pose a threat to it? The Irish Government are no different, and I have no doubt that if Sinn Féin were in Government in the Republic of Ireland, its Ministers would be happy with that. If we accept that that is the norm throughout the world, why should it not be the norm here? I am confused by the suggestion that no one should investigate threats to the country or place agents inside organisations that are opposed to the Government. Mr G Kelly: Alan should not be confused. It is about accountability. We want anything that involves the island of Ireland to be subject to proper accountability mechanisms. We had a long-drawn-out debate and agreement on what those mechanisms should be, followed by a statement. There is no legal definition of national security. We asked for one, but we got this long, rambling paragraph instead. If we look at the political policing that has occurred in recent years — we do not have to go back 20, 15 or even five years — we can see that there has been political interference. We want to subordinate all that to the accountability mechanisms. MI5 is outside those mechanisms. It is said also that MI5 will consider serious and organised crime. From the list to which you referred, Chairman, it is obvious that that will happen. Where is the demarcation line? Even if I were to take the unionist point of view, which I do not, I would want to know where the line is between what is a policing and justice matter and what is “national security”. Alan asked what Sinn Fein would do if it were in Government in the South and had responsibility for justice. We would be glad to have that power, and we would also like to have it in the North, so that there could be an all-Ireland approach. I do not know what Mr McFarland is confused about; what confuses me is that absolutely no definition of national security is provided. Unionism, in fairness, has always accepted the British state and almost anything that it does. We have an opposite point of view, and we want accountability. MI5’s interference will not help. We do not want MI5 here. Mr Attwood: There is no definition of national security to enable MI5 to define it in whatever terms it wants. Therein lies the problem. Whether here or in Britain, MI5, now or later, can define any matter as being one of national security. It will take the lead on that and have exclusive responsibility for it, whatever any policing organisation might think. That is the problem. We should try to look at it more positively. It is right that questions should be asked of Sinn Féin, but questions should be asked of the unionist parties also. If there were devolution and an Executive, including a ministry of justice, functioning as we hope that it might, what would be the consequences of a MI5 operation in the North, which either led to the arrests or deaths of innocent civilians, or to a community’s feeling that its rights had not been properly protected? Considering the continuing national and international security threats, such an operation is possible. People would be entitled to ask the Executive for an explanation, and the Ministers would be unable to give one; they would have to say that those issues were beyond their remits. That shows a conflict between having the institutions working stably in the future and people’s sense of who is in control and who has responsibility for certain key matters in the management of life in the North. All parties — not only Sinn Féin — have to face up to what might happen over the two, four, six, or eight years of MI5 primacy in the North. For that reason, if there were a preferred outcome from these discussions, it would be to go for one of the Patten options. He offered two options for national security: first, MI5 primacy; and, secondly, the retention of the current accountability of national security through the Chief Constable. We should bear in mind what Mrs Long said about the possibility of MI5’s differentiating between republican and loyalist threats. If, as Sinn Féin claim, Patten is the threshold, and if we are living within the constraints of Patten, would there not be some point in getting members around this table to move to an understanding that the best way to manage this, given the potential fallout for all of us, would be to go with the second Patten option? That is not the perfect model — far from it —and it is not what I would argue for if we had a clean piece of paper. However, that is the argument that Patten makes, and Patten, according to some members, is the threshold for policing in the future. Maybe we should have a conversation around that. The Committee should discuss also the protocols and accountability measures that need to be in place between MI5 and organisations, such as the PSNI, with which it will interface. PSNI officers will be working at MI5 desks, and we must know whether the Police Ombudsman will have the same authority over them as that office has over every other police officer in the PSNI. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We seem to have moved into a full-blooded discussion on the intelligence services. I am happy to do that, so long as members realise where we are on the agenda. Mr McFarland: This format allows us to explore things; we may have to revisit them, but we have a flow going on this. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am happy to let the discussions continue, but I want to alert members to where we are on the agenda. There seems to be the start of a proposal coming from Alex on how to deal with this issue — we must get some structure. Mr McFarland: Part of the reason that this has arisen is that the SDLP complained bitterly about Special Branch. The Government always listen to the SDLP, so they transferred the responsibility for Special Branch to MI5 at its behest. Now the SDLP is being hoisted by its own petard, and it is trying to backtrack. MI5 is an intelligence-gathering organisation. It does not rush around carrying out armed operations and shooting people. Alex’s vision of what happens in Northern Ireland is not correct. As I understand it, in the rest of the United Kingdom, MI5 gathers intelligence, and, traditionally, its executive or operational wing is its special branch. In Scotland or England, the special branches arrest people on behalf of MI5. Logically, the same system would operate here; therefore, MI5 would not carry out ambush operations. Of course, that scenario would arise only if the DUP and Sinn Féin bury their hatchets, smoke pipes of peace, and make the world lovely. The Chairman (Mr Wells): You keep reminding us of that. Mrs Foster: I do not smoke. Mr McFarland: That scene must be set before any arrangements will be established. We are not discussing a scenario from 10 years ago, when the SAS rushed around on operations and others carried out anti-terrorist activity. This year, the focus is on al-Qaeda and residual republicans in Northern Ireland who feel that they cannot give up and who are busy trying to place bombs in London, Belfast and Newry or at Eddie Haughey’s house or wherever. Therefore, that scenario is for down the line, and it will not be the lurid picture that Alex painted. As Alex mentioned, accountability is a major issue. It would be a disaster if, in order to not destabilise the political situation, the Government influenced MI5 to withhold from the Chief Constable information that showed that a senior member of the Provisional IRA was still active in paramilitarism while Sinn Féin was in the Executive. Therefore, the protocols between the PSNI and MI5 must be extremely robust. I argue that that is the responsibility of Parliament — it is a reserved matter that should be discussed at Westminster. I have had discussions with MPs from a number of parties, and I know that that they are very interested in how the arrangements with MI5 will work out here. The House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee is particularly interested, as I suspect we all are, in how we can ensure no interference with the normal rule of law. A number of issues are important. Westminster will be interested, so logically, its Intelligence and Security Committee should beef itself up. To ensure that the accountability mechanisms are robust, the protocols should be as foolproof as possible. Mr S Wilson: Alan’s first point is correct. The folks from Sinn are jumping up and down about the security issue, discussions on which were provoked — at least partly — by their incessant demands for Special Branch and “a force within a force” to be closed down. They now have a force outside a force, and they do not like that either. There is not really a great deal that they can do now — it is a bit late for them to start crying about it. The issue of whether this matter should be devolved was raised a long time ago: even in the Patten Report, which nationalists frequently cite. The Patten Report said — and this is mentioned at paragraph 7 of the research paper — that all functions, except for matters of national security, should be devolved. That was highlighted a long time ago and is now being embedded. Alex would know from his involvement with the Policing Board that it is now so embedded that the police have made great advances in setting protocols to allow any intelligence that is gathered to be transferred, when relevant, to police criminal investigations into individuals who might be involved in organisations that present a threat to national security. The police have made it clear that the transfer of national security to MI5 will not be an impediment to the PSNI doing its job. The Chief Constable is on record as saying that if the protocols are not right, he will be the first to complain. Therefore, there are safeguards. 12.00 noon Parliament is accountable, as Mr McFarland said. Therefore, if a matter is reserved to Westminster, that is where accountability for that matter should rest. Are we going to have the same argument about the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which is a national body that deals with serious organised crime? Are we saying that SOCA’s role in policing should also be devolved? Are we saying that SOCA and MI5 should be subject to the same accountability mechanism, which can happen only through the devolution of the oversight of their powers? We have not heard a word about that matter, yet SOCA has made it clear that it will be just as involved in dealing with organised crime in Northern Ireland — at national and international level — as MI5 is in intelligence gathering. Where we are going with this issue? Given the parameters that were set down in the past, mostly by nationalists, the Government have taken the view that one way to avoid charges being made against the PSNI is to take functions out of its hands. That makes sense, because we are talking about a national threat. That is in keeping with other parts of the United Kingdom, because no other police service or devolved institution would be handed control of the body that gathers national intelligence. Therefore, this is a sterile argument, and we could spend the rest of the day talking about it. Mr G Kelly: This is not a sterile argument. It is condescending of the British Government to refuse to devolve or transfer that power. As members of other parties have said, this is an issue of accountability. We must not be naïve. It has been said that Special Branch is an arresting arm of MI5, and that is quite true. However, MI5 and the SAS were involved in killings. MI5 is not accountable. Members have talked about national security, and, from a unionist point of view, that is fine. However, no one has stated what is meant by national security, except that MI5 will take that decision. Therefore, MI5 is self-accountable. We have not seen any protocols. We are asked to put faith, which I do not have, in MI5’s saying that it will introduce robust protocols, or in members saying that there must be robust protocols. We can be cynical about the effectiveness of MI6 and the intelligence agencies if we consider the solutions that they came up with to deal with the situation in Iraq, and the damage that that caused. That elective accountability ended up in a massive war over false information, which involved intelligence agencies, not only in Britain, but in America. Those are the fundamentals of this matter. That is how intelligence organisations operate. If there are no accountability mechanisms, any party will abuse that power, no matter who they are. The island of Ireland, including the North, should have accountability mechanisms, regardless of what happens elsewhere. Sammy Wilson referred to SOCA and the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA). He said that those bodies had not been mentioned. However, I will mention them, as we continue our discussions. Responsibility for those bodies should be devolved, and there should be accountability mechanisms. To this day, MI5 informers are being allowed to carry out crime. They work for MI5 and other intelligence agencies. Informers are allowed to commit crimes that have, in the past, resulted in deaths. If I may make this criticism: Sinn Féin — and probably the SDLP — took up the cases of people from the unionist community who suffered at the hands of informers and were ignored by the other political parties. The other parties took the blind view that everything in the garden was OK, thinking that MI5 would not use informers against unionists, as they were used to gather information only on republicans. In fact, members of the unionist community were killed, and unionists who went to the unionist parties for help had to approach the nationalist parties because only they would give them the necessary help. Robust protocols are one thing, but in order for what happened in the past, and for what continues to happen, to stop, the maximum number of those powers must be transferred. Mrs Long: Although we were not given a legal definition, because none exists, the NIO paper does provide a generally accepted working definition of national security. Last week, my party highlighted — and I reiterate — that we accept that, because each can be used to support the other, it is difficult to separate terrorism from organised crime. Their links are such that it is difficult to find a clear dividing line. We accept that it is a grey area: one impacts on the other. As we expressed last week, there is some concern about the lack of accountability in the UK-wide structures and the way in which they relate to the situation in Northern Ireland. Part of the solution to that lies with a more generalised reform of the UK structures and accountability for matters such as terrorism, defending national security and dealing with organised crime. However, although we believe that reform is necessary, it is not within our remit to address that. It may be that the Committee will want to draw that to the Secretary of State’s attention, because it is a matter that he can examine. I am not trying to stifle the discussion, but I want to highlight that the Secretary of State makes clear his opinion of the Committee’s role clear in his letter of 9 August 2006. He said that: “I do not see the role of the PFG as scrutinising Government policy on reserved or excepted matters”. The Committee is discussing at length those matters that parties think should be reserved or excepted, but the Secretary of State makes clear in his letter that although the Committee may get consensus about changes to those matters — though I doubt it — he does not accept that as part of its role. I have flagged that up because, although we are discussing what should be reserved or excepted, there is no guarantee that the Secretary of State will have any interest in addressing those issues. Mrs Foster: Naomi has made a good point. Sinn Féin raised a concern about an accountability mechanism for national security. It is not the role of a regional devolved institution to scrutinise issues of national security. That goes to the core of the consent principle, which Alan mentioned earlier. Does Sinn Féin accept that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom? That is the issue. If it does accept that, its members must accept that Northern Ireland will have a regional Assembly, and, as such, national security will remain an excepted matter. That is, and will remain, the position of the DUP. The protocols for accountability, which are outlined in the Assembly research paper, are not yet in place, but that work is ongoing. In Enniskillen recently, Assistant Chief Constable Sheridan gave a good presentation on the primacy of MI5 and its relationship with the PSNI. I understand that his presentation was made during a public session; I am sure that the Committee could get copies of his slides, which could prove to be useful and instructive. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will return to that suggestion. Mr Cobain: Everyone accepts that terrorism is an international phenomenon and that much of it is linked to criminality. Naomi is right in that respect. Police officers find it difficult to divide terrorism from criminality because that is how it works. The two are interlinked, and it would therefore be impossible to divide the remit, whereby MI5 would tackle terrorism and ordinary police officers criminality. During an MI5 operation, its officers may gather information on criminality that should be passed on to the police. Hopefully, the protocols that will be agreed between the Chief Constable and MI5 will allow for such arrangements. We have been discussing this for almost an hour. There is no possibility of national security being devolved to the Administration — none. The best that we can do is to ensure that the agreed protocols are as robust as possible, so that information will be shared between the police and MI5, and that that information will solely concern criminality, not national security. I am disappointed that we must continue to make that point. We can continue to discuss this matter, but there is no possibility that national security will be devolved. I understand that members have political positions on security. However, the only way in which MI5 will be accountable is through the protocols. Whether Sinn Féin or Alex has a problem with M15 makes no difference. We should deal with matters over which we are entitled to have some influence, of which the protocols are one. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We are not making a great deal of progress. Mr Cobain: We are not making any progress. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The only proposal seems to be Alex’s suggestion to adopt the Patten model. I am not sure whether it is a proposal. Mr Cobain: Alex and Gerry Kelly spoke about MI5. Are their parties saying that the devolved Administration should be in charge of national security? Mr Attwood: I am prepared to answer that question. If we had a blank piece of paper, there are ways that that could be the outcome. However, we do not have a blank piece of paper. We have the Patten Report. Mr Cobain: Would we be in charge of running agents? Mr Attwood: If you would listen, Fred — Mr Cobain: I am listening; sorry. Mr Attwood: I know that you do not like the Patten Report. Mr Cobain: At times, you do not like it either. Mr Attwood: The Patten Report recommended either that MI5 had primacy over national security or that the current approach be retained, where the Chief Constable is responsible for, and accountable to the British Government in respect of national security. I wish that the Patten Report had outlined a third option that would have kept accountability within the North for the activities of any and all intelligence services. You might think that that is poppycock; it is not. That approach was adopted in Canada. Following a crisis in its national security functions about 20 years ago, Canada developed a range of levels of accountability within and outside of Parliament for the intelligence services. However, that is not where we are. We are where Patten put us, and Patten said that the Chief Constable could retain responsibility for national security. I believe that that option is in the best interest of everybody around the table. Perhaps some will not agree and will prefer the other Patten option of MI5 primacy. If so, we should take up a few of the suggestions put forward. First, we should ask the British Government to clarify the protocols that will be in place at the interface between MI5 and other agencies. MI5 deals with revenue and customs matters, SOCA, the Organised Crime Task Force, the Police Ombudsman, the PSNI and so on. We must gather further information on the protocols. Secondly, irrespective of what I think, we need to know what the accountability measures will be with regard to MI5 primacy in the North. We may get an insufficient or neutral answer or, more likely, be told that it is a work in progress. Nevertheless, it will give us a better understanding. I want to correct a point made by my unionist colleagues — it was probably more mischievous than genuine. Patten recommended that there be a Special Branch. The reason that so much time was spent getting Special Branch right was that, if it complies with best international practice on the recruitment of agents and the gathering and distribution of intelligence, the police service will have the ability to access intelligence in the community in a manner consistent with all proper standards. As we know from the Bishopsgate incident, intelligence-led policing is crucial to being able to, on one hand, deal with the terror threat, and, on the other, maintain public confidence. 12.15 pm Ensuring that Special Branch reached the point at which it began to comply with best international practice, which the Oversight Commissioner has said it does, enabled it to access more and better intelligence, meaning it can inform the police about all levels of threat in the North, including that from international terror. That is why all that work was done, as well as to create greater confidence in policing — a confidence that was lacking for generations. That is why the PSNI is now best placed and fit for purpose to be the primary agency responsible for gathering intelligence in the North. The new standards and procedures mean that it can gain much more intelligence. To conclude, if someone from the police intelligence community were here now, I guess that they might suggest that the police were getting backed-up with intelligence. As confidence in policing grows, the flow of information increases, and with that comes the ability of the police to counter any threat, from wherever it comes in this part of Ireland. Mr G Kelly: I do not think that we will come to a conclusion on this. The argument appears to be at cross-purposes. Unionist members arrived wanting to talk about national security, which has not been defined. Our purpose is to find an accountability mechanism. The lack of a division between crime and terrorism has been mentioned. Who decides where the demarcation line lies? How can that demarcation line be drawn, and where is the accountability mechanism? As an example, I will take a different point of view. A member of the PSNI is under the control of various accountability mechanisms, which include the Chief Constable and, depending on the issue, the Police Ombudsman and others. If MI5 decides to use that member of the PSNI in an operation, he is no longer accountable, and any arguments about accountability go straight out the window. The worst part of that scenario is that MI5 decides on which matters it will act. For instance, MI5 might decide that the recent incident in Derry is its responsibility, dispense with all the normal mechanisms, and go completely over the top in trying to deal with it. There is significant evidence that it has done so previously. Sinn Féin wants accountability mechanisms. The maximum amount of accountability should remain in the North through a new justice Ministry. That is the best way forward until the interlocking institutions, as mentioned in the Good Friday Agreement, are established. Thereafter, there would be an all-island approach to any actions, policing or otherwise, taken on the island of Ireland. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There is a series of proposals. We will start with the easy one and work our way up. Mrs Foster suggests that it may be useful to request DCI Sheridan’s briefing material on the linkages between MI5 and the police. Mr McFarland: It is ACC Sheridan; he would be most annoyed to be described as a deputy chief inspector. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I do not know the gentleman. Mr McFarland: He is an Assistant Chief Constable. Mrs Foster: He is a Fermanagh man; he will be all right about it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Now that I have given him his proper title, would it be useful to request that information from the PSNI? Mrs Foster: It would come from the Policing Board. Mr G Kelly: Does that mean that we will receive documentation? The Chairman (Mr Wells): There is no commitment; the documentation will be requested out of interest to see if it will help with our deliberations. Are members content to ask for that information? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next issue for consideration is Alex’s proposal that we support the Patten model, which states that the Chief Constable should continue to have ultimate responsibility for matters here that involve national security. You may want to put what I have said into your own words, Alex, because your proposal has changed slightly. To be honest, I am not even sure whether you made a proposal. Mr Attwood: I will leave my proposal on the table, because if we adopt my other proposal and ask at what stage the protocols are and what the accountability mechanisms will be, the answers will be that we have neither the robust safeguards nor the accountability that we require, and, as a consequence, the Chief Constable of the PSNI must retain responsibility for matters that involve national security. My proposal would be better tabled when people hear what I suspect will be inadequate answers to those two questions. Mr McFarland: Alex knows that I have not been a member of the Policing Board since 1 April. He is still on the Policing Board, so he knows fine well that it is updated regularly on the protocols. It was my understanding, as at April 2006, that the protocols were to be produced in November 2006 and are still under development. Therefore, people will not be able to tell us anything other than that until November, no matter whom we call or how much we grill them. Those protocols will go the Policing Board for discussion, but that will not happen before this Committee is due to report. We should not get excited at not being able to see or amend protocols. Sammy or one of the other MPs may be able to find this out, but I believe that MPs at Westminster, particularly those who are on the Intelligence and Security Committee, are also considering whether protocols between MI5 and the police are necessary in Great Britain as a result of the al-Qaeda threat. As I have said, those issues are under development, so we will not get an answer, no matter whom we call. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex’s proposal is that we ask for them. Are you saying that we should not? Mr McFarland: He is a member of the Policing Board, so he knows the answer. Indeed, colleagues on the Policing Board who attended last week’s briefing will be able to tell us that answer without the staff having to go off, ask the police and come back to us. The answer would be the same as the one that ACC Sheridan no doubt gave to the Policing Board last week. I was not there, but someone will be able to tell me. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex, in view of that, do you wish to continue with your first proposal? Mr Attwood: I do. We receive quite useful information in those papers, because some issues are developed within them. The papers refer to protocols. It may be that we are told that the protocols are a work in progress; however, given the live nature of the issue, it is incumbent upon us to ask. Let us see whether we get something more substantial back. For example, somebody will report to the Policing Board with something more in September, not in November. Therefore, it may be timely to ask. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Lunch is imminent, so this may be an appropriate time at which to break. Alex has insisted that he wants to make this a proposal, so we are duty bound to table it. Do we have consensus that we request that information from the Policing Board? Is everyone happy that we ask for it, even though Alan believes that we will not get it? Mr McFarland: Our colleagues who are on the Policing Board will tell us that they had a briefing last week. From their most recent meeting, do they think that we will learn anything new? The Chairman (Mr Wells): It may make an exception for as important a body as ours. Are members content? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We shall reconvene at 12.45 pm. The Committee was suspended at 12.24 pm. On resuming — 12.48 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): Could we return to table 1 on the NIO paper, which deals with reserved matters and their implications for devolution? As Mr Kelly said, the table repeats what has already appeared in earlier papers, but it is in a format that is much easier to follow. Given the complexity of the matters at hand, perhaps the best way to proceed is simply to go through the table. I am sure that Mr Moore will be delighted to help us with any technical questions. I am also conscious that we have a plethora of experts in the form of Northern Ireland Policing Board members and those who are involved in district policing partnerships (DPPs). I shall just let the conversation flow. We agreed to start the discussion with schedule 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998. We are trying to tease out whether parties are content with what has been suggested for devolution, or whether they wish to add to the list of powers and functions to be devolved to Ministers for policing and justice. Mr Weir: I am not suggesting that it will be the case, but we may not be happy with what we get. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Several parties have stated that there should be maximum devolution, and I detect that most of the discussion will be at that end of the scale. Since parties have not had a chance to prepare submissions, I suggest that we go down the list, one by one, and that parties give their views accordingly. If there are no views, we shall accept that parties are happy with the level at which a power has been pitched. Paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b) of schedule 3 deal with criminal law and the creation of offences and penalties. According to the table, it appears that everything will be devolved, with no issues remaining. If the table states that there is nothing more to devolve, we must accept that we have considered 100% of those matters. Does anyone have any comments on paragraphs 9(a) and (b)? Mr G Kelly: The paper does not cover the law governing treason or terrorist offences. Our earlier conversation referred to those matters. What is listed for devolution is OK up to a point. The paper mentions only a “devolved category”, and Sinn Féin supports the maximum transfer of powers. What are “terrorist offences”? I note that the discussion on Diplock courts will be over shortly. I accept that part of the paper up to a point. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are you happy that treason remains a central Government responsibility? Mr G Kelly: I do not know. Can one define treason? We have not formed a view on that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Kelly has proposed that terrorist offences should be the responsibility of a devolved Assembly. Is there any view on that matter? Mr S Wilson: As many terrorist offences will be matters of national security, I would not expect responsibility to be devolved. Mrs D Kelly: The difficulty lies in national security and the lack of a definition. Even in its broadest context — such as in the earlier paper, which mentioned industrial acts — it could be concluded that industrial strike action, for example, was a terrorist act and a threat to national security, given the very woolly definition and the understanding that was articulated earlier. It is very difficult to agree to this without a clear definition of terrorist offences. Mr McFarland: Fred Cobain said earlier that matters are as they are, and that this Committee will not be able to persuade the Government to change their mind — unless particular parties wish to make matters a deal-breaker in negotiations. In that case, I do not doubt that those issues may resurface. We have no remit to demand the devolution of matters that the Government have deemed excepted. We must agree to disagree. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is important in all of our discussions that parties indicate whether they simply have a problem with certain issues or whether they perceive them as major impediments to devolution. We must test the strength of opposition. Mr G Kelly: If Alan is anticipating that, as we go through table 1 unionism will take one view and nationalism another. I do not know whether we can test the strength of opposition, to be honest. Mr McFarland: In December 2004, the comprehensive agreement allowed a time frame of two months for all this to be completed. It set out what policing and justice powers would and would not to be devolved at that stage. Presumably, the DUP and Sinn Féin accepted that. This information has been available for a chunk of the year in the NIO discussion paper. We have known since 1998 that certain matters would be excepted and that other matters would be reserved but devolved in due course, so none of this should come as a surprise to any of the parties. We can discuss whether some reserved matters should be transferred; for practical reasons, it might be better if some of those were dealt with at Westminster. Excepted matters such as national security are not going anywhere, no matter how long any party howls and shouts. We shall not solve that issue in Committee. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I think that Mr Kelly would disagree. Mr G Kelly: Sinn Féin has a very strong view on who has responsibility for the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), but I am willing to go through all the matters in table 1. The British Secretary of State and the British Prime Minister have said many times that certain matters are not up for negotiation, only to change their mind. If we do not get consensus here — and I sense that we will not — we will take it up with the British Government, because we hold strong views on the issue of MI5, and its powers and role in protecting national security here. Not all its powers are to do with national security; that is someone else’s interpretation. Mr Cobain: May I make a relevant point? These are all nationwide issues. The ARA is a nationwide issue — Mr G Kelly: Do you mean that is an all-Ireland issue? Mr Cobain: In this context, it is not all-Ireland. The Irish Republic has its own version of the Assets Recovery Agency. We are talking specifically about matters to be devolved to an Executive. We need to be clear that some of the issues lend themselves to nationwide agencies and cannot be dealt with only in Northern Ireland. We cannot separate serious crime here from serious crime in England, Scotland and Wales. Everything is becoming more centralised in order to improve the exchange of information. Therefore, it makes no sense to devolve responsibility for those agencies. If that happened, we would be out of the loop. We need to consider it in the context of policing. It is much easier for police services throughout the United Kingdom to work together centrally. Some people are trying to lift Northern Ireland out of the UK when it comes to crime prevention and detection. However, some powers do not lend themselves to being devolved, such as the devolution of responsibility for those two agencies. Mr McFarland: It would make much more sense for the Republic of Ireland to rejoin the United Kingdom on those issues and have an island-wide — Mr G Kelly: You should try for consensus on that one. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I do not think that we will get consensus on that. It was a good try. Mr Attwood: We have long argued that there should be an all-Ireland agency. Mr McFarland: A United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland-wide agency? 1.00 pm Mr Attwood: There should be appropriate relationships with the agency in Britain. Some matters can be dealt with on an all-Ireland and an inter-Ireland basis. That is consistent with the Good Friday Agreement, and it is in the interests of all the people of these islands. Secondly, it may to useful to enquire about certain aspects of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). On one hand, we are being told about everything that will be reserved, excepted or transferred; on the other hand, we are being told to reach decisions about what aspects of RIPA must remain reserved. I want to know precisely what is being asked of us. I presume that that distinction is due to the cross-cutting national security issue, but I would like confirmation that that is what is meant. Thirdly, regardless of the previous understandings that were reached as part of the comprehensive agreement, SOCA is a new development, and it is one of the most anonymous new public bodies that has been created in recent times. It is very difficult to arrange a meeting with that body, which is still trying to work out what accommodation and full role it will have in the North. We know that an agency exists, but no one knows much beyond that. Regardless of whatever may have been agreed already, we must get a detailed briefing on SOCA because it is new and is in the process of being defined. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex, are you proposing that we seek information about the role of SOCA? Mr Attwood: I am seeking A, B, C stuff, not just about SOCA per se, but particularly about SOCA in the North. The Chairman (Mr Wells): About its role in Northern Ireland? Mr Attwood: Yes. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That seems to be a reasonable proposal. Mr McFarland: Colleagues on the Policing Board have had a detailed briefing on this matter. In some respects, SOCA is the British equivalent of the FBI. It is a UK-wide, multi-agency body, and naturally enough, it exists in Northern Ireland because it is part of the United Kingdom. What is strange about that? Mr Attwood: There is nothing strange about that logic. The question is: what is that agency actually going to do? That has not yet been confirmed. The Policing Board has been seeking a meeting with SOCA, which has not yet been granted because that agency is still getting up and running in the North. Mr Cobain: Could we try to resolve the two issues at hand before we — The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have drifted from the first issue to the second. Mr Cobain: We can talk about SOCA, but can we try to get through the first issue so that we can get to the next page before 4.00 pm? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Before I call Mr Kelly, are there any proposals on schedule 3(9)(a) and (9)(b) or should we just accept it as it is, and move on? Mr G Kelly: I do not accept it as it is. The Chairman (Mr Wells): You do not accept it, but do you have a proposal? Mr G Kelly: As we have already discussed, the document lacks definition. I do not wish to rehearse this morning’s conversation, but the document has an impact on this matter. The table in the NIO paper pushes the point that matters are excepted, and, therefore, they will not be devolved. I do not accept that. We must look at those matters one at a time. I was going to talk about the second aspect of the matter, but I have said all that I need to on the first aspect of it. Mr S Wilson: I am seeking clarification, so that we do not waste time. I get the feeling that we are moving to a situation where — regardless of which area we discuss — if matters are reserved or excepted, Sinn Féin will not be happy. Let us just cut to the chase and agree that as long as there is something on that list that will not be devolved to a Northern Ireland Administration, Sinn Féin will have reservations. That means that we need not go through the farce of discussing each matter in turn and seeking consensus. That might save us about four hours. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There will be matters that members may agree should eventually be devolved. Mr S Wilson: I get the impression from what has been said — and perhaps this can be clarified — that there is nothing that Sinn Féin will accept should remain with, or be reserved to, Westminster. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is that your view, Mr Kelly? Mr G Kelly: I thank Sammy for interpreting my view. Could I ask whether that means that the DUP’s view is that everything set down by the NIO is acceptable? Mrs Foster: There are a couple of matters that are intended to be reserved that we believe should be devolved. However, I agree with Sammy that there is no point in going through each of those points if we are not going to reach consensus on anything. The ultimate conclusion will be that this is a matter for negotiation in October and November. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It strikes me that there will be issues on which everyone is happy with the status quo. There will be matters that the DUP believe should be transferred, and there might be agreement on that. This matter is not quite as black and white or as stark as it may seem. Mr McFarland: Sinn Féin is not comfortable with fundamental issues around national security, and that impinges on our discussion of such issues. Clearly, we will not change Sinn Féin’s view. Notwithstanding that, I suggest that the Committee considers the remaining issues, because we shall not solve the question of whether we should have responsibility for national security. We should look at “Issues remaining” — those on which a decision on whether they are to be devolved has yet to be taken. It might be worth hearing some thoughts on them. That may be the best that we can achieve today, given the stances that have been taken. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are folk willing to work down the column of issues remaining and see whether we can agree some of them? Mr G Kelly: In case there is some confusion here, Sinn Féin is in favour of all these powers being devolved. I left the meeting last week at lunchtime, but it says in the minutes: “It was agreed that the powers listed at paragraph 3.2 of the NIO discussion paper should be devolved within policing and justice.” That means that there was consensus. What we are dealing with now appears to be a list of NIO exceptions. Therefore, we seem to be being told that, although everyone agreed that the maximum number of powers should be devolved, here are a number of issues that refer back to everything in paragraph 3.2, which we have already agreed should be devolved. There is probably no other way to do this other than to go through them. Sinn Féin has strong views on ARA and SOCA. It is not contradictory to have a flow of information between North and South, between the two islands, and, indeed, between the two islands and the EU. However, that does not preclude our having an accountability mechanism — and that is what devolution would involve — that deals with the all-Ireland aspect of the powers contained in paragraph 9(c) of schedule 3 to the 1998 Act. We would still take an all-Ireland approach, but we want the maximum amount of power to be devolved. As we work down the column of issues remaining, Sinn Féin will argue that. Arlene Foster said that the DUP wants to see several powers devolved. Let us hear what those are, and then we can go back over the list. Mr McFarland: There is no point in Gerry having that view. We have a Government plan in front of us. Parties will take up with the Government the matter of whether they agree with that plan. There are issues that have not yet been resolved. Notwithstanding any party’s objection to the plan, it would seem to be profitable to discuss the issues that the Government have not yet finalised, as they may listen to the parties’ views on them. To continue an argument about whether the Government plan should be followed, or about who agrees with the plan, will not solve anything in Committee. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There certainly will be issues about which members will not feel particularly strongly; we might reach agreement on those. Mr Weir: To pick up Alan’s point, it would be helpful to concentrate our efforts on the “Issues remaining” column. If parties wish to state their case as to what should move from the “What won’t devolve” to the “What will devolve” column, I do not mind. Ninety-nine times out of 100, we will not reach consensus on the issues, so, in those cases, there is no point in a great deal of debate. “Issues remaining” seems to fall into the category of issues in which there is a grey area. In some cases, the power was going to be devolved, but it was unclear as to which Department it would go. It strikes me that that is where the margin of opportunity for a degree of discussion lies. We may reach consensus on some of the issues; on a lot of them, we probably will not. That is where the discussion should be concentrated. However, that does not preclude, for example, Sinn Féin calling for responsibility for ARA to be devolved. I have no problem with Sinn Féin’s saying that; however, there will be no consensus on that issue because we will oppose it. The Committee should not waste an enormous amount of time discussing issues that will run into the sand very quickly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Kelly, is that a way forward? Mr G Kelly: It is helpful. It is set out quite well in the column, so we have agreed what will be devolved. However, I am looking through the document now, and we have general difficulties with what will not be devolved. The column that lists what will not be devolved simply takes parts of the previous column, which lists what will be devolved, and infers that these aspects of those matters will not be devolved. Therefore, the assessment is right, and if you want to hone the conversation, I have no difficulty with that. Mr McFarland: Topics for a major discussion on the relationship between the police, the Policing Board and the Assembly are listed in the NIO discussion document. This will probably be the most vital discussion that we will have on policing, so it would be useful if we could move the conversation towards that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Parties can use a single-transferable objection to keep the discussion moving forward if they do or do not want a matter to be devolved. It is quite clear that we will not reach agreement on ARA or SOCA. Mr McFarland: The third column shows what will not be devolved. Obviously, parties will want to lodge their fiver’s worth, which is fine, but Alex asked what we are talking about in relation to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). It is necessary to discuss vetting, criminal records and disclosures and so forth and how they are handled. Those are sensitive issues. Mr Weir: I agree with Alex’s suggestion. Some aspects of RIPA are referred to, but it would be helpful if we had clarification on precisely what is meant by that section. Mr McFarland: With regard to criminal records and checks and disclosures, as members probably know, the new paedophile laws mean that we are moving to a centralised system for checking people. It is correct to say that there have been recent developments between the Republic of Ireland and the UK to put a better system in place so that people who have molested children cannot flee one or other of those jurisdictions. The increased threat from al-Qaeda and international terrorism may mean that such records will go to a much more centralised database. Again, it is probably not at all sensible to divide that into little bits, depending on where you are in the country. Therefore, my sense is that this will go to some sort of central agency into which the police services, either in the UK or the Republic, can tap to find out whether person A, B or C is fleeing justice or has a record of abusing children or whatever. That is how that process seems to be going, and to suggest that it should all chalk down here, and that we should have a little computer in Belfast that stands alone, is not the way that this is going. Mr G Kelly: The last column asks whether some: “aspects of RIPA that are currently reserved will need to remain so.” Let us find out what those are. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there consensus on that? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are we agreed on Alex’s proposal to seek clarification from the Northern Ireland Office on the role of RIPA and SOCA in Northern Ireland — Mr Attwood: I was referring just to SOCA. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Just to SOCA. Are members agreed? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Good. We can get that sorted out. Is there anything else that members feel that we can usefully discuss? Mr Attwood: Although this is not a matter for discussion, members might have some comments to make. I invite the unionist parties to consider accepting the principle of making arrangements, which would be regulated on a Northern Ireland, UK-wide or island basis, to deal with criminal records. The Attracta Harron case is an example. She had gone to church in the Irish Republic and, obviously, was abducted thereafter. The risk from offenders does not respect borders. Therefore, our thinking should be broadened from a Northern Ireland-wide basis to a UK-and-Ireland-wide basis. 1.15 pm Mr G Kelly: It has recently become clear that the South does not have great child protection controls in place, and they do not hold comprehensive sex offender lists, etc. Therefore, our discussions here, and what we decide, will have an impact in the South also. Mr Weir: The DUP believes that the list, should it be produced, should be on a British Isles or European-wide basis. The Attracta Harron case was mentioned; the media covered a case in my constituency also. The person committed offences in Northern Ireland, and then in the Republic of Ireland. The person was jailed initially in the Republic of Ireland, but was moved to a prison in Northern Ireland where he was entitled to benefit from the remission rates. When the person left prison, he immediately went to England where he committed more offences, for which he has been convicted. Far be it from me to promote Europe, but this subject should be looked at on a more international basis. Many people have second homes abroad or are retiring to places such as France or Spain. We must ensure that people are not able to slip between jurisdictions to avoid being tried for offences: child protection is the most obvious reason, but the need applies to other matters as well. People should not be able to move about without the local police being at least aware of the threat that they pose. This problem is not confined to geography. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It seems that we agree that there should be clear co-operation between all states on this important issue. We will proceed to paragraph 9(d) of Schedule 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which deals with prosecutions, where there is already a wide degree of devolution. This subject — including the role of the Advocate General for Northern Ireland — is one that is close to Alban’s heart, but he is not here. Mrs D Kelly: Given that we will be discussing justice next week, could it not be deferred until then in order that Alban could participate? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will do that. Paragraph 9(e) of Schedule 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 deals with the treatment of offenders, including children and young persons. Does anybody have any views on that? Mr G Kelly: There is no reason why that provision should not be devolved. The theme running through this paper is one that suggests a lack of trust in the Assembly and other interdependent institutions. Why should responsibility for sentence review commissioners and the remission of sentences not be devolved? Mr Attwood: In the negotiations up to and since the Good Friday Agreement, the SDLP has expressed its belief that many areas retained by the British, should be devolved. I will not go through it all; it is recorded elsewhere. I presume that the British Government feel that the release of prisoners is an emotive subject. For instance, the release of prisoners could end up being a divisive area that is difficult to manage, and a situation might arise where there would be some perversity with respect to what the Sentence Review Commissioners might or might not do. I am sure that informs the British Government’s thinking on this. The principle should be accepted that hard issues, such as the Sentence Review Commissioners, the renewal of fifty-fifty recruitment, the Parades Commission, including the Chief Constable’s right to appeal to the Secretary of State in respect of any determination, should be devolved, subject to agreement on all appropriate community safeguards, which would legislate against any group in the Assembly or any party from any background imposing its views in ways that would be against the public interests. Similarly, we believe that that matter should be devolved, but it requires some safeguards that might govern many other matters outlined later in the schedule. Mr G Kelly: I do not disagree with any of that. One of the biggest arguments about policing involves the protocols and demarcation lines that must exist between a justice Minister, the Policing Board, a scrutiny Committee, the Sentence Review Commissioners and so on. That argument is part of the wider discussion on the devolution and transfer of those issues, but we are dealing, in principle, with their devolution. Mr McFarland: The powers within the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995 will not be devolved. It is correct that matters connected with terrorism or residual matters remain excepted. Presumably, they have been held back because the Government wish to have a broad UK-wide policy on sentencing, remission, and so on. It may be possible to re-examine those issues further down the road, but it makes sense to let them sit for the moment. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there consensus on paragraph 9(e)? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The pattern will be to do a quick poll round the table, and, if there is no consensus, we will have to move on. Paragraph 9(f) is repealed, so we move on to paragraph 9(g) of Schedule 3. Mr Neeson: What did paragraph 9(f) concern? The Chairman (Mr Wells): I will just check in case something significant has been missed. Mr T Moore: Paragraph 9(f) deals with the surrender of fugitive offenders between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Paragraph 9(g) deals with compensation. The compensation scheme provided for in the Terrorism Act 2000, which is due to end in 2007, will not be devolved. Do members have any views on that? Mr G Kelly: This is an equality issue. That part of the Act has been abused. Sinn Féin believes that the compensation scheme should be transferred. Mrs Foster: The compensation scheme should remain an excepted matter. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do we have consensus? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next matter is community safety partnerships (CSPs). This matter will be devolved in its entirety, with no issues remaining. Many of us are involved with CSPs at council level and have experience of them. What is the view on the present situation? Mr McFarland: There are issues around CSPs, of which colleagues in the Policing Board will be aware. There has been a long-standing row about CSPs since their inception, as the Criminal Justice Review recommended that CSPs and DPPs should become a type of conglomerate that would give a much better service. For reasons that no one can figure out, the NIO has resolutely held its face against this. Originally, we thought that that was because of some deal between the NIO and Sinn Féin. However, if control of CSPs is devolved, the Assembly can perhaps take a more sensible view. Mrs Foster: In relation to the Review of Public Administration, the Policing Board is considering how CSPs and DPPs can have a more effective relationship with local communities. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will just leave that as it is, noting the suggestions, unless somebody wants to make a proposal. Paragraph 9A of schedule 3 provides for a chief inspector of criminal justice for Northern Ireland. All related powers are to be devolved. Are members happy with the status quo? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Public order is a more complicated matter. Remaining issues include certain aspects of parades. Mr Attwood: At least three issues remain. First, we do not accept the note in the schedule that states where responsibility lies for determining which weapons may be used in public order situations. There is a legal argument that responsibility resides with the Policing Board, in spite of the assertion to the contrary therein. Secondly, we need clarification from the Secretary of State or the MOD about how future powers will develop to enable the Army to operate in support of the police. One interpretation is that there will be garrison strength, and that that will be it. The note asserts that there will be garrison strength with Army powers, in support of civil power. I would like to know more about that. I can imagine what that would mean for public order issues and for providing a technical capacity to policing. There may be other issues, but a note needs to be added to detail the broad ground rules, and that is without prejudice to the SDLP’s view that the Army should have no role whatsoever. Thirdly, I mentioned the principles that should govern sensitive powers being devolved to the Assembly, including the power of the Chief Constable on determinations of the Parades Commission. He has not used that power to date, but he may wish to do so in the future. Nonetheless, if that matter is devolved, there must be community safeguards, because a Minister for justice cannot be given a unilateral power to decide on appeals from the Chief Constable. That is not an acceptable outcome. Appropriate safeguards must be built in to ensure that, if a situation were to arise, a decision would be made that would reflect not just one party or one community interest. Mr Neeson: The operational independence of the Chief Constable is important. During my days on the board of the Police Authority, decisions were taken by the then Chief Constable that I did not agree with. However, by the same token, when we deal with such sensitive issues as parades, the operational independence of the Chief Constable is vital. Mr Weir: The DUP believes that the power to appoint members to the Parades Commission should be devolved. The detail is vague, because certain aspects of appointments to the Parades Commission and its operation could remain reserved, if that were the wish of the Assembly. The default position is that all aspects of the Parades Commission would be devolved, unless the Assembly decided to the contrary. Is that the case? Is that in legislation? Mr T Moore: As far as I know, that is not in legislation, but again, clarification is probably required. Mr Weir: Did that statement come from the NIO? Mr T Moore: That comes from the NIO discussion document. Mr Weir: Our view is that appointments should be devolved in that regard, but we would like clarification on that matter. The example of appointments to the Parades Commission comes back to the earlier point about “certain aspects of parades”. We should seek clarification on what that means. Mr McFarland: The PFG Committee dealing with rights, safeguards, equality issues and victims has been discussing parading, and the DUP submitted a detailed document on the make-up of the Parades Commission. It would make some sense if the detail of that were allowed to run as a major issue with the PFG Committee dealing with equality, rights and safeguards, which meets on Friday — as has been happening — and we can agree or disagree with it here. My understanding is that that entire issue will be devolved, unless we think that it is of such concern that it should remain an excepted matter. However, the Friday team can discuss that. 1.30 pm On the military side, we will end up with a garrison here, where families live while the soldiers are in Afghanistan or Iraq. The soldiers will return only occasionally and then return to their posts. At any one time, a battalion’s-worth of soldiers would be here, and that is exactly what happens in other parts of the UK. It would be useful to get the protocols that govern that. It would also be useful to examine the protocols: first, in respect of Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP), which deals with riot situations and assists Ministries with events such as the BSE crisis; and secondly, in respect of Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC), which is used, for example, when a helicopter has to help a farmer lift a cow out of a bog. Defence is, of course, an excepted matter. Three of the excepted functions that will remain at Westminster are defence, foreign affairs and Treasury matters. If defence became devolved, the Government here would have to ask the Ministry of Defence for military aid, for which it would be expected to pay as part of the Budget. It would be useful to get all that clarified, but the well tried and trusted protocols that exist in the rest of the UK can assist in that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are we agreed that we will pursue Alex’s request for information? Without prejudice, we can look at that information and decide whether it is useful. Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There is a proposal that we defer to the PFG Committee dealing with equality, rights and safeguards in respect of the reference to the Parades Commission contained in the NIO paper on national security. That Committee has had quite a long discussion on parades but has failed to reach a consensus. However, we agreed to consider further the DUP’s proposals for changes to the Parades Commission, and those proposals might fit neatly into that discussion. There is a fair degree of overlap between the two groups, so I am not trying to hide anything from anyone. Are members happy that we do that? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): OK. We are making some progress. Mr G Kelly: We are giving work to somebody else. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have parked less today than we parked on Monday. I do not know whether that is a victory. Mr G Kelly: With regard to the Parades Commission, the community safeguards are clearly important, but we are passing the issue to the PFG Committee dealing with equality, rights and safeguards, so I will leave it at that. We believe that it should be transferred. You will not be surprised to hear that we are against the British Army backing up the police. We went through a long period in which that was a common occurrence, and we do not want to go back to that. Hopefully, we are entering the final stages of demilitarisation. We are opposed to British Army involvement, and we believe that that remaining issue should be transferred. The Chairman (Mr Wells): If that was a proposal, I do not think that we will get consensus on it. [Laughter.] We will note that and move on to the policing accountability framework. There is quite a bit to this matter. As it is so important, I will ask each party to have its say. I suspect that there will be a divergence of opinion. Mr Neeson: As you say, Mr Chairman, this issue is very important, particularly where fifty-fifty recruitment is concerned. My party has always believed that that would not solve the problem and has always felt that through time, and when there was confidence in the institutions, a police force comprising all races and religions would develop naturally. However, my party strongly believes that, although this remains a reserved matter, it should be devolved. Mr McFarland: We are on record as saying that fifty-fifty recruitment should be removed pronto, so we will not get into a discussion on it. However, I want to talk briefly about the point that is under the issues remaining column that concerns paragraph 11 of schedule 3 to the 1998 Act. It discusses: “The detail of the relationship between the Policing Board, the Northern Ireland Minister for policing and an Assembly policing committee.” If this Committee does nothing else, it should determine how that relationship will come about. The Policing Board was set up as a result of the Patten Report. Alex Attwood has described how inviolate that report is — except, of course, if the Secretary of State decided, with the click of a finger, to abolish the provision to have 10 elected members. It seems that one can move away from Patten if one so wishes. Patten set up the Policing Board to deal with a particular set of circumstances. However, if we end up with a Minister and an Assembly Committee for policing and justice, we will be in difficulty. Ten Assembly Members who were elected by d’Hondt would sit on the Policing Board, and the Assembly Committee would have 11 members who were also elected by d’Hondt. That means that 21 MLAs would be committed to policing. Colleagues will be aware from previous discussions that it can be difficult to fill Committees. A few weeks ago, we had an energetic discussion with Naomi Long about the difficulty of securing Committee quorums when the Assembly was up and running. It is obviously silly to tie up 21 elected representatives with policing. How do we deal with that? The Policing Board has many roles. For example, it secures money for policing from the NIO. Presumably, that money would come first to the Minister, who would then pass it to the Policing Board to dole out. The board is also responsible for the police’s manpower and equipment. Therefore, it has operational, hands-on concerns. It is also charged with holding the Chief Constable to account. There is confusion in that the board does not simply have a watchdog role; that would be the role of the Assembly Committee. The board has a combined role. Therefore, how would the Policing Board, with its many functions, operate, yet have a useful, supervisory relationship with the Committee? One option is to use d’Hondt to replace elected representatives on the board with party nominees. Those who are chosen to serve on the board would, therefore, be non-elected representatives, and the essential political input that the Patten Report requires would be retained. The Assembly Committee could then operate properly. It is uncertain whether the Assembly Committee would, under normal circumstances, call the chief executive of the Policing Board to appear before it. The Policing Board would hold the Chief Constable to account, and the Assembly Committee would hold the Policing Board to account through its chief executive. I am sure, however, that the Committee would want to reserve the right to call the Chief Constable if circumstances dictated, given that it has the power to summon people and papers. The Committee would oversee the Minister’s work. Matters that concern justice and prisons would be much more straightforward if the Committee had direct access to the relevant agencies. The issues are complicated and impinge on all kinds of areas and sensitivities. However, if we achieve nothing else, I hope that we at least have clarity of thought about how to proceed. Mr Attwood: I agree with Alan that the Committee’s work on the Policing Board could be some of the most useful that it addresses. However, the basis on which we progress must be that, although it is accepted that the Assembly and Minister would like to have as big a role as possible — since that is the nature of Parliaments and Ministers — all of the institutions established by Patten need to be ring-fenced and their independence protected to the highest possible degree. If we work from that principle, I believe that our efforts will be successful. Parliamentarians and Ministers may not end up with the authority and role that they want, but given the nature of the policing issue, it is the best way to proceed. Therefore, save as is outlined in Patten, the role of an Assembly and any Minister or Ministers should not extend beyond what I have outlined. Ministers would have responsibility for setting long-term objectives, deemed to be three to five years. Working from that basis, the principle of maximum dependence of the policing structures can be established. I am concerned about some members’ views on this. Perhaps some still yearn for a return of the days when there was a Minister of Home Affairs with far-reaching powers. Mr Kennedy: Hear, hear. Mrs Foster: Bring back John Taylor. [Laughter.] Mr Attwood: On the other hand, other parties feel that it has taken so long for us to get our hands on policing that now we are close we must grab it all. Perhaps I am over-characterising one or two parties round the table, but we must be mindful of such tendencies. In principle, the Policing Board, the PSNI, the District Policing Partnerships (DPPs) and the Police Ombudsman should be ring-fenced; as far as possible they should not be encroached upon. As a consequence, an Assembly Committee or Minister will feel that their function in relation to policing matters is not what they would like it to be, but that is definitely the best approach. Views on some elements of that may converge over the next two or three weeks. The SDLP supports the devolution of fifty-fifty recruitment, but it must be subject to safeguards. Given the likelihood, or otherwise, of the Assembly being restored by November 2006 or May 2007, the subject of its being devolved may become academic, as the British Government are about to go out to consultation on the renewal of fifty-fifty recruitment because its three-year provision runs out next April. I remind members that Patten said that there should be fifty-fifty recruitment for at least 10 years. The SDLP is working from the basis that the recommendation of 10 years is a minimum and argues that it should extend beyond that. Mr Cobain: Do you think that there will be a Prod in the police force if fifty-fifty recruitment runs for 10 years? Mr Attwood: By the time fifty-fifty recruitment has run for 14 years, the police force will probably be about 55% Protestant — or non-Catholic, to give the proper legal definition. Finally, I put down a marker about the appointment of a new Police Ombudsman in September or October of next year, when Nuala O’Loan’s seven-year tenure ends. Mr S Wilson: Are any more of your councillors’ wives looking for a job? Mr Attwood: I understand why Ian Paisley Jnr comes out with that kind of comment, but Sammy should know better. Mr Cobain: You are right. Mr Kennedy: There is no point appealing to his better nature. Mr Weir: What better nature? Mr Kennedy: Exactly. Mr Attwood: Sammy should be mindful of the company that he keeps. Mrs Foster: Sammy, I would leave now if I were you. Mr Attwood: The SDLP also wants the appointment of a new Police Ombudsman to be devolved. However, I am worried that, given the time frame, offering advice to the Prime Minister on the appointment of a new Police Ombudsman is a heavy power to give to OFMDFM. Mr G Kelly: If the SDLP had had that job in OFMDFM, I wonder whether it would have had the same opinion. Sinn Féin supports the transfer of fifty-fifty recruitment, but with community safeguards. There is almost paranoia about what will happen to the Policing Board in those circumstances, so let us try to balance it out. The Policing Board has powers that should be protected. However, we are not talking about a Minister or Ministers with no powers at all. Some of the ambience of the conversation suggests that there will be a lame duck Minister; that would assist no one. The Policing Board does not legislate — the Minister may. A Department for policing and justice must have a scrutiny Committee. Other Departments will have a scrutiny Committee with powers or limitations, so why would a policing and justice Committee not operate on the same basis? That Committee might not have the power to legislate, but it would certainly have the power to offer assistance in creating helpful legislation. 1.45 pm Bearing in mind that even this Committee has almost accepted that policing and justice matters would not be covered by two separate Departments, it is crucial to remember that discussion of a single Department for policing and justice involves more than policing and the Policing Board. We are talking about the entire policing and justice issue, which is much more wide ranging; that should be reflected in the power that a Minister or Ministers would have. Some of the powers are already ring-fenced, and I have heard no one argue that the Policing Board’s powers should diminish. That said, a scrutiny Committee is essential. I have not yet given any thought to what Alan has said about political parties replacing their elected representatives on the Policing Board with party appointees, but I suppose that it is worth looking at, given that the board might have problems getting a quorum. There is also an all-Ireland dimension to policing and justice, and I would like that dimension to be very robust, whether that be achieved through one or more implementation bodies or areas of co-operation. That would help to strengthen some policing and justice issues on which we have already had some sort of agreement. That is all that I have to say on that matter at present. I think that we can go some distance with it. Table 1 on reserved matters and their implications for devolution states in relation to paragraph 11 of schedule 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998: “The Secretary of State would retain power to issue statutory guidance to the Ombudsman (the Minister for policing would also have this power).” I am not sure what that means exactly. Would the Secretary of State and the Minister both have power or would it transfer from the Secretary of State to the Minister? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Moore will seek clarification on that. After Sammy has spoken, our round-robin contributions will be complete. I shall then seek proposals. Mr S Wilson: Like the Ulster Unionist Party, the DUP believes that fifty-fifty recruitment has been discriminatory and has damaged the police’s credibility in the unionist community. It has also been damaging to individual police officers, because they are considered to have been selected on the basis of their religion, not on the basis of their ability to do the job. Therefore, fifty-fifty recruitment should be ended as quickly as possible. I hope that that happens before policing and justice powers are devolved. I suspect that those who want fifty-fifty recruitment to be devolved to Northern Ireland want it so that they can use their veto powers to ensure that discrimination exists for a considerable number of years. That worries me. Alex has talked about fifty-fifty recruitment lasting for 14 years or more. That in itself is a warning sign for people from the unionist community. They would simply see the devolution of policing and justice as a means of institutionalising discrimination, because nationalists could use their veto to prevent any change to the fifty-fifty provisions. The relationship between the Policing Board and the Assembly is not such a big issue. Any MLA who has been involved in the Policing Board will know that a policing and justice Committee that would have other policing and justice responsibilities could not possibly do the job of the Policing Board, or, indeed, supersede it. The Policing Board’s job is more to do with the minutiae of policing. It is best to see the Committee’s role as an overarching one, perhaps in relation to legislation and long-term strategic issues, with the Policing Board micro-scrutinising policing. If much of the Policing Board’s scrutiny role were passed to an Assembly Committee, there would be meetings two days’ a week on that one issue. That would not work. I am not sure about Alan McFarland’s suggestion that political parties’ representatives on the Policing Board would cease to be elected members and instead be party appointees. That would probably lead to a reduction in the number of Policing Board members. The board might well end up with 22 members. Politicians will be involved in scrutinising policing at some level, whether at a micro level for the Board, or at a macro level for the Assembly Committee. This is not a big issue — in fact, the more people involved, the greater understanding there might be among public representatives of the issues and complexities of policing. I am not sure that we are in a position to start divvying up roles between the Policing Board and an Assembly Committee; however, it might be a natural division for one to have a strategic role — with all of the potential policing, justice and legislative scrutiny responsibilities — while the other takes responsibility for micro scrutiny. One matter concerns me. If the Assembly wanted to be involved in the minutiae of policing, it could be seen as taking some political control of that matter. That would be a retrograde step. As for the appointment of the Police Ombudsman, the DUP would be happy to see greater responsibility for at least advising as to who should be appointed. That is an important position, which requires a great deal of confidence from the police and from the community. The more that the person appointed is seen as having emerged from political consensus in Northern Ireland, the better. We should learn from the present Police Ombudsman’s standing that, if the person in the post is perceived to have been elected in a partisan manner, and there is no consensus for that name, that is detrimental to the office itself. The position is important, and the police regard it as important to have independent scrutiny of complaints. Nevertheless, the office-holder must be seen to be independent and without a political agenda, hence the need for consensus and an input from the Assembly. Mr McFarland: One of the most exciting things about the Assembly is that it has no equivalent of the House of Lords — its only balance is the Committee system, which is very powerful. In fact, Westminster’s scrutiny Committees are now similarly powerful. A policing Department and its scrutiny Committee would allocate the money, establish the legislation and would be ultimately responsible for holding the Minister to account. I cannot see a Committee fettering itself by agreeing to take a watching brief at a macro level. Secondly, Sammy cannot have forgotten, because we spent four years on it, that the Policing Board takes up an enormous amount of time, although it is supposed to be only two days a month. From a practical point of view, I cannot see how Assembly Members, who are taking part in plenary sittings on Mondays and Tuesdays, attending Committees on Wednesdays and Thursdays and working in their constituencies on Fridays, would be able to put in the time that the Policing Board, with its subcommittees and so on, requires, if they are to do their jobs properly. There is a major issue here about the Committee’s power and about the time required for Policing Board and Assembly work. The logical option would be to opt for a Policing Board equivalent to those in the rest of the UK with a number of independent members — that is the way that the old authorities worked. What I suggest is something of a halfway house. The key to the Policing Board’s success has been the political input; it brought a bite and a drive that it would not have had with independent members. This is vital work, but it means that 10 MLAs are tied up for great chunks of time. I have attempted to find a solution whereby the political input is retained, which has been important during the first four years, while taking the burden off the shoulders of the MLAs. If this place were functioning properly — and it never really got up to speed the last time — Members would need to be here full time. This suggestion is an effort to keep the political input on the Policing Board, which is healthy, while at the same time freeing up MLAs to do what they are paid to do. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Let us start at the bottom. Do we have agreement that the Assembly should have the responsibility to advise — note that the word is “advise”, not “appoint” — the Crown on the appointment of the Police Ombudsman? Are we happy to take on that power? Is there any dissension on that? Mr G Kelly: Is that the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes; the Assembly, through its Ministers. I presume that a cross-community vote could come into this, or a petition of concern could be used, if members were unhappy. There would be some safeguards — the word “safeguards” was mentioned a couple of times. What do members think of this suggestion? Of course, the Assembly’s advice could be ignored. Mr Neeson: What do you mean by “could be”? Mr McFarland: It depends on the mechanism. Will the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister decide over a cup of coffee in the morning that Mr Jones or Mrs Smith would be suitable for appointment? Will it go before the Assembly for a cross-community vote? How will this operate? Mr S Wilson: This would be one way of ensuring that there is some confidence in the person who takes on the role. Mr McFarland: So it would come through the Assembly on a cross-community vote? Mr S Wilson: It would go through the Assembly. Mr McFarland: That is not perhaps as it is envisaged here, with the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister having a cup of coffee. It would be quite healthy if the appointment were agreed in the Assembly. Mr Attwood: Sammy’s outline is a dangerous precedent, if the appointment of a person to head a senior public body, had to go through the Assembly and be subject to a cross-community vote. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I hope that that is not what Sammy is saying. I think that he means that if there were dissension by a significant group of MLAs — Mr Attwood: If there were dissension, would the appointment be subject to a cross-community vote? That is not where we are heading with this or other significant appointments. That is a power of veto that people from one, other or both communities would exercise. The Chairman (Mr Wells): At the last PFG Committee we considered the issue of making public appointments more accountable to the Assembly, so there is consistency in having what is one of the most important — Mr S Wilson: The post of Police Ombudsman is uniquely different from any other public post. I believe that there is a requirement for cross-community confidence in the person who takes that role. It may well be that, if the name suggested causes no concern, there will be no need for a vote. However, if there were, Members could lay a petition of concern that would require Assembly assent. Of course, that happens in other parts of the world; for example, for appointments of Supreme Court Justices in America. 2.00 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): This is a finely balanced argument, and we are hearing both points of view. Could we accept the principle that there should be some mechanism so that the Assembly could have an advisory input? Rather than deciding that there must be an affirmative vote in the Assembly or a Committee, we could agree on the principle that the Assembly take some role. Mr Cobain: It would be a bit silly if we had devolved policing and justice powers, but did not take a view, as an Assembly, on who would be appointed Police Ombudsman. Alex Attwood has given the impression that perhaps the Assembly is not mature enough to do that or that the Assembly is so discriminatory that it could not be trusted. Assembly Members have put themselves forward for election, and they represent the people. It is absurd for the Assembly to take no view on the matters on the list that Alex read out. Mr G Kelly: A simple proposition has been made complicated. The Assembly can decide to voice an opinion on any matter. However, it is not up to this Committee to stipulate that the Assembly must take a view. That is the difference. If we stipulate that the Assembly must have a say in the appointment of the Police Ombudsman, we will be in a situation in which everything will be run entirely by the Assembly; that leads to institutional arguments about corporate Executives and so on. The simple solution is to shift the responsibility for the decision from a single person — the Secretary of State — and to give it to OFMDFM. I am not saying that the decision should be made over a cup of tea. That is a simple proposition, and we should keep it so, instead of trying to prescribe whether that decision is made over a cup of tea, whether the Assembly has its say, or whatever. We should be careful. If we stipulate that the Assembly must give an opinion, the Assembly will have to give an opinion on every single thing. Who are we to tell the Assembly what to do? No one will stop the Assembly from voicing an opinion. If a Member rises in the House and says, “I disagree with this appointment. I want a debate in the Chamber”, we may or may not have a debate. That is the way it goes. Let us not start stipulating that that must happen. Mr Attwood: Earlier, we were told that the dangers of an Assembly Committee exercising political interference on policing matters would not arise because, logistically, that burden already falls to the Policing Board. However, 10 minutes later, there is an attempt to politically interfere with the independence of the policing structures in the North, namely the Police Ombudsman’s office. The very fear that I outlined earlier has been confirmed half an hour later. The proposal would represent political interference in public appointments in an area of great sensitivity where public confidence is essential. If we start with the Police Ombudsman, there is no doubt that we would have to do exactly the same for the Victims’ Commissioner, the Chief Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission — Mr McFarland: The Chief Constable, perhaps? Mr Attwood: Even the Chief Constable — thank you. Once that gate is opened, people will charge through it. Members know the nature of this place; from the past six or eight months, or the past year, we know how members from all parties had heightened sensitivities about who was appointed to an interim post or a full-time post in another public body. We cannot open that gate. We are fundamentally opposed to that. Of course, we can raise things in the Assembly; that is the nature of politics. However, to give the Assembly any power on this matter would be a recipe for a return to the past. Mr Cobain: The Chief Constable is appointed by the Policing Board, which is run by politicians. Mrs D Kelly: And independent members. Mr Cobain: Alex, in his capacity as a politician, sat on the interview panel for the post of Chief Constable. Mr Attwood: Was there a cross-community vote? Mr Cobain: No. There was no cross-community vote. Mr Attwood: Sammy is proposing that the Police Ombudsman be subject to a cross-community vote in the Assembly. Mr Cobain: Alex sat on — Mr Attwood: I did not; Joe Byrne did. Mr Cobain: A member of the SDLP, along with members of other political parties, sat on a panel and interviewed the candidates for the position of Chief Constable. Mr Attwood: There were independent people as well. Mr Cobain: Members of political parties sat on the interviewing panel and then voted — Mr S Wilson: The majority were politicians. Mr Cobain: Yes, the majority were politicians. They voted on the appointment of the Chief Constable. What is the difference in politicians sitting on the Policing Board? Do they leave their police hats outside that day and come in as independents? Mr Attwood: You cannot see the difference between a mixed panel appointing the Chief Constable and an exclusive body of politicians taking part in a cross-community vote? Mr Cobain: Alex, it is the same with Patten. When it suits you, you need Patten; when it does not suit you, you do not need Patten. It is the same with us. We are appointed by the people; we put our names forward and are democratically elected. This is nonsense. It is like saying that Parliament should not have any say in this or in that. Mrs D Kelly: It is one of the confidence measures that the nationalist community requires. Mr S Wilson: The current Police Ombudsman was a political appointment — Mrs D Kelly: Nonsense. Mr S Wilson: The Secretary of State appointed her, at the behest of the SDLP, and she is from an SDLP background. Do not be getting precious now about political appointments to the Police Ombudsman’s Office. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Kelly will speak next, and that is it. Mr Cobain: Sinn Féin always has the last word. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Sorry, Mr Kennedy will speak next, then Mr Kelly, and then that is it. Mr Cobain: You Sinn Féin Chairmen are desperate. Mr Kennedy: I fail to understand what virtues so-called independent members have. All of us are from Northern Ireland, with a Northern Ireland background. Clearly, all of us are capable of holding particular views. I do not understand the logic of relying on and making a virtue out of having independent members, as opposed to people who have sought the vote of the electorate. I do not see how the decisions taken by those who are supposedly independent can be defended; if the surfaces of all members were scraped, certain views would be found. Those who are democratically elected have put themselves forward and received the mandate to do it. It is astonishing. Mr G Kelly: The DUP should not get too precious when we are talking about the Parades Commission and the Victims’ Commissioner, whom they appointed. We could argue about this all day. I was hoping for a short adjournment, as I have a couple of important phone calls to make. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There will be a coffee break at 3.00 pm. Mr McFarland: Perhaps we could have a comfort break, Chairman? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes, the policy is that each party should be represented at meetings at all times. May I presume that we have consensus on the 10-minute coffee break? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is another one chalked up. [Laughter.] Does the Committee accept that OFMDFM has the power to advise the Crown on the appointment of the Police Ombudsman? Mr McFarland: Without being prescriptive as to how it is exercised? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes. It refers to general powers. What is the view on that? Mrs D Kelly: There is no definition of “advise”. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am getting the clear impression from Alex that there is no consensus on this. Let us not flog it; it is not going to happen — at least not through the work of this Committee. Let us break for 10 minutes, and I mean 10 minutes, folks. Coffee will arrive at 3.00 pm, but we will have to continue working; we cannot have three breaks in two hours. The Committee was suspended at 2.09 pm. On resuming — 2.20 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have a quorum again, so we are back on air. As we did not reach consensus on advising the Crown on the appointment of the Police Ombudsman, we will move to the next suggestion, which is that the Assembly considers whether to seek devolution on fifty-fifty temporary recruitment provisions. There seems to be some support for that, so I shall throw it out for discussion. We do not want to get into a debate about the merits, or otherwise, of that provision because we could spend several days on it. I will formally put the suggestion: do we have consensus on the Assembly having a role in the temporary fifty-fifty recruitment provision? Members indicated dissent. Mr Weir: We are opposed to that, as we are concerned that it would be used as a device to enshrine fifty-fifty recruitment. Mr Attwood: We are in favour of it, subject to appropriate community safeguards. Mr McFarland: The problem is that, at the moment, the Government have the power to change the provision. If that suggestion were approved, community agreement would be necessary to change it, so it would never be changed. An entire political issue would ensue around those who moved away from the suggestion or tried to change it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): For the sake of completeness, Sean, what is your position? Mr Neeson: We are in favour for it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): As we do not have consensus, the matter will be dropped. We will move on to new paragraph 11A of schedule 3 to the 1998 Act, which deals with co-operation between the PSNI and the guards. Mr Weir: I am sorry, Chairman; was any level of consensus reached on the Policing Board? If I understood it correctly, there probably was consensus that a policing board should remain and that an Assembly scrutiny Committee should scrutinise the work of a policing Department. I know that that may be straightforward and obvious, but — Mr McFarland: We need to discuss further the interaction between those bodies. At some stage, the parties will have to discuss how those arrangements will actually work, the make-up of the scrutiny Committee and whether the make-up of the board should change. Those arrangements are such a fundamental part of the devolution of policing that they should be agreed before we can implement it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there any chance of a low-level consensus on that issue? Mrs D Kelly: Three of the political parties are represented on the Policing Board. Last week, Prof Sir Desmond Rea wrote to the Committee on behalf of all board members, suggesting that the status quo in the relationship with the Policing Board be maintained and that the Policing Board and its functions be protected. Mr Kennedy: He would say that, would he not? Mrs D Kelly: You are a member of the Policing Board, and he wrote on behalf of that board. Mr Kennedy: I know that, but the politicians must sort out the prevailing arguments. We need not run to the Secretary of State, the security Minister, or Prof Sir Desmond Rea. There are issues to be resolved, and this is the place in which to do that, rather than hiding under other people’s skirts. Mr Weir: I hope that you are not accusing anyone of cross-dressing. Mrs D Kelly: No one has any intention of hiding behind anyone’s skirts, regardless of who chairs the Policing Board. It is a matter of record that Prof Sir Desmond Rea has written to the Committee in his capacity as chairman of the board, and one can only assume that he has done that with the blessing of that board, of which Mr Kennedy is a member. Mr G Kelly: There are three aspects to the issue. Everyone agrees that the Policing Board should maintain its powers under Patten and should remain extant. Whether one or two Ministers are responsible for a Department for policing, they should have the same powers as any other Minister under the Good Friday Agreement. There would be a scrutiny Committee, but it would only have powers to scrutinise the Department, like any other scrutiny Committee. In that way, it is quite straightforward. Mr Attwood: Except for the second point. A Minister for policing would not have the same powers as any other Minister under the Good Friday Agreement, because those powers were defined and constrained by the Patten Report. The Patten Report said that the Secretary of State’s powers, for example, were limited and primarily included the setting of long-term objectives. That is somewhat less than the routine powers of any other Minister. So, subject to that — Mr Weir: Three propositions were effectively put forward. I shall leave aside the second proposition, as there will clearly not be consensus on it, from what Alex has said. I have no problems with the first two points: the retention of the Policing Board’s current powers and the setting-up of an Assembly scrutiny Committee; I am happy to agree to those. Mr McFarland: Assembly Committees have legal powers to call people and papers. When people appear before a Committee, they can stay quiet or tell lies, but Committees have the ability to call them. One does not want to interfere with the successful working of the Policing Board because, by and large, it is the one organisation that has worked over the past while. My point was that there are serious practical difficulties with 21 Assembly Members being involved in the Policing Board. The PFG Committee dealing with institutional matters has been discussing whether the membership of the Assembly should be reduced to 90 Members or 72 Members. If, for example, Assembly membership dropped to 72, 21 Members will be pootling around in policing, if we stick with Patten and 10 politicians serve on the Policing Board. There are real practical problems with giving full service to the Policing Board. Alex knows perfectly well how much time that takes; we have spent weeks, in some cases, at meetings of the Policing Board. Colleagues who served in the first mandate know well that, when the Assembly is fully operational, we can spend nearly all week here, including some Fridays, when we should be in our constituencies. Therefore, we need to review the elected membership of the Policing Board to see whether there is another way to maintain the same political input and balance that would allow the Policing Board to do its business and allow a scrutiny Committee to operate in the proper way. It is a circle that cannot be easily squared. Mr Weir: Two issues should be separated: the membership of the Policing Board, and the powers of the Board. For the moment, the Policing Board should retain its role and powers. We might achieve consensus on that. As regards the elected membership, I am not quite convinced that the practical difficulties are insurmountable. However, if the Policing Board were reconstituted under some sort of devolved justice system, which is what we are talking about, with the Assembly up and running, it should retain the current 10 elected Assembly Members and nine independent members. If, a year or two down the line, that arrangement were found not to be working because of time constraints, I would certainly be open to some degree of review. My general preference is to retain politicians on the Policing Board, who should be elected Assembly Members. I am not comfortable with moving away from that. If it were shown from a practical point of view that it simply could not be done, I would consider changes at that stage. 2.30 pm Mr McFarland: Are we saying that an Assembly scrutiny Committee on policing and justice would examine the Minister? Nobody else is looking at the Prison Service, so no doubt we will have the head of the Prison Service in every so often to find out what he is doing. The Committee could call the head of the judiciary to find out what is going on with regard to sentencing, bail and everything that relates to the courts. Are we saying that the 11 members of that Committee would not be allowed to interfere with their 10 colleagues, from the same parties, who oversee the Policing Board? I cannot imagine the 11 good and true members of the Committee saying that the Policing Board is sacrosanct; that they have full confidence in their colleagues who sit on it; and that they will not examine policing, because that is the job of the Policing Board. Mr Attwood: That may be the political imperative, as you see it. Mr McFarland: That is the reality of it. Mr Attwood: If the Assembly is restored, it will be subject to two police Acts, which will define the roles and responsibilities of the Policing Board and the PSNI. They will define them internally and externally, and, whatever role a scrutiny Committee or Minister may have will be subject to every section of those two pieces of legislation. A Minister, or an Assembly scrutiny Committee, may want to ride roughshod over that, but they would not have the legal authority to do so. Mr McFarland: The Committee would. If an Assembly Committee produces money for policing and justice, which it would, it would have the ability to supervise the Minister and any agencies or organisations within its remit, and that would include policing and justice. Although it could not interfere with the operational activities of the Chief Constable, because that is sacrosanct, if there was a bog-up over baton rounds, I am sure that the Committee would wish to hear evidence from the chairman of the Policing Board or the Chief Constable about what went wrong. I cannot imagine any Assembly Committee forfeiting that right. Mr Attwood: I did not say that they would not try to go in various directions — they will. Mr McFarland: Would they have a legal right to do so? Mr Attwood: As tends to happen, hopefully, equilibrium would be reached, whereby the Committee and the Policing Board would recognise their limits. That is how it would work in practice. With regard to the technical position, the law will govern who has real authority when it comes to any one issue. In respect of any part of Government policy in the North, the paymaster can try to jump in on the conduct of any public body, agency or Department. Mr McFarland: In my view, there is a conflict that is not resolvable by having two sets of politicians in the same mix, from the same party, scrutinising the same thing. Mr Attwood: I will give you an example. Representatives from all the Northern Ireland parties at Westminster sit on the Northern Ireland Select Committee, and it reviews the Policing Board. Mr McFarland: That is only because it is still a reserved matter. Mr Attwood: Taking a hard parliamentary model, that Committee in Westminster reviews aspects of a Government body or Government policy. Mr McFarland: No, it does not. Mr Attwood: Yes, it does. Mr McFarland: When the Assembly is sitting, the Northern Ireland Select Committee can only consider defence, foreign affairs or Treasury impacts on Northern Ireland issues. However, when policing and justice are devolved here, the Northern Ireland Select Committee will no longer be able to posture on policing and justice, except with regard to the Budget. The Chairman (Mr Wells): This is an interesting academic argument between two experienced Policing Board members, but we are dancing on a pinhead, because the two proposals are: the Policing Board retains its current powers — and I think that everyone is agreed on that — and, the Assembly should have a scrutiny Committee on policing. The issue of who serves on it, and do we need to change — Mr Weir: Sorry to interrupt, but it would be a scrutiny Committee on policing and justice — it would go wider than policing. The Chairman (Mr Wells): If we agree that, at a later date — and it will be at a much later date at the rate that we are going — we can discuss whether it is better to have MPs, councillors, etc. on the Policing Board. Mr McFarland: This Committee’s remit is to prepare for Government. One area that requires preparation is policing, and I appreciate that it is academic until we solve the other outstanding issues that have been well rehearsed here. We can stop discussing the issue now, but we will have to sit down and discuss it again before a deal is made in the autumn. We can discuss it as part of the talks, or the five parties who have to decide how it will work could discuss it. It must be agreed before we get devolution of policing and justice. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The only issue that we are falling out about, Alan, is the actual bodies that are on each Committee; that is all. Mr McFarland: No. We are talking about the modalities of who has the authority to do what, and to call whom, when the devolution of policing and justice occurs. This is the most fundamental issue. The Policing Board — of which I am a former member — has discussed it endlessly, and Sammy will know that the interface between who has the authority has become the most major problem in policing. Following the restoration of devolution, justice and the Prison Service will be fairly easy to deal with, but policing will not, because policing is run by a load of politicians already. We must make a key detailed decision before a deal is made in November — if that is where we are heading. Imagine if the deal is struck, the Executive fires up, and there are shortened timescales. Imagine if the DUP and Sinn Féin iron out their differences, and then the question is asked about having to wait for two years before policing and justice are devolved — as it was asked here last Wednesday. If the differences have been ironed out, why should the issue be raised again then? We could reach a stage where there is a shortened timescale. The moment that the Assembly fires up again, the Policing Board membership will change. However, when that happens, will Sinn Féin be represented on the Policing Board? Soon, we will have to discuss, in detail, the interface between the Policing Board, the Assembly Committee, and the Chief Constable and how policing is going to be implemented — that is the whole idea behind the Committee. We can park it for now; that is not a problem. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We could agree by consensus that the issue requires further consideration. Mr McFarland: The issue cannot be left for discussion by a review Committee or by the Assembly, as many others can; this is a fundamental issue. The Chairman (Mr Wells): No party is flagging up the issue as being a major impediment to them going into an Executive, as far as I can see. It is a difficult issue, but it is not an impediment. Mr McFarland: When policing is resolved, this matter will become a major impediment. It should be dealt with to coincide with that point — unless we are going to delay it further down the line for discussion within the Committee. It must be dealt with, and it is fundamental to the core of policing. If we are putting it off, there is no problem. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I cannot see how we will solve it by 4.00 pm. Mr McFarland: I am not saying that. You suggested that we agree two issues and park this. That is OK. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Good. Mr McFarland: However, colleagues will have to think about the matter and come back to it. Devolution of policing will not go anywhere until this issue is dealt with. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Would parties consider the interface between the Policing Board and an Assembly Committee on policing and justice and the powers involved? Would parties come back to the Committee at a later stage? It is not something, I am sure, to which some parties have given a lot of thought. Mr McFarland: The Policing Board will have had some discussion on it, but it is a fundamental issue that must be resolved. Mr Weir: I do not agree with Alan that this obstacle is on the same scale as some of the others, but I am happy to come back to it at some point. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are we happy to agree that? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We move on to something less controversial: co-operation between the PSNI and the Garda Sióchána. 2.45 pm Mr G Kelly: As the NIO document states, the Inter-Governmental Agreement on Policing Co-operation is an international treaty. However, it is stated in the column on issues remaining that: “The Assembly will wish to consider whether, with the UK Government’s agreement, they wish in the future to negotiate replacement arrangements with the Irish government.” Sinn Féin is all for strengthening the all-Ireland structures and for the Assembly to deal with the Irish Government in doing so. That is fine by us. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do you have any thoughts on that point, Alex? Mr Attwood: The Inter-Governmental Agreement on Policing Co-operation is a moderate agreement that needs to be enhanced for many good reasons. We want a very early conversation to take place about how that could be done in such a way that threatens nobody and assists everybody on a North/South and east-west basis. To confirm: the Assembly should enter into ever-deeper arrangements with the rest of the people on this island. Mr S Wilson: Considerable co-operation occurs between the police and the gardaí, and, through our positions on the Policing Board, some of us have become aware of how much co-operation there is. There is no resistance to co-operation at that level where it is seen that it occurs for good operational reasons and produces practical results. However, unionists get nervous when the political structure is then imposed on that arrangement. As police officers will tirelessly tell you, that political structure is by and large unnecessary. The same police officers will also endlessly tell you that good relations exist in liaisons between senior police and gardaí officers and even at lower levels. We would not be happy if the arrangements with the Irish Government were enhanced or replaced. We believe that what currently exists does so probably more for political reasons rather than good, practical policing reasons. When unnecessary political structures are added to those arrangements, people only become suspicious of what should be natural co-operation between police forces on the island. Mr G Kelly: I am not sure what Sammy is saying. Surely he wants enhancement; he said that he is worried about enhancing the arrangements, but his whole discussion was about how those arrangements were very good and that they should improve. Therefore, he is as much for enhancement as he is opposed to it. Mr S Wilson: I was discussing practical arrangements and how practising police officers see where co-operation and liaison are necessary. There is no need to put a political structure on to that. Policemen know what co-operation is required, how that can occur, and that, by and large, it works. Mrs D Kelly: I would have thought that, as in any public authority, structures and frameworks that state what individual employees of such bodies can do must be agreed at a strategic level. Surely Sammy is not advocating that a garda in one area and a PSNI officer in the other make up the rules as they go along. Operational directions and arrangements must surely be in place. Mr S Wilson: I thought that the idea was that politicians did not involve themselves in operational police matters. It is dangerous to advocate that, because it will start interference on how the police forces operate with each other. Mrs D Kelly: That is what those intergovernmental arrangements are for. Mr G Kelly: There will be North/South Ministerial Council input into any of the Departments or structures that will be set up. A justice and policing Department should not be any different to any other Department. I return to the fact that all of the DUP’s arguments are, actually, in favour of enhancement. A formal North/South footing allows for — as the column on devolution states — lateral entry, secondments and exchanges, training of officers, etc. Implementation bodies and/or areas of co-operation would clearly enhance that. Mr McFarland: That proposal falls firmly into the category of “North/Southery”, and the rules on that are quite clear. Everyone is more than happy with co-operation that helps in operational matters. That is correct, and Sammy has covered that matter in some detail. However, there have been attempts to build an empire around this issue before it even reaches the Assembly. There are teams of civil servants who are all dreaming up new ideas. If measures are practical and sensible, there is no problem. However, for example, there were suggestions that all police training on the island should be carried out at a single police college where the gardaí and the PSNI would train together. There are two different jurisdictions with different legal systems and rules, and some people are trying to make proposals for political reasons. I have no doubt that my party and the DUP will block those proposals, as we have on other matters. No one has a problem with ideas that are introduced for good practical reasons, but if a measure is solely political and an attempt to bring in all-Ireland harmonisation etc, I am afraid that we will not agree to that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There seem to be slight diversions on this matter. I assume that we shall not reach consensus on this issue. The remaining matter is a bit weaker than what is being proposed, however, and concerns replacement arrangements with the Irish Government. Mr McFarland: It would make more sense if that matter were moved to North/South discussions. The Assembly and the parties have negotiated changes before and it is fair enough that we negotiate. If improvements are to be made in policing — structural or otherwise — those should be decided through normal Assembly inter-party and cross-community agreement. There is no problem if an issue is non-threatening. If one side or the other tries to steal a march on this matter, no doubt the other side will object. Mr G Kelly: Consensus with caveats? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Consensus on what is listed as — Mr Weir: Generally, even when there are negotiations, other matters will fall outside the terms of a relationship with the gardaí at a governmental level and will fall outside Northern Ireland’s jurisdiction. Some matters will be decided on a UK-wide basis and that also needs to be taken into account. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Right; we are happy enough. We now move on to firearms. Mr Kennedy: What have we actually agreed on that last matter? [Laughter.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have agreed that we are happy to try to make progress on the remaining issue, which is that there should be future renegotiations to replace the present arrangements. With the safeguards that Mr McFarland has outlined, that would be done by agreement. Mr S Wilson: I am not so sure that I would be happy with that. The SDLP and Sinn Féin have already indicated how they interpret any replacement of the present arrangements, and I suspect that the same goes for the Government. However, my understanding is that measures are intended to strengthen and deepen the political structures that have been put in place under the current inter-governmental agreement. I have made it quite clear on our part that that is not how we see the way forward for co-operation between police forces on the island, so I would not be happy to let that one through. Mr McFarland: There are two different issues. One is on the operational side, where the police deal with the gardaí, which is ongoing anyway. Mr S Wilson: That is fine. Mr McFarland: To date, the two Governments have been cooking up proposals in the background with teams of civil servants, totally outside the control of any political advice. Mr G Kelly: Set up the Assembly and we will be fine. Mr McFarland: That is the point that I was making. As Peter has said, there are national issues that will be dealt with by the two Governments. There are other proposals that the Governments are currently cooking up on cross-border co-operation that would be better dealt with by the Assembly insofar as they deal with increased co-operation on transport or whatever else. I am talking about the operational side. I am asking whether setting up structures, increasing trade, etc, would be better dealt with in a place where unionists, in particular, had some say in what was going on. Aside from the operational area — which will go on between the police services anyway — and the national issue, where, clearly, London will have to negotiate with Dublin over matters such as international treaties and the exchange of prisoners, other areas that might be up for increased cross-border co-operation really should be under some Assembly control, as are all the other elements of North/South co-operation. Does that make sense? Mrs D Kelly: That is what that says. Mr McFarland: I am trying to persuade Sammy that it might be worth considering an objection to this, here and now, provided that it is clear what we are talking about. We are neither talking about the inter-governmental stuff nor about the operational stuff between the Garda Síochána and the PSNI; we are talking about other areas that would benefit from coming before the Assembly and being dealt with by the Assembly, in keeping with normal North/South practices. Sammy, as I understood it, was about to object to all of that. I was trying to persuade him that some of it might make sense. Mr Neeson: There could be well be an issue with regard to the Irish Constitution, as to whether a Government body in Northern Ireland could directly interfere with such an important issue as security and the gardaí. Although we all welcome the maximum co-operation with the gardaí, given the nature of modern crime, it is a sensitive constitutional issue. Mr S Wilson: Despite Alan’s attempts to reassure me about this, when I look at the remaining issues, my interpretation is that we look for a deepening and a strengthening of the current arrangements between the Irish and Westminster Governments, involving the Assembly. That is not the way for future co-operation. That, to me, is really done at police level, not at Assembly level; not through political structures, but through normal co-operation among policemen on the ground. There it can be seen to have real practical benefits and not to have some kind of political agenda. I am still not happy. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is clear that there is still no consensus. We are going to have to leave that and move on to the topic of firearms and explosives. Should legislation governing automatic and semi-automatic weapons remain reserved, as in Scotland? Mr S Wilson: When we talk about automatic and semi-automatic weapons are we talking about shotguns, for example? Those are quite common, especially among the farming community. What exactly is the definition? Are we talking about weapons such as machine guns? Mr McFarland: It is rifles and machine guns. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Any experts in this field? Mr G Kelly: That depends how many rabbits you have on your farm. Mr Kennedy: Has this anything to do with the aftermath of Dunblane? It might be useful to get an explanation of the Scottish legislation in respect of this. Mr Weir: The Dunblane situation might also explain why there might be particular sensitivities in Scotland and why it may be a reserved matter there. I just do not know. I appreciate what others have said in relation to that and I think it may be helpful to get some clarification. Mr Attwood: That is right, Chairman. It depends on how the drafting is interpreted, but it might be implicit — or hinted — that it can be transferred, even though Scotland has chosen not to have it devolved. In any case, it is one of those matters about which people over here might have heightened sensitivities. We would favour devolution nonetheless. Mr G Kelly: Whatever is the interpretation of what weapons are involved, it is named in the devolved column, but we are told to see the “Issues Remaining” column. That suggests that we might want to reserve it, but there is no reason for that. If it comes down to whether we are capable of dealing with it as a transferred matter, I think we are capable, so it should be transferred. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is proposed that legislation governing automatic and semi-automatic weapons be transferred. Mr Weir: Given what I have heard so far, my inclination is that that legislation should be transferred. However, before we take a final decision, I want to be absolutely clear as to which weapons we are talking about. If we could get clarity on precisely what it would be involved, it might provide us with a degree of reassurance. The Chairman (Mr Wells): So, we shall wait to see the note from the research team. The next issue is the transfer of responsibility for explosives. Does anybody know anything about this? Mrs D Kelly: I suspect it refers to fireworks regulations. Mr McFarland: It applies to fireworks and explosives used in quarries. Of course, when explosives are mentioned, everybody has visions of the past 30 years. Presumably, this legislation refers to normal explosives that are used for quarrying, road building and fireworks. The situation in Northern Ireland is strange, and, certainly, it caused some confusion on the Health Committee. In Northern Ireland, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS) issues directions to the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service (NIFRS), and the issue is whether the Health Minister should regulate for fireworks and explosives or should that responsibility be placed elsewhere. The debate is whether NIFRS should be grouped with the PSNI and the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service or should it remain as an agency of DHSSPS, which would keep health and safety issues within Government. Mr Weir: I do not want to complicate this matter further, and correct me if I am wrong, but is it not intended that as part of the Review of Public Administration (RPA), NIFRS would come under local government control? Mrs D Kelly: That is so that our rates can pay for it. Mr Weir: Yes, it is to ensure that local government picks up the tab. If I am correct, does that add another degree of confusion? However, it would apply more to fireworks than to explosives. The Chairman (Mr Wells): A helpful note has been handed to me. In ‘Devolving Policing and Justice in Northern Ireland: A Discussion Document’ it states that: “14.6 The Secretary of State is also responsible for policy and legislation on explosives, including the substances which are controlled as if they were explosives, such as ammonium nitrate. His statutory functions include the licensing of controlled substances, factories, magazines and stores, shot firers, fireworks and the registration of premises. These functions are carried out on his behalf within the Policing and Security Directorate of the Northern Ireland Office.” “14.7 The Secretary of State’s responsibilities for explosives will be devolved to Northern Ireland Ministers. Thought will need to be given as to whether these responsibilities would best sit with the Minister for policing or the Minister for public safety.” That is the context in which the proposal has been flagged up. Compared to responsibility for illegal explosives — which is, of course, a security matter — it is a relatively non-controversial proposal. Does that help members? It is a tactical issue to which the Committee might need to give a wee bit more thought. It is not an issue that we would have expected to discuss today. 3.00 pm Mr McFarland: The discussion is straying into the territory of the PFG Committee dealing with institutional issues, which meets on Mondays. That Committee discusses such matters as the realignment of Departments; the headings under which topics lie; the reduction of Departments from 10 to seven; and the removal of issues from Departments as recommended in the RPA. There is still a question of whether public safety should stay within the remit of the Health Minister or if it should go elsewhere. In a future without today’s security connotations, the question is whether it should go to the Department of Health or be left with the police. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I cannot see how this is an impediment to devolution. Mr McFarland: It is not, but the PFG Committee dealing with institutional issues could discuss it. Mr Weir: I am happy for that PFG Committee to discuss it. I might be wrong, but I suspect that there are probably not strong views around the table as to which one of the two Departments should have responsibility for explosives regulations. However, we should not use guesswork to decide which Department should take responsibility for it. The PFG Committee dealing with institutional issues will perhaps know if there are experts in the field and find out their opinion as to the appropriate Department. I am reluctant for us to impose a solution without having any knowledge. However, most of the parties do not have a particularly strong view on it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Can we take the view that there is no strong view on this matter; which Department control of firearms and explosives is neither here nor there. They all come from Carrickfergus anyhow; it is all centralised and strictly controlled. Therefore, there is no need to get worked up about it. Mr Kennedy: It should be referred to the PFG Committee dealing with institutional issues. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I do not think that they will be remotely interested. Mr Kennedy: I do not think they will be, but they will be more fascinated than we are. [Laughter.] Mr McFarland: The PFG Committee dealing with institutional issues should consider whether public safety should remain with the Department of Health. However, we need to flag up the explosives issue for future consideration. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do we have consensus on that? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We move to paragraph 15 of schedule 3 to the Act, which deals with the courts. This is another difficult issue, and there are several items, such as judicial salaries, functions of the Lord Chancellor and the appointment and rule of the Lord Chief Justice, which will not be devolved as things stand. Do Members feel that it is important that the power to remove the Lord Chief Justice or to decide on the salaries of the judiciary be devolved? Mr G Kelly: I have often wished for that power. Mr Kennedy: Several attempts were made, but they were all illegal. Mr Attwood: The matters under “What won’t devolve” were negotiated to exhaustion in Hillsborough, and the British would not concede any further ground on the appointment and removal of the Lord Chief Justice and the Lords Justice of Appeal. I wish that it were different, and I would like discussions on that to be re-opened, but it does not look likely. However, we could argue for it, and if there was devolution we would argue for it again when things were up and running. The concordat may well be in the consultation document, but I have not picked up on it. Can our advisor advise us on what that was meant to cover? Mr McFarland: Under “What will devolve” it says: “governing the independence of the judiciary”. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is worth saying that this should be read in conjunction with paper on the role of the Lord Chancellor. Some of the material in that is relevant to this debate. Alban flagged up this matter because he could see that it might cause a problem. Mr Attwood: Is the concordat a post-restoration agreement? Mr McFarland: The concordat is with the Assembly, but presumably before the devolution of policing and justice. The Committee Clerk: The concordat is between the UK Government and the Northern Ireland Administration governing the independence of the judiciary, because it is part of the guarantee of the independence of the judiciary. Mr McFarland: Presumably that concordat is drawn up when the Assembly is up and running — because the Assembly cannot agree it before then — but before the devolution of policing and justice. It is difficult to imagine policing and justice being devolved without a guarantee or concordat on the independence of the judiciary. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is it not the case that one group will advocate that most, if not all, these matters, should be devolved; a second group will say that there is no chance of that happening; and a third group will say that some matters should be devolved? Mr McFarland: The Committee agreed that to acknowledge the fact that parties wished to register issues, but that remaining issues were being considered. Unless we can change the plan, we will have problems in agreeing the concordat. We talked about registering our objections to the plan. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I take it the standard response on this — Mr G Kelly: As Alex Attwood pointed out, we have been through lengthy negotiations. Sinn Féin is in favour of the transfer of all these matters. The paper entitled ‘The Role of the Lord Chancellor’ states: “The Lord Chancellor’s role in making judicial appointments has been devolved to an independent Judicial Appointments Commission”. However, that will not happen until the institutions are up and running and policing and justice have been transferred. Judicial appointments will automatically revert to that commission. That is straightforward; they will become the responsibility of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. Sinn Féin’s position is that those matters should be transferred. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex Attwood said that it was flogged to death at Hillsborough and that it will not be transferred. Mr Attwood: The Lord Chief Justice will not agree to it, and people here have responsibility for his — The Chairman (Mr Wells): May I have the views of the parties on my right about these proposals? Do you agree that the Lord Chancellor’s functions and judicial salaries should be transferred also? Mr Kennedy: No, the UUP is content that the Lord Chancellor is an appointment of the sovereign Government and they, therefore, have arrangements for salaries, and so on. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is what we would have expected. Do members agree that it is not worth taking that any further? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next item is the Northern Ireland Law Commission. Everything in respect of that will be devolved. According to the list, no issues remain. Is everyone happy with that? Mr Attwood: The commission should have been set up pre-restoration. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are you content with the powers that it will have? Mr Attwood: No, the SDLP is not content with them, but that goes back to pre-Hillsborough. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We do not want to stir up a hornets’ nest. We will move on to excepted matters. Alan McFarland summed them up to some extent: international relations; extradition; treason — we keep coming back to that; the defence of the realm; remuneration of judges; national security; and the Official Secrets Act. All the issues that would be expected to appear in that table are there. Mr Weir: The Committee is covering all these issues to some extent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am merely tabulating them for ease of reference. The Committee Clerk: The Chairman is specifying that those matters appear in the excepted list. Mr Weir: Presumably, the views of the parties on these issues are the same, regardless of whether they are excepted or reserved. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Sinn Féin wants all these matters transferred, the SDLP says that will not happen, and the Unionists are against any transfer of powers. Mr Weir: The Alliance Party seems to get ignored. Mr Attwood: The SDLP is making the case that these matters should be transferred; every day we make that case. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex, you made the point that excepted matters had come up time and again, but were met each time with a blanket no. Mr Attwood: Yes, on some matters. However, national security issues are separate from, say, the pre-Hillsborough issues, on which the British would not give any ground. The MI5 stuff is still a live issue. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Sean, does the Alliance Party believe that any excepted matters should become reserved or be devolved? Mr Neeson: We are still considering that, but, like others, we believe that the maximum amount of power should be devolved. Mr Kennedy: What part of the word “no” do you not understand? [Laughter.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): There are excepted matters such as international relations. Mr Attwood: Chair, may I ask a question? Arlene mentioned two issues. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I have not yet discovered what they are. Mr Weir: There may be a slight degree of misunderstanding. The issues that Arlene raised probably concern the Police Ombudsman and the Parades Commission. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Does the DUP, therefore, have no issues to raise about table 2, which concerns excepted matters? Mr Weir: Anything that we have wanted to raise, we have dealt with, but those issues are not extraneous to table 2. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Sinn Féin proposes that we have power over acts of treason, the defence of the realm and the remuneration of judges. Mr G Kelly: I did not think that there was any such offence as treason. [Laughter.] Mrs D Kelly: Well, now. Mr Weir: You would not win with that defence in court. [Laughter.] Mr G Kelly: It did not work the last time. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are you saying that excepted matters to do with policing and justice should be transferred to a devolved Assembly? Mr G Kelly: Our position is that the maximum number of powers should be transferred. As somebody has pointed out, we are going through the same list as we have gone through before. I think that Sinn Féin has made its position clear. There is no definition of national security. Come to that, there is no definition of treason. Therefore, our position on table 2 remains the same as that on table 1. That is the only way I can answer your question, Chairman. Mr McFarland: There is a definition of national security; it is just that there is no legal definition of national security. I read out the definition this morning. It is contained in section 1(2) of the Security Service Act 1989, as the letter from the NIO’s devolution and legislation division states. However, that letter confirms also that there is no legal definition of national security. Mrs D Kelly: According to that definition, Chairman, the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) strike in 1974 would have been a threat to national security, would it not? Mr Kennedy: How far do you want to go back? Mrs D Kelly: It was industrial action. Mr Kennedy: What about the attempt that was made at the General Post Office (GPO) in 1916? [Laughter.] Mrs D Kelly: I was merely asking whether the UWC strike would have come under that definition. Mr G Kelly: What was your point? [Laughter.] Mr Kennedy: What about the actions of King James’s army in 1689? [Laughter.] Mr Weir: I would point out that the reference to: “by political, industrial or violent means” relates to: “actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy”, which obviously — [Interruption.] Some Members: Refers to the 1974 workers’ strike. [Laughter.] Mr Weir: That was trying democracy, rather than trying to overthrow it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I think that we are straying. We have covered policing and intelligence services issues. We have discussed the Police Ombudsman on several occasions. Are we content that we have looked at policing issues sufficiently, or do we want to continue to discuss table 2, and leave the issue of the Police Ombudsman? We have covered the whole issue of devolution of policing and justice. Mr McFarland: Chairman, we have covered devolution of policing and justice insofar as we have covered the NIO discussion paper. In the process, we have managed to cover intelligence services. What policing issues were raised initially? We specifically included policing issues when we drew up a list a few weeks ago, and I think that a number of sub-headings were added. Can we be reminded of the issues that went under the heading of “Policing issues”, as my addled brain cannot remember what they were? The Committee Clerk: It probably would have been at the very start. The DUP and Sinn Féin asked for the heading to go in. We do not have the issues at our fingertips, but they would have been those identified in the original papers submitted by parties at the very beginning. 3.15 pm Mr S Wilson: Attitudes towards policing. Mr Weir: I do not know whether it came under that category or not but support for the rule of law and support for — Mr McFarland: That came under category 4 — rule of law — which is our last item — and criminality — but there were other issues that went into that, and I just cannot remember them. The Committee Clerk: At the outset, the parties presented five-minute position papers on what they saw as the big issues. We included policing because a couple of the parties mentioned it. Underneath that, different parties raised different matters. Mr McFarland: Can we take a rain check? Parties may want to come back to this later, in case something was slotted in here that we just cannot remember now. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes, we can return to this. Alan has a point, because we have concentrated entirely on the devolution of policing and justice, rather than overall policing issues. Of course, there have been numerous opportunities to raise general policing issues. If we parked that, would we have time to consider the issue of the Police Ombudsman’s Office? It has come up in discussion several times. Policing comes under three headings: intelligence services, policing issues, and the Police Ombudsman. It would have been nice to try to get to the bottom of that list. Mr McFarland: That would catch us up and put us well ahead for next week. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It would, provided that the debate on the Police Ombudsman was not too long, and we did not have to carry it forward. I detect that there is no objection to the principle of a Police Ombudsman and the powers that the Office has. There has, however, been some discussion about the holder of the post and some of the actions taken. Mrs D Kelly: Surely that is about the appointment, as opposed to the holder of the post. I have not heard any discussion about the holder of the post or how she has performed. Mr McFarland: Hansard will show that there were several discussions about that matter in the first two months of the Committee. Mr S Wilson: I hope that I have made it clear today that one of the reservations about the way in which the post holder was selected was due to her performance, and the lack of trust that there now is in the Police Ombudsman’s Office as a result of that. The recent disgraceful actions of the Police Ombudsman have raised the whole issue of its accountability. She trailed the news media around people’s homes while high-profile arrests of former policemen were being made. The Chairman (Mr Wells): So, issues of concern do exist. It is hardly fair, but we would normally begin with each party giving a five-minute résumé of its position. However, we did not do that for the previous heading. Is any party in a position to give its initial comments on the Police Ombudsman’s Office? Mr Attwood: Sure. The Chairman (Mr Wells): If Alex is ready to go, that will give other folk time to make notes. Mr Attwood: There are several matters to consider. First, though I have no doubt that Sammy and his party have a certain view in respect of confidence in the Police Ombudsman, it is not reflected in survey after survey of public attitudes. It is now confirmed that confidence among the Catholic and Protestant communities, as they are defined in the attitude survey, expressed as a percentage, is now in the high 70s and low 80s, and if they go to the Police Ombudsman’s Office with a complaint, people believe that they will be treated impartially. That is a very high level of public satisfaction. It is based on empirical fact and not on what any party might state in a partial manner. We need to remember that. Secondly, we are fundamentally opposed to what Sammy is hinting at in respect of the accountability of the Police Ombudsman’s Office. The Police Ombudsman reports annually to Parliament, and is subject to legal challenge through the courts. Its decisions, whatever they might be, are referred elsewhere for action. For example, prosecutions are determined independently by the Public Prosecution Service (PPS). Disciplinary action taken against any officer is referred to the Chief Constable for police disciplinary procedures. The Police Ombudsman’s Office is subject to much public and political scrutiny, and is subject to legal challenge. When it makes judgements in respect of individual cases, a determination is made elsewhere on whether any action should be taken. All of that, in my view, represents significant levels of accountability. Any argument for further accountability would be in conflict with any other ombudsman’s office, where it is accepted best practice that the levels of accountability that I have outlined are appropriate. In fact, if a further level of accountability were introduced for the Police Ombudsman’s Office, by which its judgements were appealed to some other body, the first principles of an independent complaints system would be contradicted. Thirdly, analysis of what the Police Ombudsman’s Office says and determines, shows that police officers who have nothing to fear will be exonerated. That happens on a consistent basis. However, those officers who stray beyond the requirements of public service will be held to account. Although that is painful and difficult, it is pivotal to growing confidence in the general administration of policing. The Police Ombudsman’s Office needs more help. In the initiative taken by the Policing Board and the Chief Constable to review all past murders, it has responsibility only for those instances that involved the police; however, it needs further assistance. It has been given some level of funding — I think it is £275,000 — to get that work done, but that project is important enough for overtime and additional funds to be made available both to the Police Ombudsman’s Office and the Historical Enquiries Team (HET). We must support the Police Ombudsman’s Office’s recent recommendations on informal resolution of disputes between citizens and police officers. As a community, we are indebted to it for the very brave investigations that it has launched into the past because, while there should be accountability for all those who have been involved in serious conflict in the past — just as individual officers may be held to account for past actions — those who perpetrated violence in our country should be personally held to account for what they did, whether they were in illegal organisations or in state agencies. The Police Ombudsman’s Office’s work on the Raymond McCord case, the Samuel Devenney case, the Sean Brown case — or on any other past cases — is a very important contribution to what John Hume would refer to as the “healing process”. That work will certainly help all of us to deal more wholesomely with all that happened during the past three or four decades. Mr Neeson: I well remember how the former police oversight complaints body operated. It was noticeable that a very small number of complaints were made at that time, despite its being a time of some of the worst violence in Northern Ireland. When one contrasts that with the Police Ombudsman’s Office today, the number of complaints from right across the community shows clearly that the public at large have confidence in its role. It is important that we focus on the Police Ombudsman’s Office and not on the individual in post, and that we do not focus on individual cases. The Police Service of Northern Ireland is probably the most accountable policing body in the world at present. I regret that the police service in the Republic of Ireland does not have the same facility and that it is not subject to the same level of oversight as the PSNI is from the Police Ombudsman’s Office and the Policing Board. The Police Ombudsman’s Office has made a major contribution since it was established. Not only has it dealt with recent cases, but, as Alex pointed out, it has dealt with cases that happened some time ago. Although I said I would not mention individual cases, I particularly welcome the Police Ombudsman’s Office’s involvement in the Raymond McCord murder case. It is important that the Police Ombudsman’s Office is allowed to be independent. That is vital to further progress. Mr S Wilson: The discussion is fairly predictable. The SDLP supports the spouse of one of its councillors. Nationalists, generally, support a body that is still perceived as partisan and that is not, I believe, particularly effective. The SDLP’s claim that there must be public confidence in the Police Ombudsman’s Office because 60% to 70% of people support it does not rest easily with its denigration of the RUC, which consistently recorded a higher level of public support in surveys. The SDLP’s view is inconsistent. If the RUC could be regarded as a partisan and discredited force, even when it had the support of 70%-plus of people, how can the Police Ombudsman’s Office be considered a model organisation if it has the support of only 60% to 70% of people? The real measure of support for the Police Ombudsman’s Office is how the people who come under scrutiny view it. Do they feel that they get a fair deal? Significantly, I tried for a year and a half to get the Police Ombudsman’s Office to publish the results of a survey of the attitudes of serving police officers towards it. It refused point-blank to publish those results. As it turned out, about 40% of police officers believed that they would get a fair deal from the Police Ombudsman’s Office. I believe that that is a better measure of the standing in which it is held. There are fundamental problems with the perception of the Police Ombudsman’s Office, which is why it is important that any appointment to that body should be done through the Assembly. If a large number of MLAs have concerns about the appointment, it would be subject to a vote in the Assembly. The Police Ombudsman’s Office is starting off from a low base; there is significant distrust. If a new chief executive were to be appointed, there would have to be an indication of widespread support for that appointment. Accountability is, of course, another issue that must be addressed. This morning’s long debate on MI5, the security services and the need for accountability was significant. During that debate, it was stressed that accountability must be to Northern Ireland bodies, and that the Assembly must have powers of scrutiny. However, I quote Alex Attwood, who said that, of course, the Police Ombudsman is accountable because: “The Police Ombudsman reports annually to Parliament.” If the accountability of the Police Ombudsman’s Office can be measured in terms of its reporting to Parliament, it seems a bit odd that an entirely different standard is applied to the security services. Both Alan McFarland and I pointed out that, of course, MI5 is subject to parliamentary scrutiny — and to much greater parliamentary scrutiny than any report that the Police Ombudsman will ever send to Westminster. However, that was not regarded as a sufficient level of accountability. 3.30 pm Many police officers do not have confidence in the Police Ombudsman’s Office and do not feel that they get a fair deal. It has been said that many, who are now ex-police officers, can achieve remedy through the courts, but, in practice, that often means that there is no remedy at all. Going to court requires them to bring expensive cases off their own bats. Having left the police service, they are unlikely to have the support of their federation. Therefore, that aspect of accountability is not open to all those who have a grievance against the way in which the Police Ombudsman’s Office has handled cases. No one can deny that when the Police Ombudsman’s Office decides to take on a high-profile case, it ensures that the case is drawn to public attention, right down to notifying journalists that six or seven carloads of officers are going to arrest a former Special Branch officer. Cameras are in tow and the newspapers are notified well in advance so that media deadlines can be met. The most recent example, and I could cite many others, was last week’s case involving Mr McIrath. The Police Ombudsman’s Office should be held accountable for publicising such cases. Therefore, the way in which we appoint a new Police Ombudsman is important. I have heard the special plea for more resources. The coffers of HET have already been raided to the tune of over £250,000 to finance the Police Ombudsman’s Office. That will severely curtail HET’s ability to carry out its work. The Police Ombudsman’s Office already employs 140 people. I cannot remember the last figure that I got from Parliament, but it costs more than £9 million. When compared to any other equivalent police service complaints procedure in the United Kingdom, that figure represents mega money and mega resources. The DUP is totally opposed to any further use of police resources to finance the burgeoning empire that has grown up around the Police Ombudsman’s Office. I have three suggestions to improve the image of the Police Ombudsman’s Office. The first is to carry out authorised attitude surveys of serving police officers. The Police Ombudsman’s Office should not be afraid to publish those results. At least that would provide a degree of transparency on how police officers view it. Secondly, there must be a layer of accountability, whereby there is redress for officers who feel that they have not been fairly treated during the Police Ombudsman’s investigations. Do not forget that if the Police Ombudsman finds a police officer guilty, the case will not be returned to the police for decision on the sanction. It is often decided that the trauma and the horror that that police officer has been through is sanction enough, and no action is taken at the end of it all and there is no access to redress for the officer, who is left feeling unfairly treated by the investigation. Thirdly, we accept the need for independent scrutiny of complaints against the police. However, to ensure that the Police Ombudsman’s Office has public confidence, the appointment should be more open to debate in the Assembly. Mr G Kelly: The Police Ombudsman’s Office was created to take complaints and to make sure that there is no abuse of power, and it has a scrutiny role. Its establishment was crucial. When talking about this, we cannot ignore the history of the police force here or, indeed, the whole conflict. Sammy Wilson said that some scrutiny is necessary, but I am not sure whether he is opposed to the current Police Ombudsman in particular or to the Police Ombudsman’s Office in general. However, we fought very hard to get the Police Ombudsman’s Office. Sammy mentioned resources also. The Police Ombudsman’s Office is massively under-, not over-, resourced. I do not care whether those resources do not come out of the police budget; HET receives £30 million, yet Sammy is complaining about the Police Ombudsman’s getting £250,000 at a time when the number of past murder cases that it is examining increases daily. In fact, the PSNI hands such cases over to the Police Ombudsman. The argument about scrutiny is circular: somebody scrutinises something, somebody then scrutinises the scrutiniser, and somebody else then scrutinises them. There was a fierce argument about the Police Ombudsman’s Office, as I remember it, after its first major case, which was the Omagh investigation. It made six recommendations, but the only one that was implemented was that the Police Ombudsman should come under the ambit of the Criminal Justice Inspectorate. Since then, the Criminal Justice Inspectorate has carried out work on the Police Ombudsman’s Office several times. The Police Ombudsman’s Office is crucial, and, as Sean pointed out, it has far more power than its equivalent in the South, which, as anyone would tell you, is a toothless tiger. Therefore, the Police Ombudsman, whether Nuala O’Loan or someone else, should have that scrutiny power, and needs resources to carry it out. Earlier, we got into an almost institutional argument about whether the Assembly has a veto over the Police Ombudsman’s Office. Sinn Féin wanted that particular power to be devolved so that its credibility would increase. Why is anybody surprised that the police do not like the Police Ombudsman’s Office? It is there to take complaints against the PSNI. As cops are very insular, it would be impossible to find one who supports the Police Ombudsman’s Office, and no cop will praise an organisation that exists to keep them right. Therefore, we are a bit naïve to think that we would find such a person. We need an independent complaints system. Given that there is a great distrust of nearly anything that the NIO pays for, the Police Ombudsman began working from a very low base. I lodged a complaint or two, and on many occasions, the Police Ombudsman found against me. However, we must move on. We either need an office to do this job or we do not. If the unionists are arguing against the Police Ombudsman’s Office, let them do so. However, we should not make this a personal argument about Nuala O’Loan or anybody else. Let us continue to have somebody in the post who is independent, and let us, above all, keep the Police Ombudsman’s Office independent. It was established to scrutinise the police. It has a very clear purpose, because there was an abuse of powers in the past. With all due respect, without that scrutiny function, any organisation would abuse power. Therefore, the Police Ombudsman’s Office is very necessary. Mr McFarland: We support the concept of a Police Ombudsman; it is an extremely healthy one. On a personal level, Mrs O’Loan is a very nice lady, and I like her. But can you imagine the chaos that there would have been if Eileen Paisley, wife of the Rev Dr Ian Paisley, had been nominated as Police Ombudsman? [Interruption.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): Baroness Paisley. Mr McFarland: I look to Sinn Féin and the SDLP to tell me of the wailing and gnashing of teeth that would have occurred at the injustice of the Rev Dr Ian Paisley’s wife being made Police Ombudsman. You can just imagine it — I can hear it now. So can nationalists and republicans not understand that this was not perceived by unionists as playing the game? I will leave it at that. It is not a personal issue; it is one of perception. Had it been the other way round, there would have been chaos. People would have been throwing themselves off cliffs because of it. I remind Members — and Patten was quite clear about this — that the deal was that the Police Ombudsman would look at issues post-1998. The Office was to be allowed to go back before April 1998. If a police officer came into her sights, she was permitted to examine whether that officer had been guilty of previous activities similar to those for which they now stood accused. That was the deal. No sooner was the SDLP in than it got at the Ombudsman’s Office as some sort of deal-breaker and, suddenly, it was a one-sided truth commission. It went straight back to 1972, to the Devenney case in Derry. That was not the deal, and it is grossly unfair. That is not what the Police Ombudsman’s Office was supposed to be about. It was political, and it was used for political reasons, and that was not right. The issue is one of fairness. Sammy spoke about that. Despite what people say, there is no oversight of policies, or of what the Ombudsman’s Office is doing and why. There is oversight on the money side, and reports are produced; but, with regard to pre-1998 matters, the Ombudsman’s Office is not questioned on what it is up to and why. I have no problem with chasing police officers who are up to no good, but why are we going back through the past 30 years without bringing any terrorists to book, while the Ombudsman’s Office is after police officers who may or may not have done something in the past? If we want to visit the past or have some sort of truth commission, then let us have one. Let us put our colleagues around this table into the dock to question them about what they did in the past. Let us have all those politicians out. I have no problem with that. If we spend 50 years raking over old wounds, we will never heal this community; but the idea that a Police Ombudsman can thrash around in the past, trashing members of the security forces, is grossly unfair. No one can say: “Why are you doing this?” or “What are you at?” The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am having difficulty spotting the consensus here. [Laughter.] Mr Attwood: I do not want to lengthen the debate, but there are a few things it might be useful to mention. Mr Kennedy: Are we going to go round the block again? We can do that, but what we are not going to do is allow people to have the final say. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Each group normally gets its five minutes on the issue, and then there is an opportunity for Members to question presentations. We can then move towards some proposal where we can reach consensus. I am having difficulty in seeing that, but Alex, this is your question on one of the presentations. Mr Attwood: I have a few questions and comments, although it is odd that at 3.45 pm someone has begun to question how the meeting is being conducted when a fair bit of latitude has been given by each party to every other party. Mr Kennedy: Get on with it and we will see what you think. The Chairman (Mr Wells): And you will get that latitude. 3.45 pm Mr Attwood: I do not often comment about the current Police Ombudsman. However, I advise people to look at what the SDLP said when Mrs O’Loan was appointed, rather than rush to embrace the portrayal of her as being in one particular camp. We laid down very clear requirements in respect of her conduct, as we would in respect of the conduct of any Police Ombudsman. We were informed that the current Police Ombudsman had previously sat on the Police Authority for Northern Ireland at a time when it was our view that Police Authority was not a forum in which people should participate. Sean will know that better than anybody else. This portrayal of the current Police Ombudsman as somehow being in somebody’s camp is mischievous, dangerous and personally disrespectful to her. I suggest that you look at both her personal history and at the SDLP response to her appointment. We laid down very strong criteria, saying that we would judge Mrs O’Loan by what she did. You can come back on that. Secondly, if you want to look for something positive, I find it very encouraging that Sammy Wilson is now so protective of the HET, even to the point that he says that a small sum of money was taken from its budget to give to the Police Ombudsman. That is actually not true. The NIO found a separate budget line to fund Nuala O’Loan’s part of the HET inquiries. However, his endorsement of the HET and his concern that it might lose some money is reassuring and very welcome. When it comes to parliamentary accountability, I hope that Sammy is now suggesting that MI5 should be subject to a level of accountability at least equal to that of the Police Ombudsman. If he is suggesting that, we are making some progress on a very hard issue that we tackled earlier. It would mean that there would be public hearings in respect of MI5, as there have been for the Police Ombudsman; reports would be published and laid before Parliament, as happens in respect of the Police Ombudsman; a parliamentary Committee could compel witnesses and call documents in respect of MI5 matters, as is the practice in respect of the Police Ombudsman. If that is the model that Sammy is promoting in respect of MI5 because it is equal to that of the Police Ombudsman, as a starting point, I strongly welcome it. I do not want to talk about the current investigation in respect of Raymond McCord, save to say that any citizen — whether an ex-police officer or not — who fails to co-operate with a proper and serious inquiry into serious wrongdoing should be compelled to participate in the inquiry rather than keep silent or walk away. Finally, police officers are concerned about what the Police Ombudsman does; that is probably inevitable. I prefer to draw conclusions from the public approval rates of 70% to 80%, not from the 60% to 70% that Sammy mentioned. Furthermore, the police leadership says that the Police Ombudsman is part of the essential architecture of the new beginning to policing. When the police leadership is allied with the wider public sentiment, the conclusion can be drawn that, on this issue, police officers’ concerns are often self-serving. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Thank you, Alex. I am a wee bit uneasy about people actually naming cases. It has happened from both the DUP side and your party. I will stop that from now on because both cases are under investigation and are a legal matter. Mr Kennedy: I think that Alex misses the point to a certain extent. Most of us have tried not to personalise the Police Ombudsman in terms of the present occupant, but, whether we like it or not, there is a perception — certainly in the unionist community — that she is in some way aligned to, associated with, or sponsored by the SDLP. Certainly when it comes to defending her, Alex has been in that vanguard. We want more objectivity in the performance and, particularly, the role of the Police Ombudsman. We must also ensure that the empire building that has undoubtedly been a feature of the current term is at least controlled and curtailed into a meaningful and useful role, rather than a role that is designed to cause major problems that, in themselves, are not easily solved. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have heard varying views on the Police Ombudsman and her role. [Laughter.] Interestingly, the discussion has homed in on the person and her policies rather, than the actual legislation on, and function and powers of, the Ombudsman’s Office as an institution. There seems to be consensus that a group, body or individual must scrutinise the police. I am at a loss as to how we can proceed. Apart from the fact that we have agreed to discuss the issue in the Preparation for Government Committee on devolution of policing and justice, which meets on Wednesdays, I cannot envisage there being any consensus on it. There will be a Police Ombudsman regardless of whether there is devolution. It will not, therefore, be an impediment to ongoing discussions on devolution. As there is no proposal, how do members wish to proceed? Mr McFarland: Chairman, you may be aware that for several years, those issues have been aired in the Policing Board, and they have been aired here today. Like you, I cannot envisage a solution. This issue may park and resolve itself eventually. Mr Kennedy: It is all happening in the car park. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes, it is about seven storeys high at this stage. Are members content to move on? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There are some practical issues that I hope will short and sharp to deal with. First, I am conscious that the Committee has been meeting for the past two months; members have given up their holidays, and some individuals, whom I will not name — there are certainly half a dozen — have been extremely faithful and have been here at practically every meeting. Despite that, there does not seem to be any perception of that in the media. I am talking not about our discussions or disagreements, but the fact that the meetings have taken place. The Subgroup on the Economic Challenges facing Northern Ireland has issued press releases to keep the media updated, and I am conscious that the Committee has not done that. I have had a brief discussion with the Committee Clerks, and we have scribbled out a draft press release for your approval. You will be glad to hear that it is not too controversial. To be honest, I have been disappointed that there has been so little media coverage on the effort that members have made. Mr McFarland: Chairman, one of my colleagues raised the issue with a senior journalist. He enquired why that was the case, given that Hansard is available on the web and that anyone who is interested in politics could find some of the issues that the Committee has discussed during the past two months very fascinating. Mr Kennedy: Steady on. Mr McFarland: The word was that they were not getting press releases and could not be bothered to read Hansard. I thought to myself, wow — that says a great deal about the level of journalism that exists in Northern Ireland. Mr Weir: I do not know who that journalist was. However, I suggest that he was being slightly economical with the truth. I have been to several meetings of the economic subgroup. A press release that roughly outlines the evidence that was presented has been issued after almost every one of those meetings. That information is in digestible form and tends to be a page or so in length. However, those press releases have been completely ignored. According to one newspaper, Committee meetings supposedly occur only when the trustees of the Assembly Members’ Pension Scheme (Northern Ireland) 2000 meet, despite the fact that either the Preparation for Government Committee or its subgroup meets every day. Sometimes, the media will run the stories that it wants to, irrespective of the information that it has been given. It is essential that the Committee issues press releases in the interests of openness and transparency and keeps the public informed of the facts. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Admittedly, the draft press release is somewhat bland. It states that the Preparation for Government Committee has continued to meet over the summer recess and will continue to make efforts to scope the issues that are to be resolved prior to devolution. It goes on to say that, in addition to the meetings of the economic challenges subgroup, which will report to the Committee on 25 August, the Committee has been meeting three days per week. Members have been discussing institutional issues, law and order issues, and equality and shared future issues. Today, the Committee discussed devolution of policing and justice, and policing issues generally. There is not much to the press release: it is simply to show that we are working away and doing something. Mr McFarland: Is it worth sending a copy of Hansard to each of the major media outlets? I wonder whether a political editor would be more inclined to have a quick glance through Hansard if there was a copy on his or her desk. It is more difficult to go on the Internet, scroll through it, print it all out etc. Do members see any merit in that? A copy costs about £8. The Committee Clerk: It costs £5. Mr McFarland: Perhaps the budget would not stretch to that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is a big undertaking. We need to speak to the Assembly press office about that and also ask that at least a press release is sent to advise editors where to find the Hansard on the Assembly website. I spoke to the editor of one of our biggest newspapers yesterday who was totally unaware that it was available. Mr McFarland: The Hansard reports would need to be sent to the ‘Belfast Telegraph’, the ‘News Letter, ‘The Irish News’ and ‘Daily Ireland’. They could also be sent to the BBC and UTV, and perhaps to the ‘Daily Mirror’ or whatever else is in circulation. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Can we agree to send a copy of the most up-to-date Hansard to alert the media? Are members happy with the standard press release? Mr McFarland: Alerting the media on how to find Hansard may help to some extent, but journalists are just idle. Mr Kennedy: Normally, when a press release is issued to attract wider attention, it includes a point of contact for further comment. Have you given any thought to that or does modesty forbid you? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Molloy and I can handle any procedural queries on what the Committee is doing. Beyond that, questions must be referred to the lead spokesman from each party. Mr Kennedy: Will you and Mr Molloy be in the same radio car this time? The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is unlikely. Mr Weir: I have a small point on the accuracy of press releases. When referring to a discussion on policing and justice issues and, strictly speaking, our remit is identifying obstacles to devolution on those issues, what would be the title of the press release? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We could amend that accordingly. Mr Weir: The real remit is looking at the impediments. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I assume that we have consensus on issuing 10 copies of Hansard to the media and on releasing the press release. Are members content? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The Clerk has asked whether members want to autograph the issues before they are sent out. A communication from the economic challenges subgroup, in Alan Patterson’s name, has been handed to each member. As you can see, members of the subgroup are keen to hear the views of Maria Eagle, but she is on leave until the end of August. Apparently, MPs do not work at all during August. Mr Kennedy: How do you solve a problem like Maria? Mr Weir: By not making jokes about it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The subgroup wants to schedule a meeting with the Minister and the Northern Ireland Youth Forum on 5 September 2006. Technically, that would mean taking evidence after the event. However, because of the importance of getting the Minister’s involvement, it is worth consideration. Are members content to allow the economic subgroup to do that? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The other issue, which we have touched upon several times, relates to the letter from the Secretary of State dated 9 August 2006. Several members have indicated that they are not particularly happy with his response. Mr S Wilson: Have we not already dealt with that? The Chairman (Mr Wells): I was going to ask whether members want to raise any other issues in relation to the letter. Mr McFarland: I thought that we had agreed to write to Secretary of State to invite him to our final meeting, perhaps saying that we expect him to be available, given the importance that he has attached to this Committee. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The issue was whether we were prepared to give him advance notice of our questions. Mr McFarland: It seems to make sense to give him notice of the questions that we will be putting to him, provided that he will come. Members may wish to raise other issues with him on the day, and we must allow for that. Mr S Wilson: Some questions are technical, so we want him to have advance notice so that we get full answers. If it entices him to come along, there is no reason not to give the Secretary of State the questions in advance. There will be supplementary questions anyway. Mr Kennedy: Chairman, wherever the Secretary of State is with his bucket and spade, he has access to the Hansard reports of this Committee. Mr S Wilson: I am sure that he is not reading them. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am sure that his officials, at least, are reading them on his behalf. The Committee Clerk: They will have only read the Hansard reports that have been agreed. The Secretary of State does not receive draft copies, so he will be a bit behind. Mr S Wilson: He is probably awaiting the next episode with bated breath. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next meeting, to discuss rights, safeguards and equality issues etc. will be on 18 August 2006 at 10.00 am in room 144. The format is the same: an all-day meeting day starting at 10.00 am and ending at 4.00 pm, with lunch at 12.20 pm. Mr McFarland: Sadly, Chairman, I will miss the next three meetings of the Committee, as I propose to take a week off. The Chairman (Mr Wells): You have been a faithful attendee, Mr McFarland. I think that you have been at every meeting so far. You deserve your week off. The Committee Clerk: Have you got a contact number? [Laughter.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there any other business? Mr Kennedy: We could sing the national anthem. Adjourned at 4.00 pm. |