The Northern Ireland Assembly - Interim Report on the Inquiry into the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in Northern Ireland

Interim Report on
the Inquiry into the 2001
Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak
in Northern Ireland

The current outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the UK does not pose a threat to food safety.

The temporary controls imposed yesterday (21 February) by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) on the export of live animals, meat, and dairy products from the UK have come into force on grounds of animal health, not food safety, because meat and dairy products can be a vehicle for transmitting the virus to other animals.

In a Statement on behalf of the Government yesterday (21 February), MAFF Minister Lady Hayman reported the advice of the Food Standards Agency that "cases of foot and mouth disease have no implications for the human food chain". This statement was widely reported by the media.

Contrary to reports in some newspapers, all fresh meat currently on retail sale will be unaffected by FMD, and there are no implications for meats which have been cooked or processed. Milk, cheese, and other dairy products may continue to be safely consumed. There was one case where raw (unpasteurised) milk was allegedly involved in the transmission of FMD to a person, but this remains unsubstantiated.

Responsible for the management of FMD and relevant enforcement measures; animal movements; export controls; compensation for farmers, and the State Veterinary Service.

Responsible for enforcing meat hygiene regulations in abattoirs and meat cutting plants, including ante-mortem and post-mortem veterinary inspection of animals and carcasses.

National Assembly for Wales: Foot and Mouth Helpline, Tel: 0845 050 4141 (local rates) is open between 8 am and 5.30 pm Monday to Friday, and from 9 am to 1 pm on Saturday.

You will be aware of the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) which has occurred in Essex and of the protective measures put in place by the European Commission.

I would emphasise at the outset that there are no implications for the human food chain from FMD. It is not a food safety issue although the disease has potentially devastating consequences for the Farming Industry.

We have this morning, received a significant number of enquiries from District Councils with enforcement responsibilities for food manufacturers eg milk products, meat products, minced meat/meat preparations etc. While this is purely an animal health issue we have decided to update councils in order that they may be in a position to deal with enquiries.

Fresh meat, meat products and minced meat/meat preparations from the following species cannot be exported to other Member States (including the Republic of Ireland) or Third Countries – bovine, ovine, caprine, porcine or other biungulates (cloven hoofed animals eg deer).
Procedures will be put in place as quickly as possible whereby meat products which have undergone one of a specified number of treatments (eg cooking to specified temperatures or subjecting to pH values less than 6) may be exported following veterinary certification and agreement by the importing country. Please note that it may take a day or two for these procedures to be put in place for some establishments. DARD officers are working on this as quickly as possible and may request information from EHOs including assurances with respect to process controls and traceability.
While the ban does not specifically affect poultry meat/poultry meat products, it is understood that currently (today) Gardai officers are turning away such consignments at Border checkpoints.
Milk or milk products cannot be exported but again procedures are being put in place to allow export following certification of certain treatments. Veterinary officers will again be responsible for such certification and may wish to consult with EHOs in respect of establishments under district council supervision. The approved treatment process for milk products will be heating to a temperature of at least 71.7ºC for 15 seconds or an equivalent treatment eg UHT.
The movement from England, Wales or Scotland to NI of foods of animal origin as outlined above is currently prohibited. Again procedures for veterinary certification of treatments, as outlined above in relation to exports, are being put in place as a matter of urgency. Unit these certifications procedures are up and running, some retailers and manufacturers will not be able to source products of animal origin, whether cooked/processed or not from GB.
The controls outlined above in relation to fresh meat, meat products/preparations and milk products do not apply to foods produced before 1 February 2001.
There may be a difficulty with food produced after 1 February 2001 and now in transit in that it will arrive at the Member State or Third Country of destination without the necessary documentation and may be refused entry. There appears to be no provision for retrospective issue of certification.
When the primary source of the outbreak is identified, provided it is not in NI (which is anticipated), it will be controlled by movement restriction on a regional as opposed to a national basis.

We would ask again that you bear in mind the fact that this is an animal health issue only. All of the control measures are the responsibility of DARD. The Agency would encourage EHOs to cooperate as appropriate with DARD officials during this FMD outbreak. Any detailed queries you receive should be referred to the dedicated help line set up by DARD Veterinary Service – 028 9052 4272.

If you wish to discuss anything further please do not hesitate to contact either Maria Jennings or myself.

Milk and Milk Products from Farms within 2 km of Foot and Mouth (FMD) Pyre sites

The Food Standards Agency has previously issued advice on its website (see address at top of sheet) about the food safety implications of dioxins produced by FMD pyres. We are now updating this advice.

This new information concerns farmers and consumers who exclusively consume whole milk and whole milk products from animals that have been grazing within 2 km (just over one mile) of pyre sites.

The Food Standards Agency has looked at the issue of dioxins getting into milk from pyres. We estimate it is highly unlikely that there will be an increased risk to the public.

There may, however, be a slightly higher, although very small, risk for people who exclusively consume whole milk and whole milk products from the affected farms. This information is precautionary until results of tests come through. It will take at least three to four weeks before the results begin to become available.

In the meantime, consumers who are concerned may wish to vary their diet with milk and milk products from other sources.

Continuing to consume whole milk and whole milk products over the short period until the test results are available would present, at most, a very small additional risk to health.

Further information is available from the Food Standards Agency’s free helpline on: 0800 915 1601.

DIOXIN EMISSIONS FROM FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE (FMD) PYRES: INFORMATION FROM THE FOOD STANDARDS AGENCY

This information note is intended for farmers with animals producing milk for consumption that are grazing on land within two kilimeteres (just over one mile) of a pyre used to burn carcases in response to the FMD crisis. The advice is specifically directed at those producers who consumer milk from their own herd or who engage in direct off-farm sales. In NI, we do not believe that there will be many who fall into this category. We have attempted as far as possible to direct this information to farmers likely to be in this category and, if you are not, I hope you will accept our sincere apologies for troubling you.

1. The following information provides very precautionary advice for farmers, producers and any customers who might be exclusively consuming milk and milk products from cows, goats or sheep grazing on land within two kilometres (just over one mile) of a pyre. Further information or advice will be given once the analytical results from the Agency’s monitoring programme around pyres become available. Sampling has been carried out around large pyres in GB, more is planned and FSA (NI) is arranging local sampling. As the analyses for dioxins are complex, it will be at least three to four weeks before the results begin to become available. In Northern Ireland the number and extent of pyres has been much smaller than in Britain and hence any risk is thought likely to be proportionally less.

2. The Food Standards Agency has previously published advice on its website (see address at the top of this page) on the implications for food safety of emissions from pyres of chemicals known as dioxins. Based on the information we have so far, the Agency advice remains that there is unlikely to be any increased public health risk for the vast majority of people who consume milk and dairy products, even if some have been produced from animals grazing on land within two kilometres of a pyre. However, there may be a slightly higher, although still very small, risk for farmers and others who consume milk exclusively produced from animals grazing on such land. Outlined at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 below is information for those who fall into this category. More general background information is also provided.

3. People who consume exclusively whole fat milk or milk products produced from animals grazing within a two-kilometre radius of a pyre could possibly face a slightly higher risk than others. This would apply to milk from cows, goats or sheep, but not if it is semi-skimmed or skimmed since dioxins occur in the milk fat and this is reduced through these processes.

4. Farmers in this position, and any regular customers of off-farm sales, will wish to decide whether or not to continue to consume whole fat milk exclusively from such sources. Whatever they decide, farmers should inform any customers of the situation. We wish to emphasise that the estimated increase in dioxin levels over the short period until the analytical results from testing around pyres becomes available would present, at most, a very small additional risk to the health of adults or children. We will given further information or advice as soon as we have the results.

5. In the meantime, consumers who are concerned may wish to vary their diet with milk and milk products from other sources.

6. You will be aware that burning on pyres has destroyed many animal carcasses arising as a result of the foot and mouth outbreak. The smoke from these pyres contained a range of substances, including chemicals called dioxins. Dioxins, which are produced as by-products of a number of industrial processes and which are widespread in the environment, have been shown to cause harmful effects in laboratory animals. Over the past ten years dioxin levels in food have steadily dropped and efforts are being made to lower them further in line with World Health Organisation guidelines. Most of the dioxin intake from the UK diet comes from food containing animal fats, such as milk or meat. Dioxins get into these foods through grazing animals consuming contaminated grass or soil.

7. The Agency’s calculations show that most of the dioxins coming from pyres will be deposited on land within two kilometres. We have estimated people’s exposure to dioxins from the pyres. We consider that the risk to public health is unlikely to be increased for the vast majority of people as a result of consuming milk and other animal products from animals that graze near the pyre sites. In reaching this conclusion the Agency has taken the following factors into account:

monitoring around pyres has so far shown that the concentrations of dioxins found in air, when added to those expected for the rest of the year, are no higher than those normally found elsewhere in NI or the rest of the UK;
dioxins are normally present in a wide range of foods and a small increase in dioxin levels in milk and dairy products, meat or eggs from around pyres will only have a marginal impact on the quantities that the public might consume;
most milk from the dairy farms within two kilometres of a pyre would be bulked with milk from more distant farms which will further reduce the impact on the average diet;
existing information about dioxin intakes from the diet shows that eggs make a very small contribution to the overall amount. In addition, most eggs are produced by birds kept indoors and fed on brought-in feed. Hens that have access to the outdoors also receive the majority of their food from bought-in feed. Even within a two kilometre radius of a pyre, the uptake of dioxins by hens is therefore likely to be extremely small;
health risks associated with dioxins normally found in food arise as a result of long-term exposure and are therefore unlikely to be influenced in any significant way by the short-term impact of emissions from pyres.

8. Nevertheless, the Agency is taking samples of milk, eggs, soil and grass from around a range of pyre sites to double check our safety assessments. The analysis of these samples for dioxins is complex and it will take at least 3 to 4 weeks before the results begin to become available. Further advice or information will then be issued.

9. If you have any questions about the contents of this letter you may obtain further information by telephoning the FSA helpline on 0800 915 1601. Calls to the helpline are free.

Today the Agency issued new information for certain groups of consumers and to dairy farmers [ii] to provide them with the latest advice on milk from animals grazing near to pyres.

The Food Standards Agency previously issued advice about the food safety implications of dioxins produced by pyres.

The information applies to the very small number of people who only consume whole milk and whole milk products from animals that have been grazing within 2 km (1.2 miles) of pyres. The vast majority of milk and milk products sold to consumers are bulked (mixed) and are not affected.

The Food Standards Agency has been continually reviewing the issue of dioxins getting into milk from pyres. The Agency estimates that it is highly unlikely that there will be any increased health risk to the vast majority of people.

But there may be a slightly higher, although very small, additional risk for people who only consume whole milk and whole milk products only from animals within 2 km of pyres. This advice is precautionary until results of tests on milk come through. The results will not begin to become available until the end of May and it will take until the end of June to form a complete picture of the situation.

Continuing to consume affected milk and milk products over the short period until test results are available would present, at most, a very small additional risk to health.

In the meantime, consumers of these products who are concerned may wish to vary their diet to include milk and milk products from other sources. Skimmed or semi-skimmed milk, or products made from these, are not affected.

"This is highly precautionary advice for a very small number of consumers. It is for people who only consume whole milk and milk products that have come exclusively from animals near pyres.

It is unlikely there will be any health concerns but we need to double-check with the results from tests on milk. It is right that consumers who may be affected have the information to make their own decisions, where there is uncertainty. We will make public the results of the tests and issue any further information that may be required."

Sampling of milk, soil, eggs and grass stated at the beginning of May when cattle were being put out to pasture from their winter quarters. Testing was timed to ensure that the highest levels of dioxins would be measured. Dioxins take time to build up on grass and can be washed away. It also takes time for dioxins to build up in milk. so far, samples have been collected at Holsworthy – Devon, Sennybridge – South Wales, Anglesey – North Wales, Dumfries and Galloway – Scotland, and Cumbria. Locations have been selected to represent a range of pyre types and conditions and give valuable information for the future.

An advice line has been set up for daily farmers on 0800 915 1601 (7 days a week 9 am – 6 pm).

A: It only applies to whole (full fat) milk that comes from animals grazing within 2 kms of pyres and which has not been mixed with other milk. It does not apply to milk that is generally consumed by most of the population as this milk is mixed from a variety of sources. As dioxins only accumulate in fat, skimmed or semi-skimmed milk are not affected.

A: It applies to people who only drink or eat full fat milk products from animals grazing within 2 kms of pyres.

A: No. Milk is an important part of a balanced diet. If you only consume whole milk and whole milk products that come exclusively from animals grazing within 2 kms of pyres, then you may wish to vary your diet with milk and milk products from other sources. Or, you may wish to drink skimmed or semi-skimmed milk.

A: No. It is unlikely that there will be a significant amount of cheese from these sources on the market before the test results are known.

A: No. Dioxin intake in the diet from eggs is very small. In addition, most birds are kept indoors and the majority of free-range birds are fed on bought in feed. The amount of dioxins from pyres in eggs is likely to be extremely small.

A: No. If you consume these products and they come exclusively from animals grazing within 2 km of pyres, then you may wish to vary your diet with products from other sources.

A: It is unlikely that there will be any health risk from any milk or milk products. However, consumers who obtain all their whole milk or whole milk products from animals grazing within 2 km of a pyre may wish to make their own choices about continuing to consume these exclusively until the test results come through.

A: Research on some laboratory animals shows that long-term exposure to dioxins can cause cancer and might therefore cause cancer in humans. That is why every effort is made to reduce exposure to dioxins.

A: Testing was timed to ensure that the highest levels of dioxins would be measured. Dioxins take time to build up on grass and can be washed away. Also takes time for dioxins to build up in milk.

Most of the dioxins from pyres will fall on land within 2 km of the pyres. The FSA considers that this is unlikely to increase the health risk because:

Monitoring around pyres has shown that dioxins in the air, when added to those expected for the rest of the year, are no higher than those found elsewhere in the UK.
Dioxins are present in a wide range of foods and a small, temporary increase will only have a marginal effect on total dietary exposure. Exposure in the diet to dioxins has fallen by about 75% since 1982.
Most milk is mixed from a variety of sources before entering the food chain thereby reducing individual exposure to any dioxins that may be present.
Risks associated with dioxins arise from long-term exposure and are unlikely to be influenced by short-term emissions.

Telephone: 020 7276 8888
Out of hours duty pager: 07669 074642
Fax: 020 7276 8833

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. The General Consumer Council for Northern Ireland is a statutory body set up in 1985 with the general duty to promote and protect the interests of consumers. The Council’s remit and responsibilities cover food and we therefore appreciate the opportunity to contribute to the Foot and Mouth Disease Enquiry. We hope our comments are useful.

2. While the Council was not intimately involved with the handling of the crisis we welcome the Enquiry, which we consider to be worthwhile and timely, in light of the aftermath of Foot and Mouth Disease [FMD].

3. Our understanding is that, overall, the way in which the FMD crisis was handled in Northern Ireland mitigated against, potentially, the worst effects of the outbreak. Despite this, we believe that certain lessons can be learned.

4. For example, it is our understanding that there was no contingency plan in place for a FMD outbreak. It may be prudent therefore; as has been done post-BSE, to develop a contingency plan in preparation should future outbreaks of FMD occur. Such a contingency plan should be respectful of all stakeholders’ concerns, including consumers. We also believe that an all-island approach to contingency planning is necessary given that animal and human diseases and infections are not mindful of land borders.

5. The Phillips’ Report made a number of recommendations relating to the handling of the BSE crisis. The Food Standards Agency [FSA] has subsequently published a ‘Framework for Measuring Food Risk Management Against Phillips’ Lessons’ [post-BSE]. It concludes that after any review [such as the Phillips Enquiry] policy makers should consider what lessons have been learned that might affect the future management of food risks.

6. It is our view that the FSA framework is applicable, in principle, to the FMD crisis and should be regarded as an important risk management tool for the future.

A commitment to an ethos of greater transparency, openness and information about levels of uncertainty.
More open risk communication to the public.
More consistent approach to the application and use of the precautionary principle.
Better monitoring to ensure effective enforcement and clear lines of accountability.
Government working in a joined-up manner (with the devolved authorities) without administrative barriers to ensure that information is shared effectively and without delay.
Government action underpinned by principles of transparency, accountability, consistency and targeting of risks.
Advisory Committees should not dilute their assessment of risk with a view to avoiding the expression of public alarm.
In cases of scientific uncertainty all reasonably practical precautions should be taken.

8. We also consider that it would be useful to adopt a retrospective ‘What if.?’ approach in reviewing the action taken post-FMD. For example, what if FMD had the propensity to affect public health? This would aid contingency planning and help to cover other eventualities.

9. The key lesson to be learned, post-FMD is that there must be effective controls against the introduction of disease in the future.

10. We therefore believe there is a need for a more consistent approach by all Member States towards more effective controls on the importation of animal and plant foodstuffs which could pose a threat to animal or public health. This would include more rigorous enforcement at airports and ports. Alongside strengthened domestic import controls we would therefore recommend a concurrent review of existing EU control procedures and standards.

11. We believe also that import controls could be strengthened generally, by better and more high-profile advice to the public about the dangers inherent in the illegal importation of potentially dangerous foodstuffs and ingredients. Any consumer advice, or request for co-operation, must be user-friendly and non-threatening.

12. More can and should be done to give the public and consumers regular and accurate information about the health and food safety status of Northern Ireland livestock generally. Information of this nature is usually given reactively and defensively in response to the latest crises. As a result it tends to get ‘lost’ in the attendant controversy.

13. We therefore recommend the need for better communication and information policies generally. This would serve to restore confidence among consumers at times of crisis and, as we said in our response to the DARD Vision Document, help the NI Agri-Food Industries to become better ‘connected’ with its customers.

14. We recommend that more effort and more resources should be devoted to improving bio-security in animal husbandry and at farm level generally.

15. As part of this, traceability systems should be expanded and developed. This is essential both to give effect to animal health and disease control measures and to reassure consumers as to the quality and safety of food. The introduction of an electronic identification system was previously considered by the DARD Vision group in its recent report. It recommended that the Animal and Public Health Information System (APHIS) be expanded to cope with additional data arising from identifying and recording movements of sheep and pigs. To this end, we support the introduction of the APHIS system of electronically tracing all livestock.

16. We recommend much stricter enforcement and penalties for those whose actions place the public at risk and damage the Agri-Food Industry at the same time. This should apply throughout the food chain covering such things as the illegal use of veterinary medicines, growth promoters etc as well as the illegal movement of livestock which contributed to the FMD crisis.

17. We have previously drawn attention to the need to review modern animal husbandry and farming practices. Although not directly connected with FMD there is, to give one example, considerable concern over the extensive and routine use of antibiotics in animal feed and the implications this has for public health.

18. An essential part, therefore, of any post-FMD review should be a more general review of modern farming methods and practices to minimise the risk and avert future crises.

19. The disposal procedure used in the 2001 FMD outbreak gave rise to concern over potentially harmful dioxins being emitted from the funeral pyres of livestock carcasses. Before this would be repeated we recommend that, as part of contingency planning, further research into the effects of these emissions into the environment and the associated public health consequences should be undertaken.

20. We also believe that a different disposal mechanism [to burning] would be more publicly acceptable. We therefore recommend further research into alternative methods of disposal of carcasses should slaughter be necessary. On this last point there is a need also for more research into the development of alternative [other than slaughter] treatments of cattle or sheep in the event of a future FMD outbreak.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY:
north of ireland veterinary association (niva)
and
association of veterinary surgeons in practice in
northern ireland (avspni)

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in your review of the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in Northern Ireland last year.

1. This is a joint submission by the North of Ireland Veterinary Association (NIVA) and the Association of Veterinary Surgeons in Practice in Northern Ireland (AVSPNI). The membership of the two Associations is made up of the majority of veterinary surgeons in Northern Ireland represent including those in private practice, government, research and teaching and industry. Many of our members were directly involved in the diagnosis and eradication of outbreaks as well as the follow up clinical inspections, serology and animal movement controls.

The Associations would welcome the opportunity to give oral evidence to the Committee

2. Available evidence indicates that the FMD virus entered Great Britain through waste food fed to pigs then spread to sheep through which it moved to France, the Netherlands, the Republic of Ireland and of course Northern Ireland. The single European market has encouraged free movement of animals and goods with minimal hindrance. This has led to the removal of quarantine and severe reductions in checks of animals and goods at ports and at points of destination. There is now almost complete reliance on the checks done at the point of origin. The difficulty is that as with FMD in sheep there may be few clinical signs or the animals may be in the incubation period when inspected. The virtual absence of inspections at the Northern Ireland ports and minimal checks at the given destination much reduced the possibility of early detection of the disease.

As legislation in relation to trade is laid down in Brussels there is limited scope for influence at regional level. It therefore makes sense to apply industry-based codes of practice for importers to provide for additional controls to help protect and enhance Northern Ireland’s animal health status. There is scope for this through an Animal Health body as suggested in the follow up to the Vision report.

3. The movements of animals are dictated by economic considerations. With reference to sheep movements prior to the FMD outbreaks it would appear that they moved to the Republic as there were VAT advantages, to Northern Ireland to make up numbers for subsidy purposes and to France to become French sheep which command a higher price in French slaughterhouses than imported sheep. We believe that such economic incentives need to be controlled largely to avoid the welfare problems that transport over such distances will inevitably cause but also to reduce the risk of spreading disease. A relatively small number of traders are involved in such trade and a few of those unwilling to follow the rules cannot be allowed to put Northern Ireland’s animal health status and the economic well being of so many at risk. Effective action must be taken by the enforcement agencies to ensure that these rogue traders are prosecuted.

4. It appears that contingency planning did not foresee a FMD outbreak spread by sheep involving the huge economic impact that it did. DARD’s Veterinary Service did well to cope with the four infected premises but any more would have stretched it beyond its present resource. Any future contingency plan should include the early deployment of veterinary surgeons from private practice in disease surveillance, clinical inspections and animal movement controls. Private veterinarians can be mobilised quickly under such circumstances, as much of their usual work will be postponed under the circumstances of an epizootic. There would need to be integrated training (state and private veterinarians) and exercises with all stakeholders to ensure, as far as possible, that the contingency plan would be effective and practical. It must be noted that veterinary surgeons in practice will only continue to be available while there is sufficient need and work within the industry and it is important that disease surveillance is carried out by those with the necessary expertise.

5. There was serious trade and economic consequences associated with the outbreaks with many parts of the food processing industry and other having to certify goods having no prior warning. Future contingency plans must include all parts of the industry and others on which there will be an impact. It is suggested that the contingency plan should be available through the DARD website and updated as required. This would allow other bodies to review and respond to DARD with suggestions for change in light of developments and advances in industry and science. The co-operation of those involved across the agricultural industry, food processing industry, government and others during the outbreaks was note worthy but as the farming base reduces in size and other industries increase in economic importance, as was seen in Great Britain, there may be less chance of such co-operation in future.

6. Contingency planning needs to take care of other aspects. DARD’s APHIS computer provides information on bovine herds but not on pig herds or sheep flocks. Rectifying deficiencies in databases of information on flocks and pig herds and linking in geographic information systems to associate lands to animals and their owners would be necessary in preparedness to establish vaccination zones. It is probable that with the advances in vaccine technology vaccination is very likely to be used in control of future outbreaks. That is, the use of vaccines which can be differentiated from field infection by serological testing of blood samples. In this regard it is important that sufficient laboratory capacity and expertise is maintained to ensure that serological tests can be carried out in large numbers as was required during the outbreaks.

7. The use of the military was very effective and it was commendable that they were brought in early in the Northern Ireland epidemic despite the recognised difficulties they could face working in some areas. Their training and attitude projected a desire to get the job done which is very welcome in an emergency situation.

8. Communications are always a problem in emergency situations. It is felt that this should be centralised so that the same information is provided. Many people were directed to their Divisional Veterinary Office for information and this led to inconsistency of information provided. People close to the ground are busy with practical problems and work and unable to keep up with information from the centre when that is provided. There was also a failure to provide information to the profession, which had huge implications for the work they were doing in advance of giving it to the press for what seemed to be political reasons.

9. On the ground the slaughter of animals in the control zones was slow and some slaughter teams did not work effectively. It would have been more effective to have a number of slaughtermen working under the supervision of a veterinary surgeon rather than veterinarians doing this work thus freeing up scarce veterinary expertise. On the State Veterinary side veterinary resource was used in non-veterinary tasks when more effective use could have been made of that expertise. Despite this the infected farms and culls were dealt with effectively and much credit for this must go to the personnel, both veterinary and lay people, directly dealing with the work.

10. At farm level the concept of biosecurity still seems to be poorly understood despite the outbreaks and other ongoing disease problems. The application of simple biosecurity helps to protect against the spread of epizootic disease as well as endemic disease. This is an issue industry for the industry and must be led by them with help from the veterinary profession. Recently introduced herd/flock health plans for the Farm Quality Assured Scheme will help in this respect.

DAVID STEWART, BVMS, CertPM, MRCVS MICHAEL MAYBIN, MVB, MRCVS
President NIVA President AVSPNI

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Northern Ireland Meat Exporters’ Association would offer the following comments to the Committee of Agriculture and Rural Development on the 2001 outbreak of this disease in Northern Ireland.

To begin with NIMEA would like to express its appreciation to the Minister and the Chief Veterinary Officer for the firm and effective manner in which the disease outbreak was dealt with in NI. While the decisions involved inconvenience to many people they were swift, decisive and effectual in containing the disease to a small number of cases. Had it not been for the nature of this action, Northern Ireland could have experienced a much higher incidence of the disease. Credit must be given for the manner in which policy was executed once the disease struck. NIMEA would congratulate the Minister and DARD on the actual and practical policies imposed.

While expressing appreciation of the actions taken after the disease struck NIMEA would also have to voice a degree of concern at the apparent very lax situation that pertained prior to the disease striking. It is appreciated that the "Single Market" philosophy permits free movement of livestock between Member States. However unscrupulous dealers who have since been identified in the trail of things were using the names of NI meat plants to import sheep from GB into and through NI for reasons other than declared. This information was common knowledge and was passed by meat plants to DARD officials but was apparently regarded as irrelevant due to the single market movement philosophy. Proper livestock import controls at the port of landing with correlation at the relevant meat plant would have confirmed the accuracy of the documentation and these livestock movements.

[a] NIMEA would be critical of the apparent "blind eye" that was turned in favour of these dealers and hauliers. It was as a result of these inaccurate declarations and movements that the disease arrived in NI.

[b] NIMEA would be of the opinion that if information from meat plants to DARD had been acted upon, then NI may well have been protected against, and escaped from any incidence of the disease in 2001.

[c] NIMEA would urge DARD that such livestock import controls be established to ensure no re-occurrence of previous habits. NIMEA members are prepared to co-operate in establishing a commercially acceptable system with DARD to ensure the necessary monitoring of sheep imported for direct slaughter.

[d] NIMEA would also advise that all livestock coming into NI should go direct for immediate slaughter or direct to the farm of destination. In the interest of disease control, under no circumstances should livestock imported from GB be permitted to enter directly into a livestock market to go for multi destination dispersal until after a specified domicilary period at the declared destination of importation.

[e] In the interests of an all-island individual sheep identification programme, DARD should implement individual electronic identification of sheep in NI as a further measure to fully secure the protection of the NI sheep flock in the possible event of a further disease outbreak.

[f] NIMEA is of the opinion that all meat for further processing and livestock coming into NI should be licensed to move ONLY between sender and destination point, as indeed currently is the case with meat.

[g] NIMEA would also propose that for the size of NI one port is sufficient to accommodate the movement of livestock between GB and NI and that these activities should be confined to Larne Port. This also makes sense from a staffing and cost perspective.

For many years, lambs produced in NI and sold live through livestock markets found their way into the ROI and assumed a new "Irish" identity that apparently allowed a VAT system there to be abused. These movements were undertaken in such a manner that they also deprived the LMC of the much needed levy income due to them on the "unrecorded export" of these lambs. Since the introduction of identification of sheep by tagging, sheep entering meat plants in NI have been subjected to 100% observance of this ruling while in livestock marts it appeared that a more lax attitude was adopted.

[a] It is therefore again the opinion of NIMEA, that had the rules been administered with equal vigour in respect of all livestock movements, at all approved centres, much better controls would have been in place to safeguard NI in a disease situation. This is a factor that needs to be considered in future contingency plans.

[b] NIMEA is of the opinion that history has shown that the less scrupulous dealers have tended to use and abuse livestock market facilities and thus create the perception that this is one of the weaker control points in the NI animal movement system. This is not a direct criticism of Livestock Markets themselves.

NIMEA would be disappointed at the attitude displayed by some farmers when delivering livestock to meat plants during the FMD restrictions. Vehicles were not always cleaned on the farm and meat plant facilities were used as the cleansing and disinfection centres for the countryside at large. Farmers displayed evidence of not changing clothes when leaving the farm and even brought the farm dog in the vehicle. There appeared to be a very varied approach among farmers, with some exercising exemplary attitudes but with others taking things a lot cooler. Farmers insisted in coming into the slaughterhall areas in meat plants, which in a disease situation, would be the highest risk area one could possibly visit. Consideration should be given to future controls in this area in a disease outbreak situation. The Cleansing and Disinfectant procedures implemented by meat plants were much superior to those introduced at major control points by DARD thus giving the impression that Meat Plants were over-reacting to the possible dangers. DARD’s cosmetic spraying of vehicle wheels at high-profile PR points did nothing to give credibility to those who did make serious C&D efforts to safeguard the NI livestock industry.

[a] NIMEA would therefore be of the opinion that some farmers did not fully appreciate the potential seriousness of an FMD outbreak to NI. NIMEA would also be disappointed that in too many cases farm bio-security was not taken seriously enough as part of the prevention policies imposed to keep the disease out of NI.

[b] On at least one occasion suspicion of the disease found in a meat plant lead to its closure for a period and subjected the workforce, who come from a very wide area of the rural community, to the possibility of further disease spread. Perhaps more could have been done at farm level to examine livestock before movement.

It would be the perception of NIMEA that there are different standards of enforcement for different situations, regarding the identification and movement of animals. While it is accepted that new EU rules have placed a high burden of documentation on producers, there has been a relaxed attitude towards enforcing this. NIMEA accepts that DARD has in the past exercised a well-balanced "carrot & stick" approach and slowly encouraged producers to comply with the necessary rules. However this very acceptable and understandable approach in normal times has apparently been taken by a few as latitude not to always comply, thus adding to the problems when a serious disease situation like FMD arises. Future contingency plans must highlight the necessity of proper records to ensure any disease crisis has the minimum effect on everyone.

Meat Processing Companies in N.I have been visionary in their approach to changing standards in the production of food and have established processing facilities to meet the wider UK retailer supply requirements of the 21st century. The suspension of livestock and meat product movements between GB and NI was accepted reluctantly as a very necessary disease precaution for the benefit of the entire industry in Northern Ireland. However NIMEA believes that carcass or further processed meat products could have been allowed into NI for processing and returned to GB in their entirety without any increased risk to the NI livestock industry, had a controlled system been put in place. Many added value processing companies lost both income and business due to the imposition of "shut-down" as far as GB raw material was concerned.

[a] NIMEA would be of the opinion that controlled consignments of meat from "FMD free" regions of GB posed a significantly lower risk to bringing FMD into NI than did the daily human passenger traffic at both ports and airports. If NI processors are to develop high standard UK and Continental business supply bases in NI to the benefit of the economy here, then it is essential that they have access to the raw material required by their customers to further process.

NIMEA would congratulate the Minister and DARD on the regular briefings held to keep the community informed about the disease and the restrictions being imposed. This gave representatives the opportunity of getting first-hand information right from the "top".

[a] However again NIMEA is disappointed that this very useful facility appeared to be misused by some organisations who sent many more than the invited number of representatives, in what appeared to be attempts to "hog the agenda their way".

[b] In spite of this, it remains the opinion of NIMEA that such briefings should be part of any future strategy when such disease emergencies occur.

NIMEA is of the opinion that much more needs to be done in the DARD colleges to engender an attitude of compliance of rules on-farm and that, hassle as it may be, it is a necessary farm business component to function properly in today’s marketplace.

[a] With the emphasis in the Vision report on IT training for farmers, this should include the development of user-friendly software by which farm record keeping could be made simpler and more time efficient.

[b] In respect of all EU subsidy claims, consideration should be given to applying the principles of proof established in the system for claims for export refunds.