The Northern Ireland Assembly - Interim Report on the Inquiry into the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in Northern Ireland

Interim Report on
the Inquiry into the 2001
Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak
in Northern Ireland

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1A Large numbers of Northern Ireland farming families draw income from pedigree breeding enterprises. This small province is a centre of excellence for livestock breeding with a greater concentration of pedigree breeders than any other similar sized region of the British Isles.

1B The Northern Ireland Texel Sheepbreeders’ Club, with over two hundred members, is the largest pedigree group in this province and the strongest of 17 clubs making up the British Texel Sheep Society. Itself the most important pedigree society in Europe.

1C Despite being only 4% of the total UK land area NI is home to 14% of pedigree sheep registered with the British Texel Sheep Society. One third of commercial lambs processed in NI are sired by pedigree Texel tups.

1D In common with virtually all other breeds of pedigree sheep and cattle produced here top NI Texels are sold to mainland farmers. Texel sales attract buyers from major sheep farming areas throughout these islands, especially lowland Scotland, north Wales and northern England. When currency levels are suitable bidders from the Republic are also very active.

1E NI pedigree Texel breeders are frequent buyers and sellers at major sales in Lanark and Carlisle. For genetic improvement to continue it is essential this two-way trade continues. Without access to the latest genetic advances NI commercial lamb producers will be at an increasing disadvantage.

1F The outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease curtailed this valuable trade last year and another outbreak would devastate the market for top class rams on the mainland.

2A Compared to MAFF the NI Texel Club and the British Texel Society found communications with DARD staff relatively easy. However;

2B If illegal imports from nations with endemic Foot and Mouth Disease had been prevented this disease would not have reached these islands.

2C Existing animal health legislation logically enforced would have almost certainly kept Foot and Mouth Disease out of NI.

2D Reaction to the outbreak by government was tardy with controls at NI entry points in place after considerable delay. For example, the IOM had tough port and airport controls almost two weeks earlier.

2E Communication between government and the rural community was poor and imprecise. As a result harmful rumours abounded.

2F On the ground there was perceived to be a lack of overall command with weak co-operation between government agencies. Indeed different parts of DARD gave different answers to the same question on the same day.

2G Leadership was lacking and sorely needed manpower was not made available. Yet in the Republic police, regular and FCA army resources were used to support the government veterinary service. Disposal of carcasses could have been greatly speeded up in Co Antrim by using army engineers, including local TA Sappers.

2H Texel Club members felt there was a general lack of organisation in areas such as mid and north Antrim with DARD staff unable to answer simple, practical questions regarding carcass disposal. This uncertainty and inability of DARD to ‘walk and talk’ put further stress on farming families.

2I There was also a general feeling that rules were not enforced in all parts of the country in the same manner.

2J Law breakers never went to court because DARD failed to have suitable legislation in place.

2K Contingency plans for dealing with major outbreaks failed and proved less effective than a generation ago.

2L Farmers were often treated as suspects at a time when their willing co-operation was vital to containing an outbreak caused mainly by government failures.

2M Some decisions defied logic. For several weeks lamb producers were asked to drive long distances through suspect areas to meat plants rather than allow local collection centres to operate.

2N The Minister did not communicate directly with farmers and their families until April.

3A Animal Health legislation must be firmly and fairly enforced throughout these islands and not used to make a political point or protect a home market. An outbreak in one part of these islands has the potential to damage the rural economy throughout the UK and ROI.

3B Imports of food from areas with major animal health problems need effective policing. Extra resources are required at ports and airports with closer links between governments vital. Port controls, our first line of defence, require modernisation and much closer co-operation with officials at the point of embarkation. Their problem can become our disaster!

3C Any new animal health legislation needs to take into account economic realities. The trade in pedigree livestock between this province and other parts of these islands must continue.

3D Neither devolution nor membership of the EU must be allowed to harm pedigree livestock trade nor animal health control measures.

3E Contingency plans should be exercised on a regular basis using staff from all agencies and include representatives of the rural community – farmers, private practice vets, processors and other local businesses – to avoid an ‘and and them’ scenario.

3F During the FMD crisis it took too long to set up useful meetings between DARD and pedigree sheep breeding clubs. This highlights the need to establish links between DARD and the umbrella organisation for pedigree breed groups, ie; the National Sheep Association NI breeds liaison group. Routine meetings held every six months could review topical issues and up date contingency plans in case of another major animal health problem.

3G Leadership was sadly lacking in coping with the 2001 crisis. An overall crisis manager, not necessarily a DARD official, nor even a civil servant, should be selected for each area. both technical expertise and people management skills are required to turn government statements into action – on time.

The 2001 crisis was totally avoidable. The farmers and consumers of these islands deserve better protection from imported diseases.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

This is our copy of written submission into this inquiry, we have already held meetings with Price Water House Coopers into the inquiry which has been commissioned by DARD.

We would be happy to meet with the Committee to discuss our submission and answer any questions or queries you may have.

It is our considered opinion that if a contingency plan existed within DARD very many of the vets on the ground did either not know about its policy or how to implement it. The slow way in which DARD staff reacted to the outbreak in Meigh, particularly in cordoning off the area (which did not happen until the Thursday afternoon ) could have significantly increased the risk of spreading the disease. Further more the cross border traffic that used the road less than 100 yards from the seat of the outbreak was a very serious error of judgement and should not have been allowed to happen.

We would strongly urge that appropriate import controls be put in place for animal and plant imports and especially those from countries outside the EU. Questions need also to be asked about the controls and checks from GB to slaughter here. Simple controls failed and recourses seem to be blamed again for inappropriate checks.

We strongly urge that a contingency plan be put to consultation before being adopted by DARD and it should be made available on their web site. This should contain all possible plans from containment to slaughter and disposal. Ideally this plan should be identical in both parts of the island. It became apparent very early on that the Republic was far better prepared for this disease than we were.

One major criticism of DARD is the lack of communication not just with the public but with its own staff. Farmers on the ground did not know what was happening from day to day. There was an inability to get accurate information for such things as movement licenses etc. DARD local staff listened to radio and TV for news on what was happening. This lack of communication led to a situation of farmers feeling very frustrated with DARD staff, this was particularly the case for those who lost stock. For those who had animals burned on farm, it took many months to sort out how to re-instate land and also the cleansing and disinfecting of premises. This led to hostile relations between farmers and DARD staff and it took the intervention of the Support Worker to resolve these issues.

During our discussions with DARD we made it clear that we needed help in dealing with the very many problems faced by farmers and their families in the aftermath of the foot and mouth culls. DARD agreed to fund a Rural Support Worker to deal with these problems. This project was delivered locally by The Rural Health Partnership, we feel that this was crucial in the aftermath and was very much welcomed by the community. This worker was able to resolve very many difficult issues and worked closely with DARD staff both locally and at a senior level and was able to go directly to anyone inside or outside the department to have problems resolved. This project lasted from May to mid December.

We would strongly recommend that this type of support is written into any contingency plan as it has proved vital in helping farmers in the aftermath of FMD.

Farmers who lost stock had serious knock on effects, the inability for DARD to adequately deal with valuations that were substantially below market price, and the consequential loss suffered with many animals going OTMS on farms has not been resolved. The further effects upon the marts, the tourist trade and other agricultural sectors was very damaging.

After regionalisation market prices increased, had this not happened more significant losses would have occurred.

During the FMD crisis all animal movement was prohibited except under license, however BR and TB reactors were also forced to stay on farms. We believe this was a mistake. These reactors lay for up to 18 weeks compounding the disease problem on farms. A method of removal should have been found, we are now reaping the disease implications of this policy. These reactors could have been shot on farms or removed by license. The economic impact of these diseases will be very great in their own right, and a substantial amount can be put down to FMD controls.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

I have been asked to respond to the inquiry into the foot and mouth disease outbreak.

Since the vast majority of members of the GAA come from rural areas it was very important that all members obeyed the instructions laid down by your department. The Association laid down strict guidelines for the playing of our games and members living within a certain area were actually forbidden to come to our grounds.

Hopefully there will be no recurrence of the outbreak, but if there is your department will have the full backing of our club and from the GAA in general.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The following measures taken during the Foot and Mouth disease (FMD) crisis were widely accepted as necessary to combat a further spread of the disease.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Thank you for your letter of 1 May inviting a submission from the Ulster Farmers’ Union to this Inquiry.

As you are aware, DARD has commissioned an independent review of the Foot and Mouth Disease epidemic in Northern Ireland. The UFU has already submitted evidence to this review but also welcomes the opportunity to provide the UFU’s views to the NI Assembly’s Agriculture and Rural Development Committee. I have, therefore enclosed a copy of a written submission from the Union.

I trust that this is of use. The Ulster Farmers’ Union would be happy to meet with the Committee to further elaborate on our submission.

This submission has been divided into three broad headings and outlines the issues within each which the Union considers to be the main salient points

The UFU was not aware of the existence of a ‘contingency plan’ for dealing with an outbreak of FMD. As such, we are unable to comment on the content of any such plan or on the level of DARD’s preparedness in relation to the FMD outbreak during 2001.

The FMD outbreak clearly demonstrated fundamental faults in the UK’s epizootic disease controls. There is an obvious need to review and more importantly strengthen the controls on commercial and personal imports which exist. There is equally an urgent need for a review of EU controls for both animal and plant imports, particularly from Third Countries.

More locally, the introduction of the disease into Northern Ireland and the relevant controls or lack of them at the Northern Ireland ports of entry is a subject of great debate within the industry. While the UFU accepts that trade between GB and NI is within a single EU Member State and, therefore, EU intra-community trade rules did not apply, it is essential that a full explanation is obtained on the audit and correlation controls for ‘direct for slaughter’ sheep and also that corrective action is taken to avoid the introduction of further diseases by a similar manner in the future.

The single most important decision taken during the FMD crisis and ultimately the single most effective measure in averting a much more serious FMD outbreak in not only Northern Ireland but the island of Ireland as a whole, was that of the introduction of an almost immediate ban on the importation of animal and animal products from GB into NI following the identification of the first FMD case in Essex.

The introduction of this ban, immediately after the confirmation of the first FMD case in GB, while creating extreme practical difficulties for the farming industry, was again crucial in preventing many more outbreaks of FMD in Northern Ireland. At that time, a number of Northern Ireland farms were implicated in the Essex case and, additionally, consignments of livestock had only recently been imported from GB into Northern Ireland.

This ban was, however, relaxed on a gradual basis when, based on veterinary advice, a reduction in controls was considered appropriate.

Like the ban on livestock movements, this created many practical problems for the farming industry. However, the necessity of applying such an approach was widely accepted as being essential. The continuation of improved bio-security at farm level must be encouraged. Equally, until the threat of further FMD outbreaks ultimately receded, the ongoing additional controls introduced at ports of entry into Northern Ireland and, more importantly, the unwavering support and co-operation of the general public in complying with the restrictions imposed on them played an absolutely crucial role in overcoming the FMD crisis in the Province.

The swift action taken by DARD in this area was crucial and was responsible for the identification of Northern Ireland’s first FMD case at Meigh, South Armagh.

However, the inadequacies of the sheep movement control system which existed at that time were particularly clearly demonstrated. In addition, the issue of fraud in relation to both the different Value Added Tax regimes which exist in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the EU’s Sheep Animal Premium Scheme and the avoidance in the Republic of Ireland of the UK Specified Risk Materials regulations in the slaughter of sheep over one year old was uncovered.

The action taken by DARD in almost immediately slaughtering all cattle within the 1 km zone of an FMD outbreak and all pigs and sheep within a 3 km zone once an FMD case had been confirmed was crucial given the nature of the FMD virus. This action was pivotal in preventing many further outbreaks occurring.

The livestock valuation, slaughter and disposal methods used were in general both efficient and effective.

The issue of a vaccination policy was discussed by the industry but was considered by the UFU to be the wrong course of action to follow given the small number of FMD cases and its associated trade implications.

The swiftness of the Republic of Ireland in obtaining ‘regional FMD status’ from the EU Commission after its first and only confirmed FMD case in comparison to the delay in obtaining similar status for Northern Ireland of approximately one month after the Province’s initial FMD outbreak was an issue of concern. However, the action taken to achieve regionalisation in terms of the ‘extended cull’ of sheep in the cross-border zone in South Armagh and North Louth in the Republic of Ireland and the widespread serology programme in the sheep population which followed were both essential in ultimately obtaining regionalisation status for Northern Ireland.

Given the extreme fluidity of the FMD crisis as it evolved, there appeared to be very regular liaison and co-operation between the NI and RoI Departments of Agriculture. However, while decisions were taken and altered very rapidly at central DARD level, the major criticism which the Ulster Farmers’ Union would make on DARD’s handling of the FMD crisis is that of inadequate communication: within DARD itself; with the wider agriculture industry; and with the farming communities within the three FMD affected areas of South Armagh, Ardboe and Cushendall. While regular ‘update’ meetings were held between DARD and representatives of the agrifood industry and, ultimately, closer liaison was established between senior officials from DARD and Northern Ireland’s two main farming organisations, these were insufficient in ensuring that the implementation of the decisions taken were widely and fully understood at ‘ground level’.

With the exception of those farmers directly involved in the three FMD outbreak areas in Northern Ireland, the financial effect on the majority of farmers throughout the Province was ‘neutral’ in that any extra costs incurred were generally offset by higher market returns after ‘regionalisation’ had been obtained.

For those farmers directly involved in the FMD affected areas, the provision of compensation for livestock slaughtered based on ‘re-stocking’ values and also compensation for consequential loss were not satisfactorily resolved.

Other sectors of the agriculture industry, particularly the livestock auction marts who were legally forced to close, and other industries, particularly the tourist trade, were more severely affected economically.

However, during the crisis and the enormous uncertainty which it entailed, this was an extremely stressful period for the farming community. While various much welcomed measures were introduced to address this particular issue, it is imperative that this is fully considered and incorporated into future contingency planning.

One of the key lessons to be learned from the FMD outbreak in Northern Ireland is the need for effective controls against the introduction of diseases in the future.

To this end there is firstly a necessity for a thorough review of current EU controls. Secondly, the UK must address the inadequacies of its existing control system, particularly in relation to both commercial and personal imports. Finally, it is imperative that the Northern Ireland authorities maximise their ability to strengthen controls on both animal and plant diseases within the permitted EU framework – the current pursuit of revised livestock import controls between Northern Ireland and Great Britain is fully supported in this respect as a means of commencing the process of ultimately delivering an all-Ireland animal and plant health policy.

The establishment and regular review of effective contingency plans involving all stakeholders is a pre-requisite to addressing any future major animal or plant disease outbreaks. The necessity of: ensuring sufficient resource availability; an effective logistical programme; proper communication; and simulation exercises are all essential. This is an area where improvements can be made.

The ability to effectively identify, trace and control the movements of livestock is a fundamental to effective disease control. The inadequacies demonstrated in the system which existed before the introduction of FMD and the scope for fraudulent activity at the expense of the general agriculture industry must be addressed. In particular, the development of a cost-effective electronically based, centrally recorded livestock identification and movement control system is essential.

The Food Standards Agency previously issued advice about the food safety implications of dioxins produced by pyres.

REVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED IN INQUIRIES BY COUNCILS IN G.B.

Introduction

In the aftermath of the 2001/2002 UK Foot and Mouth outbreak there was a general call to find out what went wrong with the established procedures that are meant to prevent such a devastating animal disease from ever entering the UK in the first place. However it became evident that a multi-strand investigation was necessary given the widespread impact the disease had on the rural community in general and the farming community in particular. Not only was it necessary to find out what went wrong with biosecurity protocols but an assessment of the government’s response to the disease and what needed to be done in order to be prepared for any future outbreak was also required. While the government initiated three national inquiries [iii] to address these issues a number of local councils also initiated inquiries. Although the findings of the national inquiry will undoubtedly be of relevance to the Committee’s own inquiry it was thought that the inquiries carried out on a more local scale would be of more significance. The four counties examined encountered very serious outbreaks; Cumbria for example had almost half the number of cases in the UK. This is obviously on a different scale to NI where only 4 cases arose but the issues may give the Committee some insight into what could have occurred had the outbreak got out of control and allow for some comparison of how DARD handled the outbreak here.

This paper therefore will outline the major issues that arose through three county councils inquiries: Cumbria, Northumberland, Devon. The paper aims to provide the Committee with relevant background information that will assist it in accordance with ToR1.

Themes

(i). Biosecurity

One of the common points that arises is the perceived inadequacies of biosecurity measures within existing border controls. In particular there is a requirement to minimise the possibility of meat products being brought into the country in hand-held luggage or in non-declared meat consignments. To put this in perspective, in 2000 over an eight month period, a total of 14 incoming flights from Africa were searched by UK customs. These searches found 5.5 tonnes of meat and fish in personal luggage [iv] . The potential for infected meat to be smuggled into the country is therefore high and the risk exists that this may ultimately be eaten by livestock who could then contract the disease. This is supported by the DEFRA report ‘Origin of the UK Foot and Mouth Disease epidemic in 2002’ which states that ‘The source of the virus for the 2001 epidemic was most probably infected or contaminated meat or meat products .’

At a more local level the Northumberland Inquiry concluded that the main responsibility for biosecurity lay with the farmer i.e. maintaining high cleanliness, hygiene and animal welfare standards. To some extent this is borne out by the findings of DARD’s report which recommends that the farmer must implement biosecurity measures as a matter of course and, as recommended in the Vision report, any farm assurance scheme should have an animal health and welfare component.

(ii). Livestock trading

Transportation of animals and dealing in animals outside of established markets can contribute to the spread of disease i.e. buying, transport to another region of the UK and subsequent reselling of animals. This may require reconsideration of movement controls once animals have been purchased or returned unsold from a market i.e. that they cannot be moved from the purchaser’s/owner’s property for a statutory period. This would require changes in legislation.

(iii). Vaccination

There should be a reassessment of the use of vaccination to control FMD. Private vets who are utilised by the Department should be trained in the handling of disease epidemics.

(iv). Culling and disposal

In the UK, contiguous culling was carried out i.e. animals on farms adjacent to other farms where an outbreak had occurred were culled even though there was no evidence of disease. The culling of apparently healthy animals caused considerable distress to owners and their families who questioned the necessity to do this. The Devon Inquiry suggested that this approach should be reviewed and contiguous culling confined to ’dangerous contacts’ only. The Committee may want to consider the Department’s view on ‘contiguous culling’.

(v). Animal Health and Welfare

As in NI the movement of animals was severely restricted. This developed into an animal health issue, for example in assisting lambing and the necessity to transfer animals on to other grazing. It is acknowledged that the Department in NI could not have been as successful in containing the disease if it hadn’t had the co-operation of farmers in adhering to a range of restrictions including movement restrictions. However the Department ran the risk of losing this good will as the imposed restrictions in themselves began to cause potentially serious animal health and welfare issues. During the local GB Inquiries it was suggested that the local movement of animals e.g. across roads, or where there is minimal risk of contagion should be considered to alleviate animal health/welfare pressures. The Northumberland Inquiry suggested an infected area could be declared where the most stringent animal movements could be imposed but outside this area restrictions could be for a limited time but subject to renewal based upon a formal risk assessment.

In addition, in NI the emphasis on FMD containment resulted in the monitoring of other diseases, and appropriate action that should have been taken in light of this monitoring, being severely curtailed. The Committee may want to consider whether the Department needs to reassess how it can maintain an adequate approach to other potentially serious diseases (Brucellosis, TB) while addressing an exotic disease outbreak.

(vi). Public Access

In NI as well as GB public access to the countryside was severely restricted. This has consequent effects on other aspects of the rural community such as rural tourism. It is suggested that there might be scope for a pragmatic risk-based approach to closure of parks, recreational areas etc. that might help to minimise this impact on these non-agricultural aspects of the rural area while containing the spread of disease.

(vii). National Contingency Plan

There has been a call for the development of a National Contingency Plan that should be transparent and encompass the views of all relevant parties through an extensive consultation process. This recommendation is based on the evidence submitted to Committees that MAFF was not working to any coherent contingency plan. Rather there was only an ‘internal’ MAFF plan that was overtaken by the scale and rate of spread of the disease. This suggested approach would be similar to that being developed in NZ i.e. a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. The roles of different organisations involved in the response would be clear and it would also allow the plan to be developed and ‘owned’ by those most affected i.e. the rural community and the farming community in particular. Such a plan should be updated as research and legislation changes, and practical exercises should be carried out to test the effectiveness of such a plan. DARD’S own report acknowledges that a contingency plan did exist but was little known outside the Department.

(viii). Management team

There should be an overarching management team that ensures consistency of policy in all aspects of the response.

(ix). Communication

MAFF was criticised for its poor approach to communications which cultivated an atmosphere of secrecy and confusion. There appeared to be no actual communications strategy in place. Effective communication was seen as central to the success of any strategy with involvement from all media sources. DARD regularly updated the Committee which was usually recorded by local TV and radio. There were also numerous Press Releases etc. However, DARD’s report states that communication was one of the least well-managed aspects of DARD’S response to the outbreak.

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