The Northern Ireland Assembly - Interim Report on the Inquiry into the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in Northern Ireland

Interim Report on
the Inquiry into the 2001
Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak
in Northern Ireland

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1.1 As the District where the first Northern Ireland outbreak was discovered, the Council were able to witness at first hand what happened in the immediate aftermath of the announcement.

1.2 In terms of the actual public there was a lot of initial uncertainty about the disease and what they could and could not do. There was a need for more communicating, not only between DARD Officials and agricultural organisations, but to ensure that people and particularly farmers at ‘ground level’ knew what was happening.

1.3 In general DARD acted in a prompt and efficient manner and at the Council’s request a senior Officer came and briefed the Council’s Management Team on how the outbreak was being addressed and offered advice on how the Council should deliver its services.

1.4 However, there were concerns particularly in regard to the initial checkpoints that were put in place. Although border controls were quickly established, traffic was still allowed to pass through Meigh for a short time, which was particularly concerning given that the infected area was less than a mile from the Village centre.

1.5 The introduction of the livestock movement ban was crucial to stopping the spread of the disease, but it did cause severe hardship. The concept of ‘fortress farming’, which was promoted rigorously in the weeks following the outbreak undoubtedly helped to reduce the risk of disease spread.

1.6 The emergency measures for the slaughter and disposal of animals in Meigh Village area was the cause of much distress to the locals. The leaving of slaughtered animals in the fields and the burning of carcases near a primary school all caused deep distress never mind nuisance.

2.1 During the initial weeks the media (particularly television) portrayed a very negative image of the area in terms of burning of carcases, etc. There was a focus on the illegal movements of animals, which had led to the outbreak and it is quite right that this should be investigated.

2.2 However for obvious reasons the outbreak had a devastating impact on the farmers in the district. Restrictions on movement were needed for obvious reasons, but other diseases such as TB and Brucellosis were once again allowed to thrive as restrictions could not be lifted from farms. This has now witnessed the huge number of restricted herds in the South Armagh area due to Brucellosis.

2.3 The tourism sector suffered greatly as events such as the Mournes International Walking Festival and St Patrick’s Day Parade had to be cancelled. Border based tourism businesses such as ‘Tain Holiday Village’, Omeath, Co Louth and East Coast Adventure Centre, Warrenpoint, Co Down were also adversely effected. Newry and Mourne District Council, while acknowledging the need for caution, continually promoted a more positive message, eg ‘Newry and Mourne is open for business’. This remained the central thread of the Newry and Mourne media message.

Newry and Mourne District Council is still continuing to lobby DARD to provide compensation to the tourism industry in the District, given that South Armagh was at the heart of the outbreak.

2.4 While the ring of steel around Newry and Mourne District Council area was important to prevent further outbreaks, it causes all business in the District to suffer, particularly those involved in local goods trading and those involved in exporting of products to and from the Republic of Ireland.

3.1 Contingency plans, particularly those affecting basic services such as refuse collection, were not in place. DARD had to be convinced that it was better to have the refuse collection continue albeit with severe controls. Leaving the refuse uncollected would have made a bad situation worse. There is therefore a need for better liaison with Council in order to organise and advise how services at a local level should be run in a time of crisis. These contingency plans should also be put in place at a more regional and national level.

3.2 As the Foot and Mouth outbreak proved, diseases don’t recognise borders. As proved during the crisis co-operation needs to happen between the North and South to ensure the best chance of properly tackling any disease. There is therefore no doubt that now is the time for an ‘All-Ireland Animal and Plant Health Policy’.

3.3 The Foot and Mouth outbreak showed the inadequacies in the current system for monitoring the control and movement of livestock. A foolproof centralised recorded livestock identification system is needed in order to reduce the opportunities for future fraudulent activity.

3.4 There is no way of telling if Foot and Mouth will strike at Northern Ireland again, but if this happens Newry and Mourne District Council would like to see the proper contingency plans in place to prepare for all eventualities.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. Council welcomes the fact that this opportunity is being taken to conduct an enquiry into the Foot and Mouth outbreak of 2001 which has had a major impact on both the farming and Agri Food Industries. It is acknowledged that it is imperative that lessons are learned and that the necessary measures are put in place to ensure that Northern Ireland is protected from future outbreaks of epizootic disease.

2. Urgent consideration needs to be given to the formulation of a unified national emergency plan setting out the role of all stakeholders. No one Department can deal with all aspects of an outbreak. It would be highly desirable that Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland is treated as a single identity and so the issue of land frontier controls would not need to be separately addressed. It is important that this issue be dealt with now when Food and Mouth is fresh in the minds of all – farmers, farming unions, industry and Government.

3. The arrangements at ports and airports to prevent epizootic diseases entering the country are lax and should be looked at as a matter of priority. The incidence of illegally slaughtered meat, etc. gaining entry to the UK mainland is well documented. The practices of countries such as Australia and New Zealand should be examined and incidences of good practice should be adopted for Ireland and the United Kingdom.

4. Lessons must be learned from the Foot and Mouth outbreak of 2001 in respect of movement of animals. No movement of animals for slaughter or otherwise should have been permitted into Northern Ireland from the UK mainland when Foot and Mouth was suspected. If live animals were to be allowed into Northern Ireland surely the imposition of a quarantine period would have been a sensible approach.

5. The introduction of the compulsory ear-tagging of sheep and details of sheep movements would appear to be a necessary matter for regulation.

6. There were unacceptable delays in the slaughter of animals (South Armagh area). Contingency plans for all areas of the country should address issues of where and how animals are slaughtered and disposed of. It is important that District Councils are part of the consultative process as they can in many cases advise on matters of pollution, Health & Safety, Statutory nuisance, private water supplies, contaminated land, etc.

7. Business, particularly Agri-food business has had to cope with many additional restrictions and regulations and this has been enough in some cases to put them into financial difficulties. What might appear small matters like change in documentation can have major impact on a firm exporting food products. It is important that plans are made and kept updated by DARD/FSA to ensure that there is no repeat of the confusion which was present during the Foot and Mouth outbreak of 2001.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

I refer to your correspondence dated 1 May regarding the above indicating that the Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development is undertaking an enquiry into the above. Members of Derry City Council have since considered the enquiry’s terms of reference and provide the following comments for the committee’s consideration:

1. There is a need for a more sustainable approach to agriculture and food production to prevent market opportunities for meat wholesalers to travel the length and breadth of the country seeking livestock at the lowest possible price. A food chain is needed to ensure consumers know where their food has come from and where it was produced, and can be confident that it is safe and nutritious. A market where consumers understand the nutritional value of their food and feel their aspirations for the world they live in are reflected in purchasing decisions.

2. At present enforcement is split between DEFRA, DARD (NI), Port Health (local authorities) and Customs and Excise. Fragmented border controls and "suitcase smuggling" may have been a contributory factor. Stop and search powers should be available to Port Health Inspectors. All imported food matters should be reported to the F.S.A.

3. MAFF took no account of the basic recommendations of the Northumberland Report into the 1967 outbreak. Why did the concerns expressed by EHOs on nuisance from pyres and burial pits meet with denial and obstruction? Why was CIEH not invited to participate in MAFF’s daily briefings until April despite its experience in pollution control and public health? The Phillips Report on BSE should be studied in detail and its recommendations implemented so that in the event of a future unpredictable bio-emergency, command and control structures are in place. Pyres are not accepted in other countries.

4. It is unfortunate that the recommendations of the Phillips Report into BSE had not been implemented into a crisis management plan. Emergency legislation, produced with little consultation with other regulators was rushed through sometimes with inadequate or incorrect guidance.

5. The agricultural industry in NI suffered extensively and trade was seriously disrupted, a situation exacerbated by the fact that agriculture is such a significant part of the Gross Domestic Product.

6. From a local authority point of view we relied heavily on advice and guidance from DANI (now DARD), which initially was slow to come through and this was confusing due to conflicting messages.

7. North/South cooperation was extremely effective in dealing with the disease and members felt that the only way the agriculture industry could survive was on the basis of an all island industry. The fact that Foot & Mouth Disease did not cross the border is a measure of the success of this cooperation.

b. More effective controls of the movement of all meat and meat products throughout the country and across borders.

c. Fragmentation of the responsibilities for import control needs to be resolved.

e. Implementation of the Phillips Report and the introduction of contingency plans in the event of a future bio-emergency are essential.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1.1 The Rural Community Network (RCN) is the Regional Rural Voluntary Organisation for Northern Ireland. It was established in 1991 by community groups from rural areas to articulate the voice of rural communities on issues relating to poverty, disadvantage and equality. RCN welcome the opportunity to make a submission to the Committee Enquiry into the Foot & Mouth outbreak in 2001.

A reflection by the Board of RCN at the time of the outbreak; and
Some additional points and suggestions for consideration by this committee.

2.1 It is important to acknowledge the trauma that many farm families and others in the rural community have experienced. It is important that community groups give ongoing support where that is possible.

2.2 Information provided has often been confusing. RCN should have a role in developing clear guidance to its members, providing information on where to get advice and further information. It is important that such information is practical.

2.3 There is a need to be aware of the impact the situation was having on women - dealing with the tensions within families and within the community as a result of Foot and Mouth.

2.4 It should be noted that many in rural communities may be unwilling to admit that they are in need of help and may not know where they can to get it. Advice and signposting are therefore essential.

2.5 People may be able to help by diffusing myths and rumours, which can lead to scape-goating.

2.6 RCN should have a role in lobbying for compensation for the wider rural community, which has suffered as a consequence of outbreak.

2.7 Counselling services should be available and targeted at individuals and areas most affected by the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak.

2.8 Local community support has an important potential role. A space to talk maybe provided by local community groups.

2.9 RCN could have a direct role in providing guidance to people who are trying to decide whether or not to go ahead with meetings, using the official guidelines and interpreting them within the local context.

2.10 RCN should reinforce the importance of taking precautions using disinfectant mats, sprays, signs, not just on farms. It was suggested that local councils might help out with disinfectant, as this was quite costly.

2.11 It was suggested that DARD might offer extra help to local CABs as they can offer an essential service at the present time particularly in relation to compensation, income tax and rates.

3.1 A number of people mentioned the importance of a radical review of farming and rural development and that this was an opportunity for RCN to play a role in such a debate.

3.2 Some felt that the crisis provided an opportunity to improve the relationships with the farming community and farming organisations.

4.1 It is important that the committee establish a ‘Multi-disciplinary Change Unit’ to allow those in the changing agricultural crisis to reassess their career opportunities and to make informed choices about / for their future.

4.2 Emerging legislation is being drafted at Westminster for the UK; DARD should link with the development of this Bill through the Northern Ireland Office and be prepared to learn from its experience.

5.1 RCN thank you for the opportunity to make a submission to the Committee Enquiry into the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak and hopes that the above comments are helpful.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Thank you for giving the opportunity to Omagh District Council to contribute to your enquiry into the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in 2001. The Council’s Agricultural Sub-Committee would make the following comments:

1. There is a need to maintain and improve controls at entry points to the UK, particularly the airports. Regulations on the importation of meat and animals particularly exotic should be urgently reviewed.

2. Communication between DARD and both the farming community and general public was considered to be good.

4. Consideration should be given to an enhanced role for local private vets as their local knowledge and expertise would be an asset for education and advice.

5. The effect of Foot & Mouth Disease controls on other aspects of disease control such as TB needs to be considered. No testing for TB was carried out when Foot & Mouth was active.

6. Present methods of animal and transport recording needs to be rigorously maintained, as this information was vital in controlling the spread of Foot & Mouth Disease.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The Council’s Agricultural Sub Committee has considered the consultation request from the Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development in relation to the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in Northern Ireland in 2001, and would make the following comments:-

1 The Council considers that the response by DARD to the actual outbreak was well handled with good co-operation being given by other statutory and agricultural organisations.

2 The Council supports DARD in relation to the level of restrictions that were imposed at the time, even though some of the restrictions had detrimental implications for other sectors.

3 While the response by DARD was considered effective, the Council is of the opinion that there was, and still is, an inconsistency of approach by other UK Departments, and that ‘port of entry’ restrictions could have been more effective.

4 While recommending that ‘port of entry’ restrictions should remain, the Council would request that restrictions relating to Brucellosis testing be re-examined.

5 In relation to compensation, the Council considers that the scheme provided well for those farmers who lost stock, but took little or no account of hardships faced by those farmers who had to care for stock in restricted circumstances.

6 The Council recognises that a fair compensation system would be difficult to put in place, but would recommend that this issue should also be re-examined.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Further to your letter of 1 May 2002 re the enquiry into the Foot and Mouth outbreak on 2001. I apologise for not replying sooner.

1. The Zoo closed immediately the outbreak was announced in early March 2001, and only reopened in late May 2001 following discussions with representatives from the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development.

2. The loss in visitor numbers over this period due to the closure is estimated to be in the region of 58,000. However an aggressive marketing campaign in July and August saw an increase in visitor numbers in those two months which at the year end saw visitor numbers down on the estimated numbers by some 27,000.

3. In revenue terms the loss of income was an estimated £68,136.00 due to the loss in visitor numbers and a further £19,958 in loss of income in the Souvenir Shop. Total lost revenue to Belfast City Council is therefore estimated to be in the region of £88,094.00. (This does not include any losses suffered by the Zoo catering franchise holder or the increased cost of the marketing campaign).

4. When the Zoo did open, the Children’s Farm and Elephant and Giraffe house were kept closed until September as these had been identified as areas of high risk of infection. There were some complaints regarding these closures when the remainder of the Zoo was open to the public.

5. Foot mats were in operation for visitors at the Zoo entrances, (there were some limited complaints regarding this) and the wheels of all vehicles entering the site were sprayed. It is impossible to estimate the cost of these measures but there was a considerable manpower element involved.

6. The movement in and out of the Zoo, of both exotic and domestic livestock was hindered. This caused some disruption to the breeding programmes of those species affected.

7. Movement of domestic stock is still restricted and the Zoo has not participated in as many of the local Agricultural Shows as it did pre Foot and Mouth.

9. Our main concern is the lack of monetary compensation. I believe that ‘compensation’ was given to a number of mainland organisations by the Rural Recovery Scheme.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

I refer to your letter dated 1 May 2002 regarding an enquiry into the Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in 2001, copy of which was presented to a meeting of the Corporate Services Committee held on 22 May 2002. Councillors emphasised in the strongest terms that there should be strict and rigorous controls in place in respect of animals being exported to this country in order to prevent a reoccurrence of the foot and mouth outbreak.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Although the Food and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak was primarily an animal health issue the Food Standards Agency (FSA) was concerned about the possibility of toxic dioxins, from the pyres burning animal carcases, entering the food chain. This risk would only affect people consuming milk and milk products from animals near to the pyres. We advised that those consumers could avoid any potential additional risk by also consuming milk and milk products from other sources. The Agency put in place a monitoring programme, keeping consumers informed of its investigations and, once it had enough data to reach a conclusion, was able to advise that the pyres posed no additional risk to health through food.

Recognising that illegal imports could also potentially introduce food safety risks, the Agency is taking forward an action plan to address those concerns.

1. FSA-NI is grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the enquiry being undertaken by the Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development into the Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in 2001.

2. The Food Standards Agency was set up under the Food Standards Act 1999 and launched on 1 April 2000. Our main purpose as defined in the legislation is:

"to protect public health from risks which may arise in connection with the consumption of food and otherwise to protect the interests of consumers in relation to food."

3. The FSA is a non-Ministerial Government department, operating at arm’s length from Ministers and governed by a Board which is responsible for overall strategic direction. It is a UK-wide body, accountable to the Westminster Parliament and to the devolved administrations through the relevant Health Ministers and has offices in London, Aberdeen, Cardiff and Belfast.

4. The FSA’s role in Northern Ireland is supported by advice from the NI Advisory Committee, set up under the 1999 Act and chaired by Michael Walker, a member of the Board. There are similar Advisory Committees in Scotland and Wales.

5. On learning of the first cases of the disease in pigs and cattle in Essex in February 2001, the Agency moved swiftly to reassure the public by issuing a press release advising that the disease was an animal health problem and posed no threat to food safety – a copy of the press release is attached at Annex A. FSA-NI also wrote to District Councils on that date and a copy of the letter is attached (Annex B).

6. However, although the FMD outbreak was primarily an animal health issue with responsibility falling to Agriculture Departments, there was some concern about possible risks of dietary contamination via FMD pyres, and the Department of Health (London) undertook a rapid qualitative assessment of possible risks to public health from FMD disposal options. They concluded that the exposure to dioxins via the diet from FMD pyres would be minor compared to background exposure through the rest of the diet (Department of Health, London (2001)): Moot and Mouth: effects on health of emissions from pyres used for disposal of animals, (www.doh.gsi.gov.uk). It was apparent that, although the pyre combustion, atmospheric dispersion and food chain modelling on which the assessment was based represented the best available science, there were large uncertainties in parts of the model.

7. The Food Standards Agency was keen to investigate further the degree of uncertainty inherent in the assessment and so convened a meeting of external experts from Government agencies and academia on 15 May 2001 in London.

8. The Agency commissioned a programme of monitoring dioxins in food produced in the vicinity of FMP pyres to validate the risk assessment and started collecting samples of milk, eggs, soil and grass from locations selected throughout the UK to represent a range of pyres types and conditions (Anglesey and Gwynedd, Cornwall, Cumbria, Devon, Dumfries and Galloway and County Down). FSA-NI arranged for DARD to collect the NI samples. It was however going to be a period of weeks before the first results from the programme would be available. At that time, cattle were just beginning to be put outside to graze any dioxins deposited to grazing land would need time to accumulate in their fat before being excreted into their milk. The complex nature of analysis for dioxins at such low levels meant that analysis could take a couple of weeks. The Agency, both in Great Britain and here, therefore issued precautionary advice on 25 May to farmers with animals on land within 2 km of a pyre (it was considered that most of the dioxins would fall on land within that distance of a pyre – a copy of the advice and the associated press release is attached at Annex C). The advice explained the risk assessment and the proposed monitoring programme and suggested that people who consumed whole milk and whole milk products only from animals within 2 km of pyres might wish to vary their diet to include milk and milk products from other sources. It stressed that the Agency continued to estimate that it was highly unlikely that there would be an increased human health risk. Reaction to this advice was generally very positive.

9. Results from the monitoring programme were published in reports issued on 5 July, 8 August and 20 September. By the time the third report was published, results were available for 120 samples of food and animal feed and 39 environmental samples. The Agency considered that these results showed that the pyres had posed no additional risk to health through the food supply and concluded that the precautionary advice issued on 25 May was no longer necessary.

10. The impact of FMD also led to some public concern about imported food, in particular about the possibility that illegal imports of food might have the potential to spread disease which could affect animal health. Whilst Foot and Mouth Disease is essentially an animal health issue, the Agency recognises that illegal imports carry the potential to introduce food safety risks and is taking forward an action plan, approved by its Board, to address food safety concerns about imported food. The plan includes recommendations to:

Bring imports of products of animal origin with the remit of the Agency.
Improve liaison with enforcement authorities and central Government on food safety.
Establish an electronic information database for port health authorities with relevant local authority access.
Improve training of port health officers.
Increase powers for port health officers over personal imports.

11. Inspection functions in respect of meat, liquid drinking milk and production holdings are carried out by DARD on behalf of the Agency and during the outbreak the Agency was assured that those functions were not adversely affected.