The Northern Ireland Assembly - Interim Report on the Inquiry into the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in Northern Ireland

Interim Report on
the Inquiry into the 2001
Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak
in Northern Ireland

Mr Fitzduff: I am grateful to the Committee for inviting me here today. I will make it clear when I am answering on behalf of the Rural Community Network, and when I am answering from a personal point of view.

The Rural Community Network is a voluntary organisation with over 500 members, 350 of whom are from community groups in rural areas. It attempts to articulate the voice of rural communities on poverty and disadvantage. In 1991, community groups in rural areas set up the network to act on their behalf. It supports the further development of an infrastructure of 12 rural support networks, the last of which was recently formed in south Antrim and was launched at our annual general meeting last weekend.

We are concerned about the trauma that people experienced, and continue to experience, as a result of the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. The issue affects humans as well as animals and the agricultural industry. We are also concerned about the ramifications for communities, particularly for those in which the outbreaks occurred and in which the impact of the disease still reverberates.

I will focus on two issues. The first is the clear need to guide those involved in farming through the process of change. The difficulties that they experienced in dealing with that process were exacerbated by foot-and-mouth disease. However, our systems are not equipped to support people in reflecting and coming to terms with what has happened, and is happening, to their businesses, their economy and the broader agricultural framework. No facility exists to guide people through that process of change towards a new future. As a consequence, people think only of how they can get things back to the way they were before the outbreak occurred.

Regretfully, that is one of the areas in which I feel more could be done for people going through the whole process of change in agriculture, particularly relating to the effects of foot-and-mouth disease.

I have a limited knowledge of the second area. The Westminster legislation in relation to the emergency planning scene is being reviewed. I have touched base with some people working on that, who have complimented Northern Ireland on its achievements in relation to the review process — particularly those of Bill Clements and Judith Brown. It appears that they are fairly far ahead of the game in relation to bringing forward that legislation, which would not affect Northern Ireland directly but is likely to provide a framework for it.

That has been critiqued on the basis of increasing disasters, such as flooding and unforeseen circumstances regarding disease control. However, it is centred on the need for greater co-ordination across the system to meet local requirements when such difficulties occur. The thrust of what I have been saying supports the engagement of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in such emergency planning arrangements, whereby the plans would be clearly understood and could be rolled out in the case of any emergency, of which foot-and-mouth was clearly one.

The final point which I shall make is that the rural community groups which have grown over recent years can and have played a supportive role in taking people through their changing circumstances.

The Chairperson: Were you aware of a Government contingency plan when the outbreak occurred?

Mr Fitzduff: I am aware that elements are being reviewed in that respect. I have been reading the PricewaterhouseCoopers review, which touches most of the bases that I am concerned about. However, people would not say with their hands on their hearts that there is a plan which would operate in circumstances worse than we had, which are very likely. We were spared by some miracle; I do not understand how things did not get much worse than they did.

The Chairperson: Is your organisation in favour of our having a contingency plan known to all who would be expected to co-operate in carrying it out and of regular meetings being held with the organisations as is done in America? From time to time they even have a Continent-wide reaction exercise. They tell themselves that they have foot-and-mouth disease and ask what they are to do about it and who will be swinging into action.

Mr Fitzduff: I completely agree with that. It should be an extension of the kind of safety measures that buildings and organisations have for fire and emergency drills. Part of the problem is that you cannot predict what the next disaster will be. That is the great difficulty, but the fact that you have resources which must react differently in a situation of such tragedy means that it is very hard to deal with such situations without having scenario planning, something that I know goes on in other parts of the United Kingdom too.

Northern Ireland’s emergency planning infrastructure is not very highly developed, and we should benefit from that. I distinguish between thinking about how to deal with the next outbreak of foot-and-mouth and how to deal with circumstances that we may not have foreseen, in which we need the co-ordination to react.

Mr Kane: Mr Fitzduff, you are welcome. You probably overheard my question when you were sitting in the gallery; nevertheless, I will repeat it. The EU is to review foot-and-mouth disease legislation with a view to updating it. Given the lessons learnt from the 2001 outbreak and the wide range of legislation encompassing the disposal of carcasses, animal health, welfare, compensation, et cetera, what changes in legislation would you recommend that the Department press for at European level?

Mr Fitzduff: That is a difficult question. Due to the nature of the consequences of this disease on the whole market, the main thing is that there is co-ordination and agreement about a way forward on a response. That should be an EU response. We should lobby to have whatever we decide as the best response incorporated within an EU framework. Beyond that, I am not really prepared to answer that question. I would need to take it away and consider it to determine the implications. I am not fully aware of the legislative framework that the EU demands or co-ordinates on the issue.

The key point is that we should not be doing something that does not fit in the wider market. Otherwise, it would be nonsense. It is like airborne pollution or the many other issues that you have heard about; it is not confined to this geographic territory. Immediately, co-ordination across the EU is fundamental.

Mr Bradley: You are welcome, Mr Fitzduff. My question relates to the agribusiness sector. Can you outline the disease’s impact, as you saw it, on other sectors in the rural community, such as small businesses or tourism?

Mr Fitzduff: As the Chairperson has said, everyone was caught on the hop. We did not know what impact it was going to have. The measures that were taken were credible in the circumstances. However, the ramifications would have been even greater if it had been more intense. It had ramifications for small businesses, transport and for visitors from one area to another.

It affected everyone in the community, not just the farming community. The consequences of a breakdown of relationships — even within the farming community — because of feelings of blame and so on were mitigated because of people’s solidarity in supporting one another as neighbours. That was significant. The situation may have been much worse if it had occurred in a town where people did not know one another. People were willing to co-operate.

On the other hand, there are deep feelings of suspicion and thoughts about who is dealing with what, breakdown of relations and so on. People were grappling with a dangerous situation. You can imagine many much nastier scenarios. The outbreak happened to be contained, and the better part of people was brought out. However, there were other aspects in the Ardboe area, which is right beside my house. I knew and was able to see the ramifications over those days. There were many people coming in, and there was much pressure to watch the fire, the shooting, et cetera.

That was serious in that it could have got out of hand. The controls that you must put in place in such a situation are different, because these are not normal circumstances. That kind of crowd control or policing of the situation could have been difficult if the situation was on a greater scale.

Given the isolation felt by those affected, the need for support was great, and neighbourly support was particularly welcomed. There is a need for a support unit to help those directly and indirectly affected to reach a new point in their thinking. If their livestock is gone, they must find a way to create a better life. There was no unit in place that could take people through that process of thinking seriously about how they could re-enter the labour market or re-engage with the agricultural business, which had been decimated. Other industries that have faced such crises have set up multidisciplinary units to engage with those who were directly affected. Those units help people through a process of resolving their needs — whether those are for counselling, or for reconsidering their business prospects. A multi-disciplinary body would be required.

Mr Ford: You have given the Committee a great deal to think about with regard to emergency planning. You mentioned your experience, as a neighbour of Ardboe, so to speak. How much would the organisations that the Rural Community Network (RCN) represents be able to do in such circumstances? Is good neighbourliness enough, or is a more professional input required? We spoke about the lack of involvement in emergency planning. Was there a role for Niall Fitzduff to attend the Minister’s emergency meetings in Dundonald House, as a representative of rural community activists? How do we disseminate such information, and how capable are your staff of picking it up from there? Sorry, I asked about 12 questions.

Mr Fitzduff: That is fine, David. Not knowing who is doing the planning or what the plans are is always a problem. When the outbreak was confirmed, there was panic in the community. Neighbours got together and blocked roads with tractors. Within five minutes, a tremendous voluntary effort had been made. In the next phase, the police arrived, and the neighbours disappeared. The communication between the police and the neighbours is quite important. Following that, the Veterinary Service, the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Forestry Service arrived, and the situation settled down. However, in the initial panic, communication is very difficult. The area’s community groups and those who have roles as honest brokers should be clearly identifiable. Community groups could achieve that by liaising with the authorities and local people coming through, who do not know what the consequences of the situation will be.

With regard to emergency planning, it is important, as the Chairperson said, that people know what the arrangements are, and that those are scenario-planned. Special workshops for that are important and could engage our networks so that everyone is clear about their role. Sometimes, with the best will in the world, people who set out to help cause more of a problem because they do not know what the most appropriate action would be. If people do not know the detail of the plan, and if the plan contradicts what people think would be the best option, the arrangements may not work. The result may be to intensify conflict and rumour-mongering, or to cause a breakdown in relationships at unpredictable points. The more people are aware of how people in the system think, the better.

On the other hand, there is a difficulty with a one-stop shop central response, which supposedly knows everything. Unless it is linked to good feedback from people on the ground, it will lead to as much difficulty as it does good outcomes.

As to whether I should be on a group that would think such issues through, my organisation and I would be happy to play even a minor role. It would be helpful to know what is being planned and to have some input.

The Chairperson: You outlined what happened the last time. Once farmers adopted the attitude of fortress farming, it became difficult to communicate with them, because they did not want any intruders coming up their lanes. The most important people in the countryside were isolated.

Where do you go in such a situation? Had we had a proper contingency plan, we would have known the people, and we would have known their telephone numbers and how to reach them. Many farmers were shut off so completely that they had no contact with outsiders.

Mr Fitzduff: Neighbours had a huge dilemma about whether to contact farmers and vice versa, because contact seemed to be breaking a rule. Had the disease broken out, they might have felt that they had carried it and were at fault. That sort of uncertainty is intense and difficult to deal with. Hindsight is a great teacher.

Mr McHugh: I appreciate that it is a difficult subject for you, because you were caught up in the crisis. If we must deal with such a situation in the future, can something be done to alleviate the stress of families who must suffer the aftershock of foot-and-mouth disease?

Are the families who suffered through the outbreak getting help? Did the people who were isolated at the time develop psychological problems, and was anything done for them, or have they been forgotten about? Can something be done now? The Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) undertakes outreach work on farm audits to help with the financial situation, but it is funded differently in rural areas, and perhaps DARD should examine that issue.

Women, in particular, may have had to soak up some of the stress that was suffered. Has anything been done to help them?

Mr Fitzduff: There is undoubtedly a deficit in support. Strategic plans were developed with the help of the Rural Development Council (RDC) and with local networks. One of the difficulties is that that was done in an emergency situation, and whether one should develop a strategy for the future of a community on the back of an emergency is questionable.

As regards personal and human tragedy, Mr McHugh rightly identified women and those who were not at the centre of the crisis. The psychological pressures on women and other family members were huge. There was also huge pressure on those people in the wider community who were not directly affected by the disease. It is worth noting that rural services require a premium. Equality of access to such services must be examined. There is an opportunity to reinforce services, and the Committee has often endorsed that view. However, rather than creating something new in reaction to each emergency, the responsiveness of the existing services should be examined.

I agree that the CAB and the Health Service should take particular note of what they need to do differently and try to bring that to the rural development table to make a case for the rural premium. That would be a better response than setting up new and particular arrangements for a crisis situation. The situation will change, and it will have to be addressed differently; it may never arise in the same way again. However, I agree entirely with the work that has been done on rural stress, et cetera.

During the aftermath, you can return to those communities and assess the situation. That should not be done intrusively, because one of the worst things that can happen is for a wave of counsellors to be sent in who must justify the fact that they are being paid to do that job. They then intrude on people whose family networks and community support are coping well, which is what those people actually need.

In the future, farmers may need to accept that they do not know what the consequences will be for their job or whether they will just return to their previous situation. Some people have now left farming; others have got back to where they were before the crisis. My superficial analysis would be that they have not had the opportunity to think through how they might now enter the agricultural arena differently. There was a deficit of information to enable farmers to know where to go. The place they last left was the safest place to return to. However, they invest a huge amount of money returning there, and they may be just creating a problem for the future.

Those who were affected directly should have the opportunity to discuss their business arrangements and the consequences for their families with some experts and obtain help. That kind of response is definitely required.

Mr McHugh: You mentioned the multi-disciplinary unit. Cookstown District Council funds the CAB’s outreach work, but it is left to its own devices in other areas. That work is not being done on an equal footing across the board. Through my contacts with constituents, I know that farmers in all areas are in financial difficulty, particularly those who are full-time farmers. They are not going to seek advice.

There is a deficit because of the overall impact of foot-and-mouth disease. The outbreak was a mark in the sand, and the farming landscape has since changed completely. It was said that people received compensation, but they did not get to sell their animals so it was not free money. That was not taken into account, yet fingers were pointed at communities, and to an extent that has still not been resolved.

Mr Fitzduff: Someone must take a sharp look at the existing level of resources for advice and services. In preference to establishing something new or announcing a new pot of money, I would far rather that those schemes that are currently operating well but with limited resources be enhanced.

The Chairperson: Thank you for your help. We will give you some other questions, and we would be grateful for some sort of reply. The Committee would agree that you have given us some valuable points to consider.

Mr Fitzduff: I have brought an annual report from our organisation, which has just been published. There were 150 people at Greenmount College enjoying a weekend but also thinking deeply about these issues. Thank you for the invitation.

The Chairperson: The Committee welcomes the representatives of Omagh District Council.

Mr B Wilson: I am Bert Wilson; my colleagues are Mr Gerry Hart and Mr Séamus Shields.

The Chairperson: If you make a brief statement, my Colleagues will ask questions. If we do not have time to ask all our questions, we should like you to send us written replies.

Mr B Wilson: I thank the Committee for giving us the opportunity to come here today.

Controls on meat brought into Great Britain should be tightened. We have seen photographs of exotic imported meats, some of it leaking in trunks. Although this practice has been banned, it must be policed properly: there is no point in imposing a ban if it is not properly policed.

We were told that an Asian virus was responsible for the outbreak of swine fever in Great Britain, and it is highly likely that foot-and-mouth disease was introduced in the same way. A lorry that frequently drove to Omagh had been in contact with a farm in Great Britain that had suffered an outbreak of the disease. We were very lucky.

There was good co-operation with the higher levels of the Veterinary Service and there was good communication with the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. However, there was little communication with the local farming community. I am a farmer, and the first I knew of the outbreak was when I saw people putting down mats. There was not much co-operation at lower levels. In times of emergency, local councils should be responsible for what goes on in their council areas and councils and local vets should have been consulted more. Farmers who co-operated with the Department and acted properly should have been compensated for their work. They tried to keep animals away from the road and from neighbours’ fields, which was sometimes not easy because the grazing pattern did not always work. The farmers who acted grudgingly should have been punished.

The farmers who co-operated and who played their part should have been compensated, not punished; local vets should have been used more, especially as there were staff shortages. Sufficient staff and funds should be made available to the veterinary and agriculture sectors, and to councils if necessary, to deal with any possible future emergency. On one occasion we could not get the disinfectant, so we bought some, not knowing whether it would do the job or not.

Lorries collect animals from places where there are no disinfectant facilities. Lorry drivers come to the industrial estates where local people change their animals from one lorry to another and there are no disinfectant facilities available — it can even happen at the side of the road. These practices should be stopped.

The control of tuberculosis during the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak was completely stopped. Facilities should have been in place to ensure that the two worked in tandem, as tuberculosis is now getting out of control. Local vets should have been allowed to ensure cleanliness and been able to carry on with their business. People visiting farms do not disinfect or go through proper procedures, including Government officials on business on farms.

The Chairperson: When foot-and-mouth disease started, were you aware of any contingency plan, and was it put into operation?

The Chairperson: Has your council been approached by any Department about a contingency plan in anticipation of another outbreak?

The Chairperson: Have you, or the other council members, information of any plans?

Mr McHugh: Mr Wilson made some important points about biosecurity, food, and animal security. Is there sufficient co-operation between vets and farmers and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development’s vets to prevent another outbreak or are we as open to another outbreak as we ever were, especially as some officials do not go through the proper hygiene procedures? That might always have been the case, but since foot-and-mouth disease that should have changed.

Mr B Wilson: I do not see much difference in the system since the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. We receive a great deal of correspondence, some of which deals with co-operation. The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development may work well at the higher levels, but it does not deal with the farmer on his level.

All lorries were disinfected, but some of them were travelling an almighty distance; lorries that visited farms at Coagh travelled around Omagh. Their journeys ought to have been restricted to a smaller area.

Mr McHugh: Is the council satisfied that it could take different measures, for example, making more use of mats? There was a vast difference in the actions taken by councils in Fermanagh and those across the border. For example, mats were placed at every door of the Slieve Russell Hotel in Ballyconnell County Cavan minutes after the outbreak was announced. Nothing like that happened at premises, including veterinary offices, in council areas in Fermanagh. Department of Agriculture and Rural Development offices put out mats, but the measures were often hit and miss; farmers were still going to meal stores, for example.

Mr B Wilson: I noticed that many of the mats were dry; they might have been a bluff, simply put out for show.

Mr B Wilson: I had to cross the border to Éire several times. On one occasion, I was turned back at the border because I had some items in the boot of the car. However, when I came up from the South to the North there was no problem.

The Chairperson: We had a mat at the door of Stormont that officials removed when an important visitor came from Europe so that he would not have to walk over it.

Mr Ford: How could the role of local vets be enhanced? How good were the contacts between the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and the council? Did the council feel that it could have taken action but was not asked to do so by the Department? What expertise will the council have in the event of a future emergency?

Mr B Wilson: Vets could have advised farmers more. Some properties had proper mats soaked in disinfectant; others just put down a bit of carpet. Carpet stops being effective after several lorries have driven over it. The vets should have told people that. Although vets were sometimes consulted about moving animals from field to field, they did not have much say in the matter.

I did not know that the outbreak had been announced, and I was on my way into Omagh when I saw my neighbour putting out carpet. That was when I first realised. I went home and dug a pit into which I put disinfectant, which seemed more effective. However, nobody could say whether people were using the correct disinfectant or whether the procedure was of any benefit. The Department’s vets should have known the proper procedures.

Mr Hart: There should be flexibility. When the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease occurred, farmers in our area had difficulty with the tuberculosis testing arrangements.

Mr Shields: The council recognised that some unsatisfactory circumstances arose because of the emergency. The restrictive nature of the emergency meant that ordinary processes, such as tuberculosis testing, had to be suspended. That is understandable. Nonetheless, had the situation lasted longer, such arrangements might not have been acceptable. People will accept that short-term measures are needed in such circumstances.

Recently, I was involved in a situation where a farmer theoretically had five animals punched. At that time, the Department’s officials could not go to the farms to punch the animals. The animals were punched on paper, and the farmer was paid in the normal way. However, farmers will be aware that there is a four-month stipulated period after punching after which the farmer may not sell the animal.

As this farmer’s animals had only been punched in theory, he did not know when the period ended. Thus, he presented two of the five animals at the abattoir on Monday and the other three on Friday. However, the expiry period had terminated on Wednesday of that week. As a result, he was penalised by having all five of his animals disqualified for the subsidy. That was most unfair. The regulations make it clear that doing that in any circumstances disqualifies you from the funding. This was a result of the emergency, and although the man was an honest, decent farmer he was not good at record keeping.

The inflexibility of the system was to blame. I recognise that that situation has been rectified, as others had the same experience, and it probably will not happen again. Nonetheless, it was one of the problems.

That could possibly be resolved in future by the use of local vets. If departmental officials felt that they could not go to the farms in certain circumstances, local vets could have done so and carried out the work on the animals’ ears. That would have ensured that the problem did not arise.

On general issues, we recognise that there was an emergency at the time; however, important lessons must be learnt. The local council, for example, could ensure better communication throughout the district by informing people of what was required, perhaps making emergency arrangements for collecting disinfectant or mats. Local councils could provide some services. For example, councils’ personnel could cordon off a district or ensure that controls were in place in and out of certain localities so that an outbreak could be localised and confined. In future, local councils should have a vital role.

Mr Shields: We recognise that everyone will be penalised in an emergency. It is important that all elements of the economy be considered so that any future planning to control an outbreak of this nature would have to take account of its possible long-term effects. It is important to remember that we were extremely fortunate in Northern Ireland in that foot-and-mouth disease was localised and confined. That may not be the case if it happened again, so all elements of the economy must be integrated into any emergency planning for the future.

Mr Kane: The European Union is to review foot-and-mouth legislation with a view to updating it. Given the lessons learnt from the 2001 outbreak and the wide range of legislation encompassing the disposal of carcasses, animal health, welfare and compensation, what changes to the legislation would you recommend the Department press for in Europe?

Mr Shields: Legislation is important, and the outbreaks exposed weaknesses in it.

One of the major difficulties with legislation is that farming is largely governed by European Regulations, and they, and the free movement of goods, mean that we cannot impose major restrictions at ports and airports for livestock travelling between Northern Ireland, Great Britain and Europe. I am in favour of free movement in the European Union, but we must consider how legislation could restrict imports during any future outbreak.

The importation of meat products from Africa and the Far East is a major problem — indeed, the root of the problem — and the legislation must be tightened to restrict that. It appears that pigs fed with meat products imported from the Far East caused the outbreak, and that risk still exists. Importing raw meat is worth around £1 billion to businesses in the United Kingdom.

The under 24-month scheme relates to BSE rather than to foot-and-mouth disease. However, the legislation for that scheme must be strongly enforced. Traceability of livestock is also important, and although we think that it is strong in Northern Ireland, there is ample evidence that animals are being dumped in council skips with their identity removed. Legislation on traceability must be enforced.

Mr B Wilson: Yes. Controls should be more stringent, and those who break the regulations should be penalised.

Legislation should be introduced, but it should not penalise the genuine farmer. We read that 8,000 sheep are smuggled south of the border. Farmers are burdened with legislation, and they need something sensible; they need legislation that will not penalise those who are trying to do their best.

The Chairperson: Some people felt that the Department went too far in moving cattle from one field to another; it is doubtful whether that was legal. Northern Ireland did not suffer the disease on the same scale as elsewhere. Giant European laws grip the farmers when the disease is widespread. It is easy to talk with hindsight, but we damaged some of our rural areas with regulations that did nothing to ease the situation. For instance, tourism and attendance at certain functions were restricted; yet permission was given for attendance at functions that could have presented a greater risk. I do not know how the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development decided its criteria.

Mr McHugh: Was the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development’s force majeure policy tested in relation to the farmer who lost five animals?

Mr Shields: Under the regulations, I understand that as soon as the application has been stamped a card is sent to the farmer informing him of the precise date.

Mr Hart: One of the main points in our response to the Committee was that the law on importation of meats to the United Kingdom should be tightened. The European Union passed legislation on 20 September banning people from importing meat from third countries. It will come into force on 1 January 2003 and is a marvellous step forward. That said, at a recent environmental health conference we were told that £1 billion had been made from the importation into Great Britain of bush meat and other exotic meats. Without tight enforcement, such problems will continue.

I will give you information and reports from the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, which has given information on illegal meat exports to the House of Commons Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. We are glad that the legislation has been tightened, but unless enforcement is strict, difficulties will arise. In Omagh, we feel that we have been lucky. A few days after the outbreak I received a phone call from a businessman. He told me that he had seen a feature on television about the owner of an abattoir that had been hit by the crisis. He said that the owner did a great deal of business in the Omagh area and added that he hoped to God that the owner had not visited recently. We checked with the Veterinary Service in Northern Ireland and found out that he had apparently brought consignments of sheep to Northern Ireland and brought back a great many pigs. Luckily for us, he had not been in Northern Ireland in the four weeks before the outbreak. That story brings home to us how close many farmers in Northern Ireland were to the source of the disease.

Mr Kane: Item six in the correspondence from Omagh District Council states that methods of animal and transport recordings must be rigorously maintained, as that information was vital in controlling the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. That comment has been made many times. Why does the Department not accept its share of the responsibility?

I shall give the witnesses from Omagh District Council a list of further questions and ask them to reply as soon as possible. We would be grateful if they would do that. Thank you for your helpful contribution.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

I refer to your letter of 1 May 2002 inviting the submission of evidence to the Agriculture and Rural Development Committee on the Foot & Mouth Disease 2001.

In line with the "Guidelines for Submitting Evidence" (enclose 15 copies of the two reports completed by the Rural Development Council (RDC) on behalf of two of the areas affected by FMD.

The RDC, which is funded through DARD’s Rural Development Programme, exists to address the needs of deprived rural areas in Northern Ireland. Its principle activity is the delivery of support services to organisations that are involving people locally in planning and regeneration projects that meet real needs in disadvantaged rural communities.

Completed the Action Plan report after a series of local meetings during June 2001. The plan was developed using the RDC’s Learning Regions framework and involved a series of locally based focus groups (including the farming, non-farming, community service provision and community groups). The final report was publicly presented to a range of Statutory Agencies in late June 2001.

A report was developed by the local community of the western shores of Lough Neagh with assistance from the RDC. The plan was developed using the RDC’s Learning Regions framework and involved a series of locally based focus groups (including the farming, non-farming, community services provision and community groups), familiarisation meetings with funding bodies and statutory agencies and ‘one to one’ interviews with all effected farms within the 1km exclusion zone. The report was sent to the Minister, DARD on 21 February 2002.

An initial meeting between the locally established steering group (under the chairmanship of Mr Paddy Tiernan) was held in September 2001 and training was offered to the group and in particular their appointed Community Development Worker. The group decided not to involve the RDC in their development strategy proposals.

We believe that the reports could be summarised by the term "Closure & Vision", to reflect the dual nature of their conclusions. In one sense the areas need to "close" the experience of FMD before they can start to implement its "vision" for the future.

These Action Plans represent locally developed regeneration strategies for those areas dramatically affected by the FMD crisis. These action points represent a local consensus on how the communities can help rebuild themselves. The communities should be congratulated for their ability to respond so rapidly and comprehensively. It is now clearly the responsibility of the Government and Statutory Bodies to respond directly to these reports and to put in place appropriate resources, projects and programmes to help the affected areas.

COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Thank you for inviting LMC comments relating to your enquiry into the Foot & Mouth Disease outbreak in 2001.

We would confirm to you that we have been interviewed by the PricewaterhouseCoopers team carrying out the investigation for the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. We have provided verbal responses to all of their queries. The one area where we have provided hard factual data was in regard to market returns for cattle and sheep ex-farm. What we find to be generally not well understood is that given the very low number of cases of Foot & Mouth Disease within Northern Ireland, there was in fact very little impact on beef prices. Graph 1 attached shows the monthly average comparison between the year 2000 and 2001. Over the year as a whole, deadweight cattle prices in fact marginally exceeded the year 2000 prices (by 1p/kg).

Graph 2 shows the same data for sheep. Here you will note that 2001 lamb prices for April and May followed very closely year 2000 prices, but on the lifting of the FMD ban in June, lamb prices soared ahead of the prior year. For the year as a whole, the official price reported to Brussels showed a 43% increase on the prior year. You should note also that about three quarters of the lambs slaughtered were marketed by farmers after the lifting of the export ban on sheep on 8 June.

While we feel that the above represents the best factual contribution which we can make to the Committee’s enquiry, we would be happy to respond to any further specific questions where you feel that we can assist.