Mr Adams:

On a further point of order. What I said in Irish is what I said earlier in English. Mr Trimble was in conversation with some of his colleagues and may not have heard that.

Mr Neeson:

I had hoped that the vote that we will be taking at the end of this debate would have been a determination vote. The Alliance Party is very much committed, not only to making the agreement work, but also to making the Assembly work. If this buys time to allow the process to move forward we are prepared to go along with that. It is important that the vote taken on 15 February is a vote of determination, that there is a full report from the First Minister (Designate) and Deputy First Minister (Designate) which will allow the Assembly to move forward to full devolution.

Last month the Alliance Party put forward an amendment in the Assembly, which was defeated. It called for the First Minister (Designate) and Deputy First Minister (Designate) to come to an agreement on departmental structures in Northern Ireland and on North/South bodies. I welcome the fact that they have now delivered and that they have agreed to 10 Departments in Northern Ireland, although I do have some reservations about some of the other issues that were agreed upon. I had hoped that there would have been a separate department for equality and community relations, but that has now gone to the centre. I had hoped that tourism would have been included with heritage, arts and sport, but that has not happened.

12.00

I had hoped that a department would be created for external affairs to deal with the important issues relating to Europe among others, but that has not happened.

I am looking for assurances from the First Minister (Designate) and the Deputy First Minister (Designate) that scrutiny committees will be set up to oversee equality, community relations and Europe and that the Assembly will have the opportunity to scrutinise these very important issues. It is important that that matter be clarified.

Some thought must now be given to the make-up of the Committees of the Assembly. Under the Initial Standing Orders only a limited number of people can be appointed to them. The Standing Orders Committee needs to meet very soon to ensure that all Members are involved in the process. It is important too that the parties identify the people who will become Ministers and Chairmen or Vice-Chairmen of the Committees. The period between now and 15 February should be used to work out what is happening in this respect. I urge both the British and Irish Governments to pursue, with the utmost vigour, the legislative mechanisms so that by 10 March everything is ready for power to be devolved to the Assembly.

When the 31 October deadline was missed a major opportunity for the Assembly was also missed, and the delay that missing that deadline created has brought problems for many people here. That is why the 15 February deadline must not be missed. The reason for this deadline is to allow the Secretary of State to move forward with the Orders in Council to ensure that the 10 March deadline is not missed. I am pleased that these deadlines have been established, but it is essential that they are not missed - missed deadlines have resulted in missed opportunities.

I turn to the sensitive issue of decommissioning. It is nine months since the Good Friday Agreement was reached in Castle Buildings. The onus is on Republican and Loyalist groups to start the process of decommissioning. I accept what the Agreement says, and there have been a number of confidence-building measures on the parts of all of us involved in the Good Friday Agreement.

I call upon the leadership of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groupings to take the confidence-building measures that will build the trust which is required to move the process forward. This is a very serious issue and one that has to be addressed. We only have to look at the events since the start of the year - the escalation of paramilitary beatings and shootings. These are being carried out openly by Republicans and Loyalists. If we are to create a truly peaceful, democratic society in Northern Ireland, these barbarities have to stop.

With regard to the DUP's amendment - no surprise there. Over the years we have come to expect the DUP to say "No". We would be disappointed if it did not, and this amendment comes as no surprise whatsoever. There are many problems in society in Northern Ireland at present. There is a crisis in the Health Service - a major crisis. I ask if Members of the Assembly are afraid to take responsibility for dealing with important day-to-day issues? I do not believe that any individual Member is afraid. The sad irony is that the anti-agreement constituency is just as keen to see the transfer of powers to the Assembly as those in favour of the agreement, but they cannot have their cake and eat it.

The peace process means having to take risks. All the parties have problems with the process, and it suits some of them to say no, but it is hypocritical of some Members to reap all the benefits of the agreement, while letting others take all the risks. It is a sad reflection on those Members here who are trying to hold back the process.

I want to see the agreement implemented in full with the setting up of the North/South Ministerial Council, the British-Irish Council and the very important Civic Forum. It is time for the Assembly's pro-agreement parties to regroup. We obviously want to bring the entire Assembly with us as we move closer to the full devolution of powers. But evil forces -out to destroy the agreement and the Assembly - are at work, and there is an onus on all of us to have a fully working, devolved Assembly in place by the end of March 1999 at the latest. That is what the people of Northern Ireland want, and they said so loudly and clearly in last year's referendum.

Mr Roche:

The report is the negotiated detail of the Belfast Agreement. It merely confirms the fundamental characteristics of that agreement as a radical corruption of democratic practice and the rule of law, and a massive concession to the demands of Irish Nationalism on the part of the UUP negotiators. This is most evident in relation to the provisions for the governance of Northern Ireland as set out in the report.

The UUP negotiators have capitulated to the Nationalist demand for an Executive with 10 Departments, which maximises the number of Sinn Fein seats and creates an Executive which is evenly split between Nationalists and Unionists. This even split is simply a recipe for deadlock and for ensuring that pragmatic policy-making in areas such as the economy will be subordinate to the demands of a Nationalist ideology that is literally divorced from social and economic reality on the island of Ireland.

But far worse than any of these practical considerations is that by agreeing to an Executive with 10 Departments the UUP negotiators have maximised the extent to which the decent, law-abiding citizens of Northern Ireland will be governed by the architects of the terrorism that has been directed against them for 30 years. This will be the case should the Assembly vote to accept the package being presented today. This terrorist strategy is based on a combination of the armalite and the ballot box, set out by Mr Adams in his book, 'The Politics of Irish Freedom', in which he elaborated the strategic understanding that

"The tactic of armed struggle is of primary importance because it provides a vital cutting edge. Without it, the issue of Ireland would not be an issue . armed struggle has been an agent for bringing about change . At the same time there is a realisation in Republican circles that armed struggle on its own is inadequate and that non-armed forms of political struggle are at least as important."

Between 1988 and 1992 the leadership of the SDLP forged an alliance with Sinn Fein/IRA that strengthened immensely the political dimension of Mr Adams's dual strategy but did not in any way blunt the vital cutting edge of IRA terrorism.

This armalite-and-ballot-box strategy was given international legitimacy by the Mitchell Report, which proposed taking the gun out of Irish politics by a political settlement that would obviously have to be agreeable to those who were committed to the use of the gun. Consequently, terrorists would have to be represented in the negotiations. This was facilitated in the Mitchell Report by establishing the fiction that representatives of terrorist organisations could authentically commit themselves to the principles of democracy and non-violence, while the organisations they represent retain their arsenals entirely intact.

This fiction is, of course, a radical corruption of the language of democratic politics which the UUP negotiators permitted to be incorporated into the core of the Belfast Agreement.

The report presented today involves massive concessions to both dimensions of Mr Adams's dual strategy. That dimension of Mr Adams's strategic thinking which he designates "non-armed forms of political struggle" has been accommodated by the UUP leadership's agreeing that Sinn Fein may have two seats in the Executive.

This arrangement is described in the report as the best possible form of government.

Contrary to what the First Minister (Designate) and the Deputy First Minister (Designate) have commended to the Assembly today, any civilised individual could not regard a Government which included Sinn Fein - even if the IRA were to decommission its terrorist arsenal - as anything other than something not far removed (if removed at all) from the worst possible form of government, rather than the best. Such a government should not even be contemplated, never mind negotiated, by representatives of the pro-Union community in Northern Ireland.

The First Minister (Designate) has not only the political effrontery to describe an Executive which will include two members of Sinn Fein/IRA as the best possible form of government, but he commends this arrangement as being necessary so that we can put behind us what the report refers to as "the tragic years of trauma and separation."

But what caused the trauma and separation of the past 30 years? Certainly not the absence of a so-called best possible form of government in Northern Ireland, which is what the report clearly implies, but a barbarity within Irish Nationalism devoid of any humane constraint. The words "trauma and separation" do not in any case remotely capture the impact of Republican terrorism on those directly affected. These words were chosen deliberately in order to deflect any focus on the barbarity and culpability of those for whom this report provides two places on the Executive.

How does the report accommodate the armalite dimension of Mr Adams's strategic thinking? The UUP negotiators capitulated to the armalite dimension when they negotiated the Belfast Agreement which does not require the decommissioning of the IRA's terrorist arsenal.

The UUP leader disputes this interpretation of the Belfast Agreement but the UUP leadership has failed to act on the basis of its own understanding of the agreement. The report presented today does not mention the word "decommissioning". This means that in the negotiations since 1 July 1998 the UUP leadership has totally failed to give substance to its interpretation of the Belfast Agreement by negotiating a requirement for the IRA to decommission prior to Sinn Fein's taking seats in the Executive. Therefore the First Minister (Designate) and the Deputy First Minister (Designate) are today presenting, for the approval of the Assembly, a report which meets the core requirement of Sinn Fein/IRA strategic thinking set out by Mr Adams in 'The Politics of Irish Freedom'.

But that is not the end of the story. What has been presented to us today is the agreed outcome of negotiations on the all-Ireland aspect of the Belfast Agreement. The fact that the UUP leadership capitulated to the Nationalist demand for an Executive representing 10 Departments also means that the Nationalist input into the all-Ireland dimension of the agreement will be maximised.

The purpose of the North/South Ministerial Council and the associated all-Ireland implementation body is not to provide for mutually beneficial, pragmatic co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic. The real political rationale of the all-Ireland dimension of the agreement is to give expression to what the Deputy First Minister (Designate) constantly refers to as "the Nationalist sense of identity".

This Nationalist sense of identity, in political terms, is determined by a commitment to the political unification of the island of Ireland. This means that if the North-South Ministerial Council and the associated all-Ireland implementation body are to give authentic expression to what the Deputy First Minister (Designate) understands by the Nationalist sense of identity, these institutions must act as mechanisms to bring about the conditions of an all-Ireland state.

12.15 pm

The report presented to the Assembly is the negotiated detail of these all-Ireland mechanisms. The key feature of the report is that there is an all-Ireland dimension attached to each Ministerial portfolio in the Executive. This means that the report has firmly established the institutional arrangements required to develop the all-Ireland aspect of the policy of each of the 10 Ministerial portfolios. This is reinforced by the Belfast Agreement which states that each Minister can take decisions in the North/South Ministerial Council within his or her defined area of authority without the approval of the Assembly.

Mr Birnie:

Will the Member give way?

Mr Roche:

No, I will not give way.

This means that the Assembly has virtually no effective control over the decisions of Ministers in the North/South Ministerial Council, which is the core mechanism to bring about the political and administrative structures to which the Deputy First Minister (Designate) refers as Irish unity. The combination of the detail of the report together with the inter-governmental conference means that the Republic would have de facto joint authority over Northern Ireland in the event of this report being approved by the Assembly.

No Unionist could possibly accept the content of the report by the First Minister (Designate) and the Deputy First Minister (Designate) because the report demonstrates clearly that the UUP leadership has negotiated the detail of the Belfast Agreement in a manner that strengthens both the armalite and the ballot-box dimensions of Sinn Fein/IRA strategy. At the same time, the UUP leadership has agreed to the detail of the all-Ireland institutions to which Nationalists are committed as a mechanism to bring about what they call Irish unity.

The rejection of this report by those authentically committed to the Union cannot be delayed. The report to be submitted to the Assembly on 15 February will differ from this report only with respect to incidental detail. This means that the vote on this report is the substantive vote which will determine the future of the Union.

This is one of the most important days in the history of Northern Ireland. Unionists are now being presented with perhaps the last opportunity to stop an appeasement of terrorism directed towards the destruction of the Union, and there is therefore only one course of action available to those who are committed to the Union - rejection of the report.

Mr Ervine:

Things were funny earlier on, yet when the Leader of Sinn Fein was speaking, everything became much more grave. There was silence from the DUP benches. A degree of credibility was afforded to Mr Adams that people outside would wish to know about. I wonder if the media are prepared to report it. There have been a number of things that the media have been prepared to ignore or to slant.

December 18 was hailed as a great day - a day when the SDLP and the Ulster Unionists created a wonderful agreement. They did it in the early hours of the morning, and they did it on what, we are told, was another wonderful Friday. Then, last Friday, the media described it - [Interruption]

Will the Member shut up? I expect the same consideration that was given to the leader of Sinn Fein.

The Initial Presiding Officer:

It would be helpful if we were to show some courtesy towards those who are listening and those who are speaking.

Mr Ervine:

The media said that that was a day when compromise broke out at Stormont - what a joke. In October, the Progressive Unionist Party flagged up difficulties with the agreement and with trying to implement all of its facets. Some laughed at us, and some took great succour and comfort from the fact that, for the first time, the Progressive Unionist Party was being negative about the agreement. Mr Taylor's assertion that there is a 50% chance of success is, I believe, irrationally optimistic, and that brings me to those who will have fun and enjoyment out of hearing me say how it will be.

This agreement is going down. It is going down because of the macho men on both sides who did not look for opportunities for choreography, who simply pandered to their own constituencies, who made it difficult for each other.

I hear people suggesting that the pro-agreement campaigners should stick together. They must be joking. The reality is that the macho men, demanding something which they know they cannot have and then getting upset when they cannot have it, have created circumstances wherein the other macho men have severely damaged the integrity of those in the Unionist community who advocated the Good Friday Agreement.

They did so by saying "Do you not know who we are? Do you not realise that the last time anybody asked us the irrational question about decommissioning a bomb went off at Canary Wharf?" Do they not realise the damage that does? Do they have any concept of how it looks when, at Christmas, people doing a bit of shopping find there is a horde of what look like Iranian fundamentalists running about Castle Court because we are trying to stop normal crime? They have no concept of the damage that that does, no concept of the fear that that sends into a Unionist community who, as Members well know, have their detractors, their deriders and also those, whom Mr McGrady easily identified, who are offering no alternative.

What if I am right - and I wish I were not-

Mr Morrow:

You are never wrong.

Mr Ervine:

It would be awful if I were right this time. Your twenty-nine-and-a-half grand would go down the tubes. Your swanning about here as if it were a country club would go down the tubes.

The people of Northern Ireland, whether they liked the agreement or not, certainly liked the idea of the absence of violence. They liked the idea of having the opportunity for their children to be born and reared in an atmosphere different to the one in which they suffered.

I accept that it is not perfect, but I also accept what some Members will probably never accept, that in order to manoeuvre a society there has to be a process. That provides the opportunity to see the potential for the future and to flush out what people perceive are the lies on the other side. We built a process that some entered begrudgingly, and that others cannot wait to get out of. Against all the odds, people built an agreement, but tragically, from day one, some have taken an à la carte approach to it.

Talk about the "Yes"-campaigners sticking together, I remember going to Omagh with the Women's Coalition and finding that the Ulster Unionists had been there before us, probably because they did not want to be seen on a platform with other "Yes" advocates. That was ridiculous; it came close to being sensible when Bono got involved. There was no real campaign other than the gutter campaign, other than the one in which people had had a long time to stand outside Stormont sharpening the knives and waiting for those who had created the agreement to come out so they could stab them in the back. That is the reality of the situation. Sold out.

It has been suggested that Loyalists should decommission. I would love to see the day when that could be done, when I could advocate that and stay alive. But the reality is that we have been sold out. We are being betrayed by David Trimble, we have been betrayed by Tony Blair, we are being betrayed by all and sundry. Please go to a working-class Loyalist area and tell them that they have been sold out, but that they should hand their guns in.

The Deputy First Minister (Designate):

Will the Member identify for the record any way or ways in which I have sold out Loyalism, Unionism, Nationalism or anyone else?

Mr Ervine:

In mentioning the theory of sell-out, I was paraphrasing others who said that some have sold out. Rather than bolstering your credibility, Seamus, which I believe is intact, I think I had better challenge the credibility of some of those in the Chamber.

I think that Mr Paisley said that those who support this report "will pay". I wonder what he meant by that? I could guess, and I could interpret it as an implicit threat. It may merely mean that I will not be re-elected. Those who put themselves in front of the electorate run that risk. The phrase was left hanging. Perhaps it is a bit like "Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right." Is it the old pathetic nonsense that did not scare anybody then and has no chance of scaring me now? I would like clarification because Hansard will show that those of us who support the report "will pay". Will pay what? Members spoke about punishment beatings. People come here and laugh and guffaw. It is all a great wheeze, and then someone mentions punishment beatings.

I wish I believed that everyone really cared about the 16-year-old boy on the Falls Road who has had his legs broken. We know that there is sectarianism. It is said that if we can get the IRA's guns, it will not matter about the Loyalist guns. I have been there, Bob, I have seen it. I have been there when the ambivalence of Unionism has shone through. You know what they used to say. [Interruption]

The Initial Presiding Officer:

Order. There should not be conversations between Members across the Chamber. Debate should be through the Chair, not to dignify the Chair, but to make sure that there is no indignity in the Chamber.

Mr Ervine:

You are finding out my weakness, Mr Initial Presiding Officer. Mr McCartney has obviously not had many conversations, and I was doing my best to give him one.

Contrary to my previous comments in the Assembly, I hope that the media will report on at least some of what I have said, because it is different from what other people are saying. It is about telling people out there the truth. Unless people get their act together, we are going down the tubes.

The sitting was suspended at 12.28 pm and resumed at 2.00 pm.

Ms McWilliams:

I am not sure to whom I should address my remarks because, as a pragmatist, and having worked with pro-agreement and anti-agreement parties for months, I believed that we could make the Agreement work. Mr McCrea said that we have to take on board and respect the views of minorities, and that is so. In any democracy, there will be those who will vote for a treaty and those who will vote against it. But for the first time since the referendum I have become extremely concerned about the direction in which we are going. I know that this admission will lend ammunition to those who are anti-agreement - although I hope that it will not be interpreted in such a way - but we have reached a crisis point.

Where are we going if we do not set up an Executive on 15 February? Have we invested all this time, work and commitment, together with receiving the will of the people, only to say that we, the politicians, cannot agree and are not prepared to govern and lead? That is a dire message to be sending at the beginning of a new year.

This morning's debate has told me that we are still strangers to one another, and that we do not understand one another's cultures. The Deputy First Minister (Designate) drew our attention to recent BBC television programmes which I understand reflected the great deal of hurt and pain that has been inflicted on one community by the other. Other programmes have shown the reciprocal pain and hurt felt by the Nationalist community.

We did not have a shared agreement on what constituted the problem, but we still had to resolve it through negotiation. Were agreement to be reached, none of us could achieve all that we wanted, and this agreement had to include ex-combatants. Others call them terrorists, but the word "terror" is ideologically loaded, and that is exactly what we are trying to do to each other now - we are trying to terrorise people into saying that this will not work. I am not prepared to do that. Václav Havel believed that politics was the art of the possible. I believe that we can make that determination the art of the possible.

When we voted the First Minister (Designate) and Deputy First Minister (Designate) into their positions they took a Pledge of Office, but there are others who, when they adopt the position of Ministers, will have to say that they affirm their commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose.

Some people may not believe that Ministers actually think that when they stand up and say it. I believe it because anti-agreement Members will have to swear to work to bring the new arrangements into being. If I can believe that anti-agreement Members will some day work in good faith to bring the new arrangements into being, I have to expect that that will be reciprocal, that that good faith will also lead people to believe that violence will never again be used as a way of resolving our problems. That is the only good faith I can ask of people who will take on the serious responsibility of governing Northern Ireland.

We have to stop the creation of a vacuum. We have to stop fooling the people by saying that, if we get over this hurdle, the crunch will come soon. We have been telling people that for a number of months. We have reached the crunch time. The vote will have to be taken. Vacuums do not help our community. Tensions rise and the most vulnerable in our community suffer, particularly those who live at the interfaces. However, it is with that spirit of pragmatism that I am going to make some suggestions about the report.

I am concerned about some aspects of the report, and my first concern is with the suggestion that there be a new economic policy unit -that has all the aspirations of kitchen Treasury. It is new; it may work; and I understand the political reasoning behind it. However, the European Union, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom no longer have a policy unit which deals only with economic matters and financial redistribution. Social development must be an integral part of economic policy, and I am concerned that the absence of social development in the economic policy unit suggested means that we are going back to the old ways of doing things.

Secondly, I am concerned that victims are not mentioned in the report - the one group of people which has been used most for political purposes, batted like a ball from one side of the court to the other. There is no mention in the report of where the Victims Liaison Unit will be placed. It is ironic that, while the unit is presently part of a Minister's portfolio, it will not be the responsibility of any Minister given the suggestions that have been made for the new Government. If there was ever a group of people who deserved facilities and resources that truly address their suffering, pain and needs, it is the victims. They deserve to have their unit included, and that should be a priority. Should the Assembly decide to include junior Ministers, surely responsibility for this is a job for such a Minister.

Thirdly, I am concerned that the work I referred to earlier on community tensions has not been specified as part of the remit of the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety. That is the best Department to have responsibility for the Victims Liaison Unit. The Voluntary Activity Unit, which has done great work in community development, should be placed within the Department of Social Development. We would have had a Bosnia situation in Northern Ireland had that work not been properly resourced, and it is not being properly resourced at present.

I am confident that the Deputy First Minister (Designate) is taking this project forward. I want to have that same confidence in the First Minister (Designate). I voted to put Mr Trimble in that post, and I believe that he accepted it to lead the country. I now expect him to do that.

Mr McCartney:

My remarks are addressed primarily to Ulster Unionist Party Members. In their hands, more than in those of any other, rests the future of the pro-Union people and their succeeding generations. Their future depends on the vote that will be taken at the end of this debate.

The Belfast Agreement, which was crafted and controlled by the British Government is, in essence, the terms of a conflict resolution between that Government and Sinn Fein/IRA. Its real purpose is to further the Government's policy of disengagement from Northern Ireland and to protect the lives and property of its first-class British citizens - those on the mainland. All other considerations were subservient to those objectives.

By that agreement, the Ulster Unionist leadership - now absent from the Chamber - accepted the release of the most infamous and villainous criminals. It agreed to the presence of representatives of violent Republicanism in government; it conceded the right of the Irish Government to have a share in the government of Northern Ireland; it consented to the reform of a criminal justice system that was specifically designed to combat terrorism; it acquiesced in the proposed reform of the RUC to placate those whom that force had lost lives to apprehend; and it allowed Sinn Fein/IRA the legal - though not the moral or democratic - right to demand the fulfilment of every concession under the agreement before any decommissioning of their weapons was required.

The motion asks for Members' approval of what is called a report, but by such approval Ulster Unionist Members will be pledging themselves, each and every one of them, to make the report's essential contents their determination on 15 February. I say that because their leader has publicly promised that to the Deputy First Minister (Designate).

What will Ulster Unionist Members achieve by approving this report? What will they gain? What will the Union gain? What will change in their favour between now and 15 February? The answer is that they will gain absolutely nothing but will lose much. Ulster Unionists will have given the Secretary of State time to put in place all the necessary machinery and arrangements for putting Sinn Fein/IRA in government, in the knowledge that on 15 February they will approve the contents of today's report. Those arrangements will be set in stone the moment Ulster Unionist Members determine what the House may approve in this debate.

On 15 February, when the Ulster Unionist Members make the determination that is now promised by their leader, the Secretary of State may set d'Hondt in motion and they will be unable to prevent Sinn Fein from taking their Ministries. The Ulster Unionist leader may say that the Secretary of State can do that anyway. That may be true, but imposition is very different from consent. Undemocratic imposition may be opposed, but that to which Ulster Unionist Members give consent on behalf of the pro-Union people is gone for ever.

An approval of this report, endorsed by a majority of Unionists, will give the green light to the Secretary of State to proceed in the knowledge that on 15 February the Ulster Unionist Members will consent to the determination.

2.15 pm

In voting on this report, Members are making a determination, though it may not formally come into effect until 15 February. The future of the Union will be placed in the hands of a Secretary of State who openly supports Irish unity.

After 15 February, what can Members do when d'Hondt comes into operation and puts Sinn Fein/IRA in government? Members may refuse to participate in the Executive and may even cause the Assembly, at some future date, to dissolve. But consider what Members will already have done by then. By that time, whether Members "play" in the Executive or cause the Assembly to collapse, they will have already agreed that some institutions will remain in place.

According to the Secretary of State's devolution document, the North/South Ministerial Council and the cross-border implementation bodies will be enshrined in legislation and in international treaties between the Government of the Republic of Ireland and the British Government. With those bodies permanently established, will Sinn Fein or the SDLP shed any tears if the Assembly, which is designed to offer consolation to Unionists, then collapses? Refusal to take part at that time will be worth little, and it will expose Members to the blame of bringing the Assembly down.

The Ulster Unionist leadership may still be prepared to trust Mr Blair's pledges. Members may believe that Mr Blair will not operate d'Hondt or that he will not permit the Secretary of State to do so until the IRA agrees to decommission. If that is where Members place their trust, they should not hold their breath. Members should judge the worth of such promises on the basis of the fulfilment of pledges that have already been given. Before the referendum, Mr Blair promised that no prisoners would be released until decommissioning had begun. What price is a pledge? Cardinal Wolsey, at a time when princes and kings were the Government, quoted the Bible:

"Put not your trust in princes".

Today that advice is even more applicable to Prime Ministers. If Sinn Fein is placed in government without decommissioning, there will be absolutely no reason for it ever to decommission.

There is only one way in which all the pro-Union people and their Assembly representatives can fulfil our obligations and that is to refuse, now - at this time - before it is too late. Members must refuse to further this process in any way until actual and substantial decommissioning has begun and the deadline has been fixed for its completion. It must be real decommissioning - not some token or fig leaf that would allow unreasonable and unjust pressure to be put upon Members as democrats. It must ensure that a total ceasefire is maintained and must not be one that allows the continuing murder and mutilation of our fellow citizens on both sides of the community.

For me, the preservation of the Union and my right to full and equal British citizenship, and the extension of such rights and the associated benefits to every citizen, take precedence over all else. It is above personal and party interest. I believe that that view is shared by many in the Ulster Unionist Party.

I would like the pro-Union people to be able to commend the members of the Ulster Unionist Party for their courage and self-sacrifice, rather than condemn them for their weakness and self-interest.

The verdict of history and of the pro-Union people - and some Members may smile, but it is no smiling matter - and of successive generations will depend upon how Unionist Members vote in this debate. I ask, therefore, in the name of the Union, and in the name of conscience, that those Members put self-interest and party aside, put the Union foremost and reject this report.

Mr Watson:

The Republican movement claims that there is no requirement for decommissioning even within the two-year time span. That is unacceptable given the terms of the agreement. It is also intolerable to Unionists and to the British and Irish Governments - or so they claim. There can be no progress towards an Executive role for Sinn Fein while it maintains its "no, nothing, never" policy. The ceasefires are not nearly as comprehensive as they should be. Loyalists and Republicans indulge nightly in Fascist thuggery against their communities, and even more so since the agreement. Other indications are not encouraging for the immediate future.

Members must not be blind to the reality about the Provisional IRA. This organisation is in many respects better equipped than the Irish Defence Forces - it still has the capacity to perpetrate a thousand Omaghs and flatten every town on this island. Members are still entitled to ask "Is the war over?" These are noble words and were spoken in earnest by the First Minister (Designate) in November 1998. However, I must differ with him on several points.

Neither the Irish nor the British Government would currently find it unacceptable to have Sinn Fein/IRA in government without decommissioning. The total surrender to, and daily appeasement of, the Sinn Fein/IRA terrorists means that this whole process must result in armed terrorists being in the Executive. If that does not happen, the Governments fear that they will return to doing what they do best - killing and bombing.

Currently, the difference between the so-called peace and the ongoing conflict can be measured in centimetres. The "peace" involves almost unthinkable mutilations of human limbs. The distance in centimetres from the limbs to the abdomen, where the same wounds would prove fatal, is the distance between life and death, the human measure between ceasefire and war. Already this year 16 people have been seriously wounded - the warning signs are there for all to see. It is correct to say that there is no linkage between decommissioning and seats in the Executive. That is because of the poor negotiating skills of the Unionist team, whose performance and attendance enabled Sinn Fein/IRA to gain credibility on the world stage.

To negotiate on any occasion with armed terrorists is to be involved in a blackmail process, and this is exactly what happened. There is much talk about mandates, but truth, principle and morality come before any mandate.

Adolf Hitler, after many years of intimidating his political and religious opponents, received a mandate. The result was the Second World War. Col Gaddafi has an overwhelming mandate from his people, yet atrocities like Lockerbie take place, and he arms terrorists across the world. Even Saddam Hussein has a mandate, but his treatment of the Kurdish people in northern Iraq and the genocide of the Marsh Arabs in southern Iran has to be condemned as inhuman.

Mandate or not, no right-thinking person could in any circumstances permit a group such as Sinn Fein/IRA into government while murder and mutilation continue daily.

These are the people responsible for some of the worst human rights atrocities of the twentieth century. One thinks of Patsy Gillespie, a human bomb tied into a lorry and sent to his death at a checkpoint in Londonderry. One thinks of the sectarian slaughter of 10 Protestant workmen at Kingsmills, of the Orangemen in Tullyvallen, of Enniskillen and Teebane - one could go on and on. This country is now on the verge of seeing these very people - Sinn Fein/IRA - in the Government of Northern Ireland. Members are on the brink of setting up cross-border bodies with executive powers.

This proposal by the First Minister (Designate) and his friends, seeking the approval of the Assembly, and specifically of the Members from his own party, must be considered very carefully. I think back to December 1995 when Mr Trimble, replying to an invitation to talks from Mr Spring, said

"We are not prepared to negotiate the internal affairs of Northern Ireland with a foreign Government."

How times have changed. We think back to Mr Trimble chiding Mr Mayhew in October 1995 on the subject of decommissioning:

"I must warn Sir Patrick to stick to his guns and his promise on this issue. We are not going to be party to a fudge".

If the situation were not so critical it would be farcical. The inability of Mr Trimble, the First Minister (Designate), and his negotiators to put down a marker once and for all on decommissioning has to be recognised.

This lack of commitment to draw a line in the sand and say "Enough is enough" is the problem today. The pollution of democracy with the presence of armed terrorists on the verge of entering government is simply because Mr Trimble has failed from 1995 to 1999 to exclude armed Sinn Fein/IRA from his table.

Indeed, it was highly significant that on the day when the Ulster Unionist Party held a disciplinary meeting in respect of three other members and myself, Mr Trimble met Mr Adams in private, the first of five meetings to date, thus paving the way for Sinn Fein's entry into government. This is evident to all of us in the Unionist family who see this blackmail process for what it is.

Mr Trimble's repeated assertion that there is life after politics indicates that his long-term intention is to cut a deal allowing Sinn Fein/IRA into government and move on, leaving his fellow Unionists to carry the can.

If the vote to approve this report is of no real significance, then it is much better to be safe than sorry. To reject this report in itself lets the Governments and Sinn Fein/IRA see that, finally, a marker has been laid down. Without the actual handing over of weapons, terrorists are unacceptable in governments and their nightly mutilations are unacceptable in any civilised society.

The problem with this whole process is that, sooner rather than later, we are going to face the crisis. This process is laid on a foundation of murder, bombings and terror. In reality it is built on sand, with dire consequences for us all in the future.

Until the shadow of the gun is removed from all aspects of society and true, lasting peace realised, we are beholden to the gunman. This is the dilemma that we all face. There have been many changes in Northern Ireland in recent years, some for good, but sadly some for bad, and attitudes never change.

In October 1997 Mr Trimble told his party faithful

"the key reason for staying in these talks is that nothing can come out of them without our consent. This veto means that everything must pass through the Ulster Unionist Party talks team before it goes to the people."

One must now reflect on the words and see directly where the blame for the following achievements lies.

First, the prisoner releases scheme is an issue that has caused much pain and agony for many people, in particular the families of those who have lost loved ones during the past 30 years of terror. Watching the gloating triumphalism of many of the Republican prisoners has reopened the wounds of many pained people all over this Province.

The virtual amnesty for all the perpetrators of murder beggars belief. As a result of this agreement, victims' families, who have waited and listened, some for over 20 years, to promise after promise that no stone would be left unturned to find their killers and that there would be no hiding place for the murderers, are now trying to come to terms with the fact that these promises were nothing more than empty gestures. Their faith in British justice is lost for ever.

The destruction and demoralisation of the RUC is another dividend of the agreement. No doubt the root- and-branch change here will greatly help the terrorists in a renewed campaign - another victory for the Unionist negotiators.

The impending dismissal of prison officers and the pushing through of a controversial redundancy package is again linked to the agreement.

Stand-alone cross-border bodies with executive powers - of all the items in the agreement, this particular issue lays bare all the false claims that the current Unionist Party leadership would not negotiate on our sovereignty. This is exactly what they have done with the removal of the Government of Ireland Act.

Today, though, is not a day for recriminations; it is a day for every Ulsterman to take stock of what is being asked of him. We believe that approval of this report today will leave the door open for the Secretary of State to kick-start the shadow Executive and then the full Executive at her own discretion. In my constituency, Upper Bann, there has never been any semblance of normality or ceasefire. The bombing of Portadown, Banbridge and nearby Moira has blasted people's hopes yet again. The lingering sore of 16 unresolved IRA murders since 1984 continues to fester and cause bitter resentment.

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The orchestration of a form of religious intolerance which cannot permit a church parade to continue along an arterial route back into Portadown, in order to blackmail the Government into spending millions to solve the problem, has poisoned community relations.

Even the decision to switch the Portadown-Cliftonville football match to Belfast and the banning of Portadown supporters from attending it stinks to high heaven. One wonders how many GAA fixtures have been changed, or fans barred, due to RUC advice. This is the real situation in Northern Ireland in 1999.

And so, we come to approve this report. It is too late to lock the stable door once the horse has bolted. It is too late for Mr Taylor and Mr Maginnis to complain about prisoner releases, after approving and supporting them. The honourable thing for them to do would be to admit that they helped to secure these releases, that they made a mistake and have got nothing in return.

Mr McGimpsey:

I support this report.

I have listened to Mr Watson and to others. We know roughly where we are, and the report tells us where we are going, but let us remind ourselves where we have come from.

The vexed constitutional question is "Who owns Northern Ireland?" Does it belong to Britain or does it belong to a united Ireland? The agreement solves this problem because it says that it is the people of Northern Ireland who own it. It is only they who can determine its constitutional future and that is the building block from which we are all starting. It is the people who will determine their own future.

Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom because the people of Northern Ireland so determine. If Northern Ireland were to join a united Ireland, it would be only the people of Northern Ireland who could determine that. As Nationalists might say "If you want to unite Ireland, first unite the people", whereas a Unionist might say "If you want to secure the Union, unite the people of Northern Ireland". In this regard, the self-interests of Unionism and Nationalism coincide.

We have had 30 years of conflict, and Mr Watson has referred to a number of atrocities. We all know about them, but we cannot go back and change them. However, we can try to change the future so that we do not have to go through another 30 years of conflict. That is what the agreement is about and this is the working out of that agreement.

Together, the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP have driven the process forward and have taken us towards "Devolution Day" on 10 March. This will be determined by a legislative device - a meeting of the Privy Council. We will reach that date, and at that point the UUP will have fulfilled all of its obligations under the agreement, as will the SDLP. There are, of course, other obligations which need to be fulfilled and we can talk about them.

It is important for Unionism to reflect that, under this agreement, self-determination for Northern Ireland, and as a consequence of that the repeal of articles 2 and 3, will be a big issue for the Dublin Government and the citizens of the Irish Republic. Not only will they have repealed articles 2 and 3, but any future creation of a united Ireland will require a referendum in the Irish Republic. Anybody who knows anything about the Irish Republic will know that the armed struggle over the years has been massively counter-productive to the point that today citizens of the Irish Republic would not take Northern Ireland as a gift.

Unionism and the Union are secure because their future will rest with the people of Northern Ireland, and we are their representatives.

We can then move on from that point to ask how will we share Northern Ireland - how will we get on? The agreement looks towards there being a partnership of Unionist, Nationalist, Loyalist and Republican, working together for the greatest good of all, and that is the aim of this report.

I commend the SDLP, which has worked with us, has fought its corner, and has argued its point of view, but it has always been for the greater good of the people of Northern Ireland. That is our aim also, and that is why this report is important, and it is why we need to take it forward.

Unionism and Nationalism have both made gains. Do we want a united Ireland? Only the people of Northern Ireland can deliver that. In so far as this generation is concerned, and in so far as anyone can see into the future, I do not see that happening. I do not foresee the people of Northern Ireland making that decision - but ultimately that is a matter for them.

We will go through this process today, meet again on 15 February to discuss it further and then march forward together to 10 March. That is the point at which devolution can happen, the point when Northern Ireland's political representatives begin to govern its people in a partnership, inclusive of everyone, as long as everyone meets his obligations.

The Republican movement has made gains, and a number of those have been referred to: power-sharing; full partnership; the equality agenda; the criminal justice review; the Patten Commission; prisoner releases; North/South implementation bodies; North/South areas of co-operation; and a North/South Ministerial Council.

The Provisional movement has a clear obligation under the agreement. As David Trimble outlined earlier, there are a number of references to that in the agreement. All of this was thought about, though I can understand the confusion among those who were not part of the talks. The Declaration of Support, the Pledge of Office, clause 25 of strand one, the transitional arrangements and the chapter on decommissioning all make this point clear. This is a reasonable demand. With all the weaponry out there - and bearing in mind that when Sinn Fein signed up to the agreement it signed up to total decommissioning by May 2000, and we are well into that period - we as Unionists need to know the start date, and we need to see the process start.

If that process does not begin, then, unfortunately, there will be consequences. I will not go into the detail of what they might be, but it would then be impossible for us to move forward. That might be Sinn Fein's objective, but that would be inconsistent with what that party has signed up to in the agreement, which is an acceptance that the people of the island of Ireland are not a nation in a political sense and that, therefore, they have no right to territorial unity and to national self-government. I understand that that has been difficult for Sinn Fein. After 10 March, with this final step taken, we can move forward with Sinn Fein. If that step is not taken, there are other avenues of approach.

Mr McCartney:

What are they?

Mr McGimpsey:

Wait until March 10 and we can talk about them then. We can talk about them on 18 February.

It is absolutely immoral to hold on to vast quantities of Semtex. We also know that if the guns are out there, they are used. It was the Provisionals' Semtex that was used in Omagh. The Provisionals bought the detonators used in Omagh in Arizona in 1989. If Semtex is out there, it will fall into refusenik hands, and the same will happen with the guns. They must be destroyed. That is what the people voted for.

Denis Watson talked about people having mandates. Gaddafi has a mandate and Hitler had one too. This agreement has the overwhelming mandate of the people of Northern Ireland, with almost 72% voting for it in a very high poll.

Mr McCartney:

Conned.

Mr McGimpsey:

When Mr McCartney alleges that the people of Northern Ireland were conned, he implies that they are stupid. The people are not stupid; they understand the way forward on this. In terms of a Nationalist or Republican agenda, the people of the island of Ireland voted overwhelmingly in favour of the agreement. We want to implement this in partnership because that offers the best way forward, and that can happen if everyone meets his obligations. We and the SDLP have met ours. The Provisional movement must now meet its obligations. We know the end date for decommissioning, but we must know the start date and we must see it started.

Mr Farren:

Mr Presiding Officer, I welcome and support the approval of the report of the First Minister (Designate) and Deputy First Minister (Designate), a report presented, we might note with some interest, on the day which celebrates the memory of the great human rights leader Martin Luther King, a man whose work has been an inspiration to my party and human rights campaigners everywhere.

I welcome the report. At last we can see with greater clarity the form and the functions of the political institutions which the majority here have been mandated to establish by the endorsement which the Good Friday Agreement received in the joint referenda last May. We are now on a fixed and certain timetable towards the creation of those institutions with 15 February and 10 March as the next key dates. In reaching this point, the report indicates the extensive consultations which were held involving all the pro-agreement parties. There were also many informal contacts. I do not believe, therefore, that any party can, with credibility, claim that its views were not noted and taken account of, as has been suggested in this debate.

In expressing its general welcome for the arrangements proposed by the 18 December agreement, the SDLP is pleased by a number of features. The range of responsibilities associated with departmental structures will give greater coherence to the administration. It will require intensive cross-party co-operation for its effective operation and provide opportunities for a new dynamic in the development and implementation of policies.

Two features of the 18 December agreement deserve particular comment. First, equality will be a central responsibility. Equality has been an issue of major importance to the SDLP since it was founded out of the civil rights movement. From the outset of the pre-18 December negotiations we stood by the proposition for such a provision.

Monitoring, evaluating and determining measures across the administration, in conjunction with the Ministers responsible for the various Departments, will ensure that equality principles are observed and effected throughout all areas of government. Indeed, we believe that the Assembly should assist in this task by the establishment of a special committee to scrutinise equality.

Placing this responsibility at the heart of government symbolises, in a powerfully effective way, a joint commitment by the leading Ministers of both communities to have such principles upheld throughout the administration. This puts an onus on both that, as they co-ordinate a whole programme of government, they also guarantee that it be fully informed by equality principles.

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No other approach would be likely to have the same overall effect. A free-standing Department controlled by a representative of a party from only one side of the community could never be as powerfully symbolic of a new commitment to equality and justice for all, nor could it have the same potential for ensuring that this commitment is reflected across all Departments. This is as it should be, given the overriding importance of ensuring that the new Administration and the North/South Ministerial Council is guided by principles of human and civil rights.

The announcement today of the appointment of Professor Brice Dickson to head the new Human Rights Commission marks further progress in a vital confidence-building area. We wish him and his future colleagues well as they take up their responsibilities.

With respect to the North/South arrangements, I am particularly pleased to note the strong economic-development dimension to several of the implementation bodies and areas for co-operation. I have long been of the view that a more co-ordinated North/South approach to planning economic development would be to the mutual benefit of people in both parts of Ireland.

This will be achieved most notably by implementation bodies such as those for trade and business development, special European Union programmes and aquaculture and marine matters. Economic initiatives on the part of existing bodies such as those for tourism, agriculture and transport will be of mutual benefit to both parts of Ireland - the trade and business development implementation body will be of particular significance in promoting trade between both parts of Ireland.

Public procurement programmes implemented on an all-island basis will significantly increase opportunities for northern enterprises to win a greater share of public-sector business in the South. Similarly, international trade fairs and missions will combine the strengths of businesses in both parts of the island. Research and development projects will mobilise the talents of universities and research institutes on an all-island basis to address problems of common concern.

All of this should significantly contribute to the process of attracting more inward investment to both parts of the island - particularly to the North.

Finally, I wish to return to the political process. Since Good Friday, the whole process has been a test of our respective capacities to meet the requirements of that historic agreement. The difficulties that have arisen are not uncommon in other contexts where conflicting parties have agreed to engage in a joint healing process. We have encountered delays and difficulties which have, not surprisingly, been attributed to the alleged bad faith of one party or the other, either to their reluctance to work the new arrangements, or to a real desire to frustrate the implementation of these arrangements.

Our historically deep-rooted suspicions, our pain and our suffering continue to feed our perceptions and judgements of each other and, in doing so, hold a danger of causing further delay. Alongside these impulses, which, at their worst, could lead us back to the brink of self-destruction, we have felt other impulses encouraging us to continue, to persist in order to meet the obligations we placed upon ourselves last Good Friday - obligations to create conditions for a better society where trust and mutual confidence will gradually dissipate those age-old suspicions, fears and apprehensions.

Realistically, this can only happen when we start working together for the common good in the practical matters of government. It was such impulses that brought us through the difficulties of the weeks before Christmas to reach another agreement. The report is a further testament to those impulses.

In striking an optimistic note, I am not unaware of the roadblocks that lie ahead. But, just as we have found ways of dealing with the difficulties since Good Friday, we must not allow our imaginations to fail us in dealing with what remains, either in terms of institution building or confidence building, as is the case with the problem posed by the commitment to promote decommissioning.

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