Northern Ireland Assembly Flax Flower Logo
Session 2007-2008
Third Report

Report on Northern Ireland's
Road Safety Strategy

Together with the Minutes of Proceedings of the Committee relating
to the Report and the Minutes of Evidence

Ordered by The Public Accounts Committee to be printed 11 October 2007
Report: 5/07/08R Public Accounts Committee

Public Accounts Committee
Membership and Powers

The Public Accounts Committee is a Standing Committee established in accordance with Standing Orders under Section 60(3) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. It is the statutory function of the Public Accounts Committee to consider the accounts and reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General laid before the Assembly.

The Public Accounts Committee is appointed under Assembly Standing Order No. 51 of the Standing Orders for the Northern Ireland Assembly. It has the power to send for persons, papers and records and to report from time to time. Neither the Chairperson nor Deputy Chairperson of the Committee shall be a member of the same political party as the Minister of Finance and Personnel or of any junior minister appointed to the Department of Finance and Personnel.

The Committee has 11 members including a Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson and a quorum of 5.

The membership of the Committee since 9 May 2007 has been as follows:

Mr John O’Dowd (Chairperson)
Mr Roy Beggs (Deputy Chairperson)

Mr Willie Clarke *
Mr Jonathan Craig
Mr John Dallat
Mr Simon Hamilton
Mr David Hilditch
Mr Trevor Lunn
Mr Patsy McGlone
Mr Mitchel McLaughlin
Ms Dawn Purvis

* Mr Micky Brady replaced Mr Willie Clarke on 1st October 2007

Table of Contents

List of abbreviations used in the Report

Report

Executive Summary

Summary of Recommendations

Introduction

The Scope for More and Better Road Safety Strategy Targets and for Improved Measurement of Performance

The Need to Improve the Education, Training and Testing of Road Users

The Need to Increase Detection Rates for Road Safety Offences and to Improve Enforcement of Penalties

Appendix 1:

Minutes of Proceedings

Appendix 2:

Minutes of Evidence

Appendix 3:

Chairperson’s letter of 10 July 2007 to Mr Will Haire, Accounting Officer, Department of Education

Correspondence of 15 August 2007 from Mr Will Haire, Accounting Officer, Department of Education

Lyle Bailie International letter of 12 September 2007 to Mr John Dowdall CB, Comptroller and Auditor General

Mr John Dowdall CB, Comptroller and Auditor General letter of 19 September 2007 to Lyle Bailie International

Appendix 4:

Statisical Information

Appendix 5:

List of Witnesses

List of Abbreviations used in the Report

UK

United Kingdom

PAC

Public Accounts Committee

KSIs

Killed or seriously injured

GB

Great Britain

PSNI

Police Service of Northern Ireland

The Department

Department of the Environment

C&AG

Comptroller and Auditor General

CBT

Compulsory basic training

DSA

Driving Standards Agency

VASCAR

Visual average speed computer and recorder

SPECS

Speed enforcement camera system

OFMDFM

Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister

DVA

Driver and Vehicle Agency

ADIs

Approved driving instructors

NISRA

Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency

ISO

International Organization for Standardization

CIECA

La Commission Internationale des Examens de Conduite Automobile

DPPs

District policing partnerships

Executive Summary

Introduction

1. Northern Ireland has historically had a poor road safety record with the rate of deaths and injuries significantly higher than in the rest of the United Kingdom (UK). In 2005 alone, 135 people were killed and a further 1073 were seriously injured on Northern Ireland’s roads. In 2000, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) produced a wide ranging report on Road Safety and made recommendations that were intended to inform the development of the Road Safety Strategy that was then in preparation. In the event, the Strategy was not produced until 2002. However the Committee is surprised to note that a number of the key recommendations from the 2000 report have not been progressed as would have been expected. Moreover the evidence suggests that there has not been a significant improvement in Northern Ireland’s record relative to other regions. It is evident that we still face a major challenge to make our roads safer.

2. The Committee welcomes the real progress made to date under the Strategy but it is essential that this is sustained and reinforced by further vigorous action on the part of the responsible agencies. Given the scale of the problem, Northern Ireland should strive to be at the forefront of innovation and effort in road safety and we are unlikely to narrow the gap with other regions until this is the case.

The Scope for More and Better Road Safety Strategy Targets and for Improved Measurement of Performance

3. The Strategy’s key target was to reduce the numbers killed or seriously injured (KSI) by 33%. This target is lower than in Great Britain (GB), despite the fact that the Public Accounts Committee recommended in 2000 that the Northern Ireland target should be set at a level that would close the performance gap with the rest of the UK. The Strategy’s targets were almost reached in 2005, only three years into its life and this suggests to the Committee that they were set at too low a level at the outset.

4. Casualties among drivers aged 17-24 are high but unlike Great Britain, there is no specific target in Northern Ireland for reducing them and the Committee was concerned to learn that the Department has not reviewed how successful the GB Driving Standards Agency has been in meeting its target of reducing them by 40%.

5. The Department publishes annual Strategy progress reports but current practice is to focus those reports on targets and measures that have been successful. The Committee considers that there is a risk that this kind of selective reporting could be misleading, through not presenting the public with a comprehensive picture of progress to date.

6. In the absence of full expenditure information, the overall Government priority being given to road safety cannot be measured and the responsible agencies cannot assess whether budgets are being targeted on the most effective measures. The Committee endorses the view expressed by Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) that it is time to give more mature thought to the matter and for the responsible agencies to consider what they are spending, where it is being focussed and whether they could do more with it.

7. The responsible agencies have not identified a region or group of regions in Great Britain against which to benchmark Northern Ireland’s overall road safety performance. Both PSNI and the Department alluded to the unique characteristics of Northern Ireland, such as the high proportion of rural roads, which make benchmarking difficult. However the Committee is not convinced that this prevents sensible comparisons.

8. The Department does not have a specific road safety research budget and accepts that there are gaps in its knowledge concerning particular groups of road users, such as motorcyclists and children in disadvantaged areas. In addition PSNI statistics do not distinguish between drink driving and drug driving, making it impossible to establish the true extent of either problem or to conduct relevant research.

The Need to Improve the Education, Training and Testing of Road Users

9. Given the high casualty rates in Northern Ireland, particularly among young and inexperienced drivers, the Committee considers that the Department needs to be more proactive in considering the application of new measures such as logbooks, to improve driver training and behaviour.

10. The Comptroller and Auditor General’s (C&AG) report drew attention to the higher than expected differential in driving test failure rates when a supervising examiner is present in the car. The Committee acknowledges the substantial improvements in the rate of variance since 1998-99. Nevertheless there is a statistical potential for up to 5,000 unfit drivers passing the test annually. This is a frightening statistic.

11. Despite evidence that learning to drive and handle cars at speed produces safer drivers, both ‘L’ and ‘R’ drivers are restricted to a 45 mph limit. The Department’s Strategy commitments to review the ‘R’ scheme by 2003 and to consult on driver testing and training have not yet been fulfilled. The Committee considers that there is a need to see changes in place quickly.

12. The 45 mph limit applicable to ‘R’ drivers prevents them from participating in Roadwise, a post test road safety training scheme and uptake has been well below expected levels, partly owing to the costs to participants. The Committee considers that the high casualty rate among young drivers underlines the urgency of reviewing post test training in Northern Ireland and that it would be imprudent to rely solely on a GB evidence base.

13. Graduated licensing systems impose restrictions on newly qualified drivers and delay the age of full privilege driving. Such systems are operated in a number of countries and have achieved important reductions in collision rates. The Committee endorses the view expressed by PSNI that graduated licensing is worth investing in if it saves a life.

14. Registration with the Department is mandatory for anyone wishing to offer paid driving instruction but registration for motorcycling instructors is voluntary. The Department said that consultation expected to begin later in September would cover training requirements for both motorcyclists and instructors.

15. Despite the 220% increase in motorcycle ownership over the last decade, Northern Ireland still does not have compulsory basic training (CBT) of the sort introduced in Great Britain in 1990. The Committee considers that the 50% increase in motorcyclist casualties in the last decade highlights the inadequacies of the current training regime.

16. The Department’s design of its advertising contract created a potential for conflict of interest because the successful agency was also required to arrange for research on the advertisements’ impact. It would have been preferable to avoid this at the outset.

17. Despite a 50% variance between the results of two sets of research on the effectiveness of its advertisements, the Department has not exercised its access rights to check them. The Committee considers that the large discrepancy between the two sets of results should have prompted the Department to investigate the causes and that there is little point in having access rights if they are not exercised in such circumstances.

18. The Department has on occasion authorised the agency to sell broadcasting rights for its advertisements for limited periods but has not had them independently valued.

The Need to Increase Detection Rates for Road Safety Offences and to Improve Enforcement of Penalties

19. Northern Ireland’s safety camera programme was delayed by the need to put in place legislation governing cost recovery arrangements, which came into effect in 2006. The Committee received assurances from PSNI that fixed and mobile cameras are now being located in line with accepted UK wide criteria.

20. PSNI does not operate the UK wide guidance on mileage thresholds for recording speeding offences, owing to insufficient capacity to process the associated administrative work. Given that speed is still the biggest cause of deaths and serious injuries on the roads, the Committee regards it as imperative that PSNI acts quickly to improve its performance in the detection and processing of speeding offences.

21. PSNI’s screening levels of drivers suspected of being under the influence of drink or drugs is well below recommended European levels. The Committee considers that the low screening levels under current arrangements reduce not only the number of detections but also the deterrent effect that screening provides.

22. Northern Ireland’s drink driving limit is one of the highest in Europe, and a Strategy commitment to review it by the end of 2003 was not met. While recognising that the limit is the same throughout the UK and Ireland, the Committee supports the view expressed by the Department that there is a strong argument for making a change.

23. In 2000 the PAC highlighted the issue of repeat and serious offenders, but there are still no specific local measures in place to deal with them. The Committee finds it extremely disappointing that, 7 years after the last PAC report, there are still no specific local measures in place to deal with road users who have repeat convictions and convictions for very serious offences. Road users must be given a clear message that serious offences will be viewed seriously by the Courts and will result in serious penalties.

24. While significant and commendable progress has been made, the Committee is disappointed that the responsible agencies appear to have been slow in addressing outstanding and emerging road safety issues. Of particular concern is the inexplicable delay in improving the regime for training motorcyclists and the review of the ‘L’ and ‘R’ schemes.

Summary of Recommendations

The Scope for More and Better Road Safety Strategy Targets and for Improved Measurement of Performance

1. The Strategy review must result in revised targets that are set at a high enough level to maintain the impetus to reduce road casualties. The Committee recommends that they should seek to close the gap with the rest of the UK and better performing European countries (see paragraph 7).

2. The Committee considers that the Department should make it a priority to review the effectiveness of the GB target in reducing casualties among 17-24 year olds and to determine whether setting an equivalent target for Northern Ireland would be beneficial (see paragraph 9).

3. The Committee recommends that published reports should be expanded to cover all Strategy targets and measures. In areas of relatively slow progress to date, reports should state specifically what actions are underway, or planned, and provide a timetable for their delivery (see paragraph 11).

4. The Committee recommends that the responsible agencies should consult with NIAO on how best to put in place a system for indicating expenditure totals, on an ongoing basis, and for making them available to the public. This information should be included in annual Strategy progress reports (see paragraph 14).

5. The Committee acknowledges the difficulty of finding suitable comparators, however it is clear to the Committee that the responsible agencies should establish a benchmark threshold against which performance can be measured. This should include comparison with a region or regions whose characteristics most closely match those of Northern Ireland (see paragraph 16).

6. The Committee is concerned at the absence of a dedicated road safety research programme. The Committee considers that the Department should allocate adequate funding to undertake research as a basis for designing measures to tackle specific Northern Ireland problems. It is most important that PSNI statistics are compiled in a way that underpins this research with reliable and comprehensive data (see paragraph 18).

7. Given their particular vulnerability, early research should focus on motorcyclists and children in disadvantaged areas and the Committee regards the latter as being particularly urgent (see paragraph 19).

The Need to Improve the Education, Training and Testing of Road Users

8 The Committee believes that the Department should seek to be at the leading edge of innovation in dealing with the problem of driver training and behaviour. The Committee recommends that in future the Department should seek to participate formally in relevant pilot schemes being carried out in GB. In that way it can respond proactively to the potential road safety benefits to be gained from introducing innovative measures as early as possible (see paragraph 21).

9. The Committee recommends that the Department redoubles its efforts to eradicate the pass rate variance between supervised and unsupervised tests and sets a target date for bringing the performance of its examiners into line with the rest of the UK (see paragraph 23).

10. The 45 mph limit is having an adverse effect on both the ‘L’ and ‘R’ schemes and the Committee considers that the planned consultation on driver testing and training is urgently required. It should now proceed without further delay (see paragraph 25).

11. The Committee recommends that the Department sets an early target date for completing a review of Roadwise, with a view to increasing the extent of its involvement in promoting the scheme. The review should include consideration of incentives by the Department and the insurance industry to encourage greater uptake among the target group (see paragraph 27).

12. The Committee recommends that the responsible agencies should grasp the opportunity offered by the Strategy review to evaluate graduated licensing systems, and other relevant innovations around the world, for potential early introduction in Northern Ireland (see paragraph 29).

13. The Committee considers that the current voluntary motorcycle instructor register is largely meaningless since anyone can provide paid instruction without registering with the Department. Consequently, the Department should establish quickly a regulatory regime equivalent to that in place for approved driving instructors, including a mandatory register (see paragraph 31).

14. Motorcyclist training is another area where the Committee finds the pace of the Department’s actions to tackle road safety problems completely unacceptable. In light of the ongoing increase in motorcyclist deaths and injuries, it is essential that the Department honours the Strategy commitment to introduce compulsory basic training and the Committee would like to see a firm timetable for doing so (see paragraph 33).

15. The principle of avoiding as far as possible potential for conflicts of interest is applicable to all contracts let by public bodies. The Committee recommends that Departments design future contract specifications to achieve this (see paragraph 35).

16. Departments should be prepared to exercise their access rights to satisfy themselves that research on contract performance is robust (see paragraph 37).

17. The Committee welcomes the initiative which has led to the sale of advertisement broadcasting rights. However, Departments should obtain independent valuations before embarking on any sales of public assets. This is most important in order to ensure that the transaction is fully transparent and that the sale proceeds represent a fair return for taxpayers’ investment in the assets (see paragraph 39).

The Need to Increase Detection Rates for Road Safety Offences and to Improve Enforcement of Penalties

18. The Committee recommends that PSNI reviews the coverage of speed cameras, on an ongoing basis, and conducts benchmarking with other UK regions. In the Committee’s view, this is necessary to ensure that camera deployment matches the nature and extent of the road safety issues (see paragraph 41).

19. The Committee recommends that PSNI establishes a firm target date for completing work on increasing its capacity to process Fixed Penalties and for implementing the improvements necessary to meet the increased demand arising from lowering detection thresholds (see paragraph 44).

20. Since the scale of collisions caused by drink or drug driving is greater than in the rest of the UK, the Committee recommends that PSNI reviews its screening levels and increases them so that they are at least comparable with those in other UK police services. There is an obvious need for roadside evidential drugs testing to be introduced at the earliest stage (see paragraph 46).

21 Given the problem of drink-driving in Northern Ireland, the Committee considers that the Department should proceed quickly with its review of the drink drive limit and introduce any changes that may be needed locally. This should be done without waiting for any changes in other parts of the UK or Ireland (see paragraph 48).

22. The Committee recommends that the revised Strategy emerging from the current review should report as a matter of urgency and should include commitments to enforce meaningful penalties for very serious road traffic offences and repeat convictions (see paragraph 51).

23. Given the scale of the road safety challenge the Committee urges the responsible Departments and Agencies to be both more ambitious and more innovative in their efforts to combat the poor safety record which blights Northern Ireland’s roads (see paragraph 53).

Introduction

1. The Public Accounts Committee met on 13 September 2007 to consider the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report: “Northern Ireland’s Road Safety Strategy” (NIA 1, Session 2007-08). The witnesses were:

The Committee also took written evidence from Mr Will Haire, Accounting Officer, Department of Education.

2. Northern Ireland has historically had a poor road safety record, with the rate of deaths and injuries significantly higher than in the rest of the United Kingdom. In 2005 alone, 135 people were killed and a further 1073 were seriously injured on Northern Ireland’s roads. In 2000, the Committee produced a wide-ranging report on Road Safety and made recommendations that were intended to inform the development of the Road Safety Strategy that was then in preparation. In the event, the Strategy was not produced until 2002. However, the Committee is surprised to note that a number of the key recommendations from the 2000 report have not been progressed as would have been expected. Moreover, the evidence suggests that there has not been a significant improvement in Northern Ireland’s record relative to other regions. It is evident that we still face a major challenge to make our roads safer.

3. The Committee welcomes the real progress made to date under the Strategy and believes that it is essential that this is sustained and reinforced by further vigorous action on the part of the responsible agencies. Given the scale of the problem, Northern Ireland should strive to be at the forefront of innovation and effort in road safety and we are unlikely to narrow the gap with other regions until this is the case.

4. In taking evidence, the Committee focussed on a number of issues raised in the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report. These were:

The Scope for More and Better Road Safety Strategy Targets and for Improved Measurement of Performance

5. The Strategy’s key target was to reduce the numbers killed or seriously injured (KSI) by 33%. This target is lower than in Great Britain, despite the fact that the Public Accounts Committee recommended in 2000 that the Northern Ireland target should be set at a level that would close the performance gap with the rest of the UK. The Department said that the target was viewed as realistic and achievable when it was set in 2002.See statistical information at Appendix 4.

6. Nevertheless, the Strategy’s targets were almost reached in 2005, only three years into its life and this suggests to the Committee that they were set at too low a level at the outset. The previous Committee’s recommendation therefore remains valid.

Recommendation 1

7. The Strategy review must result in revised targets that are set at a high enough level to maintain the impetus to reduce road casualties. Specifically, the Committee recommends that they should seek to close the gap with the rest of the UK and better-performing European countries.

8. Casualties among drivers aged 17-24 are proportionately high in Northern Ireland and there is no specific target for reducing them. This contrasts with the position in Great Britain, where the Driving Standards Agency has set a target to reduce casualties in this age group by 40%. The Committee was concerned to learn that the Department has not reviewed how successful the GB Driving Standards Agency has been in meeting its target. The Department said it is difficult to disentangle the contribution made by individual Strategy measures to the achievement of a target, but that the possibility of having an equivalent target for Northern Ireland could be considered in the context of the Strategy review.

Recommendation 2

9. The Committee considers that the Department should make it a priority to review the effectiveness of the GB target in reducing casualties among 17-24 year olds and to determine whether setting an equivalent target for Northern Ireland would be beneficial.

10. The Committee endorses the view expressed by the Department that targets are important for the public to assess what action is being taken and to measure progress. The Department publishes annual Strategy progress reports, but current practice is to focus those reports on targets and measures that have been successful. The Committee considers that there is a risk that this kind of selective reporting could be misleading, through not presenting the public with a comprehensive picture of progress to date. If progress reports are to be as meaningful as possible to the public, they should cover all aspects of Strategy performance measurement.

Recommendation 3

11. The Committee recommends that published reports should be expanded to cover all Strategy targets and measures. In areas of relatively slow progress to date, reports should state specifically what actions are underway, or planned, and provide a timetable for their delivery.

12. In the absence of full expenditure information, the overall Government priority being given to road safety cannot be measured and the responsible agencies cannot assess whether budgets are being targeted on the most effective measures. In 2000, the Department gave a commitment to the previous Public Accounts Committee to consider making details of the overall spend on road safety available to the public, on an ongoing basis, but this has still not been done. It is unacceptable that the Committee has had to raise this issue again because the responsible agencies have still not met the commitment given to the previous Committee 7 years after it was made.

13. The Committee acknowledges that there are difficulties in determining an exact figure for overall expenditure, given that many aspects of the responsible agencies’ general activities contribute to improving road safety, in addition to specific road safety activities. However these difficulties are not insurmountable and the Committee endorses the view expressed by PSNI that it is time to give more mature thought to the matter and for the responsible agencies to consider what they are spending, where it is being focussed and whether they could do more with it.

Recommendation 4

14. The Committee recommends that the responsible agencies should consult with NIAO on how best to put in place a system for indicating expenditure totals on an ongoing basis and for making them available to the public. This information should be included in annual Strategy progress reports.

15. The C&AG’s report highlighted that Northern Ireland’s road safety record compares poorly with other parts of the UK, ranking 37th out of a group of 48 English Unitary Authorities. Despite this, the responsible agencies have not identified a region or group of regions against which to benchmark Northern Ireland’s overall performance. The Department said that they have instead relied on specific key indicators and focussed attention on those, as well as using sources of information from across the British Isles and Europe including the Republic of Ireland. Both PSNI and the Department alluded to the unique characteristics of Northern Ireland, such as the high proportion of rural roads, which make benchmarking difficult. However the Committee is not convinced that this prevents sensible comparisons. Updated figures indicate that Northern Ireland now ranks 45th out of a group of 48 English Unitary Authorities, see Appendix 4.

Recommendation 5

16. The Committee acknowledges the difficulty of finding suitable comparators, however it is clear to the Committee that the responsible agencies should establish a benchmark threshold against which performance can be measured. This should include comparison with a region or regions whose characteristics most closely match those of Northern Ireland.

17. Research data is at the heart of targeting resources and assessing the effectiveness of Departments’ programmes. However the Department does not have a specific road safety research budget. The Department accepts that there are gaps in its knowledge concerning particular groups of road users, such as motorcyclists and children in disadvantaged areas. There was a 50% increase in motorcyclist KSIs in the 10 years up to 2005. Furthermore GB findings indicate that children from disadvantaged areas are 5 times more likely than those from other areas to be involved in a collision. In addition PSNI statistics do not distinguish between drink driving and drug driving, making it impossible to establish the true extent of either problem or to conduct relevant research.

Recommendation 6

18. The Committee is concerned at the absence of a dedicated road safety research programme. The Committee considers that the Department should allocate adequate funding to undertake research as a basis for designing measures to tackle specific Northern Ireland problems. It is most important that PSNI statistics are compiled in a way that underpins this research with reliable and comprehensive data.

Recommendation 7

19. Given their particular vulnerability, early research should focus on motorcyclists and children in disadvantaged areas and the Committee regards the latter as being particularly urgent.

The Need to Improve the Education, Training and Testing of Road Users

20. In 1999 the Driving Standards Agency in GB made available logbooks, aimed at assisting driving instructors with the training of ‘L’ drivers. The logbooks are designed to ensure a more structured approach to training. Although it has endorsed logbooks by making them available on its website, the Department told the Committee that its Driver and Vehicle Agency has not made them compulsory because it does not yet have evidence from GB research on their impact on behaviour. Given the high casualty rates in Northern Ireland, particularly among young and inexperienced drivers, the Committee considers that the Department needs to be much more proactive in considering the application of new measures such as this to improve driver training and behaviour.

Recommendation 8

21. The Committee believes that the Department should seek to be at the leading edge of innovation in dealing with the problem of driver training and behaviour. The Committee recommends that in future the Department should seek to participate formally in relevant pilot schemes being carried out in GB. In that way it can respond proactively to the potential road safety benefits to be gained from introducing innovative measures as early as possible.

22. In addition to overseeing training arrangements, the Driver and Vehicle Agency is responsible for testing drivers. The C&AG’s report drew attention to the higher than expected differential in failure rates when a supervising examiner is present in the car. Although the variance between the two rates has improved substantially since it was first raised in 1998-99, it is still higher than that in Great Britain. The Committee acknowledges the substantial improvements in the rate of variance since 1998-99. Nevertheless there is statistically a potential for up to 5,000 unfit drivers passing the test each year. This is a straightforward quality control issue. Variances on this scale which the Agency is still tolerating should be unacceptable in any system where errors are possibly life threatening.

Recommendation 9

23. The Committee recommends that the Department redoubles its efforts to eradicate the pass rate variance between supervised and unsupervised tests and sets a target date for bringing the performance of its examiners into line with the rest of the UK.

24. Despite evidence that learning to drive and handle cars at speed produces safer drivers, Northern Ireland is the only part of the UK to have an ‘R’ scheme and to restrict both ‘L’ and ‘R’ drivers to a 45 mph limit. The Strategy committed the Department to reviewing the ‘R’ scheme by 2003 but there has been no change and a Strategy commitment to consult on driver testing and training has not yet been fulfilled. The Committee considers that there is a need to see changes in place quickly.

Recommendation 10

25. The 45 mph limit is having an adverse effect on both the ‘L’ and ‘R’ schemes and the Committee considers that the planned consultation on driver testing and training is urgently required. It should now proceed without further delay.

26. The ‘R’ scheme’s 45 mph limit also has the effect of preventing newly qualified drivers from participating in Roadwise, a post test road safety training scheme. The scheme culminates in candidates taking the Institute of Advanced Motorists qualification. Unlike its GB counterparts, the Driver and Vehicle Agency has not taken the lead in developing and administering the scheme locally. The Department said it was considering a review of Roadwise and awaiting the outcome of a comparable review of the GB scheme. The Department also told the Committee that it would want to be sure that any resources spent on subsidising the scheme would be targeted at the group on which they needed to be spent. The Committee considers that the high casualty rate among young drivers underline the urgency of reviewing post test training in Northern Ireland and that it would be imprudent to rely solely on a GB evidence base.

Recommendation 11

27. The Committee recommends that the Department sets an early target date for completing a review of Roadwise, with a view to increasing the extent of its involvement in promoting the scheme. The review should include consideration of incentives by the Department and the insurance industry to encourage greater uptake among the target group.

28. Graduated licensing systems impose restrictions on newly qualified drivers and delay the age of full privilege driving. Such systems are operated in a number of countries, including Australia and the USA, and have achieved important reductions in collision rates. The Committee endorses the view expressed by PSNI that graduated licensing is worth investing in if it saves a life. The Department told the Committee that it wanted to review a range of issues connected with restrictions and controls as part of the Strategy review.

Recommendation 12

29. The Committee recommends that the responsible agencies should grasp the opportunity offered by the Strategy review to evaluate graduated licensing systems and other relevant innovations around the world for potential early introduction in Northern Ireland.

30. Motorcyclists represent an increasingly vulnerable group of road users. However the regulatory regime for instructors is less than rigorous. Whereas registration with the Department is mandatory for anyone wishing to offer paid driving instruction, registration for motorcycling instructors is voluntary. The Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 2007 has provided the necessary powers to introduce mandatory training and registration of motorcycle instructors for the first time and the Department said that consultation expected to begin later in September would cover training requirements for both motorcyclists and instructors.

Recommendation 13

31. The Committee considers that the current voluntary motorcycle instructor register is largely meaningless since anyone can provide paid instruction without registering with the Department. Consequently, the Department should establish quickly a regulatory regime equivalent to that in place for approved driving instructors, including a mandatory register.

32. Despite the 220% increase in motorcycle ownership over the last decade, Northern Ireland still does not have compulsory basic training (CBT) of the sort introduced in Great Britain in 1990. A Strategy commitment to introduce CBT by 2005 has not been met and the Department said that the earliest estimated date for doing so is 2008-09. The Committee considers that the 50% increase in motorcyclist casualties in the last decade highlights the inadequacies of the current training regime. The Department accepted the delay as a failing on its part and said that consultation on introducing CBT is expected to begin later in September.

Recommendation 14

33. Motorcyclist training is another area where the Committee finds the pace of the Department’s actions to tackle road safety problems completely unacceptable. In light of the ongoing increase in motorcyclist deaths and injuries, it is essential that the Department honours the Strategy commitment to introduce compulsory basic training and the Committee would like to see a firm timetable for doing so.

34. The Department spends around £1.5 million annually (around one third of its road safety budget) on advertising campaigns. The way in which the Department had designed the advertising contract created a potential for conflict of interest because the successful agency was also required to arrange for research on the advertisements’ impact. The Committee notes that the agency has put in place arrangements to prevent such a conflict from arising in practice but it would be preferable to avoid this at the outset. Correspondence between Lyle Bailie and the C&AG is at Appendix 3.

Recommendation 15

35. The principle of avoiding as far as possible potential for conflicts of interest is applicable to all contracts let by public bodies. The Committee recommends that Departments design future contract specifications to achieve this.

36. The Department employs two measures to assess the effectiveness of its advertising campaigns in changing awareness and behaviour. The Department considers that these measures provide a good assurance of their effectiveness. However the Committee noted a variation of around 50% between the two sets of results. Despite having access rights to examine the results, the Department has not done so and was unable to explain the variance. The Committee considers that there is little point in having access rights if they are not exercised and that the large discrepancy between the two sets of results should have prompted the Department to investigate the causes.

Recommendation 16

37. Departments should be prepared to exercise their access rights to satisfy themselves that research on contract performance is robust.

38. Northern Ireland’s road safety advertisements have attracted interest from other road safety agencies and the Department has on occasion authorised the agency to sell broadcasting rights for limited periods. However the Department has not had the advertisements independently valued and cannot be sure that the price it receives represents full value for money.

Recommendation 17

39. The Committee welcomes the initiative which has led to the sale of advertisement broadcasting rights. However Departments should obtain independent valuations before embarking on any sales of public assets. This is most important in order to ensure that the transaction is fully transparent and that the sale proceeds represent a fair return for taxpayers’ investment in the assets.

The Need to Increase Detection Rates for Road Safety Offences and to Improve Enforcement of Penalties

40. PSNI commenced the first phase of Northern Ireland’s safety camera programme in 2003 but expansion was delayed by the need to put in place legislation governing cost recovery arrangements. This was necessary to allow PSNI to retain the proceeds of fines to fund the purchase of additional cameras and only came into effect in August 2006. The Committee received assurances from PSNI that fixed and mobile cameras are now being located in line with accepted UK wide criteria. The Committee shares PSNI’s view that the public must be policed fairly and therefore encourages further use of evidence based methodologies for targeted camera deployment. This will ensure that the extent of camera coverage in any location is appropriate to its road safety problems.

Recommendation 18

41. The Committee recommends that PSNI reviews the coverage of speed cameras on an ongoing basis and conducts benchmarking with other UK regions. In the Committee’s view this is necessary to ensure that camera deployment matches the nature and extent of the road safety issues.

42. UK wide guidelines on mileage thresholds for recording speeding offences are produced by the Association of Chief Police Officers. However PSNI does not operate these thresholds, owing to insufficient capacity to process the associated administrative work. As a result, around half of speeding motorists escape detection. PSNI accepted that it could do a lot better and acknowledged the need to improve the capacity of its Fixed Penalty Processing Centre. The Committee was told that increased capacity could include technological improvements to make the process quicker and easier and that PSNI was commissioning work on how best to proceed.

43. Given that speed is still the biggest cause of deaths and serious injuries on the roads, the Committee regards it as imperative that PSNI acts quickly to improve its performance in the detection and processing of speeding offences. Since increased detection will lead to a knock-on effect on the Driver and Vehicle Agency in relation to adding penalty points to driving licences, it will be essential for both bodies to work closely to provide an efficient service.

Recommendation 19

44. The Committee recommends that PSNI establishes a firm target date for completing work on increasing its capacity to process Fixed Penalties and for implementing the improvements necessary to meet the increased demand arising from lowering detection thresholds.

45. Drink and drug driving are a factor in a significant number of road casualties. However PSNI’s screening levels of drivers suspected of being under the influence of drink or drugs are well below recommended European levels and research shows that drivers think there is little likelihood of being stopped by police. PSNI said its efforts would be greatly assisted by having legislation, such as that available to the Garda Siochana, providing powers to conduct random roadside testing which would increase detection of offenders. However the Committee considers that the low screening levels under current arrangements reduce not only the number of detections but also the deterrent effect that screening provides.

Recommendation 20

46. Since the scale of collisions caused by drink or drug driving is greater than in the rest of the UK, the Committee recommends that PSNI reviews its screening levels and increases them so that they are at least comparable with those in other UK police services. There is an obvious need for roadside evidential drugs testing to be introduced at the earliest stage.

47. Northern Ireland’s drink driving limit is one of the highest in Europe and a Strategy commitment to review the limit by the end of 2003 was not met. While recognising that the limit is the same throughout the UK and Ireland, the Committee supports the view expressed by the Department that there is a strong argument for making a change in Northern Ireland. The Committee welcomes the proposals to review the drink drive limit and considers that setting it at a lower level would send out a strong message about the danger of drinking and driving.

Recommendation 21

48. Given the problem of drink driving in Northern Ireland, the Committee considers that the Department should proceed quickly with its review of the drink drive limit and introduce any changes that may be needed. This should be done without waiting for any changes in other parts of the UK or Ireland.

49. In 2000 the PAC highlighted the issue of repeat and serious offenders, including those with multiple convictions, and recommended that proposals be drawn up with a view to introducing tougher penalties to help address the particular problems of Northern Ireland. In the interim, legislative changes have been introduced to maintain parity with the rest of the UK but no specific local measures are in place. The Department said that new measures were being considered as part of the Strategy review but were unable to provide the Committee with further details, pending a ministerial view on the way forward.

50. The Committee finds it extremely disappointing that, 7 years after the last PAC report, there are still no specific local measures in place to deal with road users who have repeat convictions and convictions for very serious offences. In particular, action must be taken to tackle the death riders who steal cars, assault their victims and then terrorise their local communities. Road users must be given a clear message that serious offences will be viewed seriously by the Courts and will result in serious penalties.

Recommendation 22

51. The Committee recommends that the revised Strategy emerging from the current review should report as a matter of urgency and should include commitments to enforce meaningful penalties for very serious road traffic offences and repeat convictions.

Overall conclusion and recommendation

52. Throughout the hearing, common themes emerged in the responses to the Committee’s questions as to why target dates for completing Strategy commitments had not been met or why action had not been taken to address specific problems. We were told that:

While significant and commendable progress has been made in improving Northern Ireland’s road safety performance, the Committee is disappointed that the responsible agencies appear to have been slow in addressing outstanding and emerging issues. Of particular concern is the inexplicable delay in improving the regime for training motorcyclists and the review of the ‘L’ and ‘R’ schemes.

Recommendation 23

53. Given the scale of the road safety challenge, the Committee urges the responsible Departments and Agencies to be both more ambitious and more innovative in their efforts to combat the poor safety record which blights Northern Ireland’s roads.

Appendix 1

Minutes of Proceedings
of the Committee
Relating to the Report

Thursday, 13 September 2007
Room 144, Parliament Buildings

Present: Mr John O’Dowd (Chairperson)
Mr Roy Beggs (Deputy Chairperson)
Mr Jonathan Craig
Mr Simon Hamilton
Mr David Hilditch
Mr Trevor Lunn
Mr Patsy McGlone
Mr Mitchel McLaughlin
Ms Dawn Purvis

In Attendance: Mrs Cathie White (Assembly Clerk)
Mrs Gillian Lewis (Assistant Assembly Clerk)
Mrs Nicola Shephard (Clerical Supervisor)
Mr John Lunny (Clerical Officer)

Apologies: Mr Willie Clarke
Mr John Dallat

2.02pm The meeting went into public session.

4. Evidence on the NIAO Report ‘Northern Ireland’s Road Safety Strategy’

The Committee took oral evidence on the NIAO report ‘Northern Ireland’s Road Safety Strategy’ from Mr Stephen Peover, Accounting Officer, Department of Environment (DOE), Mr Stanley Duncan, Director of Road Safety, DOE, Mr Desi McDonnell, Head of Road Safety Education Branch, DOE, Assistant Chief Constable Roy Toner, Head of Operational Support Department, Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and Chief Inspector Brian Kee, Deputy Head of Road Policing Development Branch, PSNI. The witnesses answered a number of questions put by the Committee.

3.20pm Mr McGlone left the meeting.

3.30pm Mr McLaughlin left the meeting.

3.33pm Mr McGlone rejoined the meeting.

3.34pm Mr Hamilton and Mr Hilditch left the meeting.

3.35pm Mr Hilditch rejoined the meeting.

3.55pm Mr McGlone left the meeting.

3.58pm The evidence session finished and the witnesses left the meeting.

[EXTRACT]

Thursday, 11 October 2007
Room 144, Parliament Buildings

Present: Mr John O’Dowd (Chairperson)
Mr Roy Beggs (Deputy Chairperson)
Mr Mickey Brady
Mr Jonathan Craig
Mr John Dallat
Mr Simon Hamilton
Mr David Hilditch
Mr Mitchel McLaughlin
Mr Trevor Lunn

In Attendance: Mrs Debbie Pritchard (Principal Clerk)
Mrs Cathie White (Assembly Clerk)
Mrs Gillian Lewis (Assistant Assembly Clerk)
Mrs Nicola Shephard (Clerical Supervisor)
Mr John Lunny (Clerical Officer)

Apologies: Ms Dawn Purvis
Mr Patsy McGlone

The meeting opened at2.00pm in public session.

2.11pm The meeting went into closed session.

2.25pm Mr Hamilton joined the meeting.

6. Consideration of Draft Committee Report on Northern Ireland’s Road Safety Strategy.

Members considered the draft report paragraph by paragraph. The witnesses attending were Mr John Dowdall CB, C&AG, Mr Eddie Bradley, Director of Value for Money, and Ms Ursula Moyna, Audit Manager.

The Committee considered the main body of the report.

Paragraphs 1 – 5 read and agreed.

Paragraph 6 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraphs 7 – 11 read and agreed.

Paragraph 12 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraph 13 read and agreed.

Paragraphs 14 – 15 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraph 16 read and agreed.

Paragraph 17 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraphs 18 – 21 read and agreed.

Paragraph 22 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraphs 23 – 24 read and agreed.

Paragraphs 25 – 27 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraphs 28 - 30 read and agreed.

Paragraph 31 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraph 32 read and agreed.

Paragraph 33 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraphs 34 – 39 read and agreed.

Paragraphs 40 – 41 read, amended and agreed.

3.54pm Mr Hamilton left the meeting.

Paragraphs 42 – 43 read and agreed.

Paragraphs 44 – 45 read, amended and agreed.

3.59pm Mr Hamilton rejoined the meeting.

Paragraph 46 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraph 47 read and agreed.

Paragraph 48 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraphs 49 – 50 read and agreed.

Paragraphs 51 – 53 read, amended and agreed.

4.14pm Mr Lunn and Mr McLaughlin left the meeting.

The Committee considered the Executive Summary of the report.

Paragraphs 1 – 9 read and agreed.

Paragraph 10 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraph 11 read and agreed.

Paragraph 12 read, amended and agreed.

Paragraphs 13 – 23 read and agreed.

Paragraph 24 read, amended and agreed.

Agreed: Members ordered the report to be printed.

Agreed: Members agreed that the Chairperson’s letter to Mr Will Haire, Accounting Officer, Department of Education, Mr Haire’s response, Mr David Lyle’s letter to the C&AG and C&AG’s response would be included in the Committee’s report.

Agreed: Members agreed to embargo the report until 00.01am on Thursday, 8 November 2007.

Agreed: Members agreed to launch the report with a reception in the Long Gallery.

[EXTRACT]

Appendix 2

Minutes of Evidence

13 September 2007

Members present for all or part of the proceedings:
Mr John O’Dowd (Chairperson)
Mr Roy Beggs (Deputy Chairperson)
Mr Jonathan Craig
Mr Simon Hamilton
Mr David Hilditch
Mr Trevor Lunn
Mr Patsy McGlone
Mr Mitchel McLaughlin
Ms Dawn Purvis

Also in attendance:
Mr John Dowdall CB, Comptroller and Auditor General
Mr David Thomson, Treasury Officer of Accounts

Witnesses:

Mr Stanley Duncan
Mr Desi McDonnell
Mr Stephen Peover

Department of the Environment

Chief Inspector Brian Kee
Assistant Chief Constable Roy Toner

Police Service of Northern Ireland

1. The Chairperson (Mr O’Dowd): I ask members of the Committee, the public, and our witnesses to ensure that they turn off their mobile phones. Unfortunately, it is not enough to switch them to silent mode, because the signal interferes with the recording equipment, and it is necessary to record this meeting so that the Committee can draw up its final report.

2. We have received apologies from John Dallat and Willie Clarke.

3. We shall be taking evidence on the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report on road safety strategy. Members have a copy of an Audit Office paper detailing estimates of the financial costs of preventing road traffic casualties.

4. Our witnesses are Mr Stephen Peover, accounting officer in the Department of the Environment, and PSNI Assistant Chief Constable Roy Toner. Both witnesses will introduce their teams.

5. Mr Stephen Peover (Department of the Environment): To my left is Stanley Duncan, director of the road safety division, and Desi McDonnell, head of the road safety education branch.

6. Assistant Chief Constable Roy Toner (Police Service of Northern Ireland): I am accompanied by Chief Inspector Brian Kee from the PSNI roads policing development unit.

7. The Chairperson: You are all welcome to this evidence session. We will start the proceedings with an explanation of how this Committee meeting will work — I will start the questioning, and then we will ask each Committee member for further questions.

8. My first question is for you, Mr Peover. Paragraph 1.1 of the Audit Office report shows that the road safety record here has been “consistently poorer” than in Britain. What is the Department doing about that? Is there a statistical point beyond which we cannot reasonably be expected to go — the maximum that we can reach in terms of road safety?

9. Mr Peover: The answer to that is no. The point that Assistant Chief Constable Roy Toner and I have made at various launches of advertising campaigns is that, although we talk about figures, we are actually talking about human beings. Northern Ireland’s road safety record has improved dramatically over the past 30 years. It is much better than it was, but too many people are still being killed and injured. We will be talking about rates of people killed or seriously injured (KSIs).

10. Ultimately, there is no acceptable level of road casualties; we must get that disclaimer out of the way. Obviously, the focus must be on reducing the number of road deaths. The Department’s targets are contained in the document ‘Northern Ireland Road Safety Strategy 2002-2012’, the aim of which is to overachieve those targets. Another point for context is that although they are called “targets”, they are only targets in the sense that they are realistic goals to aim towards. They are not intended to constrain, nor will the Department abandon its work because those targets have been reached. It regards them simply as markers on a journey to a much better system of road safety than that which exists at present.

11. The Chairperson: In a previous mandate, the Public Accounts Committee examined road safety. One of its recommendations was to set lower targets than those that are contained in the current strategy. Why was the Committee’s recommendation ignored — for want of a better term?

12. Mr Peover: I take your point about the want of a better term: the Department did not ignore that recommendation. There was a respectable argument for setting targets higher. The target in Great Britain is 40%, starting from a lower base. However, there was extensive discussion — which occurred before any of the officials who are present came to the Department — between it, the Department for Regional Development, Roads Service and the PSNI about what the appropriate target should be for Northern Ireland. Initial research suggested a figure as low as 20%. The Department took on board the recommendation of 40%. After discussion with its partners, it settled on a headline figure for the number of people who are killed or seriously injured to be reduced to 33% by 2012. That was the judgement that was made at the time about what it hopes is a realistic and achievable objective. The Department could have set a higher figure or, indeed, any target that it wanted. However, in the circumstances, that seemed to the partners to be a reasonable target. As the Department reviews the strategy in the near future, that figure must be examined in order to determine whether it would now be appropriate to set different targets for 2012.

13. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: I agree with Mr Peover. However, there are some environmental factors in Northern Ireland that must be taken into account in order to determine why the situation is as it is. Primarily, Northern Ireland is a fairly large geographical region of these islands, and it has a large number of rural roads. Its drivers cover many road miles in comparison with road users in other large parts of GB. Northern Ireland’s statistical analysis is more comparable to that of the Republic of Ireland, which also has a large rural community.

14. Additionally, from a policing perspective, there has been an opportunity to devote sufficient resources to that area of business only during the past nine or 10 years. It creates opportunities for the police in the future in that we can, for example, professionalise the aspects of roads policing that we are trying to get involved in.

15. There is also the point that many of the roads in Northern Ireland are of a type that does not necessarily allow progress to be made easily on the engineering aspect of road safety. Road safety is based on the three principles of enforcement, education and engineering. From an engineering perspective, motorways and dual carriageways are safer roads per se than, for example, B-class country roads. Therefore, there are several environmental and historical factors in Northern Ireland that have brought about the absolutely dreadful killed-and-seriously injured figures that it has at present.

16. However, the opportunity has presented in the past 10 years to take effective action. It is not an epidemic about which nothing can be done. It has been shown that action can be taken. That must be continued.

17. The Chairperson: My next question may seem strange: do targets assist in the development of road-safety strategies, or is setting them simply a mandatory task that has become more important than the programme of work that is carried out?

18. Mr Peover: We must be careful. Targets are helpful. It is useful when a variety of agencies are involved that they agree among themselves as to what those targets should be and about what can reasonably be done to achieve them. Before we came into the Senate today, we discussed the public’s right to expect agencies to act on serious social problems. How can the public assess whether that action is being taken unless there are targets against which they can measure progress?

19. In that sense, targets are helpful. However, they would be unhelpful if they became constraints or reasons for limitations, or if we found ourselves closer to achieving our targets than we currently are and people felt that we could ease off and cut back on resources or actions. For example, in 2005 we were quite close to achieving our 2012 targets. Therefore, we must be careful. In a general sense, targets are helpful for direction-setting and giving people a reason or method to assess performance. They would be unhelpful if they were simply interpreted as some important mantra in their own right. As such, they have no value — they are just figures.

20. The Chairperson: My last point is that the performance reports on your road safety strategy concentrate somewhat on the areas in which you are doing well; such a focus can be the tendency. Is it important to concentrate also on areas across the board where improvement is required?

21. Mr Peover: Yes. We have two systems of reporting: the published summary report, which tells people what is happening on key headline actions, and biannual reports on all 164 actions in the strategy. A summary of those actions is available on the website; however, we restrict the published headline report to current key areas. You have raised a useful point, and there would be no great difficulty in publishing a full report that covered all of the actions. That would enable the public to see what is happening across the board.

22. Mr Hilditch: I welcome you to the Committee, gentlemen. My questions relate to part 4 of the report, specifically on drink/drugs-driving, which remains a leading cause of death and serious injury.

23. Paragraph 2.20 shows that, before April, the standard of your record-keeping on casualties hampered research on collisions. Paragraph 4.21 states that the standard of records on drink/drugs-driving would also hamper research. When will you disaggregate those statistics and keep proper and usable records?

24. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: There is a massive thirst for statistical information in that particular area. I accept that, historically, the PSNI, in both its current and previous guises, has not kept information that is as accurate as people want today. The point is that we have striven towards achieving record-keeping that is commensurate with the standards and the context of the time. We have not always achieved that.

25. I am responsible for the road safety strategy in the PSNI and for the central statistics unit. That is handy because the two areas can be melded together. For example, we have set some high standards for crime statistics and road-safety statistics. Indeed, each year, the PSNI produces and publishes those as national statistics, and we now have a far more comprehensive system for gathering such information. As colleagues know, recommendation 93 in the Patten Report requires the PSNI to be:

“at the forefront of law enforcement technology”.

26. That is not just detection technology. It is also about IT systems that can make the gathering and analysis of such information easier. Most of those systems have built-in information management. I am comfortable that the mistakes of the past will not be revisited and that we can produce statistical information that is valid, reliable, recent and useful to ourselves and colleagues in other agencies. Such information should be in the public domain and as widely available as possible, because it is immensely useful in assisting other agencies, such as district policing partnerships, community safety partnerships and road-safety groups, to understand the size and complexity of the problems that we face.

27. Mr Hilditch: Paragraph 4.22 suggests that the screening of drivers for alcohol and, presumably, drugs, is well below the European Transport Safety Council’s recommended levels. How many more drivers would be screened if you implemented those recommended levels?

28. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: How long is a piece of string? There would be a substantial increase if we moved forward in that area. The random breath-testing approach that is used by our colleagues in An Garda Síochána works effectively, and we have been advocates of that.

29. The proposal is to implement legislation that will provide for random breath testing. That will greatly assist us. At the moment, for a person to be, to use the vernacular, breathalysed, he or she must have committed a road traffic offence such as careless driving, having a defect on the vehicle, or a road traffic collision. If we were to have the scope to introduce random testing we could, for example, set up a checkpoint in an area in which many people have been killed or seriously injured and start breath testing people, and we would see a substantial increase in arrests.

30. It is not that the officers are not keen to detect more offenders, but a balance must be struck, because our response must be seen to be proportionate. The public, the majority of whom are law abiding and do not drink or use drugs when driving, want to be assured that there will not be an oppressive use of police resources in that area. It is a case of getting the balance right.

31. The short answer is that we will increase detection of offenders when the legislation for random breath testing is in place.

32. Mr Hilditch: I agree. I know from speaking to people in my constituency that there is a perception that they will not run into police checks for drink-driving except, perhaps, in the run-up to Christmas. Thankfully, many people do not have that attitude because they have been educated about the dangers. However, it is an area that must be covered in the short term.

33. Finally, given the low levels of screening described in paragraph 4.23, it is little wonder that drivers do not think that they are likely to be caught for drink-driving. Taking into consideration the fact that police screening enforcement levels are so low, is the Department wasting taxpayers’ money on expensive advertisements on that and on other road safety issues?

34. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: That is a good point. It is the chicken-and-egg question once again, and I have given the matter a lot of thought. There will always be a criminal element that will drink and drive; that is a fact of life. My colleagues and I have consistently said in media interviews that we will catch persistent offenders; we will bring them before the court, and they will face the consequences. The courts are taking a strong line on this offence, and there have been cases in which people have been imprisoned because of multiple charges of being drunk in charge of a vehicle.

35. Occasional offenders have to consider personal responsibility. Some people think that they can have a few drinks and still drive safely. We have maintained the message that people should steer clear of alcohol completely if they are driving, and that applies to drugs, including medication.

36. Another point that we must instil, as part of the educational programmes, is that — to address Mr Hilditch’s original point — there is a stronger likelihood that people will drive around a corner and meet a police checkpoint that is carrying out random breath tests of, for example, the drivers of 15 vehicles. The chances are that drunk drivers will not get home, but will find themselves in a custody suite using breath-testing equipment for evidence purposes. We treat such people — and I make no apology for it — in the same way that we treat anyone who is brought into the custody suite as a detained person. We treat the situation that seriously.

37. Advertising is a very worthwhile and beneficial approach. The PSNI remains committed to the advertising campaigns that have been used recently. Those have been criticised for being very clear-cut and realistic and for bringing the issue into the sitting room. I have two teenage daughters, one of whom is still driving with R-plates. I made her sit down and watch the advertisements, and they brought the dangers home to her.

38. When I was in Dublin at the joint launch with the Road Safety Authority there, I made it clear that advertisements could not convey the smell of burning flesh or the screams of pain at the scene of an accident. My officers and I have been there, along with colleagues from the Ambulance Service and the Fire and Rescue Service. That is the true human cost of a road traffic collision.

39. The advertisements may be hard hitting, but they get the message across and imprint it in people’s minds. They may be unpleasant, but — and I do not want to sound melodramatic — having to go to a morgue or tell a family that a loved one has lost his or her life is very unpleasant for the officers and for the family.

40. The advertisements are a useful educational tool for getting the message across. Whether we maintain that approach in the long term is a different question, and the new road safety strategy might want to address that.

41. Mr Peover: That is an important point from the Department’s perspective. The road safety strategy is based on education, enforcement and engineering. Education is important, and, if we look back over the past 30 years, we can see that a cultural difference is emerging in how people behave nowadays compared to how they did 30 years ago when they did not regard driving under the influence of alcohol as an issue.

42. All the advertising campaigns have achieved high recognition levels, especially those about drink and drugs.

43. The anti-drink-driving message seems to be getting across, and different attitudes are emerging. We must back up police enforcement with an education campaign that is aimed at all levels — from schools through to advertising campaigns and other campaigns that are directed at adults. It is difficult to measure the individual contribution of any component of the strategy, but experience shows that education has made a difference to people’s behaviour.

44. Mr Hilditch: Paragraph 4.25 states that Northern Ireland has one of the highest drink-driving limits in Europe. How is it possible to convey the road safety message to never, ever drink and drive, when we have made no attempt to lower the limit?

45. Mr Peover: We have discussed that, and it will be addressed in the review of the strategy. We communicated with NIO Ministers on the matter prior to restoration of the Assembly. The UK — and the South — is out of line with many countries, and that must be addressed. There is a strong argument for making a substantial change in the drink-driving limit.

46. Mr Hilditch: The strategy contained a commitment from the Department of the Environment to carry out public consultation on the drink-driving limit. It was classed as a low-priority measure, and the Department missed the 2003 target for consultation. Therefore, why did the Department make that commitment? When will it fulfil its commitment?

47. Mr Peover: The Department took action on it. The drink-driving limit was reviewed, and we consulted direct rule Ministers on it. As part of the process of producing the consultation document for the review of the strategy, we will consult our local Minister shortly.

48. Mr McLaughlin: Paragraph 2.25 states that a road safety report in 1999 noted that Northern Ireland had the thirty-eighth worst record for road deaths per 100,000 of population. In 2005, it was in thirty-seventh place in a comparison with 48 unitary authorities in England. Paragraph 2.26 addresses benchmarking and the reason that the threshold against which we can measure progress and performance has not been established.

49. Why have we not moved over that time? The explanation that is offered is that there is no directly or precisely comparable region in Britain. That is really a self-serving argument. The report offers some suggestions, and I am sure that some primary research might address that need.

50. Mr Peover: I do not want to go down a byway on statistics, but it depends on how one looks at these things. One measure of our performance is on a per capita level, which is based on the number of people killed and seriously injured on our roads. In that sense, the data are correct. Another way of looking at it is that Northern Ireland is different. It is more rural with a younger population, and we know that younger people have a poorer accident record than more mature people. We travel more miles per capita, most of our roads are rural, and more accidents tend to happen on those roads. It is difficult to draw a comparison with a region or set of regions. If one considers the figure for Northern Ireland for each billion vehicle kilometres travelled, we are slightly better overall than Great Britain. There are different ways of interpreting the data.

51. It is genuinely difficult to compare Northern Ireland with any region elsewhere in these islands. Therefore, we commissioned research at various times from the Transport Research Laboratory — which is now known as TRL — on the appropriate targets that we should set for Northern Ireland and what we might expect given the context in which we find ourselves.

52. That is what has given Northern Ireland its benchmark. As regards data and figures, we have robust measures on where we are and where we want to be. We could, and do, compare ourselves with other parts of the UK. We are not trying to avoid benchmarking, but it is complicated. It is not easy to identify a place with which we could compare ourselves: we are genuinely different.

53. Mr Desi McDonnell (Department of the Environment): It is worth adding that TRL completed a piece of work for the Department in 1995. Due to input from the audit that we are now discussing, we asked our colleagues in central statistics and research branch to examine that earlier piece of work to see whether any changes would require us to revisit the subject. The findings were that the key demographic statistics for Northern Ireland that make us different from other regions remain the same. We have conducted research specifically on that topic.

54. Mr McLaughlin: I do not have the precise details or outcome of that study. Are you saying that it supports the conclusion that we do not need to conduct further work on benchmarking and that we need not rely on it in the future?

55. Mr Peover: I did not intend to give that impression. It is a difficult area, and there is the question of what the priority is. We know what the figures and key indicators are, and we wish to focus on those. We have conducted research to see whether there is a straightforward comparison that we could make and possibly learn from. We are trying to draw on expertise from across these islands, taking in Great Britain and the South, where the record is slightly worse than ours. We are examining good practice and are drawing on what our colleagues in the Department for Transport and in the Driving Standards Agency (DSA) are doing. We are using sources of information from across the British Isles and European networks to see what we can do to improve road safety. It is not that we wish to avoid comparisons, but we think it very difficult to make easy ones, and that is the point that we want to get across.

56. Mr McLaughlin: That helps, as I did get the impression that you were not prepared to go down that road. I accept that there is no readily available or cheaper source of comparative study. Can I assume that your ongoing work will establish a benchmark threshold on which you can plan and project future strategies?

57. Mr Peover: We have tested our current strategy and will test a revised strategy against what is happening elsewhere. We will look to experience, to good practice, and to the figures achieved and targets set elsewhere, and draw on all those sources of information as part of the process of establishing revised targets for Northern Ireland.

58. Mr McLaughlin: I have a question for Assistant Chief Constable Toner about paragraph 4.6, where it is stated that the PSNI was unable to expand the safety camera scheme as planned in 2004–05 because of delays in introducing the cost-recovery arrangements. I am declaring an interest in this because I have been caught by the cameras, and I am convinced that they are a worthwhile investment. Does Assistant Chief Constable Toner agree that it is a common-sense investment with a definite return as regards road safety?

59. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: I agree that it is a good incentive. Drivers are primarily law-abiding citizens, but we all speed. I am a police officer, and I cannot say that I have always watched my speedometer and have never gone over the limit. It is human nature, as vehicles are comfortable and most of them are very powerful. The cameras are a powerful deterrent, and people rely on having their motor vehicles and driving licences.

60. As regards the safety camera scheme and the installation of the four cameras, the idea at the beginning was that there would be approximately 34 static cameras across Northern Ireland. The difficulty was that the PSNI ponied up the money to start the initiative, but the legislation was not in place to capture the money that would be coming in through fixed penalties to develop the scheme further.

61. In other words, as regards using police capital to install the first four cameras, we were on the back foot. The cost-recovery process has changed, and we are now — usefully — in the position of being able to get back the cost of the cameras.

62. However, there has been an interesting debate in GB and across Europe since then about the benefits of fixed-camera sites. There are a phenomenal number of fixed cameras in parts of England and Wales, and it is clear that they add value. However, there has been a move away from fixed cameras to the use of cameras that are set up temporarily in specific locations. Police officers can be seen using them. For example, the Chief Constable of Durham has shied away from using fixed cameras but has begun to use mobile cameras a great deal. Mobile cameras are a lot more responsive to live information. The disadvantage with fixed cameras is the time that it takes to set them up.

63. There are places in which the volume of traffic is so high that fixed cameras would be immensely useful. Therefore, we propose to install more. That will involve a consultation process, and we are happy to be held to account on that. We have eight mobile camera units across Northern Ireland, and those are used in conjunction with the other laser and visual average speed computer and recorder (VASCAR) systems that police officers use daily. Those systems are not camera-based; they are a different kind of system. That means, therefore, that there are many ways to detect speeding motorists.

64. The first speed enforcement camera system (SPECS), which records the average speed of a vehicle, has been installed outside Newry. The result of that installation has been a phenomenal reduction in the detection of speeding drivers. That reduction has occurred because people have seen the first camera and moderated their speed accordingly over the stretch of road in question, which had claimed the lives of 13 people in five years. There have been no fatalities on that stretch since SPECS was introduced.

65. The approach in the new strategies is to ascertain whether we should install a massive number of fixed cameras across Northern Ireland or have a very good mixed bag that comprises some fixed cameras, increased mobile camera usage, and SPECS. There must be some proportionality; people want to feel that they are not being unduly investigated by always having speed cameras in their area. The fixed-camera sites are used for high volumes of traffic and high-risk locations, but it can take as much as a year — longer, in some cases — to identify those areas and set up the cameras. However, the legislation allows us to net off the necessary money, and the new strategy will give us the opportunity to develop safety camera technology further, albeit not necessarily with a massive number of fixed-camera sites.

66. Mr McLaughlin: Paragraph 3.50 deals with the road safety adverts that David Hilditch mentioned. Advertising agencies are allowed to conduct sales on behalf of the Department, but it does not have the advertisements independently evaluated. Therefore, how can the Department be sure that taxpayers are getting full value for money on those sales?

67. Mr Peover: It depends how the matter is looked at. The Department has a contract that includes provision for the assessment of the impact of the advertisements. That assessment is carried out by a separate company, which is contracted to the advertising agent. The Department, through its statisticians in the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), carries out an annual monitor of road safety. By and large, compared to the Millward Brown statistics, NISRA’s figures show greater levels of public recognition and awareness of the advertising campaigns.

68. The Department feels that there are enough checks and balances to ensure that the figures are as accurate as they can be. Obviously, the statistics reflect the expressions of people’s awareness or understanding of what they have seen. Therefore, there is some ambiguity in those figures, and whether people act on what they see is another issue. The Department is satisfied that the figures represent a good estimate of the wider population’s awareness and knowledge of its advertising.

69. Mr Beggs: Paragraph 3.41 of the NIAO report describes the two measures that the Department uses to assess the effectiveness of its advertising campaign: the campaign tracking research and the annual road safety monitor. Paragraph 4.23 shows that there is a variation of about 50% between the two sets of results, which is a major discrepancy.

70. The road safety monitor figures for 2002-03 to 2005-06 show that:

“38 to 42 per cent of all respondents (aged 16 or over) thought it unlikely/very unlikely that drivers would be checked for alcohol by police.”

However, a separate survey carried out in 2005 — thus covering a similar period — found that:

“92 per cent of drivers considered the likelihood of being stopped to be ‘rarely’ or ‘never’.”

Given the discrepancy between two surveys on such similar subject matter, do you agree that you need to exercise your checking rights on the research?

71. Mr Peover: As I said to Mitchel McLaughlin, there are two systems in place to provide information on the effectiveness of our advertising campaigns: one is contracted through our advertising agents, and the other through NISRA. The Department considers that those provide a good overview of the impact of its advertising on the public.

72. The two specific questions put to respondents were on whether they thought that they were likely or unlikely to be checked for alcohol by the police, and on how strong they considered the likelihood of being stopped by police, and I need to consider why those two questions elicited such different responses. However, the general point is whether the Department considers that the current arrangements for checking the effectiveness of its advertising campaigns are adequate, and I think that they are.

73. Mr Beggs: My question was based on the huge discrepancy between two surveys conducted at similar times and on a similar subject. Do you think that you need to exercise your checking rights on the research?

74. Mr Peover: There are two different issues. In response to the first question, 38% to 42% of respondents: “thought it unlikely/very unlikely that drivers would be checked for alcohol by police.”

75. The tracking research found that 92% of respondents considered:

“the likelihood of being stopped to be ‘rarely’ or ‘never’.”

The tracking research, therefore, reveals more public scepticism about being checked by the police.

76. Mr Beggs: Have you ever exercised your checking rights on the research?

77. Mr Peover: No, we have not.

78. Mr Beggs: What is the point in having those rights?

79. Mr Peover: We have rights of access to the research. If we believed that there was a need to check it, we would do so. We have independent confirmation from NISRA that the figures are, by and large, correct, and we are comfortable with that.

80. Mr Beggs: I would have thought that such a discrepancy in the figures would have prompted you to exercise your checking rights, but I will move on.

81. Paragraph 3.44 says that the arrangements for measuring the success of your road safety advertisements through tracking research create:

“potential for a conflict of interest”.

The advertising agency recognises that potential and has done its best to address the problem. For the record, I am not implying, nor do I perceive the report to imply, any criticism of the agency. I am more interested in the nature of the contract that the Department issued, which allowed the potential conflict of interest. Therefore, my concern is not with the agency, which has done its best to manage the situation in which the Department has placed it. My concern is with the Department. Do you recognise that you have placed the agency in a position in which there is a potential conflict of interest?

82. Mr Peover: I take the point that you make, in general and theoretical terms, about the conflict of interest. However, in a practical sense, there are sufficient checks and balances built into the system to ensure that it is not a real possibility. Our agreement with the advertising agents, and through them with Millward Brown, gives us access to Millward Brown’s data at the same time as the agency.

83. As I said earlier, NISRA conducts separate surveys. It is not uncommon for a Government research contract to take that form. You may know that the responsibility for negotiating advertising contracts has moved from individual Departments to the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), which now negotiates centrally on behalf of all Departments for future advertising contracts. The issue can be reviewed in that context.

84. Mr Beggs: I am disappointed with your response. It is better to admit that there is a potential conflict of interest and to learn from it to ensure that it does not happen in future and that you do not place the companies that win your contracts in difficult situations. I would like to bring in the Comptroller and Auditor General on that issue.

85. Mr John Dowdall CB (Comptroller and Auditor General): This issue has been commented on in the media, and I am glad of the opportunity to make it clear — developing Mr Beggs’s point — that our report does not criticise the advertising agency, Lyle Bailie, or question any aspect of its conduct. The report notes that industry benchmarks for awareness and influence have been exceeded. Since we had no concerns about Lyle Bailie’s role, we did not investigate its operations in any detail.

86. Just as Mr Beggs has done, the report focuses on the Department’s arrangements for the contract. It recognises the potential conflict of interest and that Lyle Bailie has taken action to prevent any such conflict. In the public sector, the principle is that, where possible, conflicts of interest are better avoided. My report suggests some improvements for the Department’s contract arrangements and for its oversight of contracts.

87. Mr Peover: I take that point. As I said to Mr Beggs, the Department is happy to look at the issue — with other Departments, through OFMDFM, which negotiates centrally on our behalf for all contracts — to see whether other arrangements should be put in place. My point is that we are satisfied, given the checks and balances which exist, that the potential to which Mr Beggs refers has not been realised.

88. Mr Beggs: In July 2000, following devolution, Roads Service was the first agency to appear before the Committee. One of the recommendations of the Committee’s report on that occasion was that the Department should make proposals for — or, at the very least, seriously consider — higher penalties for more serious road traffic offences to address the exceptional problems encountered in Northern Ireland.

89. Particular issues have arisen here much more frequently than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. One thinks of the death riders, who frequently steal vehicles, assault victims — and, regrettably, there was a recent instance of that — and then terrorise their local communities. The recommendation in 2000 was that the Department consider higher penalties for particular offences. Did you maintain parity? Did you do so, lagging behind the penalties that applied in the United Kingdom? How did you deal with penalties during that period?

90. Mr Peover: By and large, we have maintained parity with the United Kingdom with respect to penalties, particularly in the period of direct rule. Recent legislation has brought in some additional penalties.

91. Mr Stanley Duncan (Department of the Environment): The issue is important to the Department. New penalties have been introduced since the new Administration came into being in May. In June, we introduced a range of new road safety penalties in relation to driving without seatbelts; mobile telephone use; careless and inconsiderate driving; and excessive speeding in a temporarily restricted area. More new penalties may be in the pipeline, subject to the policy development process.

92. Mr Beggs: I welcome the introduction of those new penalties. Why did you take so long to put those proposals before Ministers?

93. Mr Peover: The basic issue is the one you mentioned. By and large, we have maintained parity in penalties with Great Britain, certainly in the period of direct rule.

94. Mr Beggs: There was a clear recommendation that the Department should examine areas that, in the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, should be considered for higher penalties.

95. Mr Peover: We have looked at those areas, and change is happening. Our Minister is keen to look, in the road safety review, at issues specifically relevant to Northern Ireland, to see whether we can do more.

96. Mr Beggs: What areas are you looking at?

97. Mr Duncan: Powers have been taken in the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 2007 to bring forward a number of new penalties, subject to policy development.

98. Mr Beggs: What areas are you looking at?

99. Mr Duncan: We are looking at a range of some of the issues that you mentioned.

100. Mr McDonnell: The 2007 Order provides opportunities to introduce graduated penalties, and primary powers have been taken in the Order to do that. Speeding would be the most obvious example of an offence that would incur such penalties. However, we would have to consult on the level at which those matters would come in.

101. Mr Beggs: I would like to have heard mention of specific areas — I have been given only a general answer. If you are not aware of those areas at the moment, perhaps you could write to the Committee with the details.

102. Mr Peover: We are engaging with the Minister on policy development in this area. We are somewhat constrained when responding to questions about issues on which we do not yet have a ministerial view.

103. Mr McGlone: I thank Mr Peover for setting the issue in its proper context and reminding us why we are here —this is a sensitive area, because we are talking about people’s lives, bereavements and family loss.

104. Paragraph 2.17 of the report emphasises the need to estimate the total spend by stakeholders on an ongoing basis. That relates to measuring:

“the overall Government priority given to addressing road safety”

and being in a position to

“assess, on a multi-agency basis, whether the budget is being targeted towards the most effective measures”

105. and being able to “conduct an assessment of” the effectiveness of the strategy and performance.

106. That is set in the context of a previous PAC report, in response to which the DOE gave clear commitments to set about providing such information — I think that was in 2000. We do not appear to have moved to that point yet. Is there a reason for that?

107. Mr Peover: Yes. I take the point. This is a genuinely difficult area, and one with which we and our partners have struggled. It is very difficult to identify, in any concrete way, the full range of expenditure that can be attributed to road safety activities.

108. In the case of my Department, some elements of that expenditure are fairly straightforward: the advertising campaigns, the road-safety education officers, the activities of Mr McDonnell’s branch and parts of the activity of the Driver and Vehicle Agency — indeed, the whole of that agency’s expenditure — could be attributed to road safety. Aspects of Roads Service expenditure can be attributed to road safety. Some of the police expenditure is relatively easily identifiable, but there are other areas that are less easily identifiable — for example, in the course of their normal duties, large numbers of police officers are engaged in activities that are attributable to improving road safety in Northern Ireland.

109. We think that the Department and the Roads Service together spent about £59 million on road-safety-related activities in 2006-07. That figure is subject to the caveats that I just mentioned about the difficulties of counting such expenditure. In the case of the police, it is genuinely difficult to count what is being spent on road-safety activities. Again, it is not that we want to resist giving figures; it is just that it is very difficult to find figures that would meaningfully reflect a trend in expenditure over a period, because the definitions are woolly or ambiguous.

110. Mr McGlone: Would it not have been helpful if some attempt had been made before it came to the stage where, six or seven years later, this matter had to be raised as an issue in a PAC report?

111. Mr Peover: Yes, it would be better if we had access to more accurate figures, but there are real difficulties in arriving at accurate figures. We could end up misleading people by providing a set of figures that are partial or overestimates. To take my own Department, what bit of the work of the Driver and Vehicle Agency can you reasonably count as contributing directly to road safety? Do you count the whole lot?

112. Mr McGlone: How then are you in a position to conduct an assessment of the effectiveness of the strategy?

113. Mr Peover: Because our targets are set in terms of the numbers killed or seriously injured. We are looking at the various components of the strategy. It has always been accepted that drawing causal links between any action or set of actions and outcomes is very difficult in this area. For example, how much is contributed by education, or engineering, or enforcement? We need to see whether we are moving in the right direction. We carry out tracking research — and I do not want to raise the issue again — to find out the impact of our advertising campaigns, for example.

114. Do those campaigns exceed — or not exceed — industry norms regarding awareness raising? We try to assess whether our campaigns are having the desired impact. Overall, the strategy is so complex — with 164 actions — that it is very difficult to attribute costs and outcomes to small bits of the strategy and to recognise causal links between them.

115. Mr McGlone: That leads me on to the next —

116. The Chairperson: Sorry; Mr Toner would like to make a comment.

117. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: It might be useful to say that, in looking at the Northern Ireland Audit Office’s report, the PSNI should give a bit more mature thought to the matter. We have done some work on that, and we have come up with a cost for police officers totally dedicated to roads policing as their primary function: an annual figure of around £18 million. Although it may seem to be an awful lot of money, it is not when compared with the overall police budget.

118. Returning to Mr Peover’s point, there is a lot of focus on resource — police officers, civilian staff, policing education officers, transport — and all of the elements that are purely for roads policing. Of course, we realise that when a neighbourhood police officer goes out through the door — no matter where in the Province — and comes across a road traffic accident or sees a motoring violation, he or she will deal with it. Officers will deal, for example, with a drunk driver. Therefore, it is difficult to quantify what part of every officer’s time is being used.

119. We are looking at a figure of about £18 million a year that is dedicated solely to roads policing. That figure includes the cost of education and awareness campaigns that we have done in conjunction with other agencies. We will have to begin to look at how we quantify where we will spend the other part of our budget, because we have targets in the annual policing plan and local policing plans for district policing partnerships. That is about getting the right balance. The point is well made. It is time that we developed it further and considered what we are spending, where it is being focused and whether we could do more with it.

120. Mr McGlone: Paragraph 2.10 of the report states that in Great Britain a specific target has been set to reduce deaths and serious injuries by 40% among drivers aged 17 to 24. Unfortunately, as we know, that group of road users is also very vulnerable here, yet we do not have a target. Is there a particular reason for that, given that there are problems associated with drivers in that age group?

121. Mr Peover: That depends on how you look at the problem. The Driver and Vehicle Agency (DVA) is part of the Department, and we are signed up to the corporate target for DOE, and for the partners in the road safety strategy, of a 33% reduction in deaths and serious injuries on our roads. Therefore, we regard all of the activities of the Department, including the driver-and-vehicle-testing aspect, as contributing to that target. In that sense, I do regard DVA as being signed up to the target. The issue is whether it would be reasonable and sensible to have a specific target for the 17- to 24-year-olds who present a real problem. It is something that we can consider in the context of the review of the strategy.

122. Returning to the general point, it is very difficult to disentangle the impact that any set of actions has on the overall achievement of a target. We think that we are, through DVA’s actions and its testing regime, contributing to the improvement of the outcomes.

123. Mr McGlone: Have you looked at how effective that target and strategy have been for that particular age group in Britain?

124. Mr Peover: No; not that I am aware. We are in close contact with our counterparts in the Driving Standards Agency and the Department for Transport. We will consider that matter and see if it makes sense.

125. Mr McGlone: It is extremely important that that be done.

126. Mr Peover: Yes. Their arrangements are as complex as ours. They have a strategy with a whole variety of elements in it. For them, as with us, it is very difficult to disentangle the contribution of individual components to the overall outcome.

127. Mr McGlone: But they still have a target?

128. Mr Peover: Yes. To go back to our discussion on targets earlier, whether targets are helpful in that context —

129. Mr McGlone: You are the people at the helm. It is for you to establish whether that is the case. I would like that to be made a priority in the Department.

130. Mr Peover: It has been seen as a corporate target for the Department rather than for the individual bits of the Department. We will raise that issue with the Minister as part of the review and report the comments that you have made.

131. Mr Duncan: A general point to note is that, although the impact is huge, the number of casualties in Northern Ireland is relatively small. Targets can be misleading, and the figures are subject to yearly fluctuations.

132. For example, to date this year, the number of 17- to 24-year-olds killed on Northern Ireland roads is half of what it was at the same time last year, but it is still subject to fluctuation. We would not like to assert that there is a downward trend in those figures, as they could go up. However, to date there has been a significant improvement in this year’s figures and in fatalities generally.

133. Mr Lunn: Paragraphs 3.31-3.37 of the NIAO report relate to motorcycles. Paragraph 3.31 says that anyone can set himself or herself up as a motorcycle instructor in Northern Ireland, without meeting any objective standard of competence. Given the increases in motorcycle ownership and collisions, why has the DOE not applied the same rigorous standards to motorcycle instructors as it has to driving instructors?

134. Mr Peover: The DOE recognises that as a vulnerable area that needs to be addressed. There is a need for a mandatory register, and that was addressed in the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 2007. The DOE did not have the powers to introduce a mandatory register for motorcycle instructors. Now that it does, a mandatory register will be produced.

135. Mr McDonnell: It may be worth noting that Great Britain does not have a mandatory register.

136. Mr Lunn: Yes, but Northern Ireland does not always have to follow Great Britain. Northern Ireland is a motorcycling country; it is the only place left in the civilised world where there is still crazy road racing. There is a massive interest in motorcycle racing, and because of that there are many young enthusiasts.

137. With regard to the inadequate regulation of instructors, the road safety strategy includes a commitment to introduce compulsory basic training (CBT) for motorcyclists by 2005; however, that is not yet in place. A revised timescale for introducing such training would be beneficial.

138. Mr Peover: Yes. The DOE accepts that it has not moved as quickly as it should have done. CBT for motorcyclists would have a useful impact, and the intention is to introduce it as part of the expected consultation in the later part of September. We want to consult on the introduction of CBT and introduce it as quickly as possible, depending on the outcome of consultation and on ministerial decisions.

139. Mr Lunn: The NIAO report recommends that CBT should be introduced, subject to the legislation being enacted. The earliest estimated date for introduction is 2008-09, which fills me with dread. That leads me to believe that the date for introduction will be delayed by the legislative process until 2009.

140. Mr Peover: I think we can do better than that; the DOE has more powers in that area now. Subject to the consultation, the review of the strategy and the ministerial decision, matters can move quickly.

141. Mr Lunn: If the DOE introduces compulsory basic training on a short timescale, who will carry out the testing? At the moment there is not even a basic qualification for motorcycle instructors. Presumably, testers will carry out a driving test?

142. Mr McDonnell: At the moment, it would not be useful to comment on who will carry out the testing, but we do hold a voluntary register for motorcycle-instructor training.

143. Mr Lunn: My interpretation is that the approved motorcycle instructor register does not mean anything. The registrants have taken optional training, and have been placed on the register. That does not compare with the three separate examinations that a driving instructor must take to obtain a qualification. You may know better than I do, but I believe that driving instructors must take a theory test, a driving test, and a test examining their ability to teach.

144. To obtain that qualification can take up to two years. Once they have it, trainee driving instructors are spot-tested every four years and graded accordingly. It is possible — in theory at least, but I do not know whether it happens — for a driving instructor to lose that qualification. By comparison, however, the present criteria for the motorcycle instructors’ qualification do not appear to require trainees to have a motorcycle licence; anybody can undertake that training. It is a crazy situation.

145. To take it a step further, someone who is learning to drive a car must be accompanied by a fully qualified driver. That cannot be done on a motorbike. Motorcyclists currently do not have to undertake any basic training; they do not have to have taken any instruction. They throw their leg over a bike, get their licence and off they go. The statistics bear out the inadequacies of that system.

146. Mr Peover: I accept Mr Lunn’s point. The mandatory register of approved instructors, which I mentioned earlier, is intended to address those points. We will have to consider matters such as the requirements that are necessary for an instructor to be added to that register, but those issues will be covered in the consultation document. The purpose of the exercise will be to improve the system of instruction, as Mr Lunn has described.

147. Mr Lunn: Some motorcycling instructors are listed in the phone book. However, there are only two in the Belfast and south-east phone books. I do not mean to be disrespectful to those instructors, but experience is their only qualification. I do not doubt that they are IAM-approved, but that means nothing. It is 17 years since CBT was introduced in GB, but throughout those years, this part of the country has had terrible motorcycle KSI statistics.

148. Mr Peover: If I understand the facts correctly, our motorcycle KSI statistics are no worse than those in GB, despite the fact that CBT was not introduced here. In fact, the statistics are much the same. That is no reason for complacency, however; we could improve our figures. As Desi was saying, we would be ahead of the game were we to have a mandatory register that incorporated appropriate training arrangements, certification and the possibility of removing instructors from that list. Therefore, that is an important area. It is a great pity that work on the introduction of a register has taken so long. I have no excuse for that, and I do not want to explain it away — it is a failing on our part. However, the matter is now being addressed.

149. Mr Duncan: The majority of motorcyclists in Northern Ireland undertake training that, in standard and quality, far exceeds that which they would do in a CBT system. CBT is a limited scheme that would address only the relatively small number of motorcyclists at the margin — those who have not received any training. Under CBT, they would receive only limited training. In the current system in Northern Ireland, candidates undergo more extensive, wider-ranging and longer-term training than they would under a CBT system.

150. Mr Peover: The difficulty is that training is not compulsory. As Stanley said, the majority of motorcyclists undertake training, but some do not. Those who do not undertake training may be the ones who most need to. That is a serious matter.

151. Mr Lunn: You have probably heard enough about statistics today, and I do not want to challenge your figures, given that they are perhaps no worse than those in GB. However, I know from experience that, at times over the 17 years since CBT was introduced, in this country it has been almost impossible to get motorcycle insurance. However, in GB, insurance has been easily available from several companies. Their statistics do not lie; it will be a major problem if insurance companies reach the point at which they do not want to insure motorcyclists here. That has happened many times over those 17 years.

152. Mr Peover: I was not aware of that. There has been a phenomenal growth — 220% was the figure that was quoted to us — in motorcycle ownership in the past few years. Therefore, motorcycling is a growing concern for us. In absolute terms, untrained motorcyclists are a relatively small proportion of the total number of those who ride motorbikes. However, to return to Mr McGlone’s point, that does not make training unimportant; it is just as important as any other road-safety issue. We need to close the gap between those who undertake appropriate, voluntary training — that is, the majority of those learning to ride motorbikes — and those who do not. That gap should not exist; there should be minimum compulsion that ensures that everyone has access to training and supervision before they go on the road.

153. Mr Lunn: I am slightly reassured. You have said that the Department has taken the powers and is going into consultation on some of those issues. Can the Committee be assured that DOE will move with all speed?

154. Mr Peover: The Minister of the Environment sees road safety as a key priority; therefore, the Department envisages that the issue will be progressed quickly.

155. Ms Purvis: Mr Lunn has referred to — and you have mentioned it yourself — the 220% increase in the past 10 years in the number of motorbikes registered. In the same period, there has been a 50% increase in the numbers of people killed or seriously injured in motorbike accidents. You said that you did not know who receives the training and who needs it. Why have you not, as a matter of urgency, carried out some research in that area?

156. Mr Peover: Do you mean research into training?

157. Ms Purvis: I mean research into why people are killed and seriously injured on motorbikes.

158. Mr Peover: I take the point. The growth in motorcycle ownership has been huge, but there are lots of unknowns. We do not know how many people use those motorcycles on a regular basis. We do not have data on kilometres travelled on motorcycles. There has been particular growth in the numbers of larger, more powerful bikes, which tend to be faster and, therefore, more likely to be involved in collisions.

159. There are several issues about the way in which motorcycle ownership has changed in recent years. It would be useful to undertake research in that area, but the Department does not have a specific research budget for those sorts of issues. We research a range of issues; therefore, we will need to consider whether we can find resources to carry out additional research on key issues. The NIAO report suggests a number of areas where research could be undertaken. The Department accepts that there is a need for research and will consider ways of getting resources so that it can undertake that research.

160. Mr McDonnell: The Department and the PSNI have done some research in that area over the past few years. We did a piece of work with the 2002–04 statistics that revealed a lot about who causes collisions involving motorcycles or the age group for which the problem is most common in Northern Ireland. Sixty per cent of the motorcyclists who are killed or seriously injured are under 35. Just over half the collisions in which motorcyclists are involved are caused by motorcyclists. KSI data show who has been killed, including age groups and times of day. Therefore, that may reassure you that at least some research has been done.

161. Ms Purvis: That gives me only some reassurance. However, a baseline of training must start with information such as who has been through the training and the engine capacity of the motorcycles that are the causal factor in the accidents.

162. Mr McDonnell: Seventy-one per cent of the KSIs are on bikes that are over 125 cc.

163. Mr Peover: I take your point about the specific research on the causes and factors that influence motorcyclists’ behaviour. The Department does not have figures on the usage of the bikes; we do not know how many are on the road or the differences between the numbers registered and owned. There are all sorts of issues about the data, and the Department could benefit from carrying out research in that area.

164. Ms Purvis: Research in Great Britain has concluded that road collisions are disproportionately high in socially deprived areas, to the point where children from disadvantaged areas are five times more likely to be involved in a road collision than those not from disadvantaged areas. There is no Northern Ireland comparison with those figures. DOE has previously said that it was impossible to carry out comparative research for Northern Ireland because the PSNI collision records did not include the necessary postcode data. Now that the police service has changed its recording of casualty data, what plans do you have for new research for Northern Ireland?

165. Mr Peover: As I mentioned earlier, that is another area in which research would be useful. It has been difficult to collate that research, because we did not have the appropriate data. I do not want to give a misleading impression: the Department recognises that social disadvantage exists, and it draws on what happens elsewhere in the UK. The Department has targeted its resources in road-safety education at schools that have a high proportion of pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. Therefore, the Department recognises the issue, and it has responded to it.

166. To my knowledge, the Department has not undertaken any research that is specific to Northern Ireland, but it is a potentially fruitful area. I do not want to give the impression that we have ignored the issue — we have tried to target resources to areas of social disadvantage.

167. Ms Purvis: Research data is at the heart of assessing the effectiveness of the Department’s programmes when it targets primary schools, particularly those that are in socially disadvantaged areas. How can those programmes’ effectiveness be assessed if you do not collect data in Northern Ireland that specifically relate to children from disadvantaged areas?

168. Mr Peover: I accept your point.

169. Ms Purvis: My next questions relate to driver and vehicle testing, as well as R-plate restrictions. Northern Ireland is currently the only region in the UK that imposes a 45-mph restriction on learner drivers. Newly qualified drivers are restricted to 45 mph for 12 months. Research by Queen’s University Belfast in the mid-1990s found no evidence that that restriction reduced collisions among that group. The strategy that the Department produced stated that there would be a review of the R-plate scheme by 2003 and a consultation on driver testing and training. Neither of those has been done. Can you confirm whether the review and consultation have begun? If so, when will they be completed, and when can we expect to see change?

170. Mr Peover: There are two elements to that. The Department reviewed the arrangements for L-drivers and R-drivers, after which it went to the then Minister with recommendations for change. The Minister decided that change was not appropriate, for some of the reasons mentioned earlier, and because of the difficulties with the 17- to 24-year-old age group, which we know is involved in twice as many collisions as the rest of the population. The Minister took the view that, at the time, it was not appropriate to be seen to be taking steps that would reduce the incentive for that age group to behave responsibly on the roads. However, it is an issue for the review that the Department will bring to the current Minister.

171. The review of training and testing arrangements for drivers is a complicated issue. Our systems broadly reflect what happens in the rest of the UK. Our counterparts in Great Britain produced a consultation document that included a number of recommendations for change. Those changes were considered but mostly not acted on. Consequently, when it comes to major changes in systems, the situation has been broadly static.

172. The Department has kept in line with its counterparts in Great Britain but thinks that there is value in looking at how other forms of restrictions and controls could be applied; for example, graduated licensing for young people who pass the driving test. There is a range of areas that the Department wants to address as part of the review of strategy, but, in a wider-UK context, the recommendations were not acted on. To my knowledge, Ministers in Great Britain are considering the possibility of some change but have not yet arrived at any conclusions.

173. Ms Purvis: Is that the case in spite of some evidence that learning to drive, and handle, cars at speed produces safer drivers?

174. Mr Peover: That is a very useful point. The Department feels that people need to be exposed to a wider range of circumstances when they are on the road, and that is something worth pursuing. However, that idea has not been advanced nationally.

175. Ms Purvis: Are there plans for the Minister to consult on that?

176. Mr Peover: As part of the road safety strategy, the Department wants to produce proposals that the Minister will put out for consultation and discussion.

177. Ms Purvis: Do you know when that will happen?

178. Mr Peover: I hope that it might happen next year. The aim is to get the proposals to the Minister before the end of this year and to consult on them next year.

179. Ms Purvis: My final question concerns graduated licensing, which you have just raised. It has been introduced in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Some statistics from the USA show a reduction, particularly in collisions, of between 9% and 37%, and some show a reduction of over 60% in night-time collisions. Graduated licensing deals not only with inexperienced drivers by imposing initial periods of supervision and other restrictions, but with young drivers by delaying the age of full-privilege driving. What is the Department’s position on that?

180. Mr Peover: The Department can certainly see some merit in exploring those issues. There are some difficulties with regard to the data, because those areas that have systems of graduated licensing may not have started from the same point that we would. They may have been starting from a higher baseline, so the impact of graduated licensing on their statistics may have been affected by where they started from. There is also an issue for the police in how enforceable the systems of graduated licensing are, and what can actually be done to make sure that if restrictions are imposed they are adhered to.

181. However, the Department believes that it is worth examining, and it will be raised as part of the consultation on the review of the strategy.

182. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: The L-plate and R-plate debate arises from policy that was formulated in Northern Ireland decades ago on an evidence-and-research base that was commensurate with the time. The time has perhaps come to re-examine that issue.

183. There is a lot of innovation in Europe and throughout the world, including North America. However, it is not just about putting up an R-plate and restricting speed; there are restrictions on the number of passengers and on the age of passengers. There are opportunities for that to be researched fully in the work on the revised road safety strategy.

184. The issue for the PSNI is enforcement. The simpler the system, the better it is for the police officer who has to spend time implementing it. That means that there should not be that much bureaucracy or too many complications with it. That is also better for the citizen, who will realise that it is easy to check, and that will act as a formidable deterrent also. It would be immensely useful if we could get the balance right in how we could actually police graduated restriction.

185. The best type of policing is self-policing — in other words, drivers are taught what is required of them, and they are aware of penalties, which have to be clear. That way the courts, and the Public Prosecution Service, have clear and absolute penalties for when the PSNI passes on breaches of a graduated driving licence, or a graduated approach with restrictions. There is an opportunity with the road safety strategy to act on that. If it saves a life it is well worth investing in, and the PSNI would welcome it.

186. Mr Hamilton: I am aware that Minister Foster, virtually on her first day in office, pre-empted the Audit Office report and the work of this Committee by making road safety one of her key priorities. Bearing that in mind, and following on from what Dawn has already said about the 45 mph speed limit and the R-plate scheme, young drivers have their participation in the Roadwise scheme restricted. Would the Department, and the PSNI, accept that that is another argument to have the R-plate scheme and the 45 mph speed limit re-examined?

187. Mr Peover: Yes, it is certainly an argument for that. The Department has concerns about the 45 mph limit anyway. The Pass Plus scheme in Great Britain is being reviewed, and a report is due later this year or early next year. The Department is considering a review of the Roadwise scheme. I am not sure that Roadwise is a good enough reason for getting rid of the R restriction, or whether there is a stronger, more intrinsic argument in favour of doing so.

188. Mr Hamilton: The report outlines that the Roadwise scheme has the potential to reduce deaths and serious injuries on the roads. It states that motorists who have an Institute of Advanced Motorists qualification are at least 50% less likely to be involved in an accident. The report also estimates that the cost of subsidising, for example, 1,300 candidates at £150,000 could be recouped if just one serious injury on the roads were avoided. Has the Department or any other organisation or agency carried out a cost-benefit analysis that tallies with that finding or demonstrates whether the scheme would be worth offering and what its benefits might be?

189. Mr Peover: No such analysis has been carried out in terms that are quite as stark as those that the member has just described. However, consideration must be given to those who would participate in those schemes. Given that such schemes are voluntary and that at present they also involve some outlay, it is likely that the people who participate will be motivated and will be better drivers anyway. The Pass Plus scheme has been ongoing in Great Britain for 10 years. However, it is being reviewed only now. Some evidence from the insurance industry seems to suggest that those who undertake the scheme do not have any fewer collisions than they otherwise would when various factors such as age, and so on, are controlled.

190. As regards evidence-based policy and the Department’s satisfaction that money is being spent usefully, there would need to be a system through which there would be practical and tangible benefits for the people concerned. Although the Department believes that there is a great deal of merit in people’s becoming engaged in post-test training, which is potentially extremely valuable, it questions how that should be undertaken. If such training is voluntary, the people who do not undertake it are the very people whom the Department would like to undertake it. The Department wants to ensure that the resources that it spends in subsidising such a scheme would be targeted at the group on which those resources need to be spent. That is the only caveat that I would place on it. I accept the point that additional, post-test training could be valuable. The problem arises in trying to ensure that that would be the case.

191. Mr Hamilton: I would be reluctant to make such a scheme compulsory. Is there scope to incentivise people through, for example, working with insurance companies in order to reduce premiums?

192. Mr Peover: I share that view. However, support from some insurance companies has been disappointing. It is certainly worth consideration. It is an important area of activity. The question is how to balance the resources that are invested with the outcomes that one might expect.

193. Mr Hamilton: I note from the report that the Driving Standards Agency in Great Britain — the Department’s counterpart across the water — has taken the lead in the development and administration of the Roadwise scheme. Why has that not been the case in Northern Ireland? Why was there not the same level of commitment in the original road-safety strategy?

194. Mr Peover: That was an initiative from the insurance companies after the strategy was published, during my early days in the Department. Pass Plus has been in existence for 10 years, and the Department is now awaiting an evaluation of it. However, to date, there has not been much evidence of the effect of that type of scheme. The Department will examine that. However, it has not done so yet because the necessary evidence has not been available.

195. Mr Craig: Paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of the report deal with pre-test training, and I noted Mr Peover’s earlier comments about the need to keep an eye on the rest of the UK and on what is being done there in that regard. The Comptroller and Auditor General is slightly critical in that initiatives, such as logbooks, and so on, have been used in the rest of the UK, yet the Department has decided to sit back and wait for the outcome of research. I would have liked to have seen a more proactive approach from the Department.

196. Given the high fatality rates, particularly among young drivers who have just passed their test, would it not have been more effective to take up this idea and run it as part of the pilot scheme?

197. Mr Peover: We have made logbooks available on our website, sent them to all approved driving instructors (ADIs), and encouraged their use as a tool. In a similar vein to the point that I made to Mr Hamilton, logbooks are not compulsory — they are available, but we have no evidence of the impact that they have had on people’s behaviour. However, they have merit, and we have, in effect, endorsed that by putting them on our website, reminding ADIs of their existence, and making them available. Logbooks are not compulsory anywhere in the UK. It is an issue that we can address as part of a review of the strategy, and it would be useful to have information relating to an assessment of their impact elsewhere. We will consider any such information and decide whether the scheme is worth implementing in Northern Ireland. Generally, though, we favour the use of logbooks.

198. Mr Craig: That is good news. In paragraphs 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9, which concern the test, it is fascinating to see the variance in pass rates, particularly in 1998-99. When there was an examiner but no inspector in the car, 60% of people passed their driving test. However, the pass rate dropped to 40% when an inspector was present in the car. Between April 2004 and January 2006, there was a huge improvement in those statistics when that variance dropped from 20% to 12%. As a layman considering those figures, that drop must be attributable to examiner training and a stricter interpretation of the rules.

199. However, the frightening statistic is that that variance of 12% means that approximately 5,000 people passed the test who probably should not. That might be good for those individuals who passed, but, considering the numbers of young people who are seriously injured on the roads, is there any way that you can tighten up on that figure?

200. Mr Peover: That is a difficult area. The Audit Office’s comment on that subject was carefully phrased, unlike the media coverage at the time, which was less-well phrased. The Audit Office said that:

“The current 12 per cent differential creates the potential for over 5000 candidates to pass the test annually without meeting the required standards.”

201. That is a careful form of words. It does not say that 5,000 people annually who should not go on the roads do so. It says that it creates a potential. I accept the Audit Office’s point in that context. The numbers have dropped and continue to do so — the figure is now down to 10%, which is quite close to the figure of 8% in England.

202. How should that be interpreted? Most tests are conducted with only the candidate and the examiner in the car. The presence of a supervisor means that a third person is in the car. Intuitively, one feels that, even though it is explained that that person is there to watch the examiner, having someone looking over the candidate’s shoulder is likely to have an impact on how the tested driver behaves.

203. Over the years, we have considered that point extensively; talked to examiners; talked to the DSA; held seminars with examiners; and written to other driver-licensing agencies throughout Europe to ascertain their practices. The UK is unusual in having a quality-control mechanism of supervised examinations. Some — although not many — other countries also have such a system, but any such countries do not keep data. Therefore, it is difficult to make comparisons with practices elsewhere.

204. We can say that our driver-testing process has achieved International Organization for Standardization (ISO) accreditation. We are recognised by the European body — La Commission Internationale des Examens de Conduite Automobile (CIECA) — as an exemplar of good practice in the quality control of the driver-testing process.

205. However, that differential between supervised and unsupervised examinations exists. The Audit Office is right to say that that creates the potential to which it referred, but I would not draw the conclusion that that means that there are 5,000 unqualified drivers on the roads.

206. We must have regard to the fact that there is a different dynamic in a car when a third person is present, which may have an impact on both the examiner and the driver. The Department sees that as a real issue, and we have tried to address it. We take some comfort from the fact that our examination system is recognised internationally as an exemplar of good practice and quality control. However, we are not complacent about that, and we will continue to look at the issue to see whether we can lower the differential.

207. There will always be some difference, because of the different dynamic, but we would like to think that the differential is as low as possible — it is now down to 10%. Our counterparts in the Driving Standards Agency (DSA) have an 8% differential between supervised and unsupervised tests, so we are getting closer to the UK figure.

208. Mr Craig: I am glad to hear that you are getting closer to the UK figure. You are probably correct to say that people act differently. I will confess that there was a third person in the car when I did my driving test, but that was a long time ago. I hope that you will keep your eye on that issue, because there is a potential problem.

209. Mr Peover: Yes. The Audit Office has raised a real issue, and the Department needs to be concerned about that and keep an eye on it. We had identified the issue and have been in discussion with the DSA in the past. The original sample that the Audit Office looked at was fairly small. If I remember correctly, it was about 65 tests. It is, nonetheless, a real issue, and it would be of concern to the Department if there were drivers on the road who should not be there. We have what we consider to be pretty rigorous quality control procedures.

210. Mr Craig: I might be able to identify a few of those drivers on my way home.

211. Mr Peover: Yes. Some of them might not be young drivers either.

212. Mr Craig: Paragraph 4.10 of the NIAO report deals with the thorny issue of speed-camera coverage in Northern Ireland. It suggests that Northern Ireland is badly under-represented with regard to speed-camera coverage. Some people — those who like to travel faster than most — might not think that that is an issue. Is there any timescale for readdressing the number of cameras? More importantly, how will cameras be targeted geographically? A few years ago, I spoke to officers from the traffic branch about that issue, and it concerned me greatly that they were not correlating accident black spots with places where they booked people for speeding. I would like to think that, several years on, that has changed.

213. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: That is a big question. The game plan is that, now that we have the means to net off the cost-recovery aspects, we can expand the camera scheme. The camera system has become much more sophisticated, and I refer you to my previous answer about the balance between static and mobile cameras. Static cameras add value to the investment for a while, because they are placed at an accident hot spot or because of the road features. They can be useful while, for example, DOE is working on a road engineering programme to make a particular road safer. For example, the SPECS camera outside Newry was particularly useful in that regard. There is a debate in the newspapers about whether we should move that camera to another location to gain further benefit from it. I am a great believer in cameras because of the deterrent effect that they have on all drivers, and they can be moved elsewhere across the Province, particularly the mobile units.

214. Your second point, the location of cameras, places an onerous responsibility on the police, because not only must people be seen to be policed fairly, they must believe that they are being policed fairly. We have introduced a standard UK business practice called the national intelligence model, which is, basically, a way of looking at information, or intelligence, in its broadest sense. That model analyses statistical information that might come from our colleagues in other agencies or from district policing partnerships (DPPs) or other local groups who tell us about a problem in a particular area. We research that and put a case together, and we will put our mobile cameras in those locations. The placement of mobile cameras is very much based on evidence. There is a far more complex process for the fixed camera scheme.

215. Recent freedom of information requests have revealed startling statistics: some areas of the Province have lower levels of detection and of mobile camera usage. The national intelligence model approach will steer us towards greater and more focused usage of cameras. In assisting that approach, Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, in conjunction with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, is carrying out an inspection of roads policing in Northern Ireland. Both are working with the Garda Síochána Inspectorate in the South, and the inspections will cover North/South and east-west. That is helpful, because the PSNI should benchmark against best practice in GB and Northern Ireland, and against best practice in Southern Ireland, which has similar road safety problems. That inspection will help to steer us towards where we should target camera usage. We propose to expand the camera scheme, and we tend to target cameras towards the main problem areas and accident hot spots.

216. Mr Craig: I am glad to hear that, because a police division in Lagan Valley targeted accident black spots for three months, and the statistics uncovered were startling. Fatalities and major injuries were reduced by more than 40%, compared to previous years. The public perception is that police officers always go for the easy touch; that they take a long stretch of road on which the speed limit is 30 mph and stand there with a camera, so of course they catch people speeding. We must change that perception. More importantly, we must reduce accidents and injuries through the use of such tools. That is all part of the road safety issue.

217. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: That is an exceptionally good point. Public perception and expectation must not be that police officers are on a particular road simply because they consider it to be an easy touch where it is easy to detect speeding vehicles, but that they are there because that is the best place for them to be in order to save lives and to stop people from speeding — for those drivers’ own benefit, and for the benefit of pedestrians and other road users.

218. Mr McGlone: Paragraph 2.5 says that the strategy’s target for the reduction of deaths and serious injuries is likely to be achieved well before the 2012 deadline. That could never be referred to as good news, but, on the face of it, it is an improvement. However, if the target of a 33% reduction in overall KSI levels is met before the deadline, that suggests that it was inappropriate, particularly because the Department for Regional Development initially advised the DOE that 41% was a more appropriate target. In the absence of agreement among the key stakeholders, the target dropped significantly, based on DOE research. Do you think that the target of 33% was too restrained?

219. Mr Peover: At the outset of the strategy, the advice given was that the target was challenging but realistic. This is an awkward question to answer, because although 2005 was not a good year, it was better than previous years, in that fewer people were killed or seriously injured on our roads. In 2005, we achieved a 31% reduction in KSIs and a 48% reduction in child KSIs — the targets set were 33% and 50%. In 2005, we were close to the targets that we had set for 2012, so your point is well made. Unless something dramatic had happened, the targets seemed to have been too easy to meet.

220. Unfortunately, 2006 was a poorer year, even though there were fewer deaths on the roads —126, which was the lowest figure for 60 years. We also recorded the lowest-ever level of child deaths, but the number of serious injuries rose from the previous year. In 2006, when compared with the 1996-2000 average for KSIs, there was a 24% reduction in overall KSI figures and a 39% reduction in the figures for child KSIs — the 2005 reductions of 31% and 48% decreased overall to 24% and 39% in 2006. That means that if 2005 is indicative of the trend, you are right and we should set higher targets. Indeed, TRL has advised us that, on the basis of those figures, we could aim at reductions of 50%.

221. Mr McGlone: What is TRL?

222. Mr Peover: That is the organisation that carries out research for us. It used to be called the Transport Research Laboratory, but it is now just known as TRL. It advises us — as it advises our counterpart in Great Britain — on targets for the strategy. It has said to us that, on the basis of the 2005 figures, we might reasonably expect to achieve a 50% reduction in the overall KSIs and a 65% reduction in KSIs for children. However, the 2006 figures were worse than those for 2005.

223. I do not know the level at which we should now set the targets. We will need to see the 2007 figures to enable us to consider, in the context of the review of the strategy, appropriate targets. Had the trend that was set in 2005 carried on into 2006 and 2007, we would have argued to Ministers that we should set a higher target. However, given that the 2006 figure was different, we will need to see what has happened in 2007. Therefore, at this stage I am not sure what we will say to Ministers.

224. If it is any comfort, we have had 72 fatalities to date this year, compared to 87 for the same period last year. We do not have this year’s figures for those who have been seriously injured. Therefore, in contrast to last year, there has been a reduction in fatalities. We have had only one child fatality to date — as opposed to five at this time last year — with the result that the figure for children is an improvement on last year’s. This year may turn out to be better than 2006 and more like 2005, but we need to see a clear run of figures to understand the trend.

225. Mr Duncan made the point that — and I hate talking in these terms — the figures are relatively small. They are awful for every individual who is involved, but when we are talking about absolute numbers, they are small. Therefore, a single serious accident, or a couple of serious accidents, can have a big impact on the number of deaths or serious injuries. Our figures show that there can be considerable variations between months. In April 1997 there were four fatalities; in April 2004 there were 23; and in April 2007 there were seven. The figures vary widely from month to month or year to year. It is difficult to extrapolate a trend from those figures because the numbers are relatively small — and I mean that in mathematical, not in human, terms. A small variation, or a couple of serious accidents, can have a major impact on the figures.

226. However, I take your point. We need to look at targets, but we need to do that on the basis of examining figures over several years.

227. Mr Lunn: Paragraph 4.13 states that the PSNI is not operating the recommended speed threshold for speeding offences because of insufficient capacity to process the paperwork. Why have you not appraised the cost of increasing capacity in order to rake in a great deal of the lost revenue?

228. Paragraph 4.15 is perhaps more important, suggesting that thousands of speeding motorists may have escaped detection because you are not operating recommended speed thresholds. Will you explain that? The message to drivers seems to be that they can break the law without too much fear of being caught. I am told, anecdotally, that although the motorway speed limit is 70 mph, a speeding motorist will not be prosecuted unless their speed exceeds 84 mph. That is shortly to be reduced to 80 mph, or, presumably, 79 mph. Can you confirm or deny that?

229. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: I cannot endorse anyone’s wish to risk travelling at 84 mph. Our policy is not to advise what the thresholds should be. The speed limit on the M1, M2, M3 and M5 is 70 mph. However, we have to exercise a degree of discretion on that. I accept that our discretion is greater than that recommended by the Association of Chief Police Officers in Great Britain. You are correct about the recommended thresholds, but the matter is a decision for the Chief Constable. The Patten Report’s concept of operational responsibility means that that is a constitutional decision that lies with him.

230. I strongly agree that we should move towards the thresholds agreed in GB. However, there is an issue surrounding the capacity of the PSNI’s fixed penalty processing office to deal with that. Operationally, on the ground, we have no major difficulty in dealing with the number of people we stop or process through fixed or mobile cameras, or any of the other processes we employ.

231. The PSNI prosecuted just under 38,000 speeders last year, and that is a lot. Of those, 25,500 were caught at the roadside through VASCAR or laser; 9,000 by mobile cameras; and 3,000 by fixed cameras. I am commissioning work internally, in conjunction with the work to be carried out by the Minister on a road safety strategy, on how to increase capacity in our internal processes, not only to deal with and process larger numbers of offenders, but also to make the process slicker — or quicker — and to make it easier for those individuals who violate the speed limits to appeal a fixed-penalty ticket and have the matter dealt with.

232. Some places in GB have privatised, or outsourced, the processing — not the enforcement or the cameras — to people who do that as part of their business. If motorists speed in certain parts of GB and get a fixed-penalty notice, they are given a unique reference number and a website that shows the vehicle, registration number and the speed logged. That is a great incentive for people to pay their fixed-penalty notice because they can see the evidence in front of them. They may not have known that they were speeding at the time.

233. I wholeheartedly accept that there is scope for us to improve in our fixed-penalty office. We will look at the thresholds in conjunction with the road safety review group. The short answer is yes, and the point is well made.

234. Mr Lunn: Your figure for speeding detections last year was 38,000. However, the report estimates that up to 42,000 may have escaped detection, meaning that you have caught just under half.

235. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: The figure is just under half if we apply the thresholds that the Association of Chief Police Officers recognises in GB. I agree that people may be speeding out there because we apply a greater degree of discretion. Yes, we could do a lot better, and we could detect more speeding motorists.

236. Mr Lunn: Regarding fixed-penalty notices and your inability to issue them and draw in the fines, I guess that most of the people who attract fixed-penalty notices just pay up. The proportion of people who would want to contest the notices would be pretty low, especially if there is clear evidence, and the technology is available in the UK.

237. Is there a system or computer problem in your operation that contributes to the number of fixed-penalty fines not collected, or is it a problem of handling the paperwork?

238. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: It is not that 42,000 motorists were caught speeding and were not prosecuted. There is the potential for another 42,000 offenders to be caught, and that must be made clear. However, you raised a good point.

239. Mr Lunn: I did not mean to say that.

240. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: I was not referring to the way you made those comments, but to newspaper reports that implied that 42,000 offenders were not dealt with. We are currently geared up with the number of people, and the processes and technology, needed to deal with the volume at the moment.

241. The NIAO report, rightly, states that by reducing the thresholds of discretion we could catch more speeding motorists, slow more people down and, therefore, impact on the KSIs. That argument is sound, and no one could take issue with it. We then have to look at what resources are necessary. If we were — as in this case — to double the number of people to be processed, we would have to examine how that could be done effectively and what it would cost in terms of people, technology, office space and processing power. There is a correlation between reducing the discretionary aspect to the standards and the back-office processing functions. Indeed, the last thing that I want is a scenario whereby we decrease the discretionary aspect, prosecute more motorists, and end up with people in the process who cannot be dealt with, and who will not be able to pay their fixed-penalty tickets and have the matter processed.

242. Furthermore, there is a knock-on effect in relation to the penalty points being put on to people’s driving licences. We may do our part of the process, but we must ensure that we tie in with people in the Driver and Vehicle Agency and alert them to the coming bow wave.

243. I am constantly aware that we will have to address the problem and tie in the processing of penalty notices with our road safety strategy, and I have a strong suspicion that we will go down that road. As the officer in charge of road safety policy and development for the PSNI, my view is that we must examine the issue in more detail and adhere more closely to national standards.

244. Mr Lunn: I do not know whether this next question is for Mr Peover or Mr Toner; it is about the Public Accounts Committee report of 2000 and the question of the introduction of higher penalties for serious offences. In that report there is an example of an individual who had received 18 life bans but was still driving and committing offences. I have not heard of as bad a case as that in recent years, but there are many examples of people who commit serious offences and manage to continue to drive partly because of the attitude of the courts and partly because they sometimes ignore the judgement of the courts.

245. The PAC report of 2000 states that:

“We strongly support the introduction of higher penalties for more serious offences and note that these proposals will be drawn to the attention of the Home Office. The Department should bring forward proposals for consideration by the Secretary of State where it considers that tougher penalties would help address the exceptional problems in Northern Ireland.”

246. That suggests a certain culture in Northern Ireland that bears some similarity to the American right to carry guns. In Northern Ireland, people seem to feel they have the right to drive, almost regardless of what they do. Even drivers who receive long driving bans expect to get their licences back some day.

247. I am not making a speech, but, at the moment, drivers who are convicted of drink-driving receive a 12-month ban. The penalty for a second conviction is a five-year ban. If they are caught driving during that five-year period, the ban is extended. There must come a point at which the extension becomes a life ban and, if drivers subsequently offend, there would, I hope, be room at Maghaberry for them, because that is where they deserve to be. What is your attitude to that? Is there scope for more draconian penalties for the particularly serious offenders of whom, unfortunately, there are quite a few?

248. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: You have made an excellent point. The point is that the person who received 18 life bans was caught by the police at least 18 times. If you consider the wider problem of persistent criminality — not necessarily only road traffic offences — then sentencing is required that is proportionate to the level of criminality.

249. Some people think that they can get into a vehicle and drive it on the roads, and it is not a matter of their thinking, “to hell with the police”, because they do not particularly care about us. The point is that they think that they can drive on the roads and think, “to hell with everyone else.” They have total disregard for other road users: pedestrians, cyclists, motorcyclists, and so forth. They have already been proven to be negligent and to be disregarding road safety. In such cases, our view is clear.

250. As the Chief Constable has said on numerous occasions, sentencing must be commensurate with the level of risk that individuals pose to society. There may be scope to examine the appropriate sanction for the courts to apply in the case of drivers who persistently commit serious motoring offences — and perhaps it may be an issue for the Assembly to consider.

251. Mr Lunn: Thank you.

252. The Chairperson: Mr Toner said that he works with An Garda Síochána on road safety, and I note that the DOE and the corresponding Department in the South, the Department of Transport, work together on road issues. Are there any other areas of co-operation on road safety between the two Departments, particularly in the border counties?

253. Mr Peover: Generally, we have a good working relationship with our counterparts in the South in the Department of Transport and in the Road Safety Authority. Earlier, I mentioned the joint campaigns. We work closely with our counterparts and share experiences. Similarly, the PSNI and An Garda Síochána work closely together. There is a high level of co-operation and sharing of experience, although I am sure that more could be done.

254. The formal North/South processes, which have been in abeyance for the past couple of years, are now beginning to get going again and, in fact, there is a North/South Ministerial Council meeting on transport tomorrow. There is scope for additional North/South co-operation. We are happy to work with our counterparts in the South and will pursue that. However, I do not want to diminish the good co-operation that there has been in the past. We have received good support from our counterparts in the South.

255. Assistant Chief Constable Toner: We have an open border, and we adopt an approach that is now fairly standard across Europe. There are a number of issues. The PSNI has a joint operational approach with the Garda Síochána traffic corps; the PSNI has seconded officers in Dublin, and in Belfast, there is a seconded superintendent from the Garda Síochána. That is immensely useful, and it is standard European practice.

256. One of the great advantages of that for the PSNI is that we hope to harmonise penalty points that Northern Ireland drivers receive in Southern Ireland and vice versa. People will realise that, when they cross the border, they have the same responsibility in Northern Ireland as down South and vice versa. The PSNI has been lobbying for that, and I know that the Department has also examined the issue, which can be set in a European context.

257. Mr Peover: Next year, we hope that there will be mutual recognition of disqualifications across the UK and between the UK and the South. Recognition of penalty points is a difficult issue, and the Department is working on it. Many complexities are involved, but it has now been on the agenda for some time. The Department of the Environment is working with the Department for Transport in England, which is the lead agency in that area.

258. The Chairperson: Thank you all for attending the evidence session today. It is clear that road safety and the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report on the road safety strategy are complex issues, and there are no single-agency answers to them. Mr Toner has graphically described the scenes that await the emergency services when they arrive at a road traffic accident. No advertisement in the world will fully portray that horror, or the horror that families face when PSNI officers arrive at the door to deliver to a family the awful message that a relative has been killed or injured.

259. The Committee hopes, through its report, to play its role in the road safety campaign and to make useful recommendations to those involved in the road safety strategy. I hope that the situation improves. However, it boils down to individual drivers taking responsibility for their actions and taking that extra time and care on the road in order to save more lives. I thank you all for your time and contributions.

260. Mr Peover: Since we are facing a review, a report from the Committee would be helpful to us, particularly at this juncture. It is a useful time for the Committee to be addressing the issues.

Appendix 3

Correspondence

Chairperson’s letter of 10 July 2007

Parliament Buildings
Room 371
Stormont
BELFAST
BT4 3XX

Tel: (028) 9052 1208
Fax: (028) 9052 0366

Date: 10 July 2007

Mr Will Haire
Accounting Officer
Department of Education
Rathgael House
Balloo Road
Bangor
BT19 7PR

Dear Will

NIAO Report ‘Improving Road Safety in Northern Ireland’

The Committee intends to hold an oral evidence session on 13 September 2007 on the forthcoming Northern Ireland Audit Office Report ‘Improving Road Safety in Northern Ireland’. I have invited the Accounting Officer of the Department of the Environment to attend and the Chief Constable to be represented at the hearing.

Members are, of course, aware of the role of Road Safety Education Officers, which featured in the oral evidence session on this subject in the previous mandate, and that these officers are employed by the Department of the Environment. However, the Committee would like to be advised on what you see as the role for your Department and the school system in relation to educating young people on the importance of road safety. The Committee would be particularly interested, for example, to hear about the nature and scope of the interface between schools and other organisations involved in promoting road safety.

Yours sincerely

John O’Dowd
Chairperson

Correspondence of 15 August 2007 from
Mr Will Haire, Accounting Officer

Mr John O’Dowd MLA
Chairperson
Public Accounts Committee
Parliament Buildings
Room 371
Stormont
BELFAST
BT4 3XX

15 August 2007

Dear Mr O’Dowd

Thank you for your letter of 10 July.

Please find attached a brief paper setting out the work which is currently being undertaken to deliver Road Safety education for our young people. The Department of the Environment (DOE) has, as you know, a statutory remit in relation to Road Safety education and we work together to ensure that this important area is delivered to best effect in schools.

For example, we worked very closely with DOE for many years in the context of curriculum reviews, particularly through the Council for the Curriculum Examinations and Assessment, to help ensure a higher profile for road safety education within the curriculum.

We recognise that the Department of Education and the education sector as a whole has an important role to play here and we are keen to continue to do so, working with the partnerships that are set out in the attached paper.

Yours sincerely

Will Haire

Department of Education
Road Safety Education - Public Accounts Committee

Introduction

1. This paper sets out the main issues in relation to Road Safety education under the following headings:-

i. organisation;

ii. curriculum;

iii. school programmes;

iv. qualifications;

v. travelling to school; and

vi. community programmes.

Organisation

2. The Department of the Environment (DOE) has a statutory duty for road safety and takes the lead in promoting and supporting the delivery of road safety education in schools. DOE has teams of one Senior Road Safety Education Officer and 3 Road Safety Education Officers plus administrative support, based in 5 offices across Northern Ireland, covering schools in each of the Education and Library Board areas. These officers link in with their ELB colleagues across the curricular areas and ensure that connections are made in terms of support and materials for schools.

3. In relation to road safety education in schools, and in support of the provision in the statutory curriculum, a member of the Education and Training Inspectorate maintains close and regular liaison with the Senior Road Safety Education Officer in Armagh, and through that the wider DOE Road Safety network.

Curriculum

4. Road Safety programmes are provided across all Key Stages, from Foundation Stage to Key Stage 4. From pre-school[1] to Key Stage 2, the revised statutory curriculum requires pupils to develop knowledge, understanding and skills in relation to keeping themselves healthy and safe. At Key Stage 3, pupils are required to have opportunities to develop preventative strategies in relation to accidents in the home, at school, on the road and outdoors.

5. Road Safety education also links to Sustainable Development in the context of car usage, and healthy living in the context of encouraging walking to school. Sustainable Development also forms part of the revised statutory curriculum across all Key Stages.

6. The Senior Road Safety Officer in Armagh regularly liaises with the Department of Education and the Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment on behalf of DOE on matters relating to road safety education within the curriculum and how these can best be delivered.

School programmes

7. DOE provides free road safety teaching materials annually to every school here based on the number of teachers in each school, and teachers are encouraged and supported to teach road safety on a regular, structured basis. Road Safety Education Officers provide training and advice to teachers, as necessary, on the best use of materials to meet curriculum requirements. DOE also produces and distributes a road safety teaching aid calendar to every classroom in Foundation Stage and Key Stages 1 & 2. This includes a weekly road safety message together with curriculum links and teaching notes.

8. The cycling proficiency programme is available to all primary schools and is suitable for Yrs 6/7. It is delivered mainly during the summer term and almost 10,000 children receive training each year.

9. DOE’s Practical Child Pedestrian Safety Training supports pupils in schools in disadvantaged areas. Seventy-five schools currently participate in this scheme.

10. DOE assists all schools to identify and record relevant road safety issues and to develop tailored road safety policies to assist the school in addressing its own particular road safety issues; 90% of schools currently have road safety policies. The timetabling of Road Traffic Studies in post-primary schools is also promoted, with DOE providing resources and support to teachers to deliver this course. Around 135 post-primary schools currently timetable Road Traffic Studies.

11. Through ‘Theatre in Education’, DOE further promotes road safety. Performances by experienced and professional actors are available for every age group. Supporting materials are provided for teachers to carry out follow-up work.

12. A driver training scheme is offered in post –primary schools. Pupils who are 17+ and possess a provisional licence can take driving lessons during the school day in pairs. Pupils are responsible for part of the driving instructor fees with the balance subsidised by DOE.

13. The PSNI also arranges visits with schools to provide structured programmes on personal safety and it provides its Roadsafe Roadshow initiative.

Qualifications

14. DOE promotes the GCSE in “Motor Vehicle and Road Users Studies” and provides teaching materials and other resources e.g. mopeds. There is a strong emphasis on the Highway Code and the responsible use of motor vehicles, including the serious consequences of driving any vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. In 2006, 68 schools opted for this course and a total of 1,177 candidates were entered for the examination. Translink sponsors a trophy each year for the top Northern Ireland candidate. There is also an NVQ in Motor Vehicle Studies which would apply for 16- 24 year olds through Jobskills[2] and Modern Apprenticeships programmes.

15. FE colleges provide Road Safety awareness and education programmes for 16-19 year olds, often targeting young males as most at risk. In at least one college, students can also avail of the driver’s scheme and an enhancement programme leading to a Road Safety qualification.

Travelling to school

16. The “Travel wise Safer Routes to Schools” initiative is led by the Department of Regional Development in partnership with the Department of Education. The initiative aims to tackle the school run by encouraging young people to walk, cycle and use public transport in their journey to and from school. This year also saw the launch of the “Rural Safer Routes to Schools” scheme, which so far consists of 18 schools in rural areas. DOE supports both initiatives through its road safety education programmes.

17. Crossing patrols are provided by the Education and Library Boards where significant road safety hazards have been identified. ELB’s endeavour to provide crossing patrols whenever the level of danger exceeds the thresholds set out in guidelines produced for the purpose by the Local Authorities Road Safety Officers’ Association.

Community programmes

18. The Education and Library Boards promote programmes to youth clubs, summer schemes and through outreach mechanisms. An IMPACT programme runs across Belfast and the South East dealing with car theft and joyriding. The project targets young people at risk through school programmes and also works with offenders. Programmes are also run in rural areas, particularly where issues about accidents or joyriding have been identified.

Department of Education

[1] There is no statutory curriculum at pre-school but the curriculum guidance sets out minimum content in line with Foundation Stage.

[2] The Department for Employment and Learning advise that from September Jobskills becomes Training for Success

Lyle Bailie International letter of
12 September 2007 to Mr John Dowdall CB,
Comptroller and Auditor General

John Dowdall CB
Comptroller and Auditor General
Northern Ireland Audit Office
106 University Street
Belfast
BT7 1EU

12th September, 2007.

Dear Sir,

NIAO Report on Northern Ireland’s Road Safety Strategy

1. Your report NIA 1, published on Tuesday 4th September 2007, in its content and manner of presentation, has caused considerable damage to the reputation of this company and raises serious questions about the process behind the decisions you published.

2. The damage caused is clearly evident in the media coverage surrounding your report on 4th and 5th September, specifically in relation to your findings on road safety advertising. The close identification of Lyle Bailie International Limited with road safety advertising in the public domain is apparent from the coverage in the Belfast Telegraph, Irish News, BBC TV, UTV and Radio Ulster. Examples of the damage include:

In every media report about NIAO’s findings, LyleBailie was named and identified in a negative and damaging context, as a result of the content and manner of presentation of your Report into Road Safety. Every journalist who contacted us spontaneously raised the question of damage to our company, and the issue of the next tender for the road safety advertising contract was raised.

3. The serious questions that are raised about the process behind your findings are as follows:

3.1 Why did the Northern Ireland Audit Office breach its own published Code of Conduct by failing to allow LyleBailie to clarify, correct and comment on the matters directly relating to LyleBailie?

Your Code of Conduct, section 2.2 (d) on page 6, states:

“Auditors should always invite audited bodies to confirm that facts are accurately and fairly stated in draft reports. Where it is necessary to investigate and report on the activities of bodies other than the audited body then the auditor should, in the interests of fairness, take reasonable steps to secure that such third parties have an opportunity to comment on the relevant section.”

We are clearly a third party body falling within the term of this section of your Code of Conduct and are perplexed as to why nobody from NIAO contacted us.

3.2 Why did the Northern Ireland Audit Office breach one of the main rules of natural justice, audi alteram partem (hear the other side), while it states that a decision cannot stand unless the person directly affected by it was given a fair opportunity both to state his case and to know and answer the other side’s case?

It is clear that the reputations of LyleBailie International and its shareholder Directors, David Lyle and Julie Anne Bailie, are affected by the decisions of your report in relation to road safety advertising – and that no opportunity for a fair hearing was given to either the corporate personality of LyleBailie or the individuals who own it and who work continually on road safety advertising.

3.3 Why was no consideration given to the potential damage to be caused by your highlighted findings on advertising, in breach of your own principles in your Code of Conduct?

In the Preface of the NIAO Code of Conduct, signed by John Dowdall CB, it states that:

“…the results of our work have the capacity for significant damage to the careers of those working within the bodies we audit.”

NIAO Code of Conduct, page 1.

We employ 24 people in LyleBailie whose careers could be significantly damaged by the NIAO findings, made after a flawed process, despite the overwhelming evidence that their work on road safety has been effective and reliable in improving attitudes and behaviour, reducing road carnage and providing a significant economic payback to the taxpayer.

The failure by NIAO to consider the damage to careers in a third party company such as LyleBailie is even more significant given that the private sector, in working for government, lacks both the job security and pension security of the civil service.

3.4 Why did the Northern Ireland Audit Office fail to disclose that research was and is an integral part of the advertising contract let by government, as specified in the government’s tender specification?

The NIAO Report creates a false impression by failing to disclose the full context that the advertising agency, in appointing an independent tracking research company, is implementing the long-standing instructions of government. It is impossible to create and produce effective road safety advertising without being deeply involved in attitudinal and motivational research at the development, pre-testing and tracking stages. Road safety advertising must be research-led. Research feedback is essential at every stage, within the fastest, shortest time-spans. In the case of road safety advertising, delays in research can cost lives.

3.5 Why did the Northern Ireland Audit Office downgrade the binding legal contract governing “Independence and Probity in the Provision of Research” to a “memorandum of understanding”? (Section 3.45).

LyleBailie’s agreement with Millward Brown entitled “Independence and Probity in the Provision of Research” is a binding legal contract which, in the event of non-compliance, can be legally enforced by either party or by DOE, since it constitutes the explicit terms and conditions upon which we provide research to government.

By re-designating this Independence and Probity contract as a “memorandum of understanding” the full legal gravitas of this binding contract has been minimised by the NIAO.

3.6 Why did the Northern Ireland Audit Office highlight “a potential for a conflict of interest” when it has clear evidence that all potential conflicts of interest have been legally prevented? (Pages 13, 31, 32)

The binding contract, “Independence and Probity in the Provision of Research”, prevents every potential conflict of interest. If we apply the test of the NIAO’s own definition of “Conflicts of Interests” from its Code of Practice (section 5.1 to 5.18) to the contractual relationship between LyleBailie and Millward Brown, it can be verified that on every single issue the relationship is devoid of any conflict of interest.

3.7 Why did the Northern Ireland Audit Office not exercise its own access rights to the research data – the very criticism the NIAO made of DOE?

In my letter to DOE dated 20th December 2005, headed “Independence and Probity of Market Research”, it states:

“This letter provides a contractual basis for the independence and probity of all research we commission on your behalf. It codifies ethical transparency, objectivity and honesty in the provision of research services to your organisation. It provides an automatic right of direct access for your organisation to the completed tabular data or finished research reports; to the research company’s personnel for the purpose of clarification of or investigation into the methodology, the data, the findings or the interpretation; and to check or verify, independently, the quality of fieldwork or data preparation.

This letter provides a number of checks and balances which allow you (or your auditors) to verify the accuracy, quality and objectivity of the research you receive from us. Indeed I believe that this contractual letter goes further in protecting the integrity of research in the broader public interest than any comparable system I know.”

The NIAO, auditors of DOE, were given clear access rights on a contractual basis to all road safety research data – to both LyleBailie and Millward Brown. It is surprising indeed that you failed to exercise these access rights, while attacking DOE for the same omission.

3.8 Why did the Northern Ireland Audit Office downgrade the research conducted by NISRA for DOE, which acts as an independent check on the tracking research? (Section 3.46)

The existence of NISRA’s research in the annual Road Safety Monitor, conducted entirely separately from the advertising agency, fulfils the requirements of checks and balances in the public interest. It is incomprehensible that the work of the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency was not given proportionate weight in the NIAO’s findings.

3.9 Why was the term “research partner” used to describe a research company which is owned by a global competitor of LyleBailie’s?

The use of the term “partner” implies a cosiness which is contrary to the facts. Millward Brown, the research company contracted in the “Independence and Probity” agreement, is owned by WPP – the global network which owns many advertising agencies which would, no doubt, aspire to winning the next road safety advertising contract, including Ogilvy and Mather, JWT, Grey, Young and Rubicam and DDFH&B. This fact alone illustrates how the “potential conflict of interest” allegation is false.

3.10 Why did the Northern Ireland Audit Office ignore a £1.771 million source of income and focus instead on a marginal £20,000 source of income?

The NIAO report states:

“DOE’s road safety advertisements can provide a source of income.”

Section 3.49, page 32.

The largest source of income generated by DOE’s road safety advertisements is in sponsorship contributions – the total for DOE from 1995 is £1,771,193. It is baffling that the NIAO managed to ignore this source of income – perhaps it would have been too embarrassing to have to acknowledge that in this matter LyleBailie has acted as government’s unpaid fundraiser. The second largest source of income is from joint North-South productions – these mean that a total of £942,008 of value was received by DOE through the contribution from the joint commissioning body. It is surely an inappropriate use of audit resources that a £20,000 source of income from “overseas” use is subjected to inaccurate and distorted scrutiny, while the £2.7 million in value generated through sponsorship and joint production is ignored. This is especially pertinent given that DOE’s advertisements attract massive international acclaim and interest – while very few countries can afford to use them and then only for the briefest of periods.

3.11 Given NIAO’s flawed process, breaching your own Code of Conduct, what proposals can you make to rectify the unfairness outlined above?

Given the importance of this matter and the fact that a Public Accounts Committee investigation is underway, I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee.

Yours faithfully,

David Lyle.

Chief Executive.

Mr John Dowdall CB,
Comptroller and Auditor General
letter of 19 September 2007 to
Lyle Bailie International

Mr David Lyle
Chief Executive
Lyle Bailie International
31 Bruce Street
BELFAST
BT2 7JD

19 September 2007

I refer to your letter of 12th September on the above report and I am responding to your concerns that its publication has damaged the reputation of your company and that NIAO had not followed due process.

I am pleased that I was able to meet you and Julie Bailie to discuss these issues prior to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) hearing on Thursday the 13th September. I hope that my subsequent comments in the PAC evidence session have unambiguously clarified that my report was not criticising Lyle Bailie or questioning any aspect of your conduct.

Your letter (paragraphs 3.1 to 3.11) raises a number of questions about our handling and I would like to explain our position on each point.

At paragraphs 3.1 to 3.3 you feel that NIAO breached its own Code of Conduct on third party clearance; did not give you a natural justice opportunity to state your case; and did not consider the potential damage caused by our findings. At paragraph 3.7, you query why we did not exercise our own access rights.

Because the report intended no criticism of Lyle Bailie, we did not consider there was a need to undertake third party clearance with you and, consequently, to let you state your case in reply. Equally, because we had no concerns about your role, we saw no need to exercise our access rights in order to examine this in detail. I am always mindful of the need to follow our Code of Practice where our reports are critical of third parties but, in this case, there was no criticism and we did not consider it necessary to apply the process.

At paragraphs 3.5 and 3.8 you are concerned that the report appears to downgrade both the status of your legal contract and also the research undertaken by NISRA. This is not our intention in either case. On the former, the term ‘memorandum of understanding’ was in no way meant to dilute the status of the agreement. On the NISRA point, we consider that our references to their research (at paragraphs 3.41 and 3.46) are in fact both positive and provide independent confirmation that industry benchmarks were being exceeded.

At paragraph 3.4, you are concerned that we had created a false impression by failing to disclose the full context that, in appointing Millward Brown, you were implementing the long-standing instructions of government; and, at paragraph 3.9, you indicate that the use of the term ‘research partner’ implies a cosiness which is contrary to the facts.

Let me again assure you that neither of these interpretations is intended. On the first point, paragraph 3.38 of our report explicitly recognises that DOE’s contract “covers advertising, public relations …..and tracking research”, so there is no implication that Lyle Bailie was doing anything other than implementing the contractual provisions. On the second point, you will note that paragraph 3.45 of our report indicates clearly that it was Lyle Bailie who took the initiative in establishing the probity arrangements with Millward Brown and our use of the term ‘research partner’ is in no way meant to be pejorative.

At paragraph 3.6 you ask why NIAO highlights a potential for a conflict of interest. Our report focuses on the public sector’s arrangements for this contract and, because of the way these contractual arrangements were established, we do see a potential conflict of interest and I am obliged to report this to the Assembly. While our report recognises (paragraph 3.45) that you have taken action to address this potential conflict, the principle in the public sector is that conflicts of interest should be avoided as far as possible. Our report is suggesting some improvements which are clearly the Department’s responsibility and which it should exercise in its management and oversight of the contract.

At paragraph 3.10 you query why we have focused on a marginal source of income and ignored sponsorship contributions. Our report recognises (paragraph 3.40) the contribution of sponsorship income. However, from a public sector perspective, it is legitimate for a value for money report of this nature to focus on the fact the DOE did not take appropriate steps to determine whether the monies it received for the transactions reflected the current market value. Again, there is no criticism of Lyle Bailie in this factual reprise.

To conclude, I hope that I have managed to assure you that our report is not, nor was meant to be, critical of Lyle Bailie and it was for that reason that we saw no need to undertake third party clearance with you. Having said that, I recognise that an interpretation was put on this part of the report when it was published which gave you real grounds for concern. I regret this and was pleased to have the opportunity at PAC to clarify this matter for the public record.

I am copying this letter to the Chairman of PAC and to Stephen Peover.

John Dowdall CB

Comptroller and Auditor General

Appendix 4

Statistical Information

Statistical Information

International Comparison of Road Deaths per 100,000 Population (2005)

1.

Malta

4.2 (New)

2.

Netherlands

4.6

3.

Norway

4.9

3.

Sweden

4.9

5.

England

5.4

6.

Switzerland

5.5

7.

Scotland

5.6

8.

Denmark

6.1

8.

Wales

6.1

10.

Japan

6.2

11.

Germany

6.5

11.

Iceland

6.5

13.

Finland

7.2

14.

Northern Ireland

7.8

15.

Australia

8.0

16.

France

8.8

17.

Canada

9.1

18.

Italy

9.3

19.

Austria

9.4

20.

Republic of Ireland

9.7

21.

Luxembourg

9.9

21.

New Zealand

9.9

23.

Spain

10.3

24.

Belgium

10.4

24.

Slovakia

10.4 (New)

26.

Portugal

11.8

27.

Czech Republic

12.6

27.

Estonia

12.6 (New)

29.

Hungary

12.7

30.

Slovenia

12.9 (New)

31.

Republic of Korea

13.2

32.

Cyprus

13.6 (New)

33.

Poland

14.3

34.

USA

14.7

35.

Greece

15.0

36.

Latvia

19.2 (New)

37.

Lithuania

22.2 (New)

Source: Road Casualties Great Britain 2006

Updated figures for 2005 show that Northern Ireland now ranks 14th out of 37 countries. 2004 data ranked NI 16th out of 30 countries. However one new country was ranked 1st therefore in reality NI gained one place.

Six out of seven of the new countries assessed had worse road death records than NI.

Killed or Seriously Injured per 100,000 of Population

Ranking
Region
KSI per 100,000 of population

1

Greater Manchester

36.57

2

Tyne and Wear

37.42

3

Devon

38.14

4

Avon

38.77

5

Staffordshire

41.23

6

Leicestershire

42.68

7

West Midlands

43.92

8

Berkshire

45.10

9

Bedfordshire

46.05

10

Merseyside

46.25

11

Gloucestershire

46.32

12

Hertfordshire

47.14

13

Durham

47.33

14

Hampshire

47.37

15

Shopshire

47.43

16

Cleveland

48.01

17

South Yorkshire

48.42

18

Worcestershire

48.47

19

Kent

50.59

20

Cornwall & Isles of Scilly

50.72

21

Suffolk

51.14

22

Isle of Wight

51.25

23

Greater London

52.54

24

West Yorkshire

52.75

25

Dorset

52.92

26

Surrey

53.72

27

Lincolnshire

57.86

28

Oxfordshire

58.86

29

Derbyshire

58.97

30

Norfolk

59.82

31

Buckinghamshire

60.10

32

West Sussex

60.20

33

Somerset

62.66

34

Northumberland

66.16

35

Northamptonshire

66.36

36

Herefordshire

66.92

37

Wiltshire

67.68

38

Humberside

68.07

39

Nottinghamshire

68.69

40

Cumbria

69.33

41

Cheshire

69.71

42

Cambridgshire

69.87

43

Essex

70.24

44

East Sussex

74.44

45

Northern Ireland

76.77

46

Warwickshire

76.79

47

Lancashire

78.57

48

North Yorkshire

111.96

Source: Road Casualties Great Britain 2006

Appendix 5

List of Witnesses who
Gave Oral Evidence
to the Committee

List of Witnesses who Gave Oral Evidence to the Committee

1. Mr Stephen Peover, Accounting Officer, Department of the Environment.

2. Mr Stanley Duncan, Director of Road Safety Division, Department of the Environment.

3. Mr Desi McDonnell, Head of Road Safety Branch, Department of the Environment.

In Attendance:

4. Mr John Dowdall CB, Comptroller and Auditor General.

5. Mr David Thomson, Treasury Officer of Accounts, Department of Finance and Personnel.