Biosecurity and legislation – transportation: a case study

It is evident therefore that Commissioner Fischler perceives the way forward as not simply a biosecurity issue, or animal health and welfare or a quality issue. Rather he sees an integrated approach operationally as well as politically across a range of issues. For example modern transportation arrangements, which may have previously been considered a side issue in relation to animal disease, were implicated as one of the central reasons for the rapid spread of FMD in the recent UK outbreak. In a report by the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Welfare [xli] it states that poor welfare during transport may have prolonged effects on the welfare of the transported animals and that the stressful effects may put the animals at greater risk of disease. As the report states, if animals with FMD are transported through a market or staging point there is a major risk of spreading the disease. Therefore any review of FMD must consider how to improve transport conditions in order to minimise putting animals at greater risk of disease or, if disease is already present, spreading the disease. Andrea Gavinelli, DG Health and Consumer Protection, Animal Health and Welfare, EC in a presentation to the Future of the Meat Industry Conference 2001 stated, for example, that animal transport is a major concern because:

n     Spread of infectious diseases;

n     Source of stress and sufferance for the animals; and

n     Quality of meat suffers.

The issue of welfare therefore also becomes one of disease prevention and also quality which are both related to production and ultimately, therefore, of financial importance to the farmer. The legislation governing the transportation of animals is Directive 91/628/EEC as amended (1995) which:

n     Limits continuous travelling time to 8 hours;

n     Regulates registration of transporters;

n     Regulates the means of transport; and

n     Necessitates a journey plan.

However a report on the application of this directive on December 2000 found:

n     Lack of engagement in welfare of operators involved;

n     Negligence and poor handling of animals;

n     Road vehicles in poor conditions; and

n     Administrative procedures not properly harmonised.

These findings have led to proposals for change in the legislation, principally:

n     Aim to have a more user-friendly document;

n     Facilitate clear distinction between planned and realized journey;

n     Allow easy monitoring of the journey;

n     Stricter definition of animals fit for transport;

n     Veterinary certificates including welfare; and

n     Ventilation and monitoring systems on road vehicles.

It can be seen therefore that issues such as prevention and control of FMD and other animal diseases, in the longer term, will require a broader approach with possible changes in legislation to ensure a level playing field throughout Europe. The Scientific Committee’s proposals have already been criticised by the Irish Farmers’ Association (IFA) who state that proposed changes will effectively stop Ireland’s live export of cattle. This relates to the possibility of having to reduce the number of cattle that are transported in a single shipment to make room for resting, feeding, and watering and to the prevention of animals being unloaded at staging points [xlii] . This viewpoint may be reflective of the reticence of Irish farmers to adopt changes that if implemented would mean additional costs for them. The same requirements would apply to farmers in NI so the farming community here may have to weigh up the benefits of legislation that seeks to enhance animal welfare and therefore protect animal health and reduce the risk and spread of animal disease, against the cost of implementing such legislation.

Conclusion

The close link between food safety, animal health and welfare, and consumer confidence ensures that concerns about one aspect can often have a negative impact on another. Although the call from Europe, and locally, expressed in the Vision Report, emphasises the development of an integrated food chain with a focus on safety, quality and competitive pricing there are still concerns that the responsibility for these issues is still being compartmentalised by different sectors of the agri-food business. In a survey [xliii] carried out by the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) of 1275 representative of 19 sectors within the agri-food business, and including farmers, processors, retailers, manufacturers and caterers, 63% stated that the government and regulatory authorities were responsible for resolving food safety issues with only 20% seeing it as joint responsibility. This is not only alarming but shows a considerable lack of understanding of the legal requirements placed upon them as central operators in the food chain. As Dr Patrick Wall, Chief Executive of the FSAI said:

"Whilst the relevant authorities are a resource to industry, the bottom-line is that the law firmly places responsibility for producing safe food with the industry stakeholders throughout the food chain."

Thirty-six percent of consumers were also concerned with food safety in relation to farm practices. The key issues were chemicals and fertilisers, BSE, E. coli, Salmonella, and poor hygiene. Foot and Mouth Disease also contributed to consumers concerns about farming practices.

While the FMD outbreak was yet another stressful episode for the rural community in general and the farming community in particular it offers the context against which to take a holistic view of the range of related issues that must be considered if animal disease is to be effectively and comprehensively addressed. Biosecurity is certainly at the top of the agenda in terms of preventing disease entering the country but this must surely be complemented by the highest possible animal health and welfare standards to ensure that the occurrence of endemic diseases are kept to a minimum. In addition, the relationship between food safety and animal health and welfare could be more fully explained to a public that may be largely ignorant of these issues. This might reduce the impact that an animal disease outbreak may have on sales of meat produce by helping to maintain consumer confidence. To assist this, a review of all relevant legislation to identify potential inadequacies or loopholes and subsequent implementation of more stringent legislation if required should perhaps be considered - the issue of transportation, noted above, is a case in point. The Vision Report refers to the development of an integrated food chain into which these diverse but related issues could be incorporated. If this is being seriously considered then it offers one avenue for all the above issues to be discussed and appropriate action taken by all the relevant players.

 

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH
FMD IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

INTRODUCTION

Biosecurity is a broad term that encompasses a range of issues but in farming terms it can be described simply as ‘protecting the health of livestock by preventing the transmission of disease’ [xliv] . The following paper describes the approach taken in non-EU countries, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the U.S.A. It was thought that this approach would aid the Committee in its consideration of the management of Foot and Mouth disease, and exotic diseases in general, since the approach taken by European countries is essentially the same since, to a large extent, these countries must adhere to the same European legislation. It is also acknowledged that Australia and New Zealand in particular have particularly advanced measures in pace to prevent both the entry and spread of exotic diseases.

1.         Biosecurity measures in New Zealand

MAF Biosecurity Authority was formed in 1999. It is comprised of over 100 specialist staff with experience in areas such as animal welfare, biosecurity risk management, animal and plant health and standards development [xlv] . The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry takes the lead in New Zealand biosecurity and animal welfare programmes. It has developed four key goal areas in order to deliver a vision of ‘Biosecurity New Zealand’ [xlvi] . These are:

n     Protection

n     Development

n     Assurance

n     Coordination

(i)     Protection

There are several stages of defence to aid in the management of risks to animals, plant and forest health.

n     Offshore protection: relates to the controls on importers before goods are allowed into the country

n     At the border: checks on passengers entering the country

n     Inside the border: monitoring of plants and animals for signs of pests and disease

n     Response capability: ensuring there are the specialists, resources and equipment ready to respond to a disease outbreak

n     Enforcement: specialist enforcement team has been established to prosecute those who breach biosecurity and welfare laws

n     Education: awareness programmes provide understanding of how to protect New Zealand and to encourage compliance with laws

(ii)    Development

The Authority sees the development of animal welfare and ethics standards based on science as making a "significant contribution to success in international markets".

(iii)   Assurance

The aim is to provide assurance between governments that New Zealand food and fibre products meet the biosecurity requirements of other countries. MAF Biosecurity aims to help overcome access barriers to NZ products by challenging technical barriers to trade. It is involved in international forums and thus helps to influence policy direction. It also works closely with the NZ Food Safety Authority on certification for edible plant and animal products.

(iv)   Coordination

MAF Biosecurity has a central role in the coordination of the NZ government’s biosecurity and animal welfare programme. Among other duties it:

n     "coordinates biosecurity activities across government departments;

n     develops and maintains links between government and external agencies with biosecurity interests;

n     leading and coordinating the development of biosecurity projects, including the preparation of national pest management strategies;

n     implementing a $2.8 million biosecurity awareness programme, and other targeted educational activities;

n     advancing New Zealand’s interests in international forums (including the World Trade Organisation committee on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and standard-setting bodies for animal health and plant health);

n     participating in developing international standards for animal (including bees and fish), plant and forestry health;

n     working closely with stakeholders in developing animal welfare standards and codes of ethical conduct;

n     advising and supporting the National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC) and the National Animal Ethics Advisory Committee (NAEAC);

n     managing trade issues involving biosecurity and animal welfare issues;

n     working closely with key officials in counterpart agencies in New Zealand and overseas".

Legislation

There are two main pieces of legislation that support the work of MAF Biosecurity. These are:

n     Biosecurity Act 1993 – this provides central government, regional councils and industry groups with the legal basis to manage pests and unwanted organisms in NZ.

n     Animal Welfare Act 1999 – this Act reformed animal welfare in NZ. It is flexible to allow standards to be developed and modified to respond to rapidly changing expectations of society, industry or research.

Measures taken to prevent entry of disease into NZ [xlvii]

n     All baggage entering NZ is either x-rayed or searched by hand. Mail is x-rayed and screened by detector dogs.

n     21 dog teams are stationed in airports and are trained to locate food and plant material on people, clothing and bags.

n     Passengers from countries were FMD is established are singled out for special checking at all airports.

n     Skilled teams of biosecurity staff from MAF are in airports.

n     All passengers must fill out a very detailed declaration card.

n     If the declaration card is filled out incorrectly there is an instant fine of $200. If the card is deliberately filled in with the intention of misleading the authorities there is a fine of $100,000 or be sent to prison for five years.

Interdepartmental cooperation [xlviii]

If one considers that there were four cases of FMD in NI during the recent crisis which, by Department accounts, stretched its resources to the limit it is necessary to consider what would be the response in the event that an outbreak was much larger than DARD itself could cope with. This important issue is being addressed in NZ i.e. what to do in the event that an outbreak of FMD would exceed the capability of MAF’s existing resources. This is being addressed through MAF working with other government departments so that a whole-of-government response can be coordinated.

Disposal of carcases

Contingency plans for environmentally safe disposal of carcases are being discussed with Regional Councils to ensure environmental impacts from disease control operations are minimised.

Vaccination

MAF is evaluating policies and procedures to determine how vaccination can be used as an FMD control measure if the need arise.

Outlook

New Zealand has decided that it needs to develop a broader biosecurity strategy in order to address changes in circumstance, for example increasing travel and trade, as well as to address possible deficiencies in the current approach as biosecurity risks increase. Importantly, while the traditional focus has been on the protection of primary production and trade this is being expanded to encompass protection of human health and indigenous environments [xlix] .

The aim of the biosecurity strategy is to:

n     "set an overall direction for biosecurity

n     identify areas of priority for biosecurity programmes

n     apply to primary production (agriculture, horticulture, forestry), public health, and indigenous terrestrial, marine, and freshwater environments

n     provide guidance to all involved in biosecurity

n     raise public awareness and understanding of biosecurity" [l] .

This approach provides a much more holistic approach to biosecurity rather than confining it to individual sectors. The developmental process has input at Ministerial level and a Ministry of Biosecurity has been established which is advised by the Biosecurity Council. This Council has representatives from different ministries e.g. health, environment, agriculture and forestry etc.

The approach of NZ is one of complementing the current specific biosecurity measures that apply to production and trade by establishing a Ministry of Biosecurity that encompasses biosecurity issues for other areas. This is in keeping with its whole-of-government approach as indicated in section 4 above.

EpiMAN Computer System

"New Zealand has the most advanced information system in the world for handling FMD and other epidemic diseases. Known as EpiMAN, it was developed at the Massey University EpiCentre in conjunction with the New Zealand MAF and AgriQuality New Zealand.

Subsequently the European Commission funded a project to adapt the system for European use, and the British government purchased the rights to use the system. However it had not been fully installed and made operational in Britain before the FMD outbreak. The team, funded jointly by the UK government and the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, has now installed the system, which is now supporting the search for any remaining infected properties.

EpiMAN is a very advanced software system which manages staff and other resources to control the outbreak as rapidly as possible, and can predict exactly where the virus is likely to spread on the wind. It has a range of other advanced features as well, which in combination are designed to minimise the risk of very large outbreaks by identifying infected farms rapidly - allowing the stamping out of infection in affected areas" [li] .

This system has been expanded to include other exotic and endemic diseases. There have been reports that DEFRA had been in receipt of this management tool for up to two years prior to the outbreak by failed to install it. During the outbreak veterinarians were called in form several countries including NZ. The vets from NZ had the software up and running within four days. It has been suggested that if the programme had been operational prior to the outbreak it would have resulted in a much less extensive outbreak. The government responded to a question from Stephen O’Brien MP concerning the operation of EpiMAN indicating that it was operational from the date of confirmation of the first case [lii] . Professor Morris from the EpiCentre facility in Massey University NZ where the computer programme was developed also criticised reports that MAFF had not installed the system even though it had been in receipt of it prior to the outbreak. He indicated that the implementation procedure takes a long time due to the data collection from farms and trialing it etc. The four NZ vets managed to install it "warts and all" rather than the usual methodical installation process. This tool has also been used as a decision-support system in NZ for the management of tuberculosis in livestock [liii] .

2.         Australia

Australia like NZ has an enviable record of maintaining, in international terms, a relatively disease-free agricultural production system. Recognising that this was a distinct trade advantage in a very competitive global market Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia and industry groups constituted the Australian Animal Health Council Ltd. (AAHC) in 1996 in order to consolidate and improve its animal health status. It operates under the business name of Animal Health Australia and is described as "a not-for profit public company established by governments and livestock industries" [liv] . Members, who comprise governments of states and territories as well as a wide-range of organisations representing various livestock producers, provide the funding for the company.

What does Animal Health Australia do?

The aim of AHA is the establishment of an integrated national animal health system. To this end the company created three subscription-funded programmes in 2000. These were [lv] :

n     "Animal Health Services, which aims to improve the national capability, standards and performance of Australia’s animal health system

n     Animal Disease Surveillance, which provides a nationally integrated, innovative surveillance system to underpin trade, and

n     Emergency Animal Disease Preparedness, which enhances management approaches to deal with animal disease emergencies"

A range of programmes has been initiated on behalf of a range of members and is funded by the beneficiaries. If further programmes are requested then joint contributions are negotiated between beneficiaries. Additionally, the Commonwealth Government of Australia has legislated so that levies can be collected from industry to support the company’s activities at a national level.

Disease Response and Surveillance

Two important areas in relation to animal disease are:

n     the response in the event of a disease outbreak; and

n     the nature of the animal disease surveillance programme.

The Emergency Disease Response Agreement (Appendix 1) was formally agreed between the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the Chairman of Animal Health Australia in March of this year. In effect this is an agreement outlining the cost-sharing approach to disease response. Sixty-three diseases have been classified into four categories with the cost shared between governments and industry depending on who is identified as benefiting from control as measured against impact on human health and socio-economic concerns, the environment and livestock production. The AUSTVETPLAN is the national plan for emergency disease response. It provides the framework for a co-ordinated national strategy and is comprised of integrated state and territorial sub-strategies. The main thrust of the Plan is to provide guidance in order to link policy, strategies, implementation and emergency management plans. Animal Health Australia manages the co-ordination and development of the various components of the AUSVETPLAN [lvi] .

Animal Health Australia applies a national perspective to the Animal Disease Surveillance Programme (ADSP) and identifies any improvements that can be made to it. Four priority outcomes have been identified:

1.     Demonstrated commitment by Members to a nationally integrated, real time surveillance system;

2.     Credible and justifiable surveillance information provided to enhance Australian trade;

3.     Surveillance information applied to underpin market access and secure new trade opportunities; and

4.     Innovative technology and information systems developed and adopted to provide a competitive advantage to Australian industry.

Central to the surveillance programme, and similar to NI’s APHIS, is the National Animal Health Information System (NAHIS). This underpins the exports of animals and animal products justifying Australia’s disease status for particular diseases. A full review of NAHIS is to be carried out for the first time to ensure it is meeting customers’ expectations.

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