Report on AD HOC COMMITTEE
Draft Financial Investigations
(Northern Ireland) Order 2001
Report and Proceedings of the Committee (Continued)
290. Prof Dickson: Absolutely, and I am on record as having said that
I want the Human Rights Commission to help make Northern Ireland a better
society. We share your goal of a more crime-free, paramilitary-free, safer
environment for everyone who lives here. Of course we desire that, but we also
share the Secretary of State's desire for Northern Ireland to be a model for the
world with regard to the protection of human rights. That is why the Human
Rights Commission has been established by statute, as has happened in many other
countries around the world - and not just in countries emerging out of conflict,
but in well established Commonwealth countries such as Canada, New Zealand
and Australia.
291. We see it as our duty to draw the attention of decision makers,
yourselves included, to the possible human rights implications of certain
legislation, but always within the framework of having to strike a balance
between the rights of individuals and the rights of society. Yes, I share with
you the goal of making Northern Ireland a crime-free society. One could do that
quite easily by making it a police state, if you like, but that would be too
high a price to pay. One must always strike a balance and, as we have said in
this paper and as I have said orally, so much depends on how powers are
implemented in practice rather than on how they read on paper. On balance, there
is not a lot in this that worries us, but we draw the Committee's attention to a
few potential difficulties.
292. Mr Close: I thank you for that. I do not think anyone here would
be looking for a police state, and I want to put that clearly on the record. I
am concerned because I see this proposed legislation as a precursor to a new
proceeds of crime bill, or whatever. The South has the Criminal Assets Bureau,
and I shudder to think what the reaction of the Human Rights Commission would be
to that if it has these concerns over the Financial Investigations Order. I
would like you to reassure me that we are not going to be running up against an
absolute brick wall if we try to build upon the 2001 Order.
293. Prof Dickson: I am not totally au fait with the Republic's
legislation on this, but I am aware that at a recent conference in Dublin
various concerns were expressed by high ranking politicians and lawyers about
the compatibility of the legislation on the Criminal Assets Bureau with the
European Convention on Human Rights. When the Republic eventually gets round to
incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights, the law on criminal
assets may well have to be amended to make it compatible.
294. Mr McNamee: I am not against the concept of confiscating the
proceeds of criminal activity, and I do not think anyone on the Committee would
be. We must not be blinkered on the issue of legislation which is directed
towards gathering information that will enable the proceeds of criminal activity
to be confiscated.
295. You stated that this lies not in the actual powers but in the exercise
of those powers and in how other individuals are affected by them. One may wear
blinkers and think that it is fine to investigate a person who is suspected of
being involved in criminal activity, but we have to consider the implications
for other individuals.
296. We have already heard about the difficulties bank officials face when,
for instance, issued with bank circulars. They may be providing information on
an individual other than the one on whom the information is being sought. If
information is being sought on a John Smith, then information on every John
Smith will be released given that this Financial Investigations Order will
extend those powers of trawl to other institutions, police officers, Customs and
Excise officers, financial investigators and solicitors.
297. In situations where information will be acquired in the course of those
trawls, what is your view on the number of people who will have absolutely no
connection with the individual being targeted? What is your view on the large
amount of information that will be assembled on a particular name and whether
that information is manageable? Much of it will be relevant to the individual
being targeted. However, what is your view on the number of other people whose
information will be disclosed and the potential effect of that?
298. Prof Dickson: There is the danger that you identify, but it can
be avoided by careful work by the financial investigators. When they are asking
questions of financial institutions or solicitors, they ought to be able to
identify in specific detail the person about whom they are asking questions.
Therefore there should be little risk of other John Smiths having their private
details divulged.
299. Under existing law everyone has a legal obligation to report a crime. If
one knows that an offence has been committed, one has a duty to report that.
That already goes some way towards protecting society against the illegal money
laundering activities that are being carried out through financial institutions,
for example.
300. Ms O'Conor: The Proceeds of Crime (Northern Ireland) Order 1996
specifies that anybody who has knowledge or a suspicion that the proceeds of
crime are involved in a particular activity has an obligation to report that to
the relevant authorities. Therefore it appears that the extension proposed
covers something that is already covered.
301. The Chairperson: Leaving aside the problem with solicitors, you
do not have a problem or any difficulty with what is proposed. Is it fair to say
that your submission highlights potential difficulties in practice?
302. Prof Dickson: Yes, except that it is not just in relation to
solicitors that we have reservations.
303. We have serious reservations, as dealt with in paragraph five of our
submission, about the overall compatibility of the legislation with the European
Convention insofar as the new Order would permit assumptions to be made about
where money has come from when a person has been convicted of relevant offences.
Assumptions can be made about where that money has come from and it can be
confiscated even though it may have nothing to do with any crime and may be
property belonging to a member of the family of the person who has been
convicted rather than to him. The McIntosh case in Scotland illustrates the
dangers here, and the Government need to be aware of them.
304. The Chairperson: Does that comment relate to article 9 of
the Proceeds of Crime (Northern Ireland) Order 1996?
305. Prof Dickson: Yes.
306. The Chairperson: Is there a cloud looming in relation to the
application of article 9 as a result of the McIntosh case?
307. Prof Dickson: Yes, and also as a result of the incorporation of
the European Convention into our law by the Human Rights Act 1998.
308. The Chairperson: While it has not been challenged here in our
courts, is there the potential of a challenge along the McIntosh lines?
309. Prof Dickson: I think so.
310. The Chairperson: That does not specifically relate to the
proposed draft legislation here, does it?
311. Prof Dickson: No, it relates to the original Order.
312. The Chairperson: Does the power to obtain a general bank circular
exist in Great Britain? Do the police or Customs and Excise have that power
there?
313. Prof Dickson: I do not know.
314. The Chairperson: Article 49 of the Proceeds of Crime
(Northern Ireland) Order 1996 allows for the appointment of a financial
investigator. Does that power exist in Britain? My understanding is that it does
not exist in Britain. It is unique to Northern Ireland. Is there any similar
power there to that?
315. Prof Dickson: I share your understanding that that provision is
unique within the United Kingdom. I do not think that there is a comparable
power even under the anti-terrorist laws in Great Britain.
316. The Chairperson: You suggested in your submission that it would
be helpful if the Code of Practice was amended in the light of the proposed
draft legislation. Do you have any specific amendments to propose, or is it too
early to suggest any proposed amendments to the Code of Practice?
317. Prof Dickson: I cannot put forward specific suggestions because
we could not get a copy of the Code of Practice prior to today's meeting.
318. The Chairperson: In general terms you are saying that the Code of
Practice should be looked at in the light of the draft legislation to see if
amendments would be appropriate.
319. Prof Dickson: I think that should happen.
320. The Chairperson: In relation to the general solicitor circular,
you have said that schedule 2, paragraph 4 of the 1996 Order preserves legal
professional privilege. If a solicitor decides not to comply with the Order on
the grounds of professional privilege between himself and his client, is that
reconcilable? Is this something that could cause difficulty? If you have a means
of preserving professional privilege, how can you then have an Order which, on
the face of it, seems to conflict with that professional privilege?
321. Prof Dickson: Representatives of the Law Society could better
explain this. However, I understand that there is a difference between the
existing confidentiality requirement between lawyer and client and legal
professional privilege. The former goes much further than the latter. Under the
cover of legal professional privilege, one is only entitled to keep back
information in certain very confined situations. Otherwise the duty of
confidentiality can be breached.
322. It may be that legal professional privilege does not protect the
information which a financial investigator is seeking in non-contentious
business such as house conveyancing or the drafting of wills.
323. The Chairperson: What do you mean by non-contentious business?
324. Prof Dickson: I mean business that has nothing to do with a
particular dispute. For example, you could engage a solicitor to deal with
conveyancing just as you might engage a building society employee. That you have
a solicitor, rather than someone else, to do the job might be accidental.
325. The Chairperson: If you engage a solicitor to deal with a legal
action against a third party, is that regarded as contentious business?
326. Prof Dickson: Yes.
327. The Chairperson: In that situation, would professional privilege
be activated?
328. Prof Dickson: I am not an expert on the law concerning
professional privilege. I understand that it bites on the type of relationship
in which there is a good reason for a client to have a close and honest
relationship with his solicitor, and that that would not obtain in situations in
which non-contentious business was being conducted.
329. Mr S Wilson: The more I listen to Prof Dickson, the more I am
convinced of my original assertion about this submission. There are two
references in the submission to the Code of Practice's probably needing to be
amended. You think that the amendment in article 4 should only come into force
after the Code of Practice governing the exercise of powers for financial
investigators has been amended.
330. In your response to the Chairperson you said that you could not tell the
Committee what amendments are required because you do not yet have a copy of the
Code of Practice. How on earth can you know that the Code of Practice needs to
be amended if you have not seen it? Is this not more evidence of the flavour of
your submission?
331. The bankers - and they have to work with this on a day-to-day basis -
said that they could not think of any amendments. You have not seen the Code of
Practice yet you think that it needs to be amended. Can you explain that to us?
332. Prof Dickson: I will try to. I was assuming that if changes were
being made to the substance of the law, the implementation of which the Code of
Practice is designed to give guidance on, it would logically follow that the
Code of Practice would need to be looked at, and probably amended, to reflect
the changes to the substance of the law.
333. Mr S Wilson: With respect, I would have thought that one of the
prerequisites for making any judgement like that would be to look at the current
wording of the Code of Practice to see how specific it is. You are telling us
that you have not even seen it yet you are saying that it needs to be amended.
It comes back to my original assertion that your submission appears to be more
interested in guarding what you see as the rights of the people being
investigated rather than in ensuring that the proceeds of crime are found by the
relevant authorities so that criminals cannot use them. The fact that you said
at the start that you were not convinced of the need for this legislation bears
that out. If there is one person in this country able to hold on to the proceeds
of illegal activities without the police or Customs and Excise being able, under
the current law, to get at that money, we should have legislation to deal with
that. It is not a matter of there being an upsurge in crime or not. You seem to
want to be convinced that we have a crime wave before we act. You also want all
these safeguards built in regardless of whether you have read the Code of
Practice. I am amazed that this attitude is being adopted by the Human Rights
Commission. However, given the decisions made yesterday about criminals - also
based on human rights legislation - perhaps I should not be surprised at the
apparent favour being shown towards wrongdoers.
334. Prof Dickson: I think that that is a misinterpretation of my
written and oral presentations. One of the reasons that we headed the written
presentation "provisional" was we had not had sight of documents such
as the Code of Practice. You will understand that we were asked to make a
submission to the Committee at relatively short notice. There have also been the
Christmas and new year breaks. It is difficult to track down these documents.
When we track down the Code of Practice we will scrutinise it. When we submit
our final views to the Committee, we will say clearly whether or not there
should be amendments to the Code of Practice.
335. The Chairperson: In conclusion, the bankers indicated that they
were reassured by the Code of Practice and that it was a very important element
in their dealing with the implications of the 1996 Order. To be fair to the
bankers, I do not think that they have considered the matter of amendments. They
neither sought them nor ruled them out.
336. Ms Ramsey: Just to be fair to the Human Rights Commission, the
bankers had an input into the consultation process but it did not.
337. The Chairperson: That is true.
338. I thank you for coming this morning. We have had a very useful exchange
of views. I also thank you again for your very helpful written submission.
339. Prof Dickson: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
Tuesday 9 January 2001
Members present:
Mr A Maginness (Chairperson)
Mr Bell (Deputy Chairperson)
Mr Close
Mr McNamee
Ms Ramsey
Mr M Robinson
Mr S Wilson
Witnesses:
Mr J Bailie )
Mr N Broderick ) The Law Society of
Mr P Kinney ) Northern Ireland
Mr J Neill )
340. The Chairperson: Mr Neill, your colleagues and you are very
welcome to this meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. We look forward to hearing
your views on the matter before the Committee - the draft Financial
Investigations (Northern Ireland) Order 2001.
341. As you know, the Secretary of State has, under the Northern Ireland Act
1998, referred this matter to the Committee for our consideration. We are
anxious to hear from the Law Society, particularly as article 6 will apply
to solicitors. We are keen to hear your views on the other draft articles too.
Would you like to introduce your colleagues?
342. Mr Neill: Thank you very much for this opportunity to appear
before the Committee. We heard the previous witnesses mention the short amount
of time that was available for preparation, but we do have a written document,
which I propose to read from and hand in. Although it is an interim document, it
will bring the matter forward to a certain extent.
343. We represent the Law Society of Northern Ireland, a professional body
which regulates and represents just under 2,000 practising solicitors in this
jurisdiction. My name is John Neill, and I am a solicitor in a private
practice firm with offices in Belfast and north Down. I am the society's current
president. I am accompanied today by two other members of the governing council
of the society, Mr Patrick Kinney, who has an interest in human rights and is a
partner in a private practice firm with offices in Belfast and Newry, and Mr Nigel Broderick,
an experienced criminal practitioner in a firm with offices in Belfast,
Newtownards and Armagh. We are also joined by Mr John Bailie, the society's
chief executive and secretary and, as such, our senior policy adviser, who is
also a qualified solicitor.
344. Given the limited time available to everyone, our purpose today is to
address the main policy issues raised by the proposed Order. Following this
meeting, we intend to provide the Committee with a formal note which will record
the main points made in this presentation and deal with any other points that
the Committee may wish to raise with us today. Due to time constraints, the
Committee may find it most beneficial if we concentrate upon those aspects of
the proposed Order on which we can offer some experience and expertise from a
professional perspective.
345. In essence, these provisions will impinge on the relationship between
any client and his or her solicitor. For ease of reference I refer you at this
stage to article 6 of the Order and the comments in the Explanatory
Document, with which you are all familiar.
346. I want to begin by making one point clear. The Law Society of Northern
Ireland does not condone the activities of criminals, nor do we have any
interest in affording protection to drug barons, terrorists or racketeers. We
therefore understand and appreciate the objectives and sentiments which lie
behind the proposed legislation.
347. However, we are obliged to draw attention to the right of every citizen
to due process and equal treatment before the law. The reservations we have
about these proposals are relevant to every Committee member and his or her
constituents. The proposed Order will further encroach upon the principles of
solicitor/client confidentiality and legal professional privilege. These
principles do not afford privilege to lawyers - they provide vital protection to
individual citizens. Solicitor/client confidentiality and legal professional
privilege are of a different order to other forms of confidentiality not
recognised by law.
348. A solicitor is in the unique position of being unable, as a matter of
both professional and legal obligation, to disclose any information about a
client's affairs without a waiver by the client or on foot of a clear and lawful
authority to do so. These protections have not been devised by accident, or by
lawyers for lawyers. They are characteristic of all developed, democratic legal
systems over many centuries. The issue is not about encroachment on lawyers'
territory.
349. It is the right, which each of you has, to consult your legal adviser
about your personal business confident in the knowledge that the privacy of that
consultation will be respected and will not lightly or arbitrarily be
overridden. These principles have evolved, under judicial supervision, over the
years so as to prevent excesses such as furtherance of criminal interests. The
principles do not provide carte blanche for criminals.
350. Let me cite one of the authoritative legal statements of the principle.
"The principle is that a client must be able to consult his lawyer in
confidence. The client must be sure that what he tells his lawyer in confidence
will never be revealed without his consent. Legal/professional privilege is,
therefore, much more than an ordinary rule of evidence limited in its
application to the facts of a particular case. It is a fundamental condition on
which the administration of justice, as a whole, rests."
351. Against this background the first point we wish to make about the draft
Order is that little objective justification for the introduction of these
further measures, or for the selection of Northern Ireland for special treatment
in this respect, has been presented to date. The Proceeds of Crime Order, which
is to be amended by the proposed Order, represents a series of extensive powers
already available to the investigating authorities. It is notable that the
Explanatory Document refers to the fact that the provisions of the 1996 Order
have been used to good effect. The powers therein are widely recognised as
draconian, but the present provisions have the merit of being applied throughout
the United Kingdom and have built-in safeguards.
352. A significant extension of these powers is now proposed by the
Government, and it seems clear that the level of protection generally and
against abuse of the additional powers to be conferred on the investigating
authorities is less than that given by the safeguards which apply at present
under the Proceeds of Crime Order. For example, I draw attention to the powers
conferred by article 6 of the proposed Order. From the Explanatory Document it
is clear that the purpose of these provisions is to enable speculative trawls to
obtain information about transactions conducted generally by solicitors for
clients. The operation of these provisions will almost certainly involve
infringe- ments of confidentiality and privacy, not just of the person under
investigation but of those persons with whom the person under suspicion has had
legal dealings.
353. It would appear that once appointed the special financial investigator
is to have an extensive range of discretionary powers. These are speculative in
nature, and irrespective of the provisions of any Code of Practice, it is clear
that the investigator will have a high degree of personal discretion in the
exercise of these powers. It is notable that the exercise of these powers is not
made subject to any form of independent judicial oversight by which that
exercise might be challenged or issues of legal privilege resolved.
354. There are indications that the measures have been proposed in response
to views expressed by the law enforcement agencies and on the basis of a study.
The proposals have been prepared without any input from the Law Society. We make
this point about the value of prior consultation because this would have allowed
an exchange of information and experience about the operation of the present
provisions and evaluation of any problems and the exploring of alternative means
by which the concerns of the authorities might be addressed.
355. As it is, the Northern Ireland Office has produced an Order about which,
for the reasons I have mentioned already, we have reservations.
356. We are concerned that these measures are to be limited to Northern
Ireland and will be taken forward by way of the Order in Council procedure.
First, in respect of the use of the Order in Council procedure, the effect will
be to preclude the same degree of parliamentary debate and amendment that would
apply to a Westminster Bill. The decision to legislate by way of this
unsatisfactory method is perhaps harder to understand in the light of the fact
that the Government have signalled an intention to bring forward during this
parliamentary session a Westminster Bill, which will deal broadly with the same
issues. There is a reference within the Explanatory Document to a consultation
exercise on the report Recovering the Proceeds of Crime. The Government propose
to legislate in respect of that report. It is understood that it appears viable
for that Bill to be used to deal with any legislative amendments for Northern
Ireland which are considered necessary in due course.
357. It seems inappropriate that, without any persuasive justification, the
Government propose to legislate exceptionally in respect of the criminal justice
system in Northern Ireland at this time. Media coverage of the proposed Order
suggests that the Government consider the introduction of these provisions on
general solicitor circulars as paving the way for the introduction of similar
measures in the rest of the United Kingdom. If this is so, we suggest that the
Government should make this clear.
358. Our other main concerns are twofold. First, the Government's assertion
that the proposed legislation complies in all respects with the terms of the
European Convention on Human Rights may not be well founded. Secondly, the
effect of the amendments to the 1996 Order now proposed appears to be to make
client information available to the financial investigator retrospectively. On
commencement of the proposed Order, it will be possible to have an inquiry on a
transaction which was entered into by an individual prior to the introduction of
this legislation on the basis that his/her confidence with his/her solicitor
would be respected and preserved by law.
359. In conclusion, it may be helpful to summarise for the Committee the
position of the Law Society of Northern Ireland at this stage, pending
discussions with the Northern Ireland Office and preparation of a further
detailed submission as part of the current formal consultation progress. We
invite the Committee to consider supporting the position of the Law Society in
the following respects: first, to acknowledge the importance of safeguarding the
public interest in the principles of solicitor/client confidentiality and legal
professional privilege; secondly, to have regard to the importance of those
principles, to affirm that they should not be interfered with lightly without
careful consideration of other options or without the provision of effective
safeguards; thirdly, to accept that any legislation on the lines proposed should
not be carried forward or, at a minimum, implementation of the provisions
affecting solicitor/client confidentiality and legal professional privilege take
place before full and meaningful consultation between the Northern Ireland
Office and the Law Society. Furthermore, if and when legislation on these
matters is brought forward, it should not be by way of Order in Council.
Finally, legislation on these matters should not be applied to Northern Ireland
on a selective and experimental basis.
360. I hope that the Committee finds these observations of some interest and
value when assessing the proposed Order. These reservations are not being
expressed in the interests of lawyers. They are in the interests of anyone who
needs to consult a lawyer, secure in the knowledge that his confidence will be
respected.
361. The Chairperson: The 1996 Order appears to protect professional
privilege. Do you consider this proposed amendment as conflicting with that
protection of professional privilege?
362. Mr Kinney: One of the concerns we have about the provisions of
the 1996 Order is that the definition of legal professional privilege is not the
widest definition of that term. It is confined to the privilege that attaches to
High Court proceedings. The definition of legal professional privilege, as it
has evolved over centuries of judicial consideration, is much wider. It applies
to advice supplied by a lawyer to his client and the circumstances in which a
client should approach a lawyer to seek such advice. The protection afforded by
the 1996 Order is not complete. This draft legislation goes further in that it
requires specific information from solicitors which may well conflict with that
principle of privilege and certainly with the principle of confidentiality.
363. The Chairperson: Can you explain the demar- cation between
professional privilege and confidentiality?
364. Mr Kinney: It is difficult to find an accurate and precise
demarcation between the two areas. We have a professional obligation of
confidentiality towards our clients in all respects. When people consult a
solicitor, they should feel that they have the right to consult that solicitor
and have none of their business divulged to anyone. As Mr Neill mentioned, there
are restrictions, both professionally and legally, on that right to
confidentiality or privilege. For example, if there were any question of
furthering criminal intent, that would not be covered by privilege or
confidentiality. Where the precise boundary between confidentiality and
privilege lies is not clear. That is why so much of this has come before the
courts at all levels, up to the House of Lords, and it has been considered
judicially on many occasions. What is clear is that when someone consults a
lawyer and seeks advice, information given in relation to the seeking of that
advice is privileged information.
365. Mr S Wilson: Let us imagine that a solicitor was with a client
and that during the course of the discussion it became clear that the client was
seeking advice on an illegal activity that he had been involved in. Let us say
that it was something about money and that it became clear to the solicitor that
this money had been obtained illegally. Are you obliged, as the bankers told us
they are obliged, to report that immediately to the police?
366. Mr Kinney: My understanding is that, under the terms of the 1996
Order, if I have any suspicion regarding any transaction that comes to me in the
course of my business, I have an obligation to report it. A provision within the
Order also says that if legal professional privilege applies, I must not
disclose it. However, in circumstances such as you have given, where there is a
clear criminal intent and no doubt about it, then it should be disclosed.
367. Mr S Wilson: I suppose confidentiality has already been breached
anyhow. Is what we are looking at not simply an extension of that, namely that
the police or Customs and Excise will be able to seek to obtain information? On
quite a number of occasions, Mr Neill spoke about a speculative trawl. Our
understanding from both Customs and Excise and the police - the police are the
ones who have been exercising the power so far - is that this is not speculative
at all. They must have built up a case and they must have come to the point
where they know that they need further information. They must then convince a
County Court judge. The judge, who, the police told us, carries the can at the
end of the day, questions them fairly closely before allowing them to set up the
investigation. Given all of the safeguards, do you not agree that it is wrong to
describe this as speculative? The police have already built up a body of
evidence. They have to show that they are pursuing a case and need this
additional information. Surely this is not a matter of confidentiality such as
was described earlier on; rather it is an extension of their means of obtaining
information which would help where a crime is already suspected anyhow?
368. Mr Kinney: There are two answers to that, a general answer and a
more specific one. The general answer is that a fundamental plank of our legal
system is that conversations and other communications between a legal adviser
and his or her client are privileged and should be confidential. It is important
to remember this. Any alteration of that principle should be looked at very
carefully and should be proportionate.
369. To be more specific, I used the phrase "speculative trawl"
because that is what is happening. This is a general circular to solicitors, not
a request to a particular solicitor for information. A circular is sent in the
hope of trawling some information. I think the word "trawl" is used in
the Explanatory Document.
370. The police and the relevant authorities do have powers under the 1996
Order to seek production orders which give them the power to seek particular
information about particular clients. That can be very broadly phrased. A
production order can be phrased to encompass all dealings by a particular person
in an office. One of the safeguards that the 1996 Order provides is that, if
there is any concern that privilege is being affected, an application can be
made by a solicitor to the judge who made the order. He can do this without
reference to the client, because the privilege attaches to the client and not to
the solicitor, and we have a duty to the client to protect that. We can apply to
the judge to express our concerns, and the judge can then make a decision on
what is or is not properly covered by the production order.
371. There are already systems in place for dealing with such situations, and
we think that this is speculation on how the information is being sought.
372. Mr Close: I would like to raise the issue of privilege as I am a
bit confused about it. Is information the same as suspicion when privilege
relates to information which you may have obtained through your relationship
with your client? Your suspicion might be based not on information that you have
gained from your client, but on common sense.
373. If an individual's lifestyle is far above what he can possibly maintain
on his legal income - he might be on the dole - you may well have the same
suspicion about that individual as I would have. Does your privilege extend to
suspicion?
374. Mr Kinney: We are addressing two different, although related,
issues and I think you are quite right to draw the distinction. You are quite
right that there is an obligation to report one's suspicion. Suspicion can arise
from any number of a client's activities which cause one concern. The obligation
to disclose that comes under the 1996 Order. That is different from having
possession of communications which may be considered privileged, because they
have been handed to a solicitor to provide advice to the client. There is a
distinction between the two areas.
375. Mr Neill: It is often a matter of degree. When one has a
suspicion one can face agonising decisions on whether one is under an obligation
to report it to the authorities or whether it is on the other side of the
dividing line. Like so many things in the law there is a balancing act to be
done.
376. The Chairperson: Mr Kinney raised an interesting point about the
general solicitor circular. Say, for example, that all banks are informed that
there is a "Joe Smith" living at such-and-such an address and are
asked to trawl on him. Is a general solicitor circular similar?
377. There are in Northern Ireland, I imagine, about 1000 firms of
solicitors. Does that mean that those 1000 firms would be told to trawl their
records to see if there is a Joe Smith at such-and-such an address? Is that how
it works in practice?
378. Mr Kinney: That is our understanding of it. At this stage, as was
highlighted by Mr Neill in his presentation, we have not been involved in any
consultative process with the Northern Ireland Office. We are simply going on
the information we have been provided with, and that is our understanding of how
it would work in practice.
379. The Chairperson: It would be a difficult exercise to inform and
check up on all those firms. It seems an impractical sort of order to give.
380. Mr Broderick: The legislation assumes that every solicitor's
office will have exact information on each client and that information will be
retained for a number of years. Each office is run on an individual basis, but
there is a certain amount of over-emphasis on the fact that solicitors may or
may not have all these records.
381. The Law Society shares your concern that this information may not be
available or may be difficult to obtain. It places individual solicitors under a
very onerous obligation. However, that does not take away from the general
point, and we emphasise this at the end of our submission. This is not about
lawyers' difficulties with the legislation; it is about every one of us around
this table. This is about clients' confidentiality not the lawyers'. We are more
concerned with the implications for clients than the implications for lawyers.
382. Mr Bailie: There are just under 600 solicitors' firms in Northern
Ireland at present. As regards your point about the logistics or practicalities
of implementing this legislation, we are operating on the basis of the
information we have. The word "trawl" - a fishing term - is the word
used in the Explanatory Document.
383. With regard to the way in which it will operate, we are referring to the
terms of draft article 6 and the amount of discretion that appears to be
conferred on the financial investigator. There is a process whereby, in order to
get a financial investigation underway, there has to be a court's approval.
These are wide ranging, non-specific powers which confer a great deal of
discretion on the individual investigator without any opportunity for any formal
review or oversight by a judge.
384. The Chairperson: The financial investigator will be appointed by
application to a court. A County Court judge will look at the application and
agree to the appointment. Then the financial investigator in the exercise of his
power can send a general solicitor circular to solicitors in order to conduct a
trawl. He will not have to go back to the court to get another order. He will be
able to do that if he feels it is the right thing to do.
385. Mr Bailie: That is our understanding.
386. Mr Neill: On that point the understanding is that the application
is made ex-parte, in other words unilaterally by the authorities without any
particular target having the opportunity to make representations at that stage.
Thereafter, there may be a complete lack of control or supervision.
387. The Chairperson: I can understand its being made ex-parte, in the
sense that if somebody is engaged in crime, you do not want to be tipping that
person off. However, once an order has been granted by a County Court judge, is
there any provision in the 1996 Order for the named person to appeal against
that order once that person is under investigation and knows about it?
388. Mr Broderick: There would be the normal legal remedies such as
challenging by way of a judicial review.
389. The Chairperson: But apart from that?
390. Mr Broderick: That would be the main focus. If a final order is
made, then obviously the first application is ex-parte. I am thinking about an
application specified, not to a solicitor but to a specific defendant in a
criminal case.
391. Once the order is made, that person is involved in an interlocutory
order - that is the first step. That person would then have the opportunity to
account for what he says are legitimate funds. He can then submit a replying
affidavit. That application to court takes on its own life, usually at the end
of the criminal proceedings. That can form the basis of an open hearing before
the court. Each party can make representations, which is more like a hearing
than an appeal. The initial step is taken without his knowledge.
392. The Chairperson: Are you referring to a situation begun after a
criminal conviction has occurred?
393. Mr Kinney: Mr Chairman, I would like to help clear up some of the
confusion about this matter. Provisions in the 1996 Order allow for a County
Court judge to make specific requests for information - for example, an
application by the RUC. This is a "production order" which is served
on a solicitor asking for the production of documents or information. There is
provision in the Order for a solicitor to go to that judge or to another County
Court judge to open the issue of privilege if he or she is concerned about it,
as I said earlier. If your initial question was addressed to the new draft
Order, however, to my knowledge there is no provision in the 1996 Order that
will capture the powers of the financial investigator. You could ask for a
judicial review application in relation to the initial appointment of that
officer. Once the financial investigator starts to use his wide discretionary
powers, you have no effective recourse to a court to ask for further assistance.
394. The Chairperson: Does the production order relate to an
individual solicitor as opposed to solicitors at large?
395. Mr Kinney: Yes. I am not aware of any situation where a trawl or
general production order can be made. It is normally addressed to one or perhaps
two or three firms of solicitors.
396. The Chairperson: Article 6 of this draft Order would make it
general.
397. Mr Kinney: That is correct - it would be a blanket application to
solicitors' firms for unspecified information.
398. Mr McNamee: You have said that under the 1996 Order specific
requests can be made for information. If, as Mr Kinney has said, there are
concerns about confidentiality or privilege, they can be raised in a court.
Under the proposed Financial Investigations Order there is no recourse for
dealing with concerns regarding confidentiality or privilege. I note that the
Law Society was not consulted about the Order.
399. Mr Kinney: That is correct.
400. Mr McNamee: Do you feel that it should not be introduced as an
Order in Council? The point has been made that this is specific to Northern
Ireland, as opposed to any other part of the United Kingdom. A study was done on
the effects of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996. Has the Law Society had access to
or any participation in that study?
401. Mr Kinney: We have seen nothing of that nature.
402. Mr McNamee: I would like to inform you of the difficulties this
may present. The Explanatory Document states that
"solicitors increasingly specialise in their areas of practice and
therefore there is a growing likelihood that the solicitor who represents the
defendant in the criminal proceedings will not be the solicitor used by the
defendant to carry out a property transaction for him."
Perhaps you could comment on that point.
403. You have mentioned the blanket trawl of solicitors which would be
available under this Order and the investigator's extensive discretion. Do you
envisage its affecting people other than the individual identified? For
instance, if an investigator required information on a named individual,
irrespective of any address provided or held, would the sole focus be on a name?
You are concerned about people with the same or a similar name whose solicitors
will have to release information to the investigator though their clients may
not be the people identified as the targets of the trawls. However, given its
wide nature, how many totally unconnected people might be drawn in? How many
solicitors will face the issues of privilege and confidentiality even though
their clients may not be the people targeted?
404. Mr Broderick: Perhaps I might address that question. We share the
concern that the trawl is highly speculative. There could be countless people
with similar names. It is difficult to give an exact figure, but if only a name
is given, the numbers could run into hundreds. These people's personal details
and confidential transactions - quite legitimate business - would be disclosed
to other parties though the individuals might have legitimate reasons for
keeping their matters private. Our concern is that dealing simply with a name
will jeopardise the duty of confidentiality quite rightly placed upon us as
solicitors.
405. The first point you touched on was the assumption made in the
Explanatory Document that Northern Ireland firms increasingly have a degree of
specialisation. We do not share that assumption. Northern Ireland is a very
small jurisdiction where most, if not all, practices are of a general nature.
There are very few, if any, practices specialising in a particular area of the
law. Though a firm like my own has a large amount of criminal work, it continues
to deal with a vast array of other legal issues. With respect, no firm can
afford to specialise in one particular area.
406. Since we are a small jurisdiction, a solicitor will very often know - or
know of - his client before he comes through the door. The situation is
different to that which perhaps obtains in England, where there is a far larger
population, some of which is transient, and where one might be approached by
people from different ethnic backgrounds. That is not a problem that we have in
Northern Ireland. Most of us would say that we know our clients and their
backgrounds and would have an idea of where their funds were coming from.
407. Mr Bailie: By "consultation" we mean consultation prior
to the framing of legislation rather than the presentation of legislation based
on certain assumptions. We do not merely mention consultation as a semantic
point, for it would allow examining assumptions made about the legal profession
in particular, and our experience of the Order's operation, as well as taking
into account that of the prosecutors. That is what has been missing from this
equation and the preparation of the legislation. That is why we specifically
request the Committee to endorse our view that the Northern Ireland Office
should now enter into full and meaningful discussions with the Law Society to
establish whether these powers are necessary and to allow us to see whether
these concerns might not be addressed in a way that is less offensive to
solicitor/client confidentiality.
408. Mr Kinney: In conclusion, perhaps I might add a further point in
response to the Assemblyman's question. The issue of people with like names is
not the only way in which confidentiality could be breached. It is foreseeable
that, on many occasions, third parties involved in dealings would also have to
be identified to fulfil obligations to the financial investigator. For example,
in a conveyancing transaction, if one party is suspected of some kind of illicit
behaviour, it is foreseeable that the police may wish to know the name of the
other party in the transaction to see if he is in any way connected. I see that
kind of information as also being a risk. People who have no connection with any
illicit affairs of any kind may clearly have their confidentiality breached.
409. The Chairperson: I do not think there are any further questions.
I should like to thank you once again for coming. Thank you for the submission
you have made. We look forward to reflecting on the written copy which you will
be leaving with us. The presentation and discussion have been very useful.
410. Mr Neill: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman and Committee members.
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