COMMITTEE ON THE Monday 7 August 2006 Members in attendance for all or part of proceedings: The Committee met at 10.02 am. (The Chairman (Mr Wells) in the Chair.) The Chairman (Mr Wells): As members will be aware, the meeting will go on until 4.00 pm. I propose that we break at 12.20 pm to enable the caterers to bring in the food; however, after a short break we will work through lunch. I hope that everyone is happy with that. I hope that you all have your diaries cleared until 4.00 pm. We should go through apologies and deputies. Mr Campbell: I am here, Chairman, but I do not know whom I am representing. Mr P Robinson: I am representing whomever Gregory is not representing. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will make Mr Campbell represent Lord Morrow; Mr Robinson will be Dr McCrea. Are you expecting Mrs Foster? Mr Campbell: Yes. Mr McFarland: I am expecting Mr McGimpsey to join me on behalf of Mr Kennedy. Mr McCarthy: I am representing David Ford. Mrs Long: I am just myself. Ms Lewsley: I am representing Mark Durkan. Mr McGlone: I am representing Alasdair McDonnell. Mr Murphy: John O’Dowd is representing Martin McGuinness; Michelle Gildernew will not be here. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We wrote to the Secretary of State about the issue of Chairmen for the Subgroup on Economic Challenges facing Northern Ireland. He has written back to confirm that Naomi Long, Jim Wilson and Alban Maginness have been added to the panel to chair the subgroup’s meetings. The subgroup has been advised of that decision. When those individuals slot in, that should free up the two existing Chairmen to chair this Committee. It has been quite an onerous task this past week or two. Mr McFarland: We have had a difficulty with Mr Wilson’s appointment. I am hopeful that he will be replaced later today, but it is difficult to get in touch with people on holiday. Dr Farren: Are you calling a press conference? Mr McFarland: No, he has other commitments. The Chairman (Mr Wells): You will have to notify the Secretary of State. It would be helpful if Mr Maginness, as the next person on the list, could chair tomorrow’s meeting, so that we are not prevented from adhering to the new schedule. It is either that or Mr Molloy and I are in the Chair every day every week, which is perhaps a bit much. The minutes of the meeting of 31 July have been tabled. I hope that members received them in reasonably good time. Does anyone have any additions or corrections to the minutes? Do members agree that they are a true and accurate record? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There is one other matter to get out of the way, simply because we do not know when this meeting will end. Members will recall that we wrote to the Secretary of State to ask him to move the first plenaries from 4 September and 5 September to 11 September and 12 September. He has written back to us, in a letter dated 3 August, stating that he is minded to agree to that. The Speaker has been informed accordingly. Therefore, both this Committee and the economic challenges subgroup appear to have a bit more time in which to deliberate. Is everyone content with the Secretary of State’s decision? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I hope that members will inform their Whips and parties that the first plenary is likely to be on 11 September. Mr Robinson had asked for a copy of a report that was prepared following meetings some months ago between Mr Hanson and the parties. The Secretary of State has referred the Committee to the list of institutional issues that we already have. Do members wish to comment on the Secretary of State’s decision? Mr P Robinson: Is the Secretary of State saying that Minister Hanson did not do any work after he spoke to the parties, or that he did work but will not show it to us? The Chairman (Mr Wells): From my reading of the letter, I think that it is the latter. It is clear that the Secretary of State is not prepared to give us anything more than the briefest outline of the issues. What do members feel about that? Mr P Robinson: It is a very poor performance by the Secretary of State. One would have thought that he would have had some desire to assist us in our work; it is regrettable that he does not. The Chairman (Mr Wells): What do other parties feel about that issue, or do they have no views on it? Dr Farren, do you have any views on that? Dr Farren: I think that it is mainly our own responsibility at this stage. I agree with the dates for the first plenaries being changed. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The Secretary of State will no doubt read this meeting’s Hansard, in which he will find Mr Robinson’s comments. Having got those preliminaries out of the way, we now move on to the substantive issue, which is the list of institutional issues that the parties agreed at the previous meeting. The up-to-date list is contained in your papers. Members were given an opportunity to point out any problems with the list and to request additions, corrections or deletions, but we have not had any comments. Therefore we will use it as the basis for this morning’s discussion. The issues to be discussed have been placed under headings and sub-headings within strands one, two and three of the Belfast Agreement, and, as no changes were received by 4 August, I consider the list to be agreed. Both Chairmen gave the commitment that any relevant issues that are raised will be discussed. Therefore, do not feel that we will prevent someone from raising a legitimate issue because it does not fit neatly under one of the headings. Are members content with the list? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will start with strand one, and “The Assembly” and the sub-heading “Accountability/Safeguards”. The items listed have been included because all parties stated that they were important issues; that is the only reason. No item has been given priority, because they are listed alphabetically, and I propose that we go through them in order. Members should feel free to speak on whatever issues they feel are important. I want to avoid a repeat of the material that was raised during the intensive question-and-answer session that we had last month. Do not regard this meeting as an opportunity for a rerun of what has already been said, because that will not achieve much. The objective of these sittings is to dig deeper and expand on what has already been said on the matters. Mr McFarland: Chairman, I understand that the list is in alphabetical order, but it would be logical to discuss the election of the First Minister (FM) and the Deputy First Minister (DFM) before discussing the approval of the First and the Deputy First Minister. It seems illogical to discuss the “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive” before there has been any discussion on their election. It would be useful if we could discuss the election before the approval. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Your point is entirely in order. The alphabetical list does not fit neatly into discussions, so I am happy to take “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister” first. Does anyone have anything to add? Mr P Robinson: If we are to discuss the issues in chronological order, “Voting system” should be taken before “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Discussions on “Voting system” followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister” would be the obvious order. Mr P Robinson: There is also an issue about the number of MLAs, but I am not sure what that would come under. The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Number of Assembly members” currently falls under the sub-heading “Efficiency/Effectiveness” in strand one. Mr McFarland: On one level, I agree with Peter Robinson that there is logic to tackling the issues chronologically. However, our deliberations will not affect the number of MLAs that there are at present before another election, whereas other issues could be agreed in the autumn, as they are practical measures that could be introduced before the Assembly fires up again. That said, if there is an election before the Assembly returns, the issue of the number of MLAs becomes more urgent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): OK. Mr P Robinson: Chairman, I assume that some of these matters will require little more than a sentence from members when they are giving their opinion, but discussion on some other areas will take longer. Mr McFarland: Some discussions might take days. Dr Farren: I get worried when members start to rearrange lists. We have set out the list alphabetically, and the way in which parties attack or speak to the issues will depend on the importance or emphasis they put on the need for change or the need to keep things as they are. The initial presentations that parties made several weeks ago were not as focused as this agenda invites members to be. Perhaps we will distil our significant points of difference from this exercise, if we do not know them already, but I cannot imagine that we will overcome those differences today. We may come to a greater understanding on parties’ differences, but we should defer the challenge of trying to overcome them for some other discussion. I suggest that we leave that as it is and let parties speak to the issues as they consider appropriate. 10.15 am The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is one view. Mr Robinson’s view is that we should go through the list in chronological order, as if we were sitting down in September 1998. Dr Farren: What is chronological? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We would start with “Voting system”, followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”, followed by “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive”, and so on. Mr McGlone: “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers” should come under that list. Mr Murphy: “Community Designation” should come before “Voting system”. The Committee could try to rearrange the list almost by working off Standing Orders. “Community Designation” should be the first item before “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers”, followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”. They all fall under one broad topic. I imagine that members will dip in and out of each item as we discuss them. The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Community Designation” should be followed by “Voting system”, followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”, followed by “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers”. In fact, the latter would come before “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”. The Speakers are more important even than the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, so that would be the third item. That would be followed by “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive”, so that would get up and running. Mr P Robinson: Yes, but would it be up and running by a voluntary coalition? The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Voluntary Coalition” would be next on the list. There is logic to going through the sequence of events that would occur if devolution were restored. I am loath simply to throw out all those topics and start a general discussion on them, because it would result in an endless series of contributions on disparate issues. Mr Campbell: Many phrases have been used to describe what we are doing — scoping, identifying, defining — Mr P Robinson: Grinding down. Mr Campbell: Apart from getting some order and logic to the way in which we address the issues, does a great deal depend on where the items appear and how we deal with them? The Chairman (Mr Wells): It would have helped the flow of the discussion, but it is clear that we will not reach agreement on it. Mr P Robinson: I have no emotional capital tied up in the order in which we address the issues, except that some items will be subject to the outcome of others. Mr McNarry: I agree. I have participated in other meetings, and it seems that, with all due respect to Seán, members go round the table — it is something that we all indulge in — and then we become confused. We need some sort of order and a strike system, because there are items that we will not spend a great deal of time on. However, there may be serious obstacles and members will probably need to refer to other parts of the list of “Institutional Issues” for further discussion. I wish that we could reach some consensus and approach things in a logical step-by-step way, as it would help me to follow things more clearly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Could we consider starting with “Community Designation”, followed by “Voting system”, followed by “Voluntary Coalition” — though it is a difficult one — followed by “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers”, followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”, followed by “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive”. Mr P Robinson: Presumably the voting system to the Assembly should come before “Community designation”. The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Voting system” means the voting system in the Assembly. Yes, “Community Designation” must come before that. The Alliance Party flagged that up as a major concern. From that point on, the order becomes not quite so difficult because the remaining issues relate to the mechanics of a working Assembly and could come anywhere on a chronological list. Dr Farren: I am happy that members go with the order that you suggest, Chairman. We will not reach agreement if we all put forward our preferred options. Mr Campbell: Seán, do you think that we will abide by any direction from the Chairman? Dr Farren: Let us see how it goes for today. Mr McNarry: Willie McCrea was not buying into that last week. Dr Farren: I will object if I do not find the Chairman’s direction appropriate. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The order is as follows: “Community Designation”; “Voting system”; “Voluntary Coalition”; “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers”, which is a most important issue; “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”; and “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive”. Every point after that concerns the workings of the Executive and Assembly. The order in which we put those points does not really matter, because they could come anywhere in the sequence. We have now agreed six topics, and I will throw the rest open to discussion. This could be our tenth consensus in a row, which would be remarkable. Dare I ask whether there is consensus? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Good, I am glad to hear it. As the Alliance Party highlighted community designation as a major issue, it is only fair to give it the opportunity to lead the discussion. Mrs Long: As community designation is almost inseparable from the voting system in the Assembly, it would be almost impossible to deal with one without the other. If members will indulge me, I will probably cross the line between the two at different points. At present, the Alliance Party probably feels the impact of community designation most acutely. However, it is conceivable that any party that chooses not to designate itself as “Unionist” or “Nationalist” in future could also experience the same discrimination that Members from my party have experienced over the term of the agreement. It is an anomaly, and recognised by the community at large, that, in a so-called cross-community vote in this Assembly, the votes of the Alliance Party are discounted, although it is the only cross-community party. That anomaly must be dealt with. One of our main concerns about community designation is that in recent correspondence from the Secretary of State and in discussions about the comprehensive agreement, reference was made to MLAs stating their community designation at the time of nomination for election, as opposed to on arrival at the Assembly after election. That would further entrench the divisions in our society rather than address them. The community-designation system was put in place in order that the voting system could function and to offer protection to minorities in the Assembly. However, the most significant minority within this Assembly is those who are neither unionist nor nationalist, and the voting system affords them no protection. The Alliance Party believes that the voting system can provide protection for minority communities and viewpoints within the Assembly without entrenching division. The voting system should deal with the deeply divided nature of Northern Ireland society and its political system. We accept that there is a need for checks and balances and that a strict 51% majority would not be acceptable, particularly on contentious issues. However, the system must be designed in such a way as not to entrench further the divisions in society. If this Assembly is about anything, it is about trying to bring the community together to work towards a single aim or purpose. The introduction of what the Alliance Party believes to be a discriminatory voting system encourages people to regress into tribal camps. Those who may wish to break through the barriers and cross those lines may feel inhibited because of the voting system. The system must also be flexible enough to accommodate demographic and political change. The current voting system is designed to protect the nationalist minority. However, it is clear that demographics, time and politics will change, and the voting system must be flexible enough to deal with such change. The Alliance Party does not want a system that would allow a minority in the Assembly to hold the entire operation of the Assembly to ransom — that was most starkly evidenced when the anti-agreement minority in unionism barred decisions that would otherwise have been carried by a majority of Members. However, that is not exclusively the case, as other Members have used the veto to their own end. The voting system must be democratic. The votes of all Members of the Assembly must count at the same level as every other Member. It is a basic right that should be reflected in the voting system. It should also be easily understood; therefore, that the way to marry all those concerns would be to remove the designation system — other than for party membership — completely and move to a weighted-majority vote system. The weight of that majority would have to be closely considered. A threshold of between 60% and 70% has been suggested. In cases in which the unionist majority was much larger and stronger, the argument of 70% was very strong. A cross-community vote could meet the 60% threshold, without having the approval of the nationalist minority. Therefore 60% is too low and 70% too high. About 67% would ensure that everyone’s votes are counted equally and would allow every Member to exercise that vote, and that no section of the Assembly, or the community that Members represent, would be excluded from any part of the voting system. In particularly sensitive votes, such as the establishment of an Executive or the election of a First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the cross-community threshold — the percentage of weighted majority — could be set higher than for other votes. It would therefore be possible to have a structure in which, if people felt that there was need for more cross-community support from Members who would have a particular responsibility, the threshold could be set slightly higher in order to ensure that those Members would feel fully included in the system. The number of MLAs has been raised and will be discussed later, but if we have 108 MLAs, the Petition of Concern should remain at the threshold of 30 Members. The Chairman (Mr Wells): You are right, Naomi. There is clear overlap between designation and the voting system, so I am happy to allow members to deal with both. I cannot see how we can deal with one and not mention the other. The Alliance Party has stated its position. Mr McFarland: Designation was brought in because the communities did not trust each other. Have we reached the stage where the communities fully trust each other and that each in turn should have a veto on what goes on? Would changing the percentage to 67% guarantee, in all scenarios, that communities could stop agreement being reached on something that they did not like? Mrs Long: The voting system should not be used by Members to bar something that they did not like: that would be like setting up a series of vetoes for parties, and it would not be a constructive way to move forward in Government. The voting system should protect the rights of minorities to express their views democratically on issues debated in the Chamber and in the Executive. That is not the issue. Building trust and confidence is not enhanced by people having to regress into tribal designations at the very outset. More confidence would be built if people had the freedom to build allegiances across the community, as opposed to along tribal divides. The Alliance Party believes that that would enhance cross-community support and would encourage people to move out of entrenched positions and build across the community. A threshold of 67% would ensure that people’s views were properly taken on board and that the issues of minorities were properly dealt with. The Assembly would need a minimum number of unionists or nationalists on board. 10.30 am You simply could not reach that degree of cross-community consent without the co-operation of unionists and nationalists. Sixty per cent would be too low because it would be feasible to reach agreement without the co-operation of nationalists. Therefore there is an issue around which weighting must be set. In order to build confidence in particular offices, for example the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, a higher threshold may be desirable. Members elected to such offices require a higher level of approval and acceptance by the whole community to facilitate them in discharging their duties. The current system may provide a veto for some parties, but it has not enhanced confidence or co-operation — we are sitting around this table during a suspension of the Assembly. The argument that a particular system will build confidence is folly, but it is possible to protect minorities and provide safeguards for them. Weighted majority, without designation, provides such safeguards and avoids further entrenching existing division. Dr Farren: We may consider what happens in other Assemblies, but our responsibility is to address the situation that faces us. The evidence is that most people in Northern Ireland regard themselves as either unionist or nationalist, and they use religious affiliation — Catholic and Protestant — as shorthand to describe their identity. Representation in the Assembly has been like that since Northern Ireland was created: it was the cause of its creation in the first place. However they may be defined and however distasteful others might find it, we have to live with those communities and seek to reconcile each to the other. A clear principle, then, underlies the adoption of designation. Mr McFarland referred to the practical point that each community has to grow and develop confidence and trust across the divide. Members recognise that there are problems with respect to designation, particularly as to the voting system to be adopted and whether designation should be used in perpetuity. Had things worked out otherwise, I would have hoped that, at this point, we might be some way towards changing the form of some of the safeguards for minorities in the Assembly, the Executive and the other institutions. However, we have not been able to achieve that, and we are faced with a task — perhaps all the greater now — of creating trust and confidence between our “communities”, as they have been traditionally described. There is a sound principle of building trust and confidence between our communities that applies not just to how we describe our affiliations but how generally we work the institutions of government. However, that is not without its problems in selecting a voting system. I note that when Naomi talked about weighted majorities, it was essentially with the intent of safeguarding either unionism or nationalism. Therefore in a sense, the same objective was underlined. Mrs Long: Seán has misunderstood my point. The Alliance Party fully recognises the need, in a divided society, to accommodate divisions. However, the party’s main aim is to protect and place on an equal footing those who choose not to be part of that divide. Dr Farren: Naomi will note that I said that I recognise that anomalies and difficulties must be addressed. Therefore the SDLP is prepared to consider voting systems that will ensure that all Members and parties in the Assembly are treated equally and fairly. All parties should set themselves that challenge when exploring alternatives to the current system. However, at this point in time and history, the basic principle of designation is necessary, so we should stick with it. I certainly hope that we can work towards something different and better in the future. The SDLP stands by the principle of designation, although it recognises its operational problems and is prepared to explore options with other parties to see if a different — and perhaps better — means of implementing the principle can be found. Mr P Robinson: The practice of community designation is a Northern Ireland attempt to meet the South African principle of sufficient consensus. Nobody has indicated that we do not want a system that ensures that any decisions taken have the support of the broad swathe of the community, and, as it is a divided community, that the decisions are broadly acceptable to those on both sides of the divide. The difficulty with the community-designation proposal is that it tends to be divisive; it sets the two communities up as two separate communities at all times. On a practical level, the Assembly voting system is fairly complex. However, I am not sure that the two proposals — weighted majority and community designation — are necessarily mutually exclusive. Two different voting mechanisms flow from the community-designation system to provide that cross-community support. It is clear that a weighted majority, if struck at the right level, will require community support as well. Why should we have alternative systems? Why not have the ability to use whichever system? Thus a proposition would be agreed if it met requirements under the community-designation mechanism or the weighted-majority mechanism. We must recognise that a section within the Assembly does not designate as either “Unionist” or “Nationalist” and that, to some extent, its vote is excluded — perhaps not excluded, but devalued. An alternative would be the weighted-majority system, which, if set at a particular level, could exclude the DUP. However, that is democracy and that is politics. If that is the direction in which the vote goes, so be it. However, it would be set at such a level that it would bring both sections of the community — although perhaps not a majority of both sections — along with it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Regarding the structure for the rest of this meeting, I will be asking the party that feels most strongly about a subject and which required it to be on the list to speak on it. Then members can question that party; when we have finished, the lead party can have its final say and perhaps make a proposal that can be put in the normal way and made subject to consensus. After Mr Murphy and Mr McNarry, we will return to Mrs Long to summarise, then we will put a proposal to the vote. Mr Murphy: The safeguard mechanisms in the agreement are complicated and the designation mechanism can be blunt. However, they are also necessary, given the experience of nationalists in institutions such as this and their ongoing experience in some councils across the North. Stringent safeguards and mechanisms to protect rights in this institution were necessary to get people to sign up to the agreement in the first place. We might wish that that were not the case, but the voting and community designation system that was designed to offset abuse or denial of rights of any sector in the Assembly reflects experience. Designation may be a blunt instrument, but Sinn Féin believes that, unfortunately, it continues to be necessary. One could be flippant and say that because the voting system works through a majority of Members, unionist and nationalist, being present and voting in the Chamber, there are not enough “Others” — if they constituted a majority on their own, they too would have a veto. However, that is the system that we must have. I recognise the difficulty that it creates for those who have not designated as “Nationalist” or “Unionist” and that they feel that their vote is devalued. However, I have not yet heard any alternative proposition, including Naomi’s, which offers the safeguards that we needed to get people to sign up to the agreement. Therefore Sinn Féin is not in favour of any change to the system. Nevertheless, Sinn Féin is willing to discuss the issue. The Alliance Party put this forward in the review of the Good Friday Agreement that took place some years ago, and there was lengthy discussion on it. Parties were willing to explore the Alliance Party’s alternatives with it. Thus far, however, I have not heard an alternative that provides the requisite safeguards; therefore the present ones cannot be abandoned yet. We are moving on to issues such as voluntary coalitions, but we must recognise that one person’s voluntary coalition is another person’s exclusion. I accept the bluntness of the designation mechanism and the difficulty that it poses for “Others”, and we will continue to discuss alternatives to it. However, only the current safeguards protect the guarantees of the Good Friday Agreement. Mr McNarry: Provided that we are still here and working, there are unlikely to be any consequential challenges to an Assembly on the constitutional position for the foreseeable future. Unionists have worries about what might happen if there were no Assembly. The Assembly that we would like to talk about is one that delivers devolved rule in both legislative and administrative forms. 10.45 am Does Naomi think that there is there any difference between voting on legislative matters and voting on administrative matters? Would both matters need to carry the 67% to which she has referred? The utopian position would be that we had matured sufficiently — my colleague Alan McFarland mentioned this issue — for there to be a simple-majority vote on most issues. If we are to reduce the level of difference, will Naomi consider whether the Assembly could have a simple-majority vote on this issue and let us get on with it? The Chairman (Mr Wells): I will ask Peter to come in briefly, after which, Naomi can sum up her case. We will then proceed to a proposal. Mr P Robinson: I had assumed that, whether we were discussing community-designation voting or weighted majorities, they were introduced only when required by a petition of concern or a statutory obligation. All other votes would be by simple majority. Mr Murphy referred to his experience of abuses of the system. I too have some experience of abuses of the system, when designations were changed fraudulently. A particular Assembly vote could not be carried unless there was a fraudulent change. Does Naomi agree that that type of abuse does nothing to commend the system? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Naomi, I suppose your defence is that you were not an MLA at that time. Mrs Long: I do not wish to distance myself, in any way, from decisions that my colleagues have taken. I do not wish to duck the issue, and I will return to it. A couple of issues have been raised. Seán said that the SDLP would be willing to re-examine the voting system; that is important. However, he also said that most people are happy to use the shorthand of “Unionist” and “Nationalist” to describe their position in society or the group to which they belong. Most people may be happy, but a recent Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey concluded that up to 14% of people are not happy with those designations. When people refuse to state a designation, civil servants spend much time examining the religion of people’s referees, the sports that people played at school and, indeed, the schools that they attended to try to force people into community boxes when, clearly, those people are not happy to designate themselves. The fact that, by your standards, a minority is a small minority does not lift our responsibility, as elected representatives, to treat those people with equality. The suggestion is that, because most people are happy with the system, the minority who are not happy should accept the inequality. Dr Farren: I do not think that I used a word such as “happy”. It would not occur to me to use that word to describe people’s feelings about our society. The SDLP wants to ensure that parties do not feel excluded and that no attempt is being made to devalue their vote. In the framework laid down by designation, the SDLP is willing to explore ways whereby anomalies could be addressed. It will not be easy to arrive at a satisfactory situation, but we should try to take that small step forward. Community designation is a reflection of, if not the entire reality, a considerable reality. It is the reality on which a large majority of people are represented in the Assembly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mrs Long, before you conclude, it would be useful if you were to deal with the issue that Mr Robinson raised about there being three options: a simple majority, a weighted majority, and — Mrs Long: I intend to do that. I am attempting to deal with the issues in the order in which they were raised. I shall not argue about whether the word “happy” was used. I wrote down that word, and Hansard will reflect whether I incorrectly transcribed it. From our perspective, just because equal voting rights are afforded to those who designate as “Other” in the Chamber, that in no way diminishes the rights that other parties around the table currently enjoy. That is the point that the Alliance Party is trying to make. We understand the current realities of our society; we acutely understand the divisions that exist and the protections that communities wish to have. However, we are not dealing only with the current reality but — we hope — a changing reality, in which people increasingly wish to move away from old divides and form new allegiances with one another in order to move society forward. We must have a voting system that can accommodate that change if we are to encourage such change in wider society. I do not believe that anyone at this table believes that it would make one less of a unionist or a nationalist if one did not have to write that in a book in the Chamber when one signs the Roll of Membership. This is not a matter of attempting to diminish anyone’s position, but simply of affording equality of representation to everyone around the table. Peter Robinson raised the idea of a weighted-majority vote being run in parallel with the designation system. We have a fundamental objection to the designation system, but if weighted-majority voting were introduced in tandem with it, that would at least be a step forward, and it would represent progress. Although that would not be our mechanism of choice, it would be preferable to not addressing the issue at all. We accept that safeguards are necessary, and I entirely accept what Conor Murphy said about the necessity of safeguards in order to get certain parts of our community to buy into the agreement. Our argument is not with safeguards but with their current form, which we believe discriminates against our Members. This is not simply a question of the number of Members that we have, because I accept that, as a party, we can cast only six votes. I do not object to that but to the fact that those votes do not carry the same weight in the Chamber as six Sinn Féin votes or six DUP votes. That is the issue at stake, not the number of seats that our party holds, which is a matter for the electorate and for our party to address. When we were discussing that matter, Conor said that the denial of rights of any member of this society would not be acceptable. Surely it can be no more acceptable to Sinn Féin that my rights or Kieran’s rights or any of our colleagues’ rights in the Chamber are in any way more diminished than anyone else’s. That is the point that we are making. We are not arguing that there should be no safeguards but that those safeguards should be designed to protect my rights every bit as much as other MLAs’ rights. That is a fairly simple point. David McNarry mentioned the difference between legislative and administrative functions. The current position is that, unless there is a petition of concern, a simple-majority vote carries. That should continue to be the case. It is certainly our wish that there should be fewer petitions of concern, because, as business becomes more normalised in our society, they should be less necessary. However, when a petition of concern is laid, there is an opportunity for a weighted-majority vote to ensure cross-community support for whatever measures are under discussion. As I have already outlined, that weighted majority does not need to be a consistent majority for all types of votes. The particular weights that would apply to particular types of votes — whether they be administrative or legislative, or, indeed, the election of an Executive and a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister — should be set out in the structures beforehand. It is clear that there is no consensus around the table. Therefore my proposal only exposes that lack of consensus; it does not move the process forward. However, we certainly wish to see the issue of designations and the voting system dealt with in a way that would bring about weighted-majority voting on those matters that require a petition of concern. We propose that the Committee move to that now. However, we are open to the discussions, to which Seán Farren and Peter Robinson referred, about how it could be introduced as one of several Assembly voting mechanisms. We are happy to engage in those discussions with other parties in order to further that objective. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is that a formal proposal? Mrs Long: It is a formal proposal that we change the voting system in the Assembly to weighted majority and that the weighting should be set by further discussion. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Would that replace the present system? Mrs Long: Yes. Mr McFarland: Chairman, we are discussing “Community designation”; we have not reached “Voting system”. Are you taking the two together? I am happy to do so if you are. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I think that we have to, because I cannot see anything new arising when we move on to discuss “Voting system”; we will get exactly the same arguments. There is nothing there that is not relevant to “Community designation”. Mr McFarland: Are we dealing with the topics and ticking them off one by one? Is there consensus to change community designation? My sense is that there probably is not. The question then is: is there consensus that we look at the voting system? You may get consensus if parties are happy to re-examine whether we have weighted majority, etc. Mrs Long: The issue of designation is not simply about people stating whether they are “Nationalist” or “Unionist”; most of us can work that out before people sign a book. The issue is that the voting system should work. The two things are intimately entwined and cannot be separated. That is why I raised the issue of the voting system along with designations, which exist to facilitate the voting system. It would be a pointless exercise unless the voting system actually used the designations. Mr P Robinson: At our last meeting, there was a vision that we kept in mind, which was whether the issues that we were discussing were of such enormity that they were an obstacle to our agreeing to devolution. Is this issue such an obstacle that Naomi would not agree to devolution taking place if it were not changed? Mrs Long: None of the Alliance Party’s proposals is a precondition for devolution; we are making proposals on the basis that I described last week. There will be issues that some parties feel are a precondition; we do not have such issues at this time. Mr P Robinson: Therefore it is not an obstacle to devolution. Mrs Long: No. However, if devolution were restored, it would be an obstacle to good governance and to the stability of the Assembly. Given recent instability and the frustration of the community at our inability to stabilise the institutions, we believe that these are valid issues to raise. Mr Campbell: Chairman, before we take the proposal from Naomi, I want to try to get my head round this. At the end of the series of issues that we have identified, will we have proposals on which there is consensus? What, in effect, will that mean? If we have two or three issues on which there is consensus — “Community designation” and “Voting system”, for example — and a series of other matters on which there is no consensus, what will we have at the end of our discussions? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will have a report that will go before the Assembly on 11 September, where it will be noted that the Committee reached agreement on some issues and not on others. Mr P Robinson: Then there might be a need for more than one proposal. Naomi could propose that community designation be scrapped in favour of weighted majority. Mrs Long: Which I have done. Mr P Robinson: Equally, I could propose that I am content with weighted majority as an additional voting mechanism. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I would be happy to take that proposal. As I said, we are not excluding anything. The discussion is structured this way to give it flow, and that has worked quite well. We can take a vote if any member wishes to do so; if we do not get consensus, I am willing to take another proposal. 11.00 am Mr McFarland: I was very interested in what Peter said at the previous meeting. When our report goes to the Assembly, it could help the parties, when we hold negotiations in the autumn, if we identify the areas that are unlikely to be neuralgic and the areas on which some negotiation will be needed. It will clear the decks and distinguish between the clutter and the serious aspects, and that will be quite useful. It will assess what is a major problem and what is unlikely to be a major problem. Ms Lewsley: I would like some clarification. I assume that Naomi is proposing that we scrap community designations and go for weighted majority. Is she asking us to return to the Chamber and sign the Roll without designating? Moreover, is Peter Robinson suggesting that we keep community designations but introduce weighted majority, so that we would have both simultaneously? My worry is what the consequences will be if we get the community designations but do not get weighted majority, or vice versa. Mr P Robinson: First, I am content with the Alliance proposal. A weighted majority is a much more understandable system. It is a system that operates in other parts of the world for key votes. For many reasons, it is a more sound system. I made the other proposition because I thought that it was more likely to get a wider degree of support from other parties. However, there would be no difficulty operating it. The Speaker would simply hold a vote. The Speaker could determine from the Members who had voted whether by way of one or both mechanisms the proposition had passed. It is as simple as that. It is a mathematical, computer exercise, which would take no more time than the present arrangements. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We could go down the route of having three proposals: one from Alliance to remove the designation system completely; one to move to a weighted-majority vote; and the third to have the option of any one of three voting systems. Mrs Long: Mr Chairman, we could not divorce the first proposal from the second. Unless designations are removed and weighted-majority voting introduced, the current voting system will not work. For example, if, by some miracle, the first proposal were agreed and the second were not, the Assembly voting system would be in chaos, because the designations are necessary to operate the system as it is. Our argument is that we should introduce weighted-majority voting, which does not require community designations. That is our principal proposal. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I detect that there is some opposition to that. Mrs Long: I detect that also, but it still remains our position. Mr P Robinson: I want to comment on one or two other issues under the joint heading that we now have. In her presentation, Naomi referred to the time when it is necessary for elected representatives to designate. The argument that it should be done at election time seems to me to be altogether reasonable. If candidates are to take a major decision on what designation will apply to them for all Assembly votes, it might be a tad unreasonable for the community not to be aware of it. Designations should be part of the nominating process, so that people know exactly for whom they are voting. It would also stop abuse of the system whereby people designate as one thing on one day only to change their designations on the next. That is not something that many of us would do, but some Members were prepared to do it before. The public would then have a mandate to vote on that designation as well. Other issues arise out of the voting system. Although we have a separate heading for it, one issue would be the petition of concern, which is an integral part of the voting system. We start blending together the various headings on the list. It is a central part of the voting system; indeed, it is an essential part in a community designation or weighted majority system. I presume that there is support for the general principle of a petition of concern. It was referred to, but nobody else mentioned it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Naomi said that she was happy with the rule that 30 Members’ names would be required to trigger a petition of concern. Mrs Long: That is on the assumption of an Assembly of 108 Members. Mr P Robinson: On the assumption that my party continues to have no less than 32 Members, 30 Members seems reasonable. Mr McNarry: Some big assumptions are being made here. Mrs Long: A point was raised about whether candidates should designate when they are nominated for election. That simply further entrenches division. People are aware of the politics of the candidates for whom they vote; therefore the idea that candidates should have to designate before they stand for election is nonsense. Indeed, the names of at least three parties at this table already give an indication of whether they vote “Unionist” or “Nationalist”. Given that some members of Peter Robinson’s party went to the electorate under a different party designation but have changed party since the election, it seems ironic that the DUP would press for candidates to declare their stance in advance of an election. I would defend the right of a Member to change parties; I would also defend the right of Members to change designation, if they wished. However, it is not something that my party intends to do in any future Assembly session. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Can we move to the proposals made by Mrs Long and Mr Robinson? I definitely sensed a hint of dissention in the Committee on some of those issues. Mr P Robinson: What finely tuned antennae you have. [Laughter.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): We may not get consensus on the proposals anyhow. First, Mrs Long’s proposal was to move to a weighted majority system and remove the present community designation system. We will vote on that. Does everyone support that? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I see that there is no consensus on that. Mr P Robinson: Do you want to quantify the dissention? Mr Murphy: My earlier remarks made it clear that Sinn Féin was willing to discuss this issue, as we did at length during the review of the Good Friday Agreement when the Alliance Party put forward various propositions. We are happy to discuss this further, following the reinstatement of the institutions, but I do not support a change to the community designation system at this time. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Not that it is needed, but can parties outline their position on this proposal? Mr McFarland: In previous meetings Mr McCrea got slightly fraught that dissention was recorded. However, if there was not consensus, there was not consensus. In fact, most decisions were four votes to one. Mr McCrea quietly objected to votes being recorded. The agreement was that, where there was not consensus from any one party, the proposal fell. We did not vote on whether there was consensus. I do not mind what we do. The Chairman (Mr Wells): If a party wishes to record its view, it should be allowed to do so. Does any party wish to record its view on Mrs Long’s proposal formally? Mr P Robinson: We consider that we have done so. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It will be apparent from the text of the Hansard report. Mr Robinson’s proposal was to keep the present community designation and use a weighted majority and the current cross-community voting system. Does anyone have views for or against that? Mrs Long: Given that our proposal was unsuccessful, we see Mr Robinson’s proposal as a step forward — albeit a small one — from our perspective. Therefore we welcome the proposal. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Any views against? Mr Murphy: The proposal may need further explanation. Under the current arrangement in the Good Friday Agreement, there are the cross-community consensus and the weighted majority systems. Perhaps there is some difference between Peter Robinson’s proposal and the current arrangements. I am not quite so sure. There are two possible voting mechanisms. One would require a simple majority from the “Nationalists”, “Unionists” and “Others” present at the vote; the other would follow the weighted-majority system for which, to achieve an “Aye” vote, 60% of members must vote in favour of the motion, and, of that 60%, at least 40% of “Nationalists” and 40% of “Unionists” must vote in favour of the motion. Is the suggestion that the designation requirement be scrapped completely, leaving a simple weighted majority, without any reference to the 40%? I would like to be clear that that is the proposition. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is worth reminding members of the four statutory votes that currently require the cross-community voting system to be triggered. They are the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister; the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speakers; the vote on the Budget; and a vote when a petition of concern, which must be signed by 30 Members, has been lodged. Mr P Robinson: Our suggestion is for a weighted majority, without reference to designations, but set at a level that would require cross-community support. Mr McFarland: It is worth separating the four statutory votes, because the vote for the First Minister and Deputy First Minister requires a 50:50 outcome, while the other three votes need a 60:40:40 outcome. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is right. They are different votes, but they still require a mechanism to reflect cross-community support. Mr McFarland: Yes. Mr Murphy: This proposition is to do away with the 40:40 element. The weighted majority in that system is 60%. There is no proposition as to what the weighted majority would be in a new system. Mr P Robinson: We have suggested 70%. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Naomi suggested 67%. Mrs Long: We determined 67% as the level at which cross-community support would be required. It would achieve cross-community support; 67% could not be achieved without cross-community support. Mr McFarland: Would that change if the unionist/nationalist weighting of the Assembly were to change? I presume that the level at which cross-community support would be achieved would fluctuate and would, therefore, have to be changed for each Assembly. It might need to be changed repeatedly, whereas, regardless of the number of “Unionists”, “Nationalists” or “Others” in the Assembly, the current system is easily understandable. Logically, if a percentage that would guarantee cross-community support were adopted, each Assembly would have to reassess the necessary level. Mrs Long: Yes. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Such a decision would probably require legislation, or at least a change to Standing Orders. Dr Farren: There should be a mechanism that applies in almost every circumstance. Mr P Robinson: The requirement for 70% would do that. Dr Farren: I am happy to explore the issue in a little bit more detail than it might be possible to do so at the moment. I would not be unhappy if members decided to consider the situation in the context of the review. I am easy enough with either doing that in the next few weeks or after the report has been presented to the Assembly. However, the issue needs further exploration. The exploration should be based on the principle that I outlined earlier and on the recognition that there are anomalies and some inequities in the present voting mechanisms that leave parties unhappy and, in a sense, that devalue their votes. To address that, we should commit ourselves to overcoming those difficulties. However, at present, I do not approve of, or support, any of the changes that have been suggested in Committee. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Robinson’s proposal has not achieved consensus. However, perhaps it was a bit stark. Can members agree on the suggestion that further consideration be given to a change to the Assembly’s voting system? I think that it was a Sinn Féin proposal. The Committee Clerk: It was Seán Farren’s. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am sorry. I noted it as a proposal made by “SF”. Mr Murphy: You need to change your designation. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Could everyone sign up to the proposal that further consideration be given to a change to the Assembly voting system? Dr Farren: I am not necessarily committing myself to change. It may be that we have to live with what we have. I am certainly open to exploring the voting systems in order to remove anomalies, but I cannot make an a priori commitment to change. 11.15 am Mr McFarland: The various scenarios have implications for parties: if the Assembly were to be reduced to 90 Members, or to 72 Members, or if the balance between the communities changed. It might be worth parties having a think. We could revisit it in our discussions when we have had more time to study possible outcomes. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The way to square that circle is for the parties to give further consideration to the Assembly voting system. Mr McFarland: Do we lodge that as part of the report and revisit it after examination or do we leave consideration until the autumn? How do we leave it? What goes into the report — is it that the parties are considering the matter or that we will revisit it to come to a decision? Mr P Robinson: There is another alternative. In the two Governments’ proposals for a comprehensive agreement, it was proposed that there be a standing institutional review Committee. The matter could be referred to such a Committee — as might several others. Mr McFarland: As we said at the beginning of our discussions, it would be beneficial to sort out the issues that need to be sorted before the Assembly fires up again. Clearly, some issues cannot be sorted out, and they may have to go to a review Committee. However, if there are issues that can be sorted out in time for restoration — and if there are more effective and efficient ways of operating — it would be worth trying to get them into action. Mr Campbell: I took it that the proposal amounted to further consideration of possible changes to the voting system in the Assembly. Is anyone saying that there is not consensus on that? The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is a fairly mild proposal. Mr Campbell: I cannot think of a more vague, indefinite proposal. Mr P Robinson: Does anyone refuse to consider this any further? Dr Farren: I am not saying that. Mr Murphy: Is it also clear that, given the suggestion of a formal mechanism for considering this and other issues after the restoration of the institutions, that this is not considered a blockage to the return of devolution? Mrs Long: I have already set out our position with regard to this being a blockage. Mr Murphy: You have made your case clear. However, should there be consensus to revisit the issue, it might be helpful if there were also consensus that we do not consider it an issue that blocks the return of devolution. Mr P Robinson: It might also be helpful to the Alliance Party if everyone were to say that this matter could be considered by a review Committee. Dr Farren: Including the words “should be considered” would make it a little stronger. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is that the way forward? Does anyone have any problems with that suggestion? Mr McFarland: What if it were possible to get changes to the Assembly’s voting system decided before the Assembly fires up again so that it could tackle proposals that would make it more efficient and effective straightaway? The issues were identified in the last Assembly, and we examined them in some detail in the review in 2002. We did not take a decision at that stage, but parties were aware that there might be better ways of doing things. Will it be possible to get a decision on change — if change is the parties’ wish — before the Assembly fires up again? It would make sense to do that, rather than leave a whole swathe of issues to bubble up in the middle of the next Assembly — if there is a next Assembly — because we were still reviewing matters. Some issues will have to be left to a Committee such as Peter suggests. Is this one? Can we deal with it so that it comes into effect when the Assembly fires up again? The Chairman (Mr Wells): There are two suggestions. We can consider the voting system in more detail later in our deliberations; or we can refer it to a review Committee. At this rate we will still be discussing the matter at Christmas. Mr Campbell: Which Christmas? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Exactly. We have spent 45 minutes getting to point 2. We need a quick decision. Mr Murphy: The best-case scenario is that there are issues that we can identify that we can agree on and get out of the way. There are other issues that need further work, but we can agree that they are not a blockage to devolution and, therefore, we do not expect them to be raised in the autumn as issues that have to be sorted out before we can get the Assembly functioning again. Then there are those issues that people want resolved before the Assembly can function again. Whatever the chosen mechanism — an institutional review Committee or something else — this issue could be resolved in an agreed format by the Assembly following restoration of devolution, if it is not possible to resolve it now. Equally, it is not a blockage to the return of devolution. It can be referred to whatever mechanism is agreed for resolving this and any other issues that we decide need to be resolved when devolution returns. Mrs Long: The Alliance Party is not saying that this is a barrier to devolution, but it is a destabilising influence on the Assembly. That must be borne in mind. The fact that we are not placing roadblocks in the way of devolution does not mean that we give this any less weight than those who do attach roadblock status to their issues. It needs to be addressed if the Assembly is to be stabilised. It would be preferable if it could be addressed before devolution, as Mr McFarland suggests. If it cannot, devolution can still occur, but the Assembly will not function efficiently. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I will have to call this section of the discussion to a halt. I will put two proposals — Mr P Robinson: Chairman, may I say one thing, because there is a distinction to be made. It would not be unhealthy for the Assembly, on a continuing basis, to look at improving the way it does business. One of the problems with the Belfast Agreement was that everything was permitted to run along and then suddenly there was a review every four years, or whatever it happened to be. It is better to have a review as part of an ongoing process, rather than happening every four years or after a fixed period. Therefore, there is a need for a standing Committee to look at those issues. If consensus is not reached today, I do not think that it will be reached between now and the restoration of devolution. It is better to identify issues that can be the business of such a standing Committee, rather than pretend to ourselves that we will return to them when everyone knows that we will not. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That leads on neatly to Dr Farren’s proposal that further consideration be given by this Committee to the Assembly voting system, and Mr Robinson’s proposal that voting systems should be referred to a review Committee. Dr Farren: I do not want to prolong this discussion, but are the proposals mutually exclusive? If the Committee has the time and the will to do so, there is no reason why we cannot come back to the matter, and if it is not resolved at that point it can be referred to the type of Committee that Peter suggests. Rather than create division, could not the two proposals be melded together? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are members content that further consideration be given to the Assembly voting system by this Committee and, if consensus is not reached, that the matter should be referred to a review Committee of the Assembly? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Having effectively parked that issue, we move on to “Voluntary Coalition”. This featured prominently in the evidence given by the DUP in the question-and-answer session in June, as well as more recently when we were discussing the headings for today’s deliberations. I will ask Mr Robinson or Mr Campbell to speak to this issue, and then we will go round the parties as usual. Mr P Robinson: The best kind of Government is one into which all the participants have freely entered because they recognise that those whom they are partnering in Government share basic principles and, therefore, have chosen to work together. It is the system that works in virtually every democratic country in the world; where one party cannot secure sufficient support to be in Government, it seeks a partner. It is a system known to us all. It operates on democratic norms without mandatory requirements and will provide the best form of Government. In Northern Ireland there will, of necessity, be some stipulations, and that is why the weighted-majority issue has been a requirement. However, whether you have a weighted majority or community designations, a voluntary coalition would be unable to get up and running unless it received wide support. Clearly, it would be a voluntary coalition that would have a cross-community ingredient. If the system of voting is satisfactory, why should it be mandatory? If a voluntary coalition can get the degree of support that the voting system requires, let us remove the mandatory requirement. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are there any views on that proposal? Mrs Long: The Alliance Party also raised the issue of voluntary coalition in ‘Agenda for Democracy’. We raised it for the reasons that Peter Robinson has outlined — it provides for stable governance and provides direction to Government. For Government and the Executive, in particular, to function well, there must be a collective view about the future of the Executive. Leaving aside the unionist/nationalist divide, there are other divides in our society. For example, it is hard to imagine how conservative, socialist and liberal perspectives could be melded together inside one Executive on all occasions. There is also an inability to negotiate priorities in the same way as there would be in setting up a voluntary coalition in other societies, because the coalition is mandatory and, therefore, people’s participation in it is not based on whether they are content with programmes for Government. It is actually done in reverse, and we do not believe that that gives stable guidance. This impacts on other issues. The Assembly was set up so that everyone could participate in Government. In a healthy society, it is not Government that everyone should participate in, but governance. It is possible to be part of the governance of a country without being in Government. That distinction is unclear in our current structures. Strong opposition is key to good Government. The current mandatory coalition system does not provide for larger parties to be represented in opposition. In the current Assembly, a maximum of nine Members do not belong to parties that would be in Government. That does not lead to a healthy opposition, notwithstanding that, as one of those parties, Alliance has challenged on the basis of good opposition. There is a role for strong opposition. The corollary of having no opposition is that there is little opportunity for the public to change the Government. They can change the internal make-up and complexion of it, in terms of the numbers of seats apportioned to different members of the Executive, but under the current arrangements for mandatory coalition it would be very difficult to have a wholesale change of Government. That could permit stagnation and many other things to creep into Government that would not happen in a voluntary coalition, where there would be negotiated outcomes. A voluntary coalition allows for good government and strong accountability mechanisms for the public, and it ensures that, ultimately, people have the sanction to change the Government. 11.30 am Mr McFarland: By way of a philosophical question, suppose that, by the autumn, Sinn Féin has passed all the tests that it has been set and that the DUP considers it to be fit for government — Mr Murphy: And is considered fit for government by the UUP too. Mr McFarland: If we got to the stage at which Sinn Féin is acceptable to everyone, would Peter and the DUP be comfortable with Sinn Féin, the Alliance Party, the SDLP and the UUP forming a voluntary coalition that left the DUP out of government? I wonder whether it is acceptable to the DUP that the major party in unionism would be excluded from government. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Would Mr Robinson like to answer that? Mr P Robinson: I thought that I had answered the question before it was asked. During the discussion on weighted majorities, I pointed out that a voluntary coalition could lead to the Democratic Unionist Party not being in government. That is a fact of life. If the other unionist party wanted to run with the nationalists rather than with its partner in unionism, that would be an obvious outcome. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are we reaching consensus on a voluntary coalition? I have not heard any opposition. Dr Farren: I indicated my opposition to the idea few minutes ago. As with the previous issue, it is a question of where we would like to be and from where we start in order to get there. Whatever the parties’ views on the Good Friday Agreement, I like to think that we all subscribe to the aspiration of creating a society that is “peaceful”, “exclusively democratic” and in which the question of greater understanding, respect and reconciliation between our communities is being addressed. Given the clear and prolonged absence of consensus on the structures of government, we have an overriding responsibility, as political representatives, to ensure that we achieve as much consensus as possible on the new structures. At the end of the day, that is a matter for political judgement. In the initial stages, a clear degree of support for, and participation in, the institutions is required. The level of participation must reassure all sides of the community that they are represented at the highest levels of decision-making and, therefore, that respect for their identities and aspirations is being fully upheld. The whole notion of the inclusivity of the Executive flows from that type of thinking. We do not necessarily have to see ourselves wedded to that for for ever and a day, but the experience of our recent and not-so-recent history indicates the need for a high level of participation in decision-making by representatives from all sides. The inclusive formation of an Executive is not quite as mandatory as people tend to represent it: it is represented negatively rather than positively. Parties have the option of not participating. However, the option is there for the parties that qualify on the basis of their mandate to participate and lend support to building consensus. That is essential in the initial phase, which will be as long or as short as we make it. The greater the degree of consensus, the more fluidity that can be achieved in our political system, and the more rapidly people want to move to different ways of structuring our political system, the better. With respect to the loss of opposition in the Assembly that an inclusive Executive would seem to suggest, a strong Committee system would be the location for much of the challenge that opposition can provide. People should remember that we are not a sovereign territory; we do not have the same responsibilities or degrees of discretion with respect to a whole range of matters that sovereign parliaments have. The consensus that is needed here overrides the issues related to left/right politics that apply in other situations. The inclusivity principle is essential to the successful working of the Assembly and other institutions because of the nature of our society and the consensus required for those institutions. Mr Murphy: As with the community-designation system, the safeguards around the ability to participate in Government according to mandate were a necessary part of the agreement. We are not operating under democratic norms in this state, and never have. Therefore safeguards and mechanisms that allow people to participate as of right in the institutions and the Executive are necessary to get past that experience. The right to participate in Government has the potential to form an inclusive Executive that, ultimately, with people working together on issues — and having to work together in order to make it work — leads in the longer term to better working relationships and ways of addressing issues such as reconciliation, trust, confidence, and other issues that people currently find to be blockages to the return of the institutions. Ironically, the next item on the agenda is the election of the First and Deputy First Ministers. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Correction: it is the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker — a much more important issue. Mr Murphy: I suppose that that should have come before “Voluntary Coalition”. Unless the voting system is changed, the First and Deputy First Ministers require 50% of nationalist votes and 50% of unionist votes, so the only people that would potentially be excluded under a voluntary coalition mechanism would be the smaller parties on each side of the community designation. The votes of the larger parties would be required to elect the First and Deputy First Ministers. Sinn Féin has never been in favour of excluding parties. Whether we like what parties stand for or not, we have always argued that in the system that we have under the Good Friday Agreement it is their democratic mandate that entitles them to be part of the Government — or not, as the case may be. We stand by that. We are not in favour of exclusion at local government level, or any other level. We contend that a party’s right to be part of Government, according to its mandate, is a central issue for this institution and for the Good Friday Agreement as a whole. It should be adhered to. Mr McNarry: We should establish that the principle of voluntary coalition should not be an impediment to good government. Many unionists, myself included, are sceptical of an imposed mandatory Government or an agreed voluntary coalition that includes those who have not yet convinced us of their commitment to good government. I wonder whether that brings us to the role of a formal opposition. A significant party may opt for voluntary exclusion. One of the matters that is not covered here is whether a party excluding itself, and playing the role of the official party of opposition, would be formally recognised as such. I do not suggest that such a role would be totally similar to that played by Her Majesty’s Opposition. Colleagues may have a view on that or wish to consider it either now or later. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there any reaction to that? Mr P Robinson: Dr Farren and Mr McNarry have both misunderstood. This is a mandatory coalition. Neither Sinn Féin nor the DUP can choose to be in opposition. If they so chose, there would be gridlock. Both would have a veto under the voting mechanisms that we have talked about. It is not a matter of choosing to be in opposition. It is a requirement to be in government. It is a mandatory system. That answers Mr McNarry’s point. Mr McNarry: That applies only where a party finds itself in the position currently occupied by Sinn Féin or the DUP. Mr P Robinson: Yes. Mr McNarry: It does not apply to a party such as my own. Mr P Robinson: And? Mr McNarry: There is no formal provision for such a party to exclude itself from Executive positions. Mr P Robinson: There is. You do not nominate anyone. Mr McNarry: I accept that. I do not want to get into technicalities. There would then be no formal recognition that an opposition could be posted in the Assembly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Any other views on that? Again, I detect opposition to this proposal. All the parties have stated their positions, which are in Hansard. Dr Farren: What is the proposal? The Chairman (Mr Wells): The proposal is that the Executive should be formed by voluntary coalition. That is Mr Robinson’s view, and it is supported by Mrs Long. Mrs Long: Mr Murphy referred to voluntary coalition as a mechanism for the exclusion of parties. The Alliance Party has never viewed it in that way. It has always been viewed in the context of inclusive governance, where parties actively participate in governance through the mechanism of opposition. That is a role that the Alliance Party does not diminish in any way, as it is a role that my party has fulfilled. It is an important role in government. It has never been about including or excluding any specific party. That is not where we are coming from. It is a suggested way to have stability and good governance. Mr P Robinson: It also comes from a peculiar view of democracy. There seems to be a view that a vote at an election entitles one to a share in government. That flows from what Dr Farren said. One can support institutions without being in government. I support the institution at Westminster, but I am not in the Government. One does not have to be in government to support the institutions; therefore inclusive government is not a requirement. It is the politicians whom people most trust who form a government, and they are required to meet a certain standard — the rest are in opposition. That is the best way of keeping government on its toes. It allows continual scrutiny of what government is doing and continuing examination and questioning of what Ministers are up to. That is the stuff of democracy, and it is a most certain way of ensuring that there is no abuse in the system. 11.45 am Mr Chairman, you look as if you are dying to say something. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am. The Committee has received an encyclical from Hansard. Once again, somebody in this room has kept their mobile phone on, and it is causing problems with the recording system. We recently lost a complete section of the Hansard report because somebody had left their phone on. Please turn them off completely; they cannot even be left on silent mode to receive messages. We just cannot afford to lose this important material. I am sorry, Mr Robinson, for interrupting you. Mr P Robinson: I am not guilty on that score; I turn my phone off. I would not like anybody to miss my comments in the Hansard report, so I hope that whoever has left their phone on will turn it off now rather than wait until I have finished. Collective responsibility is also one of the imperatives of government. It is nonsense for one Government Minister to oppose what another Government Minister has brought before the Assembly. That is absurd, and it would not happen under a voluntary coalition. A Minister who moved away from the collective decision of the Executive would be fired. We must also look beyond the immediate. The best that can be said of the arguments that have been presented against a voluntary coalition is that some special, peculiar and immediate need must be addressed because we are a divided society, full of instability and distrust. The argument is that that necessitates an inclusive and mandatory form of government. If that is accepted, the next question is bound to be: will that be the position for ever? A voluntary coalition, however, allows a cross-community system, and it allows us to grow into the norms of democracy and to establish a normal democratic society in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, if we become entrenched in a mandatory system, moving to the next stage means stopping, wrecking what we have, and creating something else. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I will ask Gregory Campbell to speak, followed by Alan McFarland. Rather than simply go round and round, I will then see whether the Committee can reach consensus. Mr Campbell: I will be brief, Chairman. The concept of voluntary coalition, like many concepts in Northern Ireland, suffers as a result of being viewed in completely different ways by those who are either in favour of it — as the DUP is — or those who totally oppose it. The purpose of a voluntary coalition is to ensure that there is not an implacable veto on establishing a government. The DUP believes that the formation of a government should not be prevented because one party is inextricably linked to criminality, gangsterism, terror, the importation of guns, and punishment beatings. Government should not be held up because of that, irrespective of the size of the mandate of those who advocate that type of activity, and, in some cases, take part in it. That is how the DUP views voluntary coalition. Others claim that a voluntary coalition will circumvent the need for support across the community — which is why we had a discussion about the voting system and community designation. Peter outlined the issues regarding mandatory coalition. We must grasp the nettle and establish a system that allows government to function. Just as others have talked of their background and their history of resentment about how institutions were governed in the past, some of us remember how systems were run in the more recent past. We want to arrive at some form of voluntary coalition — some system of government — that is not held, almost literally, to ransom by one party that will not budge and that says that there will be no Government without its endorsement. We need a device to ensure that if the operation and interaction of one party is unacceptable, the system of government can nevertheless get up and running and will not grind to a complete halt due to the position that that party adopts. Mr McFarland: In a normal society, Governments operate by voluntary coalition. If a party can form a government, it does so; if it cannot, it joins with others to form it. However, the Belfast Agreement is, rightly or wrongly, the template that we are discussing. The Prime Minister said so, so we are discussing how we can modify and improve it. The Belfast Agreement does not cite a voluntary coalition but a mandatory coalition. Earlier, the Committee heard from the SDLP, which made it quite clear — [Interruption.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do you wish to take a point of information? Mr McFarland: Yes. Mr P Robinson: For goodness’ sake, that is a crazy argument. Is Alan saying that we should not consider the Belfast Agreement because it does not mention a voluntary coalition? The Belfast Agreement does not and will not include any of the other changes that we want either. Is he saying that we should not look at making changes because they are not in the Belfast Agreement? Mr McFarland: No. As Peter said earlier, we are here to modify and improve the Belfast Agreement. Mr P Robinson: I do not think that I said that. Mr McFarland: The SDLP made it clear earlier in Committee that it is not prepared to enter into a voluntary coalition. It is an aspiration for us all for when society here allows everyone to be comfortable with discussing their politics and trying to form a Government with those of a like mind. The political reality is that we are not currently at that point. The SDLP has made it clear that it will not exclude Sinn Féin and go into government with the rest of us. That is the only voluntary coalition that is likely to happen, for the reasons that Gregory has just outlined. The DUP finds Sinn Féin not to be acceptable. The only other cross-community way in which the DUP could go into government is with the SDLP; and the SDLP said on the Hansard record at the beginning of the proceedings that it will not do that. However aspirational it may be at the moment, it is not achievable. We would like to see it happen down the line, but it will not happen immediately. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Of course, the eloquence of the DUP is such that it could persuade the SDLP. Mr McFarland: Absolutely. Mr McGlone: Or vice versa. Mr P Robinson: Or something else might persuade the SDLP. I have had private meetings with the SDLP in which it was nuanced, somewhat. It was not saying that there were no circumstances in which it would participate in a voluntary coalition. If, for instance, the IRA were to take off on a terrorist campaign akin to that in 1972, would the SDLP really hold out for Sinn Féin to be in government? Dr Farren: Let us deal with the realities that face us rather than get into hypothetical discussions. Mr P Robinson: That indicates that there are circumstances in which it would be possible. Dr Farren: Many things are possible if the premise upon which we are working is changed. However, we are not changing it; the premise is the premise. Mr P Robinson: Others could change the premise. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The proposal is that the Executive should be formed by voluntary coalition. Do we have consensus? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We do not have consensus; one if not two groups are opposed to it. The next issue — a very important one — is that of the election of Speaker and Deputy Speaker. Mr Campbell: Jim, that is twice that you have described that as important business. The Chairman (Mr Wells): This is a big issue. Ms Lewsley: A declaration of interest? [Laughter.] Mr P Robinson: As a first question, do we need Deputy Speakers? Ms Lewsley: And if so, how many? The Chairman (Mr Wells): They are absolutely essential. As members know, the election of Speaker and Deputy Speaker is an issue that requires a cross-community vote. That has not occurred in the Assembly, because both Speakers were — Mr P Robinson: Imposed. The Chairman (Mr Wells): They were arrived at by other means. We have had elections for the Deputy Speakers when three of them were elected in 2000. Several parties, including the DUP, flagged up that issue. It has not featured prominently in cross-examinations. Does any party feel that the issue (a) poses an impediment to devolution or (b) should be dealt with after devolution? Mr P Robinson: Some of us resent the fact that the Secretary of State appoints the Speaker and the Deputy Speakers. The Assembly should elect its Speaker and Deputy Speakers, whatever voting system is used. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are members content that the Speaker and the Deputy Speakers be elected by a cross-community vote? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There seem to be no burning issues about this topic. Mr McFarland: May I raise an issue for further discussion? Who holds the Speaker to account? During the Assembly’s first mandate, questions were asked about the absolute power of the Speaker, with the Speaker having a budget and the Assembly having no input into what it thought the Speaker should be doing. Is there an issue about the Assembly’s ability to advise, influence or control the Speaker? The Chairman (Mr Wells): I clearly remember the day when a motion of no confidence was brought against the Speaker, and Jane Morrice had to take over the Chair. That mechanism exists, as do the Assembly Commission and the Business Committee, both of which the Speaker chairs. Should the Assembly have more control over the Speaker’s activities? Mr McFarland: Ministers must agree a Programme for Government, and so forth, with the Executive. Committees and other areas of the Assembly have oversight mechanisms. During the first mandate, there was no oversight mechanism, and the Speaker could not be challenged, other than by tabling a motion of no confidence, which is fairly high on the seriousness scale. Mr P Robinson: That is the mechanism, and it is also the mechanism that is used elsewhere. Under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, there are several circumstances under which a Speaker can be replaced, one of which is that the Assembly can elect a member to hold the position of Speaker. What decisions does the Speaker take beyond his or her judgement in the Chair during debates? The Speaker is subject to controls on every other issue: he or she is under audit controls; he or she is in the Chair at meetings of the Assembly Commission, but only members of the Commission can vote. Where are the dangers in the system? Mr McFarland: Peter sat on the Shadow Assembly Commission, and, at that time, members commented on the jaunts around the world and the amount of money that was being spent. It may well be that the auditors audited the books, but my understanding is that the Speaker had a budget, and he could decide when and where he went, and what he said about the Assembly. There was no mechanism in place to report back on what he had been doing and why he was doing it. It seemed to be outside the Assembly’s control. Mr P Robinson: Surely the Commission should have controlled that. Ms Lewsley: Or the Assembly. Mr McCarthy: The past Speaker, the present Speaker and the Deputy Speakers have been people of the highest integrity. There is no problem. They have conducted their business impeccably. Mr P Robinson: He really could not say anything else, could he? Mr McCarthy: Absolutely not. Ms Lewsley: Surely the Speaker is ultimately accountable to the Assembly? Any questions about inappropriate action could be raised in the Chamber. 12.00 noon Mr P Robinson: On spending matters, the Speaker is accountable to the Assembly Commission, which holds the voting power to take decisions. As regards adjudicating in the Assembly, the Speaker is ultimately subject to the will of the Assembly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): This does not seem to be a burning issue. Is the Committee content with the present arrangements in Standing Orders for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speakers? Members indicated assent. Dr Farren: If we could just agree the nomination. Mr Campbell: That is a slightly different matter. [Laughter.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next issue is perhaps slightly more complex: the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, which several parties, including the DUP, have raised as an issue of concern. This matter brings us back to the earlier discussion about designations, voting systems and so on. Does any member wish to lead the discussion by outlining what they feel is unsatisfactory with the present arrangement? Mr P Robinson: If you want the get the row going, I will start. If there is a mandatory system, with the resultant requirement to ensure automaticity in everything, then why have an element that is subject to something other than a mandatory system? Ministers are automatically nominated by a process, but, from somewhere out of the blue, having recognised that there is a need for a mandatory form of Government, people say that the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister should be elected via a different process. There is a nonsense in that contradiction. If anyone has looked at the difficulty that we had in trying to agree a Speaker, or the difficulties that we had in trying to determine who should chair meetings of this very Committee, they will know the difficulties that there would be in reaching agreement on a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister. On that basis, why put measures into place that will cause, at least, an obstacle, if not gridlock, and why not continue with an automatic system such as the one for Ministers? That is the obvious way forward. Many mechanisms could be used to do that, but I have explained the principle behind our position. Mr McFarland: The essence of the agreement was that parties were pushed, so to speak, into sorting themselves out. The essence of the office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister, which is clear right the way through the legislation, is that it is a joint post, and that the Assembly votes for the pair. Members may not like the people concerned, but the posts are voted for as an entity because the office operates as an entity. It does not operate as two separate entities — there is no separate First Minister or Deputy First Minister. The office comprises both the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. If we are to completely move away from that situation and have a separate Prime Minister and a Deputy Prime Minister, then that is a different matter. However, in the comprehensive agreement, as I understood it, the DUP and Sinn Féin accepted that the office was joint — that is what it says in the agreement — but there was an attempt to have the election of that joint office done separately. Why was that? Why would we wish to do that? One interesting thing about electing the office jointly is that unionists, nationalists and republicans have a veto over who their First Minister or Deputy First Minister will be. If they are not happy with the person nominated, they can refuse to vote. The process continues until such times as a pair that is acceptable is voted into office. If we get to a stage where the DUP accepts Sinn Féin as partners for Government — the only scenario in which this becomes relevant — it could be that the DUP will find Martin McGuinness unacceptable. Under the current system, the DUP could ask Sinn Féin to reconsider its nomination if it were not happy to have Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Minister. It could ask Sinn Féin to put forward Conor Murphy, for example, if it felt it could vote for that option. Similarly, Sinn Féin could be neuralgic about Rev Ian Paisley as First Minister and could ask for someone else to be nominated. Therefore there is a degree of cross-community say in who is nominated. In the comprehensive agreement, it looks as though the DUP was unhappy about public perception if it had to vote for Martin McGuinness. They came up with a cunning system in which unionists could vote for unionists and nationalists for nationalists, so that they would not have to stand up in public with dirty hands, having voted for Martin McGuinness. How would that operate in a joint-office situation as the two people nominated to those posts must operate jointly? That seems to be a bit of a smokescreen in order to avoid voting for the opposition. There was another strange system suggested in which the Ministers all went out, and there was a wrap-up vote. The difficultly with the comprehensive agreement, which was negotiated by the DUP and Sinn Féin, was that if the SDLP and the Ulster Unionists did not support the candidates for First Minister and Deputy First Minister, they would be excluded from government for the entire life of that Assembly, leaving the DUP and Sinn Féin in government together. As I understand it, it is the DUP’s worst nightmare to be left in government with Sinn Féin and with no other cover. Therefore the system negotiated in the comprehensive agreement, and which was within a hair’s breadth of implementation in December 2004, seems slightly daft, and negotiated for all the wrong reasons. Mrs Long: We are not exercised about the decoupling of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister — having them coupled did not show that they had a good working relationship. However, we do believe, having lost the argument this morning on voluntary coalition, that we should now examine how to increase coherence and collectivity in the mandatory coalition. We want to move from a situation in which there is power dividing among parties in the Executive to one in which there is power sharing. At the bare minimum, that requires all members of the Executive to be willing to support the collective responsibility of the Executive and to recognise all other participants as equal members. At the sharp end, that requires parties to recognise those who are sharing power with them in that Executive and, indeed, in the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It should be part of a collective vote in the Assembly to approve the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. We would prefer to see that vote coupled, because it would enhance collectivity. We realise that a vote will not make people work together, but it would indicate a willingness to take the first steps towards working together. If people are not willing, at a bare minimum, to endorse other peoples’ positions in the Government, yet will go into government with those same people, there is something inherently unstable about that. Our argument is that there should, therefore, be a collective vote on electing the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The office should remain coupled in the way that it is at present. Mr McNarry: The discussion so far says to me that we need to redefine the role of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). My experience in the First Minister’s Office told me that “jointery” between the Ulster Unionists and the SDLP simply did not work. I cannot recollect that I could compile a list of great successes. With regard to redefinition, it was inappropriate that, apart from other duties of little consequence, the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister had — and the Civil Service and the back-up team wanted to prove “jointery” more than anyone else — responsibility for community relations. Consultation documents came out of that office as if paper had just been invented and was something novel to play with. In effect, nothing of any substance or benefit to the community came out of it. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister spent their time fire-fighting community disputes. I thought that it was menial that the two titular representatives of the Government of Northern Ireland — and I am not belittling community relations as a departmental issue; it is very important — had that responsibility but could not make a decision between them. The First Minister — and what is the point in calling him that if that is not what he is? — could say or do nothing without the approval of the deputy. In one instance, the First Minister could not visit a Protestant area, because the Deputy First Minister would not go with him. The First Minister was told that he could not and must not go — it was not “jointery”. One would have thought that the relationship between the two parties at that time and the personnel involved would have been pretty amenable to sorting things out. Given who we might have as First Minister and Deputy First Minister, I see a crazy situation arising; obstinacy would kick in, and that would be that. There is an interpretation of the working of this office in which “jointery” is key. If asked, the last First Minister would not agree that he operated a joint office, and that is the problem: the First Minister is the First Minister, and the deputy is deputy. The First Minister should always have a deputy, but it might be better if he or she chose the person rather than have the crazy “jointery” with which the office is bedevilled. Unless we agree and recognise that, we are going nowhere. We need to redefine the workings of that office. Mr Campbell: My contribution is a variation on what David said. It is clear that, under the old system, the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister was not just about the establishment of a Department. It was also about the perception of the “representatives” of the two communities and of the two largest parties acting in unison, and that gave out a particular message, whether said or unsaid. It was said many times, and left unsaid some times, but that was how it was perceived. Its practicalities under the old system were as David McNarry said. My party knows less about it than David does, but if that was the case under the old system, will anybody claim that under any new system such a projection would be anything other than a pretence? Any system that we agree must acknowledge and allow for the difficulties of the past; it must be sufficiently fluid and flexible to permit Government to continue and to permit the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister to be elected. It must not perpetuate the urban myth that this is a joint office with the two Ministers acting only after prior consultation and agreement with each other with neither able to do anything without the consent of the other. Either we accept that that did not work or we do not, and most people accept that it did not. 12.15 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr McNarry has provoked much interest. Mrs Long, Dr Farren, Alan McFarland, Peter Robinson and Mr Murphy wish to speak. As there is quite a lot of debate forthcoming, members will please try to keep it as snappy as possible. Mrs Long: The issues concerning the functions of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister need to be resolved later. This debate is specifically about how that office is elected. The Alliance Party has some firm proposals as to how the office should be shaped. We oppose Members simply being put into those positions — particularly such responsible positions within the Executive — on the basis of simple mandatory coalition rules, where Members are placed in positions and that is the end of the line. There should be a joint election for the posts of First Minister and Deputy First Minister, in the context of the Executive also being subject to an Assembly vote to endorse it. It is important that that should take place. The DUP has said that it would not be in favour of a joint election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The position between that and simply adopting a mandatory template is to choose a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister, fill the remaining Executive posts and endorse them on the Floor of the Assembly. Is the DUP suggesting that position, or does it propose that those posts should simply be filled on a mandatory basis with no endorsement from the Assembly? The Chairman (Mr Wells): The DUP can either interject with a point of information or wait until its next turn. Mr P Robinson: I have other things to say, so I will take Mrs Long’s views on board as well. Dr Farren: Experience has much to teach us in this matter as in others. I am not sure that all the bedevilment of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister that has been mentioned can be attributed to the joint nature of the office. Indeed, it is a challenge to the principle on which the joint nature of the office is based. I also recognise that we can point to anomalies, as Peter has done, in respect of the operation of the election of Ministers under the mandatory principle. Let us look at what we expect of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and why we would have two such Ministers on a coequal basis. In a sense, it comes back to the underlying objective of what we are trying to achieve: reconciliation; respect; and co-operation between our communities. The Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister is not, therefore, a functional set of responsibilities for each office-holder, whereby business of the Executive is managed. However, there is a clear representative function on behalf of the Assembly as a whole and, indeed, on behalf of the entire enterprise — the people of Northern Ireland. Therefore, for the Assembly to jointly elect both posts goes some way to endorsing that particular representative responsibility, in that representatives of each community have confidence in the Minister from the opposite community who holds one or other of the two offices. There is no doubt that, if two people and two parties are involved, more than two parties will be involved in any decision-making process. Before we get too tied up with the problems that arose in the past and directly attribute them to the joint nature of the office, we should recognise that reaching a decision in this case will necessarily be a little more complex and lengthy than if there were only one person and one party. The most efficient form of Government might well be one that is run by a dictator, who simply tells the rest of us what to do. However, when parties and their representatives are involved in the decision-making process, we must accept that there will be some inherent complexities and, if nothing else, delays in the way in which decisions are reached. That is part and parcel of that type of process. Indeed, in this society, it is probably an essential part of building consensus and ensuring that reconciliation will flow from that consensus. Therefore, before we rush to address the practical difficulties, let us not lose sight of the underlying principles that have informed some of the procedures adopted in the Good Friday Agreement. I have some fairly close experience of the way in which things operated. Decisions were reached, meetings were held under joint chairmanship, and the process of government was conducted in such a way that gave at least the prospect of matters improving. However difficult, complex, tedious and lengthy some of those procedures and processes, we must weigh them against our ultimate goal. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Gentlemen, ladies, it is 12.21 pm, and the food is about to arrive. I am looking for your guidance. Mr Campbell: The food wins the vote, Chairman. Dr Farren: On this one. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next members to speak will be Alan McFarland, followed by Peter Robinson. Are members happy to break for lunch now, or would they rather conclude the meeting first? Dr Farren: How long will it take to finish the meeting? The Chairman (Mr Wells): At the rate we are going, we will be having food in about two hours’ time. Dr Farren: Let us have the food. It will be sustenance for the battle that lies ahead. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will take a 15-minute break. The Committee was suspended at 12.23 pm. On resuming — 12.47 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): The Clerks arranged a very pleasant lunch. If that trend continues, it will be very welcome. We broke after Dr Farren’s contribution; Mr McFarland is next, followed by Mr Robinson and Mr Murphy. After that we want to move quickly on to the next topic. Mr McFarland: The joint nature of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) was a core safeguard in the agreement. David McNarry has highlighted various problems. There were major problems with the personalities involved in the first Assembly. That does not mean that the actual joint nature was wrong; rather, it did not work particularly well because those involved were, shall we say, not comfortable with each other. Many issues were assigned to that office that perhaps should not have been. There are issues that are outside the office, but that might reasonably be put in. There is a whole discussion to be had about what OFMDFM as a Department should contain. There is also an issue about the oversight of that Department, but it is hard to see how we can move away from the essential safeguard of the joint nature of the office. It is not ideal — in many ways it is far from ideal — but it was put there because the communities did not trust each other to operate independently. It is difficult to see how one could interfere with the joint nature of the office, which is in the legislation, without having a complete renegotiation of the entire agreement. I do not think anyone is suggesting that; it would take years. The chances of us getting agreement on anything similar ever again are nil, I should think. Mr P Robinson: I have a slight distaste for people who put forward propositions without explaining how they are so. How is it a “core safeguard”? What is it safeguarding? What does one method of electing a First Minster and a Deputy First Minister safeguard over another? You still end up with a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister. There is no safeguard within the election. Mr McFarland: I think that Peter has misunderstood. I have moved on to the essence of the Department. I agree that we should go back to the issue of elections. My comments were in relation to the essence of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and the joint nature of it; they were not specifically to do with the voting mechanism for it, which I covered earlier. Mr P Robinson: I agree with David McNarry. He has identified something that is not on our agenda: the role of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. When there was a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister, I was startled to see that they felt that they had to go about hand in hand and even go to the toilet together. It seems absurd that there could not be a sensible division of the workload and still have it considered to be a joint office. That should be done. We do not expect the two of them to stand up and answer questions by chanting the same answer at the same time, so they do not have to do everything together at the same time. The Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister has a joint responsibility rather than the two Ministers being expected to do everything jointly together. Therefore it would be worth having the role of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister as an item on the agenda. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The functions of OFMDFM are included under “Efficiency/Effectiveness”, and they would be better discussed under that heading. Mr P Robinson: I will perhaps return to it when we are discussing that heading. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We are currently discussing the mechanism for electing the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. Mr P Robinson: The definitions of the functions are distinct from how those functions are exercised, and David McNarry’s point was about how the functions are being exercised. Therefore as long as you are happy to add “the exercise of those functions” we can deal with this point under “Efficiency/Effectiveness”. I am not sure that it is a matter of efficiency, but it is certainly a matter of effectiveness. I will deal with the principle of the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and its practice. With regard to the principle, I would contend that no violence is being done to the institutions by the mechanism that is used for the election, and no underlying principle is harmed by having it elected in a different way. Someone asked how the elections would be carried out. The most obvious way is to use the same kind of format that exists for the election of Ministers. Therefore the nominating officer from the largest party in the largest designation will make the appointment of the First Minister and the nominating officer for the largest party in the second largest designation will make the nomination for the Deputy First Minister. Just as there is no requirement for a vote to elect Ministers under the existing practice, so it would be for the First Minister, the Deputy First Minister and other Ministers. The SDLP and the Ulster Unionists protested about the fact that if they did not vote for the ministerial state, at the end of the day they would be excluded from Government. They did not explain to me how they felt it would be proper for them to be a part of an Executive that they were not prepared to vote for. If they answered that for me, they would probably give me a stick to beat them with where the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister are concerned. If they were willing to serve in an Executive with those who have been nominated by other nominating officers, I cannot understand why they would not be prepared to vote collectively for that Executive. If, however, that is the case, they add to the argument that there should be no similar requirement in respect of the appointment of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. I now turn to the practice of this election. The DUP preferred a voluntary coalition; in that way you can choose whom to take along with you. If we do not have that system, why should one be asked to vote for people whom one did not choose to be in Government? It is as simple as that. If members want a mandatory system, let it be a mandatory system; if they want a voluntary system, let it be a voluntary system; but let us have consistency in one or the other. That is the principal argument. Just as this Committee was deadlocked in its decision to elect a Chairman, MLAs will be deadlocked if they have that requirement for a future Assembly. Is that really what members want? Mr Murphy: There are two discussions: one is on the mechanism for electing the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, and the other is on the operation of that office. The previous incumbents did not operate as well as they could have, but they managed to agree to limit the scope of the scrutiny function of the Committee of the Centre. They also agreed to take matters that related to the Strategic Investment Board into the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. They found agreement on issues that the rest of us had difficulties with, but that is not an argument for changing the current mechanism. There are anomalies in the Good Friday Agreement. The issue of electing the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister was meant to have symbolic significance, but the operation of that office by the former First Minister and Deputy First Minister did not lend itself to that. Nonetheless, Sinn Féin does not believe that there is an argument to change that now. We advocate that it stays as it is, under the Good Friday Agreement. Alan McFarland mentioned ideas that had been put forward by the two Governments in the latter half of 2004. Sinn Féin has made it clear time and again that any proposals that were considered at that time were in the context of the situation that pertained at that time. We also made it clear that our approach to matters involving the Executive or the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister was one of inclusivity and of locking people into the Executive; it was not about locking anyone out of the Executive. Sinn Féin is unique among all the parties in that it has no history of the practice of exclusionist politics. On the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, we advocate sticking with the Good Friday Agreement as it is. Mrs Long: The Alliance Party has stated its position on a voluntary coalition. However, if we were to have a mandatory coalition, our argument would be different to that of the DUP. We would try to amend that coalition to increase and enhance the amount of collaboration and collectivity within it, rather than diminishing those on the basis that if it is mandatory, let it simply be mandatory and nothing more. The Alliance Party would like that collective role and nature to be enhanced. The Alliance Party proposed that the Executive should be subject to a vote of support in the House, and that Members who enter into a mandatory coalition could choose to absent themselves from nominating to ministerial posts if they are unhappy with the make-up of the mandatory coalition. However, if Members are going to nominate to that coalition, it is important that they at least acknowledge that other Members have a right to be at the table with them. The DUP seems to prefer not to have a joint election for the posts of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. Is the DUP therefore willing to vote for them as a collective with the rest of the Executive or is it simply a matter that that would be mandatory and nothing more? Mr P Robinson: The terms of the proposal are what would matter. The terms of the proposal that we agreed to vote for in December 2004 were that those who are nominated would be in the Executive. That is slightly different. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Everyone has had adequate opportunity for discussion. There seem to be two proposals: one from Mr Robinson and one from Mrs Long. I shall put the first to members. Mr Robinson proposes that the positions of First Minister and Deputy First Minister be filled by separate nominations. The largest party would nominate to the post of First Minister, and the second largest party would nominate to the post of Deputy First Minister. 1.00 pm Mr P Robinson: No, that is incorrect. The largest party would nominate to the post of First Minister, and because the two largest parties may be from the same designation, the larger party from the second largest designation would nominate to the post of Deputy First Minister. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes, sorry, I get your point. The proposal, therefore, ends with the second largest designation nominating to the Deputy First Minister post. Do we have agreement on that? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): As there is no agreement, that proposal falls. Mr P Robinson: I assure you, Mr Chairman, that it does not fall. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It falls as far as getting the agreement of this Committee is concerned. It will arise again in future discussions. Mr P Robinson: May I identify that as an issue that must be resolved? The Chairman (Mr Wells): OK. Mrs Long’s proposal is that the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister be the subject of a collective vote in the Assembly. Mr McFarland: That is the current position. Mrs Long: No, I raised two issues. The Alliance Party’s preference is for the First Minister and Deputy First Minister to be elected with a collective vote, which is the current situation. However, we recognise that at least one party has significant issues with that, and we wish to seek a compromise that does not diminish the collectivity of that joint office, but increases the collectivity of the entire Executive. Therefore the Alliance Party’s proposal is that the entire Executive, including the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, should be endorsed by a vote in the Assembly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): In that case, “the entire Executive” must be added to your proposal. Mr Murphy: The election of the Executive is included in the next item on the agenda. The Chairman (Mr Wells): How should we deal with this? Mrs Long: I am indifferent as to how we deal with it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is it still a proposal? Mrs Long: If it would be better to consider the proposal under the next point, I am happy to defer it until then. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Thank you. We move on to the next item, which is the approval of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and the Executive. Clearly, there is a high degree of overlap between this discussion and the one we have just had, so we do not wish to rehearse all those points again. Does anyone from the DUP wish to say anything? Other parties raised this issue, but the DUP made the lengthiest submission. Mr P Robinson: We have dealt with at least part of this point, and my comments referred to the approval of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and the Executive. There can be no argument for requiring the approval of the nominations for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister but not of the Executive. That seems to be a point made by both the Ulster Unionists and the SDLP. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there any reaction to that? Mr McFarland: I want to clarify whether the vote on the nominations to the Executive would be cross community. Presumably it would be. Secondly, what would happen if the cross-community vote were to go against the nominations? Technically, a particular party or designation may be unhappy with one Minister only. What mechanism would there be to tell the party that nominated the so-called objectionable Minister that its nomination had been rejected and that to get approval for that position, it might have to nominate again? What would be the consequential outflow of a vote against the collective Executive? The vote may have been against one Minister, two Ministers or whatever, but how could that problem be identified? Mr P Robinson: There is a further issue: are we saying that we would operate a system in which a nominating officer could be overruled? Mr McFarland: The current system for electing the First Minister and Deputy First Minister is that a nominating officer can be overruled in the Assembly by a party of another tradition saying that it is not happy. Mr P Robinson: There is no nominating officer for the election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister. Mr McFarland: The Assembly can express a view on the election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister and it does not matter who the nominating officer has put forward. The Assembly can tell the nominating officer that it is not happy with the nomination, and to think again. Effectively, there is a nominating officer: the largest party puts forward person A to represent its party, and the other tradition puts forward person B to represent it. They are nominated but not by a nominating officer — although presumably they are nominated within their party. The Assembly does not have the ability to say that it is not happy with the ministerial choice. Mr P Robinson: It could have. Mr McFarland: Yes, but how could that be identified? Everybody could be happy with nine of the 10 Ministers, but how could the Assembly identify the Minister that one or more parties, of whatever tradition, are not happy with, and tell the party concerned to think again. Mr P Robinson: Presumably a party would say whom it is opposed to. What happens after the Assembly has identified that person, or persons? Mr McFarland: There would be a debate. Mr P Robinson: You want the nominating officer to change the nomination. Mr McFarland: There is no point in voting if the Assembly does not have that option. Mr P Robinson: Absolutely. There must be consistency one way or the other. Either the Assembly has the right to choose its First Minister and Deputy First Minister and its Ministers, or it is mandatory throughout. Mr McFarland: But you are choosing your First Minister and Deputy First Minister with the current system. Mr P Robinson: You are. I am proposing something different. Mr McFarland: Chairman, the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister share joint office and they are voted for jointly. The Assembly can say that it is not happy with that pair being in the lead. That is the choice at the moment. It has been suggested that there should be a vote for the Ministers as well. However, Peter Robinson seems to be saying that even if the Assembly says that it is not happy with those Ministers, it cannot gainsay the nominating officer of a particular party by saying that the Assembly may not be happy with that Minister. What is the point of having a vote if the Assembly cannot influence the choice, and how does the Assembly identify whether it is a particular Minister that the Assembly is not happy with, or whether the Assembly is not happy with five of the Ministers? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Presumably there would be a debate. Mr McFarland: That was my question. There should be a debate after the nominations, in which case, Members could say who they like or dislike, and have a vote. What would that achieve if you were gainsaying the nominating officer? Mr P Robinson: That is why it should be either mandatory or voluntary, throughout the system. Mr McFarland seems to think that because the Belfast Agreement says that this is a joint office and they must be elected jointly, that that is it. I do not accept that. I accept that it should be the same system for the election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister as it is for the Ministers. Mr McFarland: Chairman, we have a system — [Interruption.] Mr P Robinson: We do not have a system. We have deadlock at the moment. Mr McFarland: A system is laid down in law, and the only way to get away from that — in theory — is by some sort of consensus that we need to move away from it. We are trying to work out the blockages that people have problems with, and whether there is any consensus to sort them out or not. Sinn Féin is deemed to be acceptable in Government, but we will not progress unless those problems can be sorted out and there is consensus. I am not trying to argue, I am just trying to tease out the position on the various proposals, and the consequences of those proposals. If a vote were taken in the Assembly on the election of Ministers, could the Assembly do anything if a party refused to re-nominate? How could we identify which Minister the Assembly is not happy with? I am speaking to the people who proposed the system. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Dr Farren and Ms Lewsley have been waiting a long time. Dr Farren: I am interested in whether Peter will answer those questions. Mr P Robinson: My proposition is that nominating officers should nominate for all positions, including First Minister and Deputy First Minister. Dr Farren: We have little of substance to add. I have outlined reasons why the process of nominating the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister should remain the same. If we move to a situation where nominating officers nominate Ministers from the parties entitled to hold office, I am unsure as to what purpose a vote after that would serve. If there were a negative outcome, the only way of disapproving of the nomination of one Minister would be to disapprove of them all, identify during the debate the identity of the Minister in questions and hope that the nominating officer would act accordingly. However, I cannot imagine that any nominating officer would. The alternative might be for a party so minded to enter a vote of no confidence naming a particular Minister. Again, that would not have the intended effect. Disapproval of a Minister would have to achieve a level of cross-community support for it to have any impact. Ms Lewsley: With respect to the collective voting of Ministers, it would be hard to identify which Minister is disapproved of, unless he or she is named in a vote of no confidence, which Seán mentioned. My concern is that it would descend into a personality contest. If parties enter an Executive in good faith, how can one party say that it does not accept a nomination from another? Parties will make recommendations for their own reasons. It is unreasonable for a party to claim that it does not agree with another’s nomination because they believe that that person is unsuitable for the job. Mrs Long: This discussion highlights the specific problems of trying to achieve inclusivity and collectivity within a mandatory coalition system. The vote to endorse the Executive ought to reinforce its collectivity, but it is being viewed as a means of pillorying individual Ministers. That is not the context in which such a vote should take place. However, that says something about the attitude of parties around the table in that they will see that vote as an opportunity to attack Ministers from other parties. Bearing in mind that those Ministers and their colleagues will serve in the same Executive as members from other parties, it seems ludicrous for members of the same Government to attack its Ministers. When Minister publicly turns on Minister, it is a sign of a failing Government. This discussion highlights that establishing a sense of collective responsibility in the Executive at the outset is critical to its functioning. The election of Ministers to the Executive should not be a mechanism of declaring no confidence in an individual, but a mechanism by which a party recognises that other parties have the same rights and responsibilities to nominate the appropriate Ministers from within their party teams. It is not about simply about picking and choosing other parties’ nominations, but about reflecting the fact that a party accepts the right of other parties to make those choices and accepts that they are part of a collective. There was a strange situation in the last Assembly where Members were Ministers, but not members of the Executive. That is not a recipe for good governance, and it certainly does not enhance collectivity within the Executive or create stability. It would be better if Members endorsed the notion of the Executive. Peter Robinson used a form of words by which nominations would be accepted. That might be a lowest common denominator, but it would be better than no endorsement whatsoever, which would suggest that parties have not bought into the idea that, once in the Executive, they are part of the same Government. The Chairman (Mr Wells): No one else has indicated a wish to speak. I have a proposal from Naomi, although I am open to others. The proposal says that the entire Executive, including the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, should be subject to a collective vote in the Assembly. That is obviously a combination of earlier proposals. Are there any other proposals? 1.15 pm Mr P Robinson: I want to ensure that everyone understands the process. My argument was that the nominating officers should nominate a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister in the way in which I outlined, and there would be no vote. Ministers would then be nominated by parties’ nominating officers, as was the practice. Collectively, all the Ministers would make up a team, and, as proposed in the comprehensive agreement, the proposal that Ministers A, B, C, and so forth, would form the Northern Ireland Executive would be put to the Assembly. Therefore, the requirement is clearly an acceptance — as opposed to a desire — that those Members will be in the Executive. It gives, at least, a higher degree of approval for their work than has been the case heretofore. Mr McGimpsey: In the first mandate, the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister were not elected on the same day on which the rest of the Executive were appointed, and they were subject to different mandates. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister are elected under the principle of parallel consent and the rest of the Executive are appointed under d’Hondt. If both the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and the Executive are to be elected at the same time, how will those mandates be changed? It seems much more sensible to keep the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister separate, and, once they are in place and the Assembly has consented to and approved the individuals concerned, they will form a Government, albeit a mandatory coalition formed under d’Hondt. Mr Murphy: Following on from what Michael McGimpsey has said, and this is an issue that the DUP has raised on several occasions, it is up to the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister to decide on the number of Departments. If all were elected on the one slate, it strikes me that that would end that debate. Nonetheless, we are content with the system as it currently stands under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I think that our lunch has slowed us down. Having listened to what the DUP delegation has said, I believe that we have another proposal. Mrs Long’s proposal is that the entire Executive, including the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, should be subject to a collective vote in the Assembly. Have we consensus on that? Mr McFarland: What are the implications of a “No” vote on that? Mr P Robinson: The same as they are for the election of a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister — deadlock. Mrs Long: Whatever the mechanism, parties can contrive a deadlock if they are intent on doing so. Mr McGimpsey: Is Mrs Long talking about parallel consent? Mrs Long: If the composition of an Executive is endorsed after a vote in the Assembly, that, as far as the public is concerned, at least shows a willingness to work together in the Executive. It also sets down a marker for parties in that they have recognised other Members’ right to participate fully in the Executive. Mr McFarland: First, is Naomi saying that the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and the Executive should all be voted for together, as Peter has suggested? Secondly, should the vote be subject to the principle of parallel consent or 60:40:40? Mrs Long: First, I will reinforce the Alliance Party’s stated position. The party’s preference would be for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister to be jointly elected in a separate vote. However, it is clear that there is no consensus on that proposal. My new proposal accommodates those who do not wish to have a separate vote on the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. At the same time, the proposal enhances Executive collectivity in general. The party believes, on principle, that progress must be made on that issue. It is not that we are unwilling to see a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister elected; we have made our position clear on that. The DUP in particular is not content with that position. We are saying that there is a way of ensuring that the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister are elected and that collectivity in the Executive is simultaneously enhanced by putting the entire team to a vote. Mr McFarland: By parallel consent? Mrs Long: That would not be our choice. Weighted majority would be our preference, but I imagine that it would be at least a cross-community vote. Mr McFarland: What does the law say on this? I understand that the law is specific on the roles and functions of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and the order in which all this takes place. Mrs Long: If we are here to discuss how the Assembly will function, discussing the laws that surround the framework of previous Assemblies is not necessarily useful. Mr P Robinson: We are talking about how to change the law. Mrs Long: The law is a moveable feast; it can be changed if necessary to accommodate any agreement that might be reached around the table. The issue is not whether the law permits it, but whether we agree it. Mr McGimpsey: Yes, but it is better to do it within the existing framework if we can. Otherwise we will need agreement around the table on every jot and tittle. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Members, there is a slight addition to Mrs Long’s proposal that a vote in the Assembly should be cross-community. We have looked at this from every angle. Mr McFarland: Parallel consent, is that right? The Chairman (Mr Wells): No, cross-community vote. Mrs Long: My proposal is for a cross-community vote, the definition of which has already been discussed. Mr McFarland: Therefore we are dropping the requirement for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister under 50:50. Mrs Long: Yes. That is what the proposal involves. The Chairman (Mr Wells): To reiterate, the entire Executive, including the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, should be subject to a collective vote in the Assembly by a cross-community vote. Do we have consensus on that? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The proposal falls. I detect a proposal from the DUP, stating that the nominating officers should nominate the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and the other Ministers, and that nominations to the Executive should be put to the Assembly for the vote. It does not say what type of vote. Perhaps we should beef that up a bit; I am summarising from the various contributions. Mr P Robinson: Having the nominating officers nominate the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and the Ministers is the way forward. If we want to get more collectivity, we can make it subject to a cross-community vote in the Assembly. Mr Murphy: Is that the same proposal that we just discussed? The Chairman (Mr Wells): What is the difference between that proposal and Mrs Long’s? Ms Lewsley: None. Except that Mr Robinson was saying that the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister would be nominated, then a team of Ministers would be nominated and voted on collectively; whereas Mrs Long proposed that the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and all the Ministers would be voted in and on collectively. Mr P Robinson: I understood Naomi’s proposal as almost two separate votes in the Assembly, one for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister — Mrs Long: No. That would be our preferred option, but my proposal was specifically to accommodate those who did not want — Mr P Robinson: Chairman, you were wrong in assuming that there was another proposal. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There seems to be little or no difference between the two, so it is not worth putting it to a vote. We will move on to the other issues: proportionality, petitions of concern, the Assembly referring to the Executive, etc. Proportionality was listed as a concern by the DUP. However, we could not tease out what was behind that issue. Mr P Robinson: I do not think that it was put forward as a concern. At one stage we needed to go through all the facets of the structures and institutions, agreeing on some and not on others. It was not being raised as a concern; it was being put forward as one of the elements of the institutions. Mr McFarland: Can you refresh us about what it is? Mr P Robinson: We are talking about the proportionality representation on Committees, etc. Mr McFarland: Do you mean d’Hondt? Mr P Robinson: At present it is d’Hondt. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We do not need to dwell on that issue. Mrs Long: In previous discussions the SDLP has said that, rather than run d’Hondt separately for ministerial posts, for Committee Chairs and so forth, it should be run just once. That would be a good thing. Our problem is not with proportionality itself, but with the d’Hondt mechanism. The fewer the number of posts, the larger the number of groups and the larger the disparity between the groups, the less proportional d’Hondt becomes and the more anomalies that are possible. That will be an issue during the discussions about the number of ministerial positions and Departments, because fewer Departments means less reflection of proportionality. Is the SDLP still of a mind to look at that issue under the heading of “Proportionality”? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are you suggesting that d’Hondt become a very long process, starting at the top with the Executive and going all the way down to the last Committee position? Mrs Long: Yes. Mr McFarland: All the big parties would get completely disenfranchised on the Committees. Mrs Long: That is not, of course, the case. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have a heading “Formation of Committees”. Mrs Long: It was not my proposal; I was simply asking the question of the SDLP. Mr P Robinson: Surely we are mixing jelly beans with liquorice allsorts. Mrs Long: Given that the SDLP raised the issue in earlier discussions about proportionality, I was simply asking for its views. Is that not the point of holding these meetings — to ask questions? The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Formation of Committees” is a separate heading under “Committee System”, and we can address the issue of proportionality when we get to that. Dr Farren: I would not want Naomi to be held in suspension until then. [Laughter.] The SDLP suggested that the clock should not be restarted after d’Hondt is run to form an Executive; that would lead to a more proportionate and representative allocation of positions. In practical terms, we would want to examine in further detail how far the clock should continue to run. The principle that proportionality should be operated in that way should be considered. Mrs Long: To restate our position, we would prefer to see the formation of an Executive, and elections to other positions, being conducted through an STV ballot of Members, rather than simply by running the d’Hondt formula. I do not expect that to become a proposal, nor do I expect it to get consensus, but that is my party’s position. The Chairman (Mr Wells): In the absence of any motions, we have consensus to move on to the next item, “Petitions of concern”. A petition of concern must be signed by at least 30 Members, and it triggers a cross-community vote. This issue has featured in many submissions, although I do not detect much concern about the actual mechanism. Does any member wish to raise concerns? Petitions of concern have been used on seven or eight occasions that I can recall, including the famous “Easter lilies” debate. Mr P Robinson: If ever there was a safeguard in the system, this is it. Mr Campbell: The only concern was that the petition of concern would be dropped. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are members content with the petition of concern as it stands? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Everyone wants to retain the petition of concern. We have consensus, and we are on a roll. This is a slightly more controversial issue: a proposal for an Assembly referral to the Executive. Again, this is an issue that the DUP has raised. 1.30 pm Mr P Robinson: This matter is relevant in the context of a wider discussion about the accountability of the Executive and of Ministers. However, it is only one element of that wider issue. At our last meeting, David McNarry mentioned that powers were devolved by legislation to the Departments, as opposed to the Assembly. That meant that the Assembly does not have control over business — it does not have the final say. Individual Ministers have that final say. Therefore, the question is: who is accountable, and to whom? The mechanism of which this is a part is intended to introduce some accountability into the system. Our proposal allows the Assembly to refer matters with which it is not content to the Executive. Obviously, our preference is that power should be devolved to the Assembly, which ultimately could decide against or in favour of a Minister’s proposal. If power rests with the Assembly, this proposal becomes irrelevant. However, if power rests with a collective Executive, this measure is a safeguard that allows the Assembly to keep batting a matter back to the Executive for whatever number of times we allow. If power is to rest with Ministers, we shall not have any accountability. The Chairman (Mr Wells): This and the next two issues for discussion — the statutory recognition of the supremacy of the Assembly, and the power to reverse ministerial decisions in certain circumstances — strike me as having such a degree of overlap that it would be best to discuss all three matters at once. There is bound to be overlap, and a single debate would neatly finish off this section. The entire relationship between the Assembly and the Executive, and the control thereof, is the issue here. Mr McFarland: The question of where power resides concerns fundamental issues of law that are quite complicated. Without a detailed legal study it is hard to say whether that can be solved. The other two issues are potentially solvable among the parties. The idea of referring topics back to the Executive seems to be quite healthy. The question, I suppose, is whether one needs cross-community support before one can refer a matter back to the Executive. Under the comprehensive agreement proposals, the Assembly could have sent a matter back twice. The difficulty was that even if the Assembly disagreed with something it still did not have any power, other than referring it back twice, to actually do anything about it. Therefore, the question is whether the Assembly should have the ability to gainsay the Executive and the Ministers. It is also tied in with the reversal issue. Technically, the issue should never arise. Logically, Ministers should confirm their position with their own parties, and there would be no one in the Assembly to vote. However, members will vividly recall the GP fundholding vote, when the Assembly put back fundholding for a year under Minister de Brún. I am not sure whether there were any other instances where the Assembly rebelled against what the Executive had collectively agreed. There are times when that tension is extremely healthy, but how far do we go? Do we simply allow for the embarrassment of referring a matter back to the Executive twice to lead to an outcome? Alternatively, do we agree that if a matter is returned three times, the Assembly’s writ runs? The Chairman (Mr Wells): It strikes me that this debate will go nowhere if one party says that the Executive must be supreme in every instance. If parties believe that the Executive must have complete control, we shall not make much progress on the other issues. It is important to see where the various parties stand on this crucial issue. I shall ask Naomi Long and then the other two parties to let us know where they stand on this matter. Mrs Long: Our position is that, in certain circumstances, which should be very tightly defined, the Assembly needs to have the power to negate a ministerial decision on the basis of a cross-community vote. That is distinct from ministerial decisions that require cross-community support to pass. We have detailed proposals on this, and we would be happy to circulate them, if that would be helpful. Our proposal is that if someone were to put forward such a motion, it would have to be signed by at least 20 other Assembly Members in order to reach the stage where the Speaker would judge whether it was competent — given the rules that would have to be set up to strictly limit the degree to which that could happen — or whether it was vexatious. Once it had been agreed as competent, it would be debated. If there were a cross-community vote in favour of negating the Minister’s decision, the motion would come back to the point at which no decision had been taken. That is our proposal for accountability between Ministers and the Assembly. Of more importance, however, is the issue of collectivity within the Executive. It is clear that at different points during the last Assembly, all members of the Executive were not supportive of individual ministerial decisions. We do not want to set up a series of vetoes, whereby Ministers would be hampered in the conduct of their duties. We want to see some form of enhanced collectivity within the Executive. Again, we envisage a mechanism for a Minister to be called to the Executive to debate a particular issue if it were judged to be contentious by a number of his or her Executive colleagues. We can submit more detailed proposals on that, but we believe that the Assembly should have the right to negate a decision in certain circumstances. Dr Farren: This is a complex issue, and I am not sure whether, in the course of what will be a fairly cursory discussion, we will be able to make all the necessary distinctions to arrive at a consensus. If we consider practice elsewhere, we can take the maxim of the Mother of all Parliaments that Parliament is supreme. However, the exercise of ministerial responsibility is not so circumscribed to the point where every decision that a Minister makes is subject to the approval or otherwise of that Parliament. We have to recognise some distinctions, among which would be ministerial decisions made in the context of the Executive responsibility that Ministers have, so that there is not the potential for gridlock to be created by the decisions that they take. In one sense you can say yes to the principle of the Assembly’s being supreme in a democracy. However, we must consider carefully the distinctions that must be made between the kinds of ministerial decisions that are to be subject to the ongoing approval of the Assembly. Although we do not want to inhibit the smooth operation of government, we must recognise that MLAs have the right to challenge, question and, indeed, where appropriate, express their disapproval or, if necessary, approval of what has been said. At this point, I am not so aware of the fine distinctions that need to be made and I recognise that we may have to revisit the issue. Is it an issue, in the way that the question has been posed previously, that is regarded by any one party as a block to restoration? Mr P Robinson: Yes, it is, because it goes to the heart of accountability. It appears to me that what is being said does not move that far away from the proposals contained in the Governments’ comprehensive agreement. First, they did not go for 20 — and I can see why Naomi might go for 20 — they went for the standard 30, which is the trigger mechanism for the petition of concern. That stops it from being used for some vexatious challenge made for some simple local reason and ensures that a significant body of people will use it for what they believe to be a matter of importance. The Speaker would then have to subject the request to a test to ensure that it is important — the fact that a Minister wants to change to orange street lights may not be considered to be as important as some other issues. If the Speaker decides that it is an important matter, it would then be subject to a debate and a decision by the Assembly on whether it is referred back or not. There would be that criterion of importance, and it would be put into the impartial hands of the Speaker to decide on a non-party basis. Mr Murphy: Also, there was a stipulation in that set of proposals that a matter could only be sent back once. It could not be sent back again by the Assembly. I do not think it is simply a matter of whether the Executive or the Assembly is supreme. There can be sensible discussion on enhancing the accountability of Ministers to the Assembly, and that discussion, I suppose, does cut into the one about placing the ministerial code on a statutory basis. These are things that parties can reach agreement on. Sinn Féin does not consider those issues as a block to re-establishing the institutions. They are important matters. It is simply a matter of finding ways in which Ministers can rightly do their business and the Assembly can feel that it has proper accountability mechanisms in place. It is very rare that a significant decision does not require legislation, which means that a Minister has to bring legislative proposals to the Assembly. There is scope for discussing accountability mechanisms and trying to get the proper balance between getting the Assembly’s business done and the Assembly’s role vis-à-vis Ministers. It is not simply a matter of whether one or other is supreme; it is a matter of getting the balance right, and that is something that the parties could discuss in even more detail than we are able to here. It is something that I can foresee agreement on. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That was useful because no one has ruled out some form of control over the Executive by the Assembly, albeit that some wish for a stronger mechanism than others. I am just going to read the three tentative proposals that are before us at the moment. From the DUP: “There should be a mechanism for the Assembly to refer ministerial decisions to the Executive for consideration.” Mr P Robinson: Let us be clear: the DUP says: “In the absence of the Assembly having overall authority…” which is our preference. The Chairman (Mr Wells): OK. From Naomi Long: “The Assembly should have power on a cross-community vote to negate a ministerial decision.” Mrs Long: Under certain specific controls. It would obviously not be unfettered. Unlike Peter Robinson, I can foresee a situation in which 30 people wished to be vexatious. Mr P Robinson: There could be issues concerning schools or hospitals, and you could get the lower figure quite easily because many people would think that such issues were important. It is a matter of the degree of support that there would be. The Chairman (Mr Wells): And then from Seán: “Further consideration should be given by the Committee to the mechanisms of accountability between the Assembly and the Executive.” That strikes me perhaps as being at the lower end of the scale. Those are the three proposals. Do members wish to start at the bottom and work their way up, as it were? How do you wish to deal with it? It is quite clear that there is some agreement that a mechanism is needed; it is just a matter of degree. Mrs Long: I raised an issue about accountability within the Executive, which is pretty important, because a lack of accountability in the Executive often results in issues reaching the Chamber. As regards the DUP’s proposal to refer a matter back to the Executive, what mechanism is there to deal with that at Executive level? 1.45 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): Far be it from me to cut you short, but “Executive” is a separate heading. We will consider that as a separate issue. Mrs Long: My question is pertinent because I want an explanation. If, for example, the Assembly chose to refer something back to the Executive, what powers would the Executive have over an individual ministerial decision? In the previous Executive, that power was very limited. Mr P Robinson: That is the reason why I would prefer that power to be vested in the Assembly, rather than the Executive. As I indicated, that is only one element of accountability. Let us be clear: Executives will never be perfect; they will make mistakes and ignore issues because of time pressures or whatever. If the Assembly identifies an issue that should have been dealt with differently or with a greater degree of urgency, the Assembly can send it back to the Executive, which would have an opportunity to reflect on its previous decision. The Executive would also be able to take into account the weight of opinion and the nuances raised during an Assembly debate on the issue. My proposal gives the Executive a second chance, as it were. It is a poor alternative to the Assembly having the authority. Mrs Long: That proposal is not mutually exclusive with my proposal, whereby a decision could be sent back to the Executive for further consideration. The Assembly could even choose to negate a decision. The two proposals are not mutually exclusive in that sense. Mr P Robinson: I prefer the proposal to allow a decision to be negated, because that gets back to Assembly authority. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We must do what we did previously, in that where agreement is reached on a set of proposals, they are combined. Dr Farren: We will not reach consensus on either the DUP or Alliance proposals, and perhaps we will not reach consensus on my proposal. However, the argument in favour of my proposal is that it subsumes the other two proposals, in a sense, and does not exclude them from the discussion that we would commit to undertake. To shortcut the discussion, we could vote on my proposal. Obviously, if there is no consensus, there will be no consensus on any of the proposals. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will move up the ladder to see which proposal achieves the greatest degree of consensus. The SDLP proposal is that the Committee should give further consideration to a mechanism of accountability between the Assembly and the Executive. Do we have consensus? Mr P Robinson: That proposal is too limited for us to approve. This is a key issue of accountability that must be dealt with; further consideration is simply not sufficient. We require that that matter be resolved. Dr Farren: With respect, that is your position. Mr P Robinson: I can only give my position. Dr Farren: I know that. That will be made clear in our further discussions. Mr McNarry: I am not taking a position on the proposal. However, with all due respect, it seems that there is a move from the other side of the table to move these issues along. We are trying to produce a report. My concern is that, if we continue on this basis, our report will state that we want further discussion on almost every issue. I understand why that position is being adopted, but could we revisit some issues? Accountability is important. Dr Farren: That is what I am saying. Mr McNarry: We could come back to those issues in order to fulfil our obligations to produce a report in a more definitive way. What Seán is saying, with all due respect, is that the report will say that the Committee was unable to agree so many items in the time allotted. It should be borne in mind that the report will be put before the Assembly to debate, and it is hoped that there will be an outcome from that. I do not want the Committee to produce a report with so many ifs. Mr McFarland: Can I just find out — Dr Farren: Given that the question was directed at me, can I reply? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Let Seán answer the question. Dr Farren: I have made it clear that I have never viewed the report that the Committee hopes to present on 11 September as a final report in which all the issues have been wrapped up. Last week, I think that it was agreed that the Committee might have made only a modest achievement by then, whereby parties — Mr McNarry: Consensus is a matter at which the Committee arrives. However, if the Committee’s failure to reach consensus is simply because it cannot achieve it by a specified date but may be able to do so later after a certain amount of reconsidering, perhaps we should dispose of the issue now. Dr Farren: That would be the effect of my proposal. Mr McFarland: Does the SDLP need more time to consult or does it feel that this issue should be left to the negotiations? If either of those applies, should the Committee move on and come back to the issue when the report is being drafted? The Chairman (Mr Wells): The proposal was for further consideration by the Committee. I see this as simply parking the issue and coming back to it at a future meeting. Mr McFarland: Yes. I am just trying to tease out that that is what Seán means by his motion. Dr Farren: Yes. Mr McFarland: Therefore the Committee will revisit the issue before the report is completed. Mrs Long: Before moving to Seán’s motion, it may be better to test the two proposals to determine whether they have consensus because it — Mr McNarry: He just said that there was no consensus. Mr McFarland: Seán said that because there was no consensus — Mrs Long: It would be logical to test the two more detailed proposals first, and if neither of them reaches consensus, we should move to Seán’s proposal to suggest further reconsideration by the Committee. Mr Murphy: Part of the difficulty is that the proposals are not detailed enough. It is a complicated issue that is tied in with the ministerial code, which the Committee has not yet discussed. It is not enough to use a half-hour discussion and a verbal proposal to deal with accountability between the Executive and the Assembly. We need to consider other issues, such as how the proposals would affect the ministerial code. If members have proposals — and I am not averse to agreeing proposals to get some of these issues dealt with and out of the way — the Committee would need to see significant, detailed outworkings. The problem does not lie with the detailed proposals; it lies with the lack of detail in the proposals and, perhaps, with a lack of consideration of how they might impinge on other areas that the Committee has not yet discussed. Mrs Long: If Seán’s proposal were expanded to say what the mechanism would be, it may be possible to reach consensus on it. Several matters have been deferred for future consideration already today. Will there be more detailed papers on those issues? What mechanism is there to allow those of us who have suggestions to make them to ensure that when the Committee comes to discuss this issue again it is not put on the long finger? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Consensus was not reached because the DUP objected — Mrs Long: Yes, I am aware — The Chairman (Mr Wells): We need to hear from the DUP whether there is any possibility of moving the issue forward on that basis. Mr P Robinson: I do not mind discussing the issue again; I am merely making it clear that it is in the deal-breaker category. Rather than being put on the long finger, this matter requires resolution. The Chairman (Mr Wells): On that basis, if I were to put Seán’s proposal again, could members reach consensus? Mr P Robinson: I have a fear — I am sure that it is unrealistic — that by the time the Committee finishes this process, the Assembly’s first sitting will be upon us. After the Assembly has debated the Committee’s findings, the November deadline will have arrived, and there will be very little time to fix anything. Mr McFarland: I propose that the Committee recognises that this is a key issue and that it comes back — Mrs Foster: Is it a priority? Mr P Robinson: Either here or during the negotiations. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there a specific date on which the Committee will return to the issue? Mr McFarland: The business of where power lies was mentioned earlier. It would be useful if the parties could do a little bit of work on that. I suggest that those three issues be lumped together as a specific accountability issue to be taken after item 4, if not before, in strand one. That would allow us time to take legal advice on the accountability of the Assembly and the extent of its authority. At that stage, the Committee could revisit the issue, with parties having had more time to discuss it privately. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Would slotting in those three issues, in order that we do not miss them out, allay the DUP’s concerns? Mr P Robinson: I am quite content with that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We seem to have got around the problem. The proposal is that the Committee should give further consideration to the mechanisms of accountability between the Assembly and the Executive. Do members agree? Members indicated assent. Mr McFarland: May we make that a fifth heading under “The Assembly”? The Chairman (Mr Wells): After “Stability”? Mr McFarland: Yes. Mr Campbell: Do you mean that points 9, 10 and 11 under “Accountability/Safeguards” become a fifth heading? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes. Mr McFarland: We need some legal advice on the implications of having power devolved from Parliament to the Assembly rather than to the Departments. That will impinge on what Peter asked earlier. We are now saying: “Well, if it is this way, it will be this; if it is that way, it will be that.” That will give us some guidance on whether it is possible to look at devolving power to the Assembly, and that will obviously have a bearing on the issues of who has the authority to challenge the Executive, etc. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Let us take that as a formal proposal in order to get consensus on it. Are members agreed that we have a fifth heading, after “Stability”? That would guarantee that the Committee would return to the issue. Mr Murphy: I would be content with that. However, I am conscious that we would deal with the fifth heading before any discussion on the ministerial code, which has an impact on the issues to be discussed under the fifth heading. The ministerial code comes under the heading of “The Executive”. There is a great deal of overlap. What we are discussing here has a significant bearing on the discussions around the ministerial code. Mr McFarland: We could make it a new item 2 under “The Executive”. That would put it back slightly further. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The Clerk reminds me that we have also agreed to look again at the voting system. We need to put that in as well, so that we do not forget to return to it. It will all be in Hansard and in the minutes, so I do not see how we can forget about it, but in case anyone fears that we will try to pull a fast one — Mrs Long: Mr Murphy’s point about the impact that collectivity in the Executive has on any proposals for accountability is important. It is a point that we have made before, and we want the fact that we are dealing with it to be recognised in some way. There will be considerable overlap, and it will not be possible to achieve a perfect formula, so we are not going to be difficult about it. Mr McFarland: The issue of where power is vested in Northern Ireland is already mentioned under “The Executive”, at the last bullet point under “Accountability/Safeguards”. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We still have this suggestion that we take some form of legal advice on the mechanism for transferring power. Mr McFarland: At the current rate, we could do that between now and when we get around to discussing the Executive. The Chairman (Mr Wells): As long as we agree to do that. Mr P Robinson: We would not have any great difficulty in putting it under “The Executive”. The important point is that it should be considered before we finish with strand one issues. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is everyone happy enough with that? Our research staff can have a look at the whole issue of how to devolve power to the Assembly rather than to Departments. Members indicated assent. Dr Farren: We are beginning to identify some substantial issues that parties indicate are possible deal-breakers, and also issues that, although they may not fall into that category, are quite important. It may be useful to have brief papers from the parties at some point on some or all of those issues. As we get into them, it will be difficult to treat them on the basis of oral discussions without having given prior consideration to what other parties think about how those issues might be resolved. The parties probably have position papers available anyway, so it would be good if some of their proposals for resolving the issues were circulated in advance. Today’s discussion has been very helpful, but that seems to be the direction in which we will head as we get into more detailed discussion on the issues. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are the parties content? We have lost a party. Naomi Long has gone to the ladies’. Mr McNarry: She said that I could vote for her by proxy. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I do not think that it is permanent. Mr Campbell: Losing an entire party could be down to carelessness. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The Clerks have confirmed that it is possible to do that sort of research. Our researcher, Dr Gilleece, has moved on to the economic challenges subgroup, but we can certainly get that done. Are we happy to draw “Accountability/Safeguards” for the Assembly to a conclusion? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am very encouraged because, reviewing the evidence that has been presented this morning, there has been little or no overlap with the long question-and-answer session that we had in June. Members have clearly taken advice to try to present new material and to mine a little deeper, and that is much appreciated. Let us hope that that continues. 2.00 pm We move on to “Committee Systems”. There are four items under that sub-heading, the first of which is “Committee Structures”. We have had first-hand experience of the Committee system, which, incidentally, met for 30 months. I understand that the Assembly lasted for 97 months, and the Committees operated for 30 months of that — about one third. In that, I am including such Committees as the Committee of the Centre. Therefore we have had some experience of their operation. Do members have any concerns about Committees? Mr P Robinson: Can we deal with the Committee of the Centre first? Hopefully, we will reach agreement on that. As OFMDFM is a recognised Department, the Committee of the Centre should have the same statutory rights of scrutiny that other Departments’ Committees have. Not only junior Ministers should be answerable to that Committee. OFMDFM should be answerable in the same way as Ministers of other Departments. Mr Murphy: When the Committee of the Centre was being set up under Standing Orders — I do not know whether we need to see a list of the functions to agree all of this — there was a discussion about the range of matters that it would scrutinise. The Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister brought forward its own draft Standing Order that limited the scope of the Committee of the Centre’s scrutiny functions to a number of areas within the Department, and excluded some others. Given the Department’s discussions, I would have thought that it would be difficult to reach agreement on a valid argument for non-scrutiny of certain functions. However, if we were to look again at placing it on a statutory footing, we would also need to re-examine the range of issues in OFMDFM that the Committee of the Centre can look at under current Standing Orders. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Does anyone have any other views on the Committee of the Centre? Mr McFarland: There is an issue over its size. Previously, there was an attempt to have every party represented on the Committee of the Centre, but if it is going to be a Statutory Committee, it will make sense to have it constructed on the same basis as other Committees. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It presently has 17 members. Mr McFarland: It used to have 19 members, did it not? The Chairman (Mr Wells): I presume that that included the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman. Ms Lewsley: I was a member of the previous Committee of the Centre, and I agree with what Conor said about its wide remit. There were many issues that some of us would have liked to have been given priority, but they did not see the light of day in the Committee. Alan McFarland commented on the size of the Committee of the Centre. Many Committees found it difficult to get a quorum at times. For example, the Committee for Finance and Personnel, which often sat on a Tuesday afternoon when the House was sitting, often found itself inquorate. However, the Committee of the Centre got through a fair amount of business because it had so many members. Therefore, I would be cautious about reducing its membership dramatically, because we often found that it was difficult for other Committees to get a quorum and get business done. The Chairman (Mr Wells): All of those issues are covered by the DUP suggestion that the Committee of the Centre be established on the same basis as a Statutory Committee. That simplifies it. Mr P Robinson: The DUP’s suggestion is that all of the business of OFMDFM be scrutinised; nothing should be hidden from scrutiny. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Unusually for a Committee, the specific issues that can be dealt with by the Committee of the Centre are listed in Standing Orders, but other Committees can deal with the entire remit of their Department. That is why the Committee was constrained in what it was permitted to examine. Are there any fundamental problems with that? Ms Lewsley: The Committee of the Centre had a large remit and, as far as I remember, it was the only Committee that had the opportunity to create a subcommittee on European issues; there was a lot of commitment asked of it. It was later decided that we needed to look at subcommittees in an attempt to deal with some of the business that was coming before the Committee. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There would be 11 Statutory Committees, assuming that there are 11 Departments. Mr P Robinson: The Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister had fewer functions than most of the larger Departments. It dabbled in some issues on which it overlapped with other Departments, and that probably extended its role beyond what it should have been. That comes back to the question of the role of OFMDFM. Mr McNarry: It would also be normal to factor in issues, not of national security, but of high specification, about which the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister would have been reluctant to talk. Some understanding should have been given when probing the First Minister or the Deputy First Minister about meetings that they had separately, or jointly, with international figures. I do not think that Peter was saying that everything should be divulged. Mr P Robinson: The amount of information that is divulged will always be up to the Minister. Seán, Michael and I may have, from time to time, decided that certain things were not ready to be made public. Mr McNarry: Surely not. On water, for instance? Mr P Robinson: Ministers made it very clear that they were against water charging and privatisation. There was no reluctance on that one. Dr Farren: I will not start to divulge state secrets here. Mr P Robinson: Please do. When I stepped down as Minister at the Department for Regional Development, I made an effort to obtain all the papers that a former Minister is allowed. I went over them, page by page, during a debate in the House of Commons, and anyone can read that in Hansard. No one in the House challenged any issues, including the then First Minister. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am glad that there is no political point scoring going on this afternoon. The Committee of the Centre would be reduced to 11 members were it to become a Statutory Committee. The Assembly decided to put the Chairman of the Committee of the Centre on the same footing as the 10 Chairmen of the other Committees. Therefore it recognised at an early stage the important work of that Committee. Do we have consensus that we put the Committee of the Centre on the same footing as the other 10? Mr McNarry: Does the Public Accounts Committee operate on the same basis? The Chairman (Mr Wells): The other Standing Committees do not. Dr Farren: Does that include all Statutory Committees? The Chairman (Mr Wells): The Committee of the Centre was not a Statutory Committee. Dr Farren: I know, but you are talking about the other Statutory or departmental Committees. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There are 10 Statutory Committees, and the Committee of the Centre would make 11. We are talking here only about the Committee of the Centre. Committees such as the Public Accounts Committee and the Committee on Standards and Privileges are different issues altogether. There are not the same burning issues there. Are members agreed? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will move on to “Committee Structures”, “Formation of Committees” and “Role and effectiveness of Committees”. Are members happy with how Committees were set up, and how each party was represented on them, and so forth? Mr McFarland: The UUP introduced the point about the “Role and effectiveness of Committees”, because one role of Committees was to introduce legislation. Several attempts were made to make that happen, but I am unsure whether it happened in the end. One issue that constrained Committees was the fact that they did not have a budget or the research staff to develop the legal framework for introducing legislation. Members who served on Committees were always busy with issues, and those issues often ran in parallel. Unless there was a burning issue, Committee members were unable to persuade their party colleagues on the Executive to introduce legislation. Therefore Committee members were asked by party colleagues on the Executive what sort of legislation they intended to introduce and whether it went against ministerial decisions. What happened if a Committee could not get the Executive to introduce a burning piece of legislation, so it decided to introduce the legislation itself and needed a substantial amount of money to pay drafting staff, etc? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Individual Members had the right to introduce private Member’s Bills, and work had started on a couple of those before the Assembly collapsed. The advice and assistance from researchers and clerical staff that Members received was also available to the Committees. Mr McFarland: I looked into introducing legislation, as did the Committee for Regional Development, and the difficulty was that it requires a substantial amount of money. The Assembly research staff did not have the time for legal drafting, and there is also a massive shortage of legal drafting staff in the Departments. The lack of draftsmen or draftswomen meant that much of the legislation that the Executive tried to introduce became bogged down. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The Assembly Commission, of which I was a member, had a separate budget set aside for drafting legislation, and it was barely used. The Commission never became involved in the introduction of a private Member’s Bill or a Committee Bill, because there simply was not enough time. Mr McFarland: My understanding was that there was no one to write the legislation. Ms Lewsley: There was. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes, there was. Ms Lewsley: As my private Member’s Bill was due to go to the House on the day of suspension, I have gone through the whole process. There are only four legal writers in the entire UK. However, the opportunity was there for individuals or Committees to go through that process and the money was available. In fact, before suspension the Speaker was quite keen on legislation being introduced. The support was there and it was a case of looking for a gap in Assembly business. However, there is a proper process involved in introducing a private Member’s Bill. The Bill must be subject to an equality impact assessment and must go out to consultation. My private Member’s Bill went out to consultation twice and had the backing of the relevant Department. A lot of background work is required, but it certainly is possible for a Committee or an individual to introduce legislation. Mr McGimpsey: Nevertheless, there is a shortage of resources in the system. Several Departments shared a Bill team, so it was necessary to prioritise. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There was a separate fund for the Assembly to pioneer and progress Bills. For instance, one Member wanted to give farmers the right to build bungalows, and that Bill was in the process of going through to the Assembly. Mr McGimpsey: Are you talking about money or about Bill teams? Bill teams have particular expertise; it is not only about money. Ms Lewsley: I can speak only from my own experience. I had the support of the Business Committee, whose team liases with the legal writers. Departments differ in that they have teams to put together legislation. Mr McGimpsey: The problem is that some Departments do not have their own teams. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alan, I can assure you that that is not the case. If a Member had had the time to go through the process, the resources were available. Mr McFarland: Conor sat with me on one of the early Committees that examined the introduction of legislation. When Assembly staff advised us that the resources were not available, we backed off. Things may have changed since, and perhaps additional staff have been brought in over the last two years, or there may have been money available that we were not told about. We were assured that the infrastructure was not in place to allow the Committee to introduce legislation. Dr Farren: Why are we discussing this? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes, I was going to say that we are going down a route that — Mr McFarland: We are discussing this because it is directly related to the role of the Committees. There is a question as to whether Committees should introduce legislation. Perhaps not, and in that case there would not be an issue. However if, as under the current legislation negotiated as part of the Belfast Agreement, Committees can introduce legislation, the problem is that in the first Assembly, Committees were told that the resources were not available to allow them to do so. That is why, since 2002, the UUP has included this issue in its list for discussion in a forum such as this. The Chairman (Mr Wells): This is not an institutional issue. The Commission can release as much or as little money as is necessary to ensure that the Committees are properly serviced when introducing Bills. That is entirely an Assembly Commission decision, but it does not relate to the structure of the Committees. Mr McFarland: My point is that when a Committee tried to introduce a Bill in the first Assembly, it was told that no money was available. Mr P Robinson: In that case, you had a right to tell the Assembly Commission to fulfil its obligations. Mr McFarland: We were told that there was no money. Therefore, my point is twofold. First, in the light of the experience of the first Assembly, do Committees need the ability and the funding to introduce private legislation when the parties on those Committees are in the Executive, which could do it for them? Secondly, we must ensure that if Committees retain the ability to introduce legislation, funding is available to pay for draftsmen and research facilities. 2.15 pm Mr Murphy: As well as being a member of that Committee, I chaired the Committee on Procedures, which carried out various investigations into how the business of the House was conducted. I am clear in my recollection that the Committee was advised that there were resource issues, not necessarily financial, and that drafting resources were tied up on Executive work and would not necessarily be made available to the Committees. I recall that, towards the end of the Assembly, limited resources were made available to allow individual Members to introduce Bills, but not necessarily to the Committees. It was discussed earlier that given the nature of the Administration, Committees are the first line of opposition to the Executive. I agree that that is the case. Committees should be able to introduce legislation if their members feel that an issue is important and the Department or the Minister does not share those feelings. It is part of the agreement. I wore a number of different hats in the last Assembly and it was always clear to me that resources were an issue. However, if that were not the case, and all necessary resources — not just financial — would definitely be made available to any Statutory Committee that wanted to introduce legislation, could we have written evidence of that? Alan McFarland asked whether Committees should have the right to introduce legislation, and I agree that it is important that they do. Given that we have a mandatory coalition, it very often happens that opposition to the Executive comes from the Committee system, and that should not be diluted in any way. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are you proposing that the necessary resources and expertise should be made available to enable Committees to introduce independent Bills? Mr Murphy: If members can be assured that resources have always been available, the proposal is unnecessary. Could the Committee receive confirmation that resources were available? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will do that. We will delve in to this to find out where the perception came — [Interruption.] Mr P Robinson: Surely a Committee should not have to concern itself with resources. If it believes that it is right to introduce legislation, it is up to the officials to source the resources. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am trying to move things on. This is not the main issue on the effectiveness of the Committees. Ms Lewsley: It is not right to put members of Committees in the position where they have to put pressure on Ministers from their parties. A Minister may have totally different priorities to those of the Committee. Committees should make their own decisions to introduce legislation, which, hopefully, would have the sanction of the Ministers. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We can get this issue sorted out. However, given the 30 months’ experience gained from the previous Assembly, there must be more substantive matters of concern about the role of the Committees and their effectiveness. Mr McFarland: By and large, the Committees were the one element that worked well in the first Assembly. In most cases, the Ministers were co-operative. Two of the Ministers that I served under are here, and although I am slightly reluctant to say it, both of them were very good to their Committee. However, some Committees did not have good relationships with their Ministers. I do not know whether anything can be done about that, because part of it depends on the temperaments of the Minister and the Chairperson of the Committee. In most cases, however, the Committees worked well when there was goodwill on both sides. Most Departments were open with their Committees, which I think was the key to their success. There was no major problem in the two Committees on which I served in the first Assembly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): This question is for the older Members of the Assembly. Were there any other — [Laughter.] Can I say “more experienced”? Ms Lewsley: So you do not mean “older”, as in “age”, but “older” as in “more experienced”. Thank you very much. I am glad that you qualified that. I served on five different Committees during the last Assembly and they worked very well. As a member of the Committee for Finance and Personnel, I know that some Members had an issue about scrutinising the Budget before it came to fruition. The Committee for the Environment found that, since the greater part of the Budget was being spent according to EU directives, there was no significant contribution to be made, and that any of the Committee’s priorities were overridden by demands on the Budget. In the round, the Committees worked very well, and Members used their positions well in making Ministers accountable on many issues. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We do not seem to have concerns about the present system. Mr P Robinson: There are some issues relating to Committees bringing forward legislation and some parameters must be accepted. A Committee’s legislation on a subject should give way to the Department’s legislation if they are on the same issue. No one wants two different bodies going head-to-head with legislation on the same issue. There are also finance issues. Dr Farren will know more about that than I do, however, most legislation has a price tag attached. A Committee should not attempt to enlarge a departmental budget by legislation. There is a requirement for the cost to be approved by the Department of Finance and Personnel. Dr Farren: The protocols would spell that out. Most legislation has resource implications. If Committees did not take those implications into account, they would be ignoring significant aspects of their responsibilities. Committees would want to take account of resources — and enhancing departmental resources is something that Committees would want to see as a priority. At the end of the day it is a balancing exercise about what is possible across Government. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There are two safeguards in this respect. First, any legislation requiring reallocation of resources has to be approved by the Minister of Finance and Personnel. That is normal. Secondly, if the Business Committee saw legislation coming from a Committee and from a Department, presumably it would rule as to whether it was appropriate to have both on the Floor at once. Mr McFarland: I disagree with Mr Robinson’s first point. If Members are to operate Committees as a safeguard, it is essential that those Committees can bring forward legislation that is not agreed or in keeping with the Department’s policy. He is right on his second point. It is daft for a Committee to try to bring forward legislation that has no money attached to it, unless it is something that does not need finance. It is questionable whether a Committee may bring forward legislation that is not cleared by the Department of Finance and Personnel or indeed the relevant Department. There is a question here about the right of a Committee to bring forward legislation. That is sacrosanct. However, if there is a cost attached to it, that Committee has to understand that it is not going to succeed without clearance from the system. Mr P Robinson: Let us be clear about the first point. I would have thought that there is no contention about it. If a Committee wishes to bring forward legislation on subject A, and the Department says that it has already taken steps, the Committee should give way to the Department. The Committee may well seek to amend the Minister’s legislation, but I do not think that two sets of legislation should be prepared. Mr McFarland: If that is the scenario I accept it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We can get around that concern. I am concerned that these have been flagged up as issues of concern and yet hearing various individuals, generally, as the structures stand, there seems to be general contentment. Mr P Robinson: You keep going back to this “flagged up as issues of concern”; in many cases these were flagged up as component parts of devolution, some of which may well be agreed. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is true, although I have been alerted to the fact that issues such as proportionality in Committees and d’Hondt might be of concern to individuals. Are people content not so much with how Committees operate but about how they are formed? Naomi raised a point earlier that she would prefer that we start with the Executive and run right down through the Committees on a very elongated d’Hondt system — presumably because the smaller parties would be better represented. Mrs Long: No, because the overall reflective balance would be much fairer. D’Hondt operates best when there is a large pool of posts; when the pool is small, d’Hondt is not as representative. Huge anomalies are created. When the Committee discusses a reduction in the number of Departments, members will no doubt see huge anomalies in the division within the Executive. Those anomalies are thrown up when there is a small pool of posts. The SDLP raised the issue of running d’Hondt, and I sought clarification on proportionality. The Alliance Party’s preferred system would not be d’Hondt, but, given that the Committee gave my party’s preferred system the thumbs down when it was raised at a previous meeting, I am exploring option B, which is to run d’Hondt with a larger pool of posts, thereby creating a more reflective balance. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do you propose that d’Hondt be run the whole way down the line, including in the formation of Committees? Dr Farren: I would be happy to join Naomi in proposing that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are there any views on that? My council, Down District Council, adopted that approach, and the smaller parties did much better as a result. Mrs Long: That is news to me, but welcome news. Mr Campbell: That did not mean that you got the chairmanship post that you wanted. The Chairman (Mr Wells): No, it did not. Mr Campbell: That is another matter. Mrs Long: You will get it. Dr Farren: You will, if you stick around long enough — another 20 years. Mr Campbell: He has only been there for 30 years. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do folk think that d’Hondt should be run once only for the appointment of Ministers, for Committee Chairpersons and Vice-Chairpersons, and for membership of Statutory and Standing Committees? In other words, do we run d’Hondt for more than 150 positions? Dr Farren: That is not problematic. Mr Campbell: That is just crazy. Dr Farren: We will have to run d’Hondt for 110 places on Statutory Committees, in any case. The Chairman (Mr Wells): If we are to have 11 Statutory Committees, there will be 121 positions on Statutory Committees. Mrs Long: Only 11 posts are being added, so that can hardly mean that the situation moves from being completely acceptable to completely ludicrous. Mr P Robinson: The Member who gets the first choice can say: “Do I want to be the Minister of Finance and Personnel, or do I want to be Deputy Chairman of some obscure departmental Committee?” Mrs Long: If the Member thought that the latter post was so obscure, I imagine that it would be a simple choice for him or her to make. Mr P Robinson: It is back to the jelly beans and liquorice allsorts. We are dealing with two entirely different matters, and d’Hondt must be run for matters that are similar. Chairman, if it is a lack of consensus that you want registered, I register it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is the end of that argument. Dr Farren: What if Naomi breaks her own maxim and says that this is a deal-breaker as far as the Alliance Party is concerned? Mrs Long: The Alliance Party is not here to be difficult, not even when I am taking the lead. Mr P Robinson: There was a time when the Alliance Party was not even here. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have really highlighted only two issues: legislation and d’Hondt. Mr Robinson made the point that we should not necessarily see it as being a problem, so can we therefore get past Committee issues with very little difficulty? Mr P Robinson: Are you dealing with “Committee structures”? The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Committee structures” and “Formation of Committees”. Mr P Robinson: I want to raise two issues under “Formation of Committees”. The first we may come to later under “Efficiency/Effectiveness” and is the need to constantly examine the efficiency of devolution and the way in which the Assembly operates, and the need for a Committee for that purpose. The other matter, which has almost been accepted, is the mechanism/institutional review Committee. We referred a matter to that Committee earlier, so we can assume that it exists. 2.30 pm The proposals for a comprehensive agreement stated that Assembly Committees should have the power to call the chairpersons and chief executives of North/South implementation bodies before them annually. Because those bodies are of a North/South nature, that power does not currently exist. Committees could do so by grace and favour, but it is better to have the power — the Dáil has the power to do so. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Under the strand two headings are “Assembly scrutiny of implementation bodies” and “Operation (efficiency) of North/South bodies”. Would it be preferable to discuss that now rather than under the strand two heading? Mr P Robinson: It is more relevant to an Assembly Committee than it is to a North/South implementation body. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Let us get it out of the way. What are members’ views? Currently, chairpersons and chief executives of North/South bodies can be invited to appear before a Committee but they do not have to come. Should Committees have the right to compel them to give evidence and answer questions? Mr McFarland: In essence, it is a good idea. There is a question in relation to the legal basis of those bodies: were those bodies not established by an international treaty and are therefore separate from other legislation? I seem to remember that hiring staff, duties of staff, functioning of the bodies and so on were discrete issues between two nations, as it were. What are our powers, or the powers of an individual Government, to effect that option? Mr P Robinson: The international treaty is between two parties — the British and Irish Governments. Those are the parties who made the proposal and, whatever their mechanism, it is presumably they who will agree that it can be done. Mr McFarland: I see what you mean. Dr Farren: I see no reason why chairpersons of North/South bodies would not have more or less the same position vis-à-vis Committees as permanent secretaries and so on. They are discharging functions on behalf of the public, and are answerable to Ministers on a day-to-day basis, through the North/South Ministerial Council, but they do not appear before Committees, except, as Peter says, by invitation. I am not sure what the effect of moving from that position to a “power to compel” would be. However, they should attend; if that requires those posts to have the same status as permanent secretaries, that is fine. I do not know what the pitfalls of that might be, but the more information that is available to Assembly Members about how the implementation bodies operate, the better. Mr Murphy: I presume that, if Sinn Féin is content with the arrangements in the Oireachtas in relation to these matters, it will be content with similar arrangements here. If those people appear before Oireachtas Committees, I do not see why we would not have them here. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We seem to have consensus that Assembly Committees should have the power to summon chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of North/South implementation bodies at its meetings. Mr McFarland: Does that include chief executives? Mr P Robinson: It would have to. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes. Chairpersons and deputy chairpersons are different to chief executives. Do you want to expand that to include chief executives? Mr P Robinson: I said chairpersons and chief executives. Mr Murphy: It was mentioned that the provision to call such persons would be at least yearly. I presume that that would be scrutinised so that vexatious demands would not be put on people to appear every other week before a Committee. Safeguards would have to be built in to ensure that it is proper scrutiny and that people are not being put through their paces too often. Mr McFarland: If a certain Committee were at war with its relevant permanent secretary and was behaving in a silly way, that would quickly become clear and would get back to the Minister and questions would be asked in the House. The Committees would have to be sensible, and separate guidance is not required. All parties are represented on Committees, and parties would have to agree in order to haul in permanent secretaries or whoever every week. Safeguards are already built into the Committee structure, so it would be somewhat strange if specific safeguards were created for this issue. Dr Farren: North/South implementation bodies are part of the agreement between the British and Irish Governments, and it would be appropriate to take their views on the matter. We want to achieve this, but we need to hear what the Governments might have to say. I do not imagine that they would be awkward about it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do we have consensus about chairmen and chief executives? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Peter Robinson proposes the establishment of an institutional review Committee for the Northern Ireland Assembly to examine the operational aspects of strand one. Mr McFarland: Did Peter say that one proposal was on procedures, or was one on something else and one on the institutions? Can the existing Committee on Procedures, which examines how the Assembly does business, be expanded? Mr Murphy: The Committee on Procedures examines Standing Orders. Mr McFarland: Could that Committee examine the workings of the Assembly? Once Standing Orders are in place, and unless something specifically changes, by and large the Committee on Procedures has a monitoring role. We are bedded down fairly well after the first mandate of the Assembly, but Standing Orders may have to be tweaked if the Assembly gets up and running again. Could the Committee on Procedures monitor the areas that Peter wants to be monitored? Mr P Robinson: No, it could not. The Committee on Procedures examines, within the existing legal framework, the Standing Orders on Assembly procedures. We are discussing a change to the legal framework, so it is a wider remit. The proposed Committee would not meet every week. It would be a Standing Committee, so it could meet when a party feels that an issue needs to be resolved. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are we content, with those few additions, to leave the “Committee System” behind and move on? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will move on to “Efficiency/Effectiveness”. I did not expect to get this far today, so we are making good progress. We will then take Peter’s proposal formally. We have discussed at length why it is felt that this Committee is needed. Mrs Long: The Alliance Party supports the creation of an institutional review Committee. It was referenced earlier in the context of the four-year reviews that were set up under the agreement. We would not accept that the proposed Committee would be a substitute for those four-year reviews, although the Committee could examine institutional issues. The agreement was signed by other parties, including the two Governments, therefore, the all-encompassing review process would still need to stand because of the involvement of the two Governments. An institutional review Committee would be a useful mechanism to deal with any changes to the institutions. Mr McFarland: We are happy enough with the fact that such a Committee may be needed. Some issues will need to be left to that Committee because they are either not solvable at the moment or they are wider issues, and it would be useful for this Committee to have a view on those issues. As I mentioned earlier, if we can solve issues to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Assembly before it is fired up again, it would be useful to do that, rather than to put everything off until some time during the next Assembly mandate. If some issues can be dealt with in advance, we can leave other issues that are so large or complicated that they may need to be left to an institutional review Committee. Mr Murphy: It is clear that there is a need for a mechanism, beyond the reinstatement of the institutions, for the conclusion of some of the issues outstanding from the formal review of the Good Friday Agreement. Perhaps that formal process has not been concluded and needs to be tidied up in some way; it is unclear. However, there is some need for an agreed mechanism to address some of the outstanding issues. The difficulties in setting up an institutional review Committee are that we would need to know its remit and make-up, its lifespan, and whether it is an Ad Hoc Committee to sort out issues that are outstanding from our work, or whether it will continue to examine issues as they arise. Where does that fit in with the formal review of the Good Friday Agreement that takes place every four years? To my knowledge, that review started but was not concluded. At the start of this meeting, an issue was raised about a paper that David Hanson has on some of these issues. That paper has not made its way to us, and there has been no communication from the Government about that. That paper may be on matters that the Government were working on, which may cut across the work of this Committee. We may be able to agree, in principle, a mechanism to deal with these issues, but a lot more flesh needs to be put on the bones. I do not have difficulty in agreeing in principle that a mechanism be established, but we would have to see what exactly that is and how it relates to the other work that is still out in the ether, which has not yet been concluded. Mr P Robinson: Mr Chairman, there is sense in what Alan McFarland said. If the Government bring forward legislation to make changes so that we can move forward with the institutions— as I believe they must — that will be the best opportunity to make any other changes that might be considered by other people to improve the institutions. Any changes will require legislation at Westminster, because they will require alterations to the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Time will not be readily available at Westminster for that type of legislation, so if we wish to take the imminent opportunity for change, we should try to resolve some of the other issues now, rather than simply let them hang around. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We seem to have two very similar proposals. Mr Murphy has proposed that a mechanism be established in the Northern Ireland Assembly to examine the operational aspects of strand one. Peter has proposed that an institutional review Committee of the Assembly be established to examine the operational aspects of strand one. Is there enough between those two proposals that we need to deal with them separately, or are we happy to run with one of them? It strikes me that there is not an awful lot between those two positions. Mr P Robinson: The further element is whether, in conjunction with the Executive, consideration might be given to changes to strand two. We are not attempting to say that strand two is perfect, are we? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We could opt for a similar mechanism when we discuss strand two issues. I am trying to finish the strand one discussions today, if we can, although I have my doubts. 2.45 pm Dr Farren: Let us not complicate the issues. I am happy with either proposal, as long as we are clear that the general overall review of the agreement stands. As somebody said, there are far more participants than those represented around this table. I am a little concerned about the institutional review. However, as long as it is understood that the review is of the operation of the institutions rather than a fundamental review, I am happy to accept the proposal. Mr Murphy: The proposal should be more vague — it is fairly specific in relation to strand one. We can agree to consider the creation of a mechanism to deal with all outstanding issues on the operation of the institutions, pending the review of the Good Friday Agreement, which has yet to be concluded. However, there are outstanding strands to be picked up, including what has been done in this Committee, that will probably be dealt with on the other side of devolution. If there are issues that can be resolved here, that is well and good, but there are outstanding issues that can be resolved after devolution. The parties can agree a mechanism to do that, which must take into account the outstanding work of both Governments and pick up those issues as well. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will keep the ball rolling. I will put the DUP proposal and, depending — Mr P Robinson: I want to make it clear that it is a stand-alone proposal without reference to any wakes that might be held for the Belfast Agreement. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The proposal is that an institutional review Committee in the Assembly should be established to examine the operational aspects of strand one. Do we have consensus? Mr Murphy: The proposal is fairly narrow. I would prefer to have some detail about how the Committee will conduct its business. Alternatively, the proposal should be sufficiently vague to allow us to determine the detail of the Committee’s remit, title and so on at a later stage. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there consensus? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The second proposal is that a mechanism should be established in the Northern Ireland Assembly to examine the operational aspects of strand one. Do we have consensus? Mr P Robinson: It is too vague. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there a halfway house between a mechanism and an institutional review? If both proposals fall, we have nothing. Mr P Robinson: We could perhaps agree that there should be a mechanism or institutional review. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Would that be a possible compromise? Mr Murphy: I do not mind. That allows for a number of variations, and it is not specific on the title or remit of any such Committee. However, there are issues that we are dealing with here, issues that have been dealt with in the review and outstanding issues in the ether, currently within David Hanson’s remit, that need to be picked up. We therefore need to leave sufficient scope and flexibility in how we deal with those on the other side of restoration. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Peter, you said that we could agree “a mechanism for an institutional review”? Mr P Robinson: A mechanism or institutional review. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there consensus on that proposal? Mr McFarland: What is the precise wording of that? The Chairman (Mr Wells): The proposal is that a mechanism or institutional review be established in the Northern Ireland Assembly to examine the operational aspects of strand one. Do we have consensus? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We come now to “Dual/triple mandate”. Many members will have an interest to declare on this matter. There are members with dual and triple mandates; I do not think that anyone has a quadruple mandate, although there have been such cases in the past. This issue concerns the right of an MLA to be an MP, a district councillor, or whatever. Who raised that as a concern? Mr McFarland: We did, Chairman. The Review of Public Administration (RPA) legislation sorts out the business of being a councillor and an MLA, as we understand it. The Scottish Parliament did some soul-searching on this matter, and there seemed to be no effort to stop anyone being an MP and a Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP). The press took up the issue, asking how Members could be at Westminster and in Edinburgh at the same time. It ended up with a campaign, and they may have won the dual-hatted status, but all the rest decided that they were either Members of the Scottish Parliament or Members of Parliament at Westminster. If we had devolution, the only things that would be left at Westminster would be Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Treasury. Everything else would be here. How can someone be a full-time MLA, giving of his or her best as a member on, perhaps, two Committees, serving his or her constituents, or even being a Minister, and also attending Westminster for all the debates? There is a problem if the Assembly is settled. I can understand why people would not want to bale out of councils, the Assembly or from being a MP. One could argue that it is unhealthy for political parties, and for politics generally, to have double-, triple- or quadruple-hatted folk, because they are clearly not giving of their best in their various elected positions. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Dare I ask whether there is any reaction to that? Dr Farren: To borrow from an old slogan: one mandate, one person. It could also be possible that we might have Members of the Irish Senate, the Dáil— Mr P Robinson: Or the House of Lords. Mrs Foster: Do not tell Lord Morrow. Mr P Robinson: Or John Taylor. Dr Farren: The House of Lords, indeed; I knew that there was a third one. Timing is an obligation. Given the instability of the first mandate of the Assembly, it would have been unrealistic and unfair to have required those people who were councillors to choose between council membership and Assembly membership at the time of the first Assembly election or, indeed, soon thereafter. It is a question of when it could be brought into effect. The more stable the Assembly, the greater the case for bringing it in sooner with respect to Assembly Members. Mrs Long: I agree with Seán about a phasing-in period, given the changes that the RPA will bring to local government. Many experienced councillors may be removed from their posts because of their role in the Assembly, and that will have an impact on how those institutions deal with all future changes and challenges. We must be aware of the level of change that is taking place in local government. Our preference is against multiple mandates, and I say that as someone who has one. However, whether I am seen to do both jobs well is largely a matter for the electorate. If it feels that I am not serving my roles well, I can be unseated. We should not become too caught up on whether people can discharge their functions. Perhaps the management of any conflicts of interest is a more important issue. Mr McFarland: The issue of multiple mandates affected the running of Committees. For instance, on a day when a Committee was meeting, we reached 4.30 pm and you could see the agitation rising round the table. The councillors who had to make it back to council meetings were busy shuffling their papers, and then suddenly, at some key point in the evidence session, half the Committee was out the door like whippets. There are important long-term issues for the Assembly to function effectively and to do good for constituents. Mr P Robinson: Every political party wants to have this issue resolved. We discussed the issue internally, and all parties want to eliminate multiple mandates. However, the Assembly has not been sufficiently stable for Members to say that they would like to give up their Westminster seats in order to be a part of it. An institutional review Committee might deal with this issue more appropriately when the Assembly is stable. Mr Murphy: Or other mechanism, I suppose. [Laughter.] We broadly support the proposal, especially in relation to council mandates. It is a conflict of time as well as a conflict of interest. However, we are obviously not as preoccupied with attending Westminster as other parties. Sinn Féin has discussed the issue and is broadly against the idea of multiple mandates, although it has a different stance on Westminster. We are quite happy to consider the matter and certainly see the logic of the proposal in relation to council, as opposed to Assembly, mandates. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Members will recall the debate on this issue in the Assembly four years ago. Councillor Close MLA made a very impassioned plea — one of the best contributions ever made in the House. There seem to be two suggestions. Mr McFarland has suggested that legislation should be introduced to prevent multiple mandates. Mr McFarland: The issue need not necessarily be resolved through legislation. In Scotland, the issue was dealt with through media pressure. It would be sensible for the parties to have a gentlemen’s agreement, perhaps. The issue logically rests with the mechanism/institutional review Committee. There is no point in asking Members to relinquish a particular job if their Assembly job is unstable and may cease in November. However, multiple mandates are generally unhealthy. Whether it is through legislation, whether everyone agrees that it is better for politics here if we do not have multiple mandates, or whether it is as a result of media pressure, some way must be found of resolving this issue in the longer term. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There appears to be a consensus to refer the issue to the mechanism/institutional review Committee. When that is up and running, in whatever form, we will refer the issue to that Committee for consideration. Is there consensus? Dr Farren: I did not hear any dissent in relation to abandoning multiple mandates in principle. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I detected a slight dissent. Dr Farren: I did not hear it; not even from the DUP. Mr P Robinson: We do not disagree in principle. The general principle is that an elected representative should not have a multiple mandate where a conflict of interest arises within that mandate. That could be the case with council and Assembly mandates in the future. However, stability is the important aspect in this issue. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The timing is the issue here, rather than the principle. Mr P Robinson: Parties will have to develop and broaden their bases. It will be in their interests to encourage other people to come forward within their systems. This issue cannot be resolved be fixing a date, in November or January, for example, by when multiple mandates should stop. Mr Campbell: There is broad consensus on the principle. It is not an identical anomaly, but there should be an overlap of council membership to allow the new councils created by the Review of Public Administration to bed in. Therefore I am not in favour of the abandonment of multiple mandates in the run-up to the shadow council elections. However, I would be in favour of it beyond that period, once the new councils have had time to bed in. Similarly, with the Assembly, I would not be in favour of the abandonment of multiple mandates within the next 12 or 18 months. In the long term, however, parties should be in favour of abandoning multiple mandates. I hope that a statutory obligation would not be required, but that parties would move towards the principle over the period of an Assembly term, for example. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Could the circle perhaps be squared by saying that further consideration should be given to whether Members should be allowed to have multiple mandates? Mr P Robinson: You could say that there is general agreement that multiple mandates should be phased out. Dr Farren: The suggestion to phase out multiple mandates could be referred to the mechanism/institutional review Committee. Not to suggest that multiple mandates should be phased out would certainly attract adverse comments. This is perhaps minor on the scale of everything else, but it is nonetheless a popular issue, and the media will latch on to it. If we have that strong commitment, and we recognise that phasing out multiple mandates is an issue, we should aim for the strongest possible consensus. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Therefore in principle, members agree that multiple mandates should be phased out. Dr Farren: Yes. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The only remaining issue is the timing of that. Mr Murphy: I pointed out that compared to the other parties, Sinn Féin does not have the difficulty of Westminster attendance. Sinn Féin’s general policy is that it is against multiple mandates. Therefore, in principle, I agree that parties should consider phasing out multiple mandates. 3.00 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): Members seem to be happy enough. There was general agreement that multiple mandates should be phased out. Do members agree also that the timing of that should be referred to the mechanisms/institutional review Committee? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is 3.00 pm. I have to rush away to an important meeting of Down District Council at 4.00 pm. [Laughter.] Mrs Foster: He is declaring another interest. Ms Lewsley: That was a declaration of interest. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I must be totally honest: it is the planning committee. Therefore, it is very important. Mr McNarry: How many houses will you pass today, Jim? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have an hour to go — Mr P Robinson: If you had told us that before, we might have taken a different view on this subject. Ms Lewsley: We might have taken a wee bit longer. The Chairman (Mr Wells): On a housekeeping issue, we will break in a couple of minutes when the tea and coffee arrives. We are going extremely well. Mr Campbell: We are? Dr Farren: Keep reminding us of that, please. Mr P Robinson: We have agreed so much. Mr McFarland: We are in danger of reaching point 5, which we referred for legal advice. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I would like to think that we will have got to the bottom of “Stability” by 4.00 pm. Mr Campbell: We will never get to the bottom of stability. [Laughter.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): If we could get to the bottom of “Stability”, that would be a natural break in proceedings, and we could pick up again next Monday. Are members content that, after our tea and coffee, we try to run through to 4.00 pm on those issues? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will have a five-minute coffee break before finishing off today’s business. The Committee was suspended at 3.02 pm. On resuming — 3.10 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): We come to the sub-heading “Number of Assembly members” and the sub-entry “Elections to the Assembly (STV)”. Again, that was a DUP issue. Mrs Foster: We believe that 108 Members is too many, and we have maintained that position for some time, especially in the light of the RPA recommendations. The matter needs to be looked at again. It is not going to be sorted out before devolution comes back again, but it should be referred to a committee on efficiency. Such a committee was envisaged in the comprehensive agreement to deal with issues such as this. We propose that an efficiency committee be set up within the Assembly. Do you wish to take comments on STV at this time? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes. Mrs Foster: We are not seeking to change the voting system. We are happy enough with it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): What do other members think about the number of Assembly Members and the voting system? Mrs Long: There are a couple of points. We have proposed a reduction in the number of Assembly Members to approximately 80. We recognise that the ratio of Members to the size of the population makes our Government unwieldy in comparison to other parts of the UK and Europe. It is certainly a higher ratio than in Dáil Éireann, for example. We are in favour of the single-transferable-vote system of proportional representation because it is the fairest system. However, the use of STV in smaller multi-member constituencies tends to create a slight imbalance towards larger parties, and particularly towards the largest party in a region. Mr P Robinson: I do not think that you said that right. Mrs Long: Yes I did. Mr P Robinson: It is not the smaller constituency — Mrs Long: It is the smaller number of members per constituency. The initial decision to return six Assembly Members from each of the 18 constituencies was taken in order to allow for a greater diversity of membership. That has not worked; it has not really achieved great diversity. It would be possible to reduce the number of Members and increase diversity at the same time by having a more reflective proportionality. We would have larger multi-member constituencies returning more Members, but a lower total. For example, you could have 12 constituencies returning between six and eight Members, which would give around 80 Assembly Members. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Any views on that interesting proposal? Dr Farren: It is a view that is being expressed at the minute. As Mrs Foster said, it is not likely that we are going to reach a resolution on it today. It may well need to be referred to the institutional review committee, or some such committee, following restoration. In our submission to the Review of Public Administration, the SDLP recognised that the public is concerned about the high number of public representatives in Northern Ireland, between the councils, the Assembly, Westminster and the European Parliament, and that there should be some cutback. Our submission suggested that there should be 90 public representatives, giving five to the existing constituencies, and that we should persist with the STV system. 3.15 pm However, there will be a significant problem in getting public representatives of high quality, and there will be a challenge in achieving the numbers that have been proposed in the RPA along with the elimination of the dual mandate for Assembly Members. Recognising that the ratio of Members to the electorate is quite low compared to many others, a smaller number of Assembly Members is recommended. There are many practical considerations impelling us to look at reducing the number of Assembly Members. Mr McFarland: It is generally agreed that there are too many MLAs, and that the number needs to be reduced. The question of how far is a matter for further discussion and would have to be referred to the relevant Assembly Committee. Mr Murphy: We are happy to look at this with other parties and see what agreement can be reached when devolution is restored. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mrs Foster proposed that an efficiency committee be set up within the Northern Ireland Assembly to consider issues such as the number of Assembly Members and that Members of the Assembly should continue to be elected by STV — but STV did not really arise as a problem. Mr McFarland: Can this be filtered off to the famous mechanism, or institutional review, Committee that will look at issues relating to structures, numbers, etc; it is the same topic. The danger of creating a committee for each area is that we end up having more chairmen, and then the question of payment for chairmen arises. If we are doing jobs for the MLAs, we are in danger of creating extra committees when they are not needed. Mr P Robinson: Do chairmen get paid? Mrs Foster: The chairmen of Ad Hoc Committees do not get paid. Mr Murphy: There is a danger of creating inefficiency committees by creating too many of them. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr McFarland, are you suggesting that we do not have an efficiency committee, but that this matter is referred to the other mechanism suggested? Mr McFarland: An efficiency committee makes lots of sense, and we support having some sort of organisation that will examine, for instance, effectiveness, efficiency, who is doing what, and how we develop and re-examining different areas. However, if we keep establishing committees for every topic that needs to be examined, we will have trouble getting Members to sit on them. An institutional review Committee — or mechanism — could examine how to better the Assembly; whether the institution needs to be changed, and which bits of it are not working properly. Regardless of what the committee is called — effectiveness and efficiency Committee or institutional review Committee — it would have the same objective. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mrs Foster, it was your proposal. Mrs Foster: Yes. We envisaged the institutional review Committee as being a Standing Committee, whereas the efficiency review Committee would be appointed to deal with issues such as the number of MLAs and the size of departmental structures, etc. I would have preferred if it had stayed where it was. Naomi made a point about larger constituencies. Members will be aware of the recommendations in the RPA concerning the size of the constituencies, but they detract from the connection that the public will have with their representatives. That is particularly important for the DUP in the west of the Province. I am not in favour of increasing the size of the constituencies. Fermanagh and South Tyrone is, I think, the second largest geographical constituency in the United Kingdom, and I cannot envisage making it any larger. Therefore we want to address that point. The points have all been made. There is public concern, and members know fine well that the ‘Belfast Telegraph’ runs articles every now and again about the 108 people who do nothing for their money. It is something on which we have consensus, and I hope that we can go ahead with it. Mr P Robinson: In the comprehensive agreement, the proposed efficiency Committee has been scaled down to a panel appointed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister to deal with efficiency matters. We will probably get general agreement somewhere between that and the more institutional issues being dealt with by the institutional review Committee. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There should be an efficiency panel in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Mr P Robinson: The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister would appoint a panel under proposals by the two Governments. They have a responsibility under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to consider the number of Departments, and so forth. They hold that rolling function, so it is simply a matter of widening it to consider additional issues. Mr McFarland: That panel should reflect the Assembly, rather than two parties appointing colleagues to examine efficiency. The UUP would not have a problem with a body being set up that is similar to a Committee and which reflects the percentages of the Assembly. However, leaving it to colleagues to identify issues that may be helpful to parties would not necessarily be healthy. Mr P Robinson: We have already agreed a principle of proportionality, have we not? Dr Farren: We have agreed a commitment to reducing the number of MLAs. Can we agree to defer the question of a mechanism until we find the most appropriate one to be established? That is a second issue. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are members agreed? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have agreed, in principle, to a reduction in the number of MLAs, and we will defer consideration on the mechanism. Do we need to raise “Elections to the Assembly (STV)”? Mr P Robinson: Yes, you said that you agreed to it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It was put down as an issue, but everyone spoke favourably on it. Are members agreed? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We move to “Standing of MLAs”, which Mr McFarland raised. Mr McFarland: I worked for some years at Westminster, where, if someone wanted to get access to a Minister, the gatekeeper was the MP: a constituent wrote to the MP, and the MP organised matters from there. Therefore the MP was of some standing — they were someone in the community. There was a strange situation in the previous Assembly in which — and perhaps it was in an effort to get us close to our constituents — we sometimes ended up with Ministers taking delegations from anyone who wrote to them. There were all sorts of people, including councillors and individuals, leading delegations on issues to see the Minister. As a result, MLAs became irrelevant, or at least not of the same standing as MPs. That was because MLAs were not the gatekeepers; they had nothing to deliver to someone who wanted to meet a Minister, because that person could write to the Minister, and the Minister would receive a delegation. We should use the same system as Westminster, where people who wish to contact a Minister write to their MP. MLAs should be important in getting access to a Minister. If councillors and the general public can access Ministers themselves, what is there for an MLA to do? The answer is: not a great deal. The standing of MLAs is important for the next time. An MLA should be a key figure in getting justice, access or changes made for constituents. At the moment, MLAs are largely irrelevant. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Does anyone have a view on that suggestion? The same applies to the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints. Members of the public cannot approach the Commissioner except through an MLA. Mr McFarland: Absolutely, that is the one thing that a MLA can do. People cannot access the Ombudsman without going through their MLA. Mr P Robinson: Where do we draw the line? Are we saying, for example, that if representatives of Belfast City Council wish to meet with the Minister with responsibility for the Department of the Environment, an MLA must sponsor them? Are there no groups of sufficient standing to merit a meeting with a Minister should they request one? As happened many times when I was the Minister for Regional Development, if trade union representatives requested a meeting, I met them, and the same applied to the Institute of Directors (IoD) or the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). I am not sure that that is appropriate in all cases, but it was for those groups. On account of the division in our society, some groups might find it difficult to be associated with a particular MLA. That would lead to a situation whereby all the MLAs for a particular area would need to be dragged along to each meeting. It would end up that Windsor Park would be needed to accommodate some of the meetings, especially if Naomi were to get her way. Mr Campbell: I want to expand that point. If, at some point in the not-too-distant future, there is a reduction in the number of MLAs, there could conceivably be a number of constituencies in which a section of the community does not feel that it is represented by any of the MLAs. That could effectively create a barrier between the Minister and a community group, or various people within a constituency, because they do not feel that they have an elected MLA, not only from a political party of their choice, but from the community of their choice. Mr McFarland: The current situation is no different: if a nationalist from east Londonderry wishes to gain access to the Home Secretary in London, he goes through Gregory, or if uncomfortable with that, through Martin McGuinness. If MLAs cannot deliver something that Joe Public could not achieve simply by writing a letter to the Minister, they are largely irrelevant. Councillors have greater access to councils than MLAs. If people want to raise issues with councils, they would normally approach their local councillors who would make the arrangements. They would be brought to the council and, if councillors agree to speak with them, that would go ahead. In the first Assembly, our experience as MLAs was that when it came to accessing Ministers, we were largely irrelevant. If the title of MLA is to mean anything, or if MLAs are to have any power as gatekeepers, we must act. Otherwise, we may as well pack it in and become super-councillors, and if people want to come to us, that is OK. They will be able to drift in to see the Minister whose time will then occupied by loads of wee groups from all over the place who want to have a word with him or her. Mrs Long: I am not sure that I understand Alan’s motivation. As an elected representative, I do not wish to see myself installed as a gatekeeper to prevent my constituents having full access to the people to whom they wish to speak. I would not be particularly eager to take on that role. It is true that councillors can sign in MLAs at their local councils and that they can request deputations. As MLAs, we have the right to sign in anyone who wants to sit in the Assembly’s public gallery. However, I do not imagine that any council would turn away an MLA who has phoned about a particular constituency issue. Therefore, I am not sure that that holds true. It is up to MLAs to justify their existence to their constituents and the electorate. When we have legislative and scrutiny functions, we must demonstrate that we discharge those well and in the interests of our constituents. We must demonstrate that we listen to what they say and that we are making representations on their behalf. Much of what our constituents seek from us will relate to our individual powers of persuasion and argument and to our understanding of the political system. They will not expect us to take on a gate-keeping role to prevent them from making a direct appeal to a Minister, which they may feel would get them further. 3.30 pm Dr Farren: I hope that it is not too indelicate to suggest that this issue arose because of difficulties the UUP had with the Ministers in office. That is a flippant remark. I did not afford individuals immediate access. However, if individuals nabbed me by the collar at a public event, or when I walked down the street, or if they got hold of my telephone number and phoned me at home, then I would engage with them insofar as I wanted to or could do. However, some delegations consisted of one person, and that person was there because of a corporate responsibility. MLAs, councillors, or both, accompanied many delegations, and I am not sure what would have achieved by being restrictive in any formal way. In practice, time is rationed anyway. It is rationed between the delegations and people you want to meet according to their needs. People should have access. MLAs were accessible to the electorate and were available on many occasions within constituencies and elsewhere in a way that people had not experienced prior to devolution, and I hope that will be retained. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I do not think that we are going to get consensus. Mr Murphy: I agree with Seán Farren. One of the successes of the Assembly was having accessibility to those who were making decisions — and that is one aspect that people miss. MLAs have a role and it is up to them to make themselves relevant in whatever role their party has given them or whatever role they can carve out for themselves. The problem that Alan McFarland refers to has not arisen as far as Sinn Féin is concerned, and it is certainly not an issue. People have roles, and they work as effectively as they can within those roles. Naomi Long referred to MLA’s being gatekeepers, and I share her concerns that there are too many gatekeepers in this society. They become apparent when you try to gain access to Ministers through the Civil Service and the NIO. I would not be comfortable with such a role in relation to my own constituency. If people have issues that they do not want me to bring forward on their behalf, then another representative can do that for them. Sinn Féin has not experienced that problem and does not see any necessity to bring in specific mechanisms to deal with it. Mr McFarland: I am not against institutions having direct access to Ministers. However, the first Assembly was made up of Members who were also MPs and councillors and therefore had access to Ministers. When Members are acting as MLAs only — and are not also MPs, councillors or anything else — what specific attributes can they deliver within that role? My understanding is that a Home Office Minister can only be accessed through an MP — as an individual — and I suspect that a Dáil Minister can only be accessed through a TD. I think it will be important to find out what MLAs can deliver after they have shed their roles as MPs and councillors. There is no consensus, and I accept that. This will be an issue as people start to divest their roles and Ministers start — [Interruption.] Mr Murphy: I do not think that that is correct in relation to the Dáil. I know of constituents who write to Dáil Ministers. Mr P Robinson: Neither is it correct in the case of the Home Office: the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Prison Officers’ Association, and all the other groups who have an interest in Home Office matters could go along there. I did not meet individuals when I was a Minister. I met representative groups, but I do not think I ever met individuals. No individual wrote to me and was invited to meet me as a result. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr McFarland, I take it that you do not want to formally move your proposal? Mr McFarland: No. This is not necessarily a problem now, but it may be a problem in the future. There are issues around it that need to be aired. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will move on to a very significant issue, an Alliance Party issue that has come up several times; the power to raise or to vary our own tax. Mr P Robinson: Do you mean to vary Members’ own tax or to vary somebody else’s tax? The Chairman (Mr Wells): It will be interesting to see. The phrase used is “tax-varying powers”. Mr McNarry, do you wish to comment on this issue? Mr McNarry: Yes. Could the Committee give an opinion on this matter to the subgroup? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Yes. You were quick to point out that we should not cut across their work. If we take decisions or do anything on this issue, it is important that the Committee let the subgroup know immediately. Naomi, what is the main thrust behind the suggestion? Mrs Long: The Alliance Party has a principled position that the Northern Ireland Assembly should have the ability — similar to the Scottish Parliament — to vary taxes within Northern Ireland to take account of its specific economic situation. If the matter is better dealt with through the subgroup, my party is happy with that. It is not concerned about where this is discussed. Mr P Robinson: There is a misunderstanding. The Scottish Parliament does not have power to vary taxes; it has power to raise its own tax. There is a great difference. If the Assembly had power to vary our own tax, we could reduce income tax, corporation tax, VAT and everything else. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is a good idea. Mr P Robinson: I do not think the Chancellor would like that. Mrs Long: Within a Northern Ireland context it would be feasible to decide that rather than have separate charges for rates, water charges and the plethora of other local taxes, they could be rationalised in such a way that the outcome would be varied. Mr P Robinson: We have complete control over the regional rate and authority over the local rate and water charging. Mr McFarland: Dr Farren, I am sure, will keep us right, but my understanding from the first Assembly examination of this issue is that the Chancellor would be delighted if the Assembly would abandon the Barnett formula and adopt its own tax-raising powers because an enormous slice would be removed from the subvention that Northern Ireland receives. That idea was examined in the first Assembly and was found to be slightly dangerous. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The subgroup is looking at corporation tax and industrial derating at the moment. This matter would be best taken by the subgroup. You were not to know when this item was listed that the subgroup would be looking at those items. Mrs Long: We raised this issue in our initial submission and at that time the agenda for the subgroup had not been finalised. This was part of our overall submission on preparation for Government. If it is now best dealt with through the subgroup we are content. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I think that is a reasonable decision. Mr McNarry: I am sure Mrs Long will be impartial when this matter arises during her time as Chairperson of the subgroup. [Laughter.] Mrs Long: As always. Dr Farren: The subgroup will report to this Committee. Therefore, this Committee will have a say if it wants to. Mr Murphy: I am content to allow members of my party on the subgroup to air views on the matter. Sinn Féin is, in general, for the maximum transfer of powers, so that would include all of these matters, but my party will let members of the subgroup spell it out in more detail. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next issue is “Stability”. I do not know if this meeting will conclude by 4.00 pm, but a series of issues has been raised, mostly by the DUP. The first is a major issue: arrangements for a fail-safe mechanism in the event of recurring terror and criminal behaviour. Does anyone wish to speak on that? Mr McNarry: We have moved remarkably quickly through this part of the agenda, and I understand that there is to be a full session the next time we meet. The issue of “Stability” cannot be properly considered in 20 minutes. I suggest that we return to it later with fresh minds. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Seán, you are happy with that. Mr P Robinson: I am quite content; we do not want to begin to discuss the topic with only 20 minutes left. Could some work be prepared for the Committee on the issue? We need to know the existing arrangements with regard to the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) reports and recommendations and the legislation as it stands. What is the responsibility of the Secretary of State or the Governments if the IMC recommends the disqualification of a party, for instance, in the event of terrorism? If the Assembly were started up because the IMC had judged that there was no ongoing paramilitary or criminal activity, and six months later the Ulster Bank was robbed — or something as outlandish as that — what mechanism would be in place to deal with that? The IMC might report that the party should be disqualified from Government for a period of time, but my understanding is that that disqualification would be subject to a decision by somebody else. The IMC can only make recommendations. If we could be apprised of the legal and factual position in the present situation, it might be worth considering how it could be strengthened. Mrs Long: Mr Chairman, I would like some clarification on that. Mr Robinson, when you mention the situation as it currently stands, do you mean during suspension, when the decision to follow through on recommendations is at the Secretary of State’s discretion; or are you referring to the Assembly’s ability to follow through on recommendations, or both? Mr P Robinson: I am assuming that the Assembly is running. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is everyone happy? I take David’s point; the Committee will not get through this issue in less than 20 minutes. Considerable progress has been made in getting through the agenda. Would everyone be content if we stop now and return to the issue later? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): One or two small issues remain. First, are members happy with the revised work programme that is in their papers, which gives the dates and the names of those who will chair the meetings? Obviously, it is a moveable feast and will depend on whether we make more or less progress than expected. However, it gives members an idea of what will be happening over the next few weeks so that they can check their diaries. Is everybody happy with that? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next meeting will be held on Wednesday 9 August at 10.00 am in room 144. It will be on policing and justice issues, and it will be an all-day meeting. Does the Committee want another all-day meeting on Monday 14 August, from 10.00 am to 4.00 pm, to try to get through this? Is everyone happy with that, even the councillors and the MPs? I take it that no one has to rush off to any other meetings? Members indicated assent. Mr P Robinson: I do not think that “happy” is the word that we would use. Adjourned at 3.45 pm |