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Regional Development Committee

Public Transport Reform

Outline Business Case (May 2009)
Comment & Context

Translink
for Regional Development Committee of NI Assembly
16th September 2009

1. Public Transport (PT) Reform – Overview

PT Reform proposes changing the current structure to one of two options (do nothing is not an option);

2. Public Transport Reform – Stated Objectives / current position

DRD stated aims of PT reform (at RDC 9 th September 2009) are

This is aligned to Translink’s current aspirations and it can be seen that the current structure delivers:

  • Integration of transport modes
  • Bus and rail services are scheduled together and complementary.
  • Passenger information is a leading edge delivery, fully integrated on line and through a call centre
  • Ticketing is increasingly integrated
  • Facilities, including park and ride sites, are fully integrated
  • Wider availability / accessibility of public transport
  • NI has a significantly broader spread of PT than equivalent areas of GB or ROI
  • greater availability will require greater funding than present;
  • PT Reform provides no additional funds,
  • More affordable public transport
  • DRD research benchmarking fares in NI shows fares ‘generally compared favourably with other operators in similar areas’
  • Higher quality services at lower cost / better value for money
  • Translink services acknowledged as among the highest quality in the UK – winner of UK Rail Business of the year
  • Customer satisfaction has risen year on year and is at a record high
  • Passenger numbers have grown 13% in the past 5 years
  • Funding of PT (per capita) in is much lower than other regions of GB (see chart below)

Total indexed expenditure on public transport

3. OBC Conclusions – Commentary / critique on proposed reformed organisational arrangements (from OBC chapter 5)

4. Conclusions

Translink is clear that there is a requirement to change current structures to be compliant with EU regulation1370 however this can be achieved by means of a direct award contract.

There is a real danger that introducing new structure may mean that available funding goes from delivering front line services to the establishment of an agency / increased bureaucracy.

Note: Translink is a public corporation, its shareholder is the minister and Translink is accountable to DRD. Translink has local management operating across the whole of NI making it part of the community and responsive to the community.

Appendix 1

Performance of Current Public transport System

1. Financing of Public Transport (ref. OBC para 2.15 onwards, page 15)

  05/06 09/10 5 yr change
Funding to Translink
     
Subsidy      
Bus (1)
5.2
4.9
-5.8%
Rail (2)
21.9
21.3
-2.7%
Concessions
17.8
29.4
65.2%
Fuel duty rebate
8.6
10.2
18.6%
Total
53.5 65.8 23.0%
       
Funding to other operators (3)
3 7.4 146.7%
Total
56.5 73.2 29.6%
Source - appendix 2
Definitions

(1) Subsidy for bus services includes transport programme for people for disabilities, rural transport fund, route revenue support (for socially necessary services) and partial funding of employer pension contributions

(2) Subsidy to rail is PSO (public service obligation) including partial funding of employer pension contributions

(3) Funding to other operators also includes concessions, fuel duty rebate, transport programmes for people for disabilities and rural transport fund


Subsidy per rail 04/05 - 08/09

2. Capital Funding of Public Transport

3. Public Transport Usage (OBC para 2.20 onwards, page 17)

Journeys per 000 of population

Bus and rail passengers

4. Fares (from OBC para 2.22, page 19)

5. Customer satisfaction and punctuality

Bus and rail customer satisfaction

On Time performance

6. Home to school transport (OBC para 2.24, page 20)

Appendix 3

Gross cost contracts

In a gross cost contract the tendering authority agrees to pay an operator a specified sum to provide the specified service for a specified period. Revenue from fares is passed to the tendering authority, which bears the ‘revenue risk’. The service provider generally carries the ‘cost risk’, though there may be provisions for cost increases to be passed through, such as elements of wage or fuel costs. Generally the tendering authority will take responsibility for working out routes, and may also specify the vehicles to be used.

Because the operator has no direct commercial relationship with passengers it is common for the tendering authority to provide a system of bonuses and penalties to give operators a financial incentive to provide the desired quality of service.

Net cost contracts

In a net cost contract the operator takes on both the revenue risk and the cost risk. It keeps the revenues from fares, and the tendering authority provides a contribution in the form of additional contracted income. This offsets obligations that the tendering authority may have to ensure the provision of a public transport service, or to meet social objectives where the cost of providing such a service would not be commercially viable if it depended solely on the fare income that it could achieve.

On especially popular and important services it may be possible of the tendering authority to reap a premium payment from the operator running these routes rather than providing financial support.

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